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j4uthonzed Translation. 








Trannlated from the CSfrman fn/ 






' ^ ' ' // LIST OF MAPS. 

' (.ieneral Map of Uie moRt imporUnt marches of the Germao Annies 

until the araiiitice 1 

^Map of the Mtrategical formation at the end of July 15 

> Map of the Fight at WciHsenburg and of the Battle of Woerth ... 53 

Map of the Fight at Saarbriicken 71 

Map ».f the Batfle of Courcelles . . . , 93 

(lenerul Map of the movements on the 15th and IGth of August. Marches 

t() tite batUe-Aelds of Vionville and Gravelotte 99 

Map of the Battle of Gravelotte. I. Advance of the German Annies . 119 

Map of the Battle of Gravelotte. II. After the decision 133 

Map of the Battle of Sedan. I. Adrance of the Germans and com- 

in(>nceinent of the engagement 165 

Map of tin' Huttle of S«Mlan. II. Moment of the Kmperor'« surreinler . 173 

' Map of lh«' ln\<'stnu>iit of Met/, on the 3nl of September .... \\H\ 

Map of tln' Hattle of Noisseville )H)'t 

Map r>f the Siege of Strasbiirg 2'lii 

- Map I of ruris. (leneral map 257 

Map 11 of I*ttris. front 315 

Map III of VarU. front 3(»7 

Map IV of TurH. North front 2^7 

Map of tin* Opcrutions of the Loire Army 3*23 

Map of tlir Operation.** of the Northern Army 351 

Map <»1 tlir <^outli-«'uitcrn tliratrc of war ... . 307 

Map of till* Sir;;«- of H.lfort . . . . 3S1 




Iiitruilurtinii 7-14 

FIRST ciiai»ti:k. 


riir straU'cical diitpoMtiuii i;)_51 

War declared airaintt PrtMsia p. Ki. Oitlrr vf battlr of tlio Frrncli Army p. *:. - 

Order of battle uf the Gerniau Arinit>« p. ii. — Small Huht* at Uiv end tif July p. V* 


Tin* foiHM'niratrd <)lTni:<^ivf> itiovoiiKMit ol" tlio (ioriuaii Ariiiica in thr ln-- 

.niiniii^ of Au;;ii!<t 1H70 . . . .">*J 7h 

Tlip ftirfat at WeUscnburtf on tlir 4tli uf Aiifriii>t p. .jI. - The battlt* uf Wuvrlh uii 
th<* i>th of August p. b6. — The flRlit at 8aarbrQckeu (Kiwlcheiu) uu the titb uf 
Auffoet p. 71. 


riiiKi) cnArTKK. 

I'hi- iiuotiiiciit of' StrniilMir;; aii«l thr lir»t hnttli' near Mcu (('oiiri-cll*'.-) 7*.l '.»M 

I li«* rftr#at of the Fmich corps p. 79. The a«lTanci' of tlii* (H-rman Armte« 

p. ?*&. — The investment of 8tra«bur|f p. h7. — The battle uf Cuarvelli's (Hurny) 
• •n the llth uf August p. 9i. 

1 hi- I'itttlc of Vioiivillc (Mnrh lu Tour) on thr li'itli of Au^uM . W 117 

'f'fif bftttlr of (fravclottr on tlu> IXtli of Au;;uAt UH \\'» 


Thi ' npiliilalion of Spilnn \ \'\ 177 

Ma<- Malion's undertakinK up"n Mrtx p. 117. The fiKht at Muh4iii-> on llin .'7th «>( 
Anirast p. IbO. - Th) Aght at Nouart ou the JUth of Autfunt p i:>( Tie 

rngageaeat at Reaumnnt on the 30lh uf August p. \hb. — Thi- liatllr of hi dan tm 
the 1st and Jod of Bepteniber p. 166. 



Thr niiliUry aituation of Franri" after tlic < at:ij«(r<t|ihr n\ Siihui lf<l lO.** 


The investment of Mets IM— IM 

BaiUe of MoiiMTllto ou Iht im of Angul ud Um Itt of Scptombw p. Mi. — 
Atlaoks upon Ksawicf '• Oifiiton on Um ind ud 7Ui of Oelobor p. ttt. 



Siege operations 

The oonquMl of tlio fortnu of SteMbarg p. tt6» of Seblottsladt p. fSt. of Xm- 
BratMoh wmd Fort Mortlor p. t40. of Pfalsborg p. tit . of ThioavUto p. SM, 
of M onlmMjr P* !<•* of Loagwy P> S4B. of Mteitett p. t48, of Boom ». M». 
of Tool p. tM. of SoiMOBS p. tSl, tf Vordan p. t6S, of Ia Whn p. tM, or FisoMM 

p. 266. 


The Siege of P«rU 867— iii 

The fortifloatioBt of PMia p. tftS. ~ Tho iBToefaMat Im tlio moBtli of HwtSMbst 
p. 274. ^ Oidtrof boltltofUMPaiitfauianojofdof!uMop.tT8.— 8h«U flflili 
daring tho iaTeotmont of Puis p. 286. ~ Tbs ■ortlo flglili Is Oo l o h s r p. Mt. —> 
The eoxlie flfliU la Movsaiboff p. 100. — TIm eortlo flails in DsosMhsr p. lOt. «- 
The oombst tovnd Brio sad ChaaipicBj p. SOS. — Boctfo oa Iho tlstof llsisabst 
p. SOS. — The bofiaaiag of tho artillerj attaok. Bombavdaeat of Mont 4vite 

» * p. 810. " Tho bombardaioat p. Sll. — Bortio oa tho ISth of Jaaoaij p. lit. — 

The analaHoo asfoHatloas p. tiO. 



The Attempts for the relief of Paris 

\\ 1. The operations of the Loire Army 8SS— S51 

Ocoupailon of Ocliaiu by General Ton der Tann p. 326. — Ori<*ane is re-taken by 
the Frenob p. 826. — Oambetta's organisatione iu NoTcmber 1870 p. Si?. — The 
Grand liuke of Meoklenbarg-Schwerin's operations from the 9th of Norember to 
tlie 1st of December p. 820. — Encounter of the French Loire army with Prince 
Frederick Charles's army p. 8Si. — Fights at Ladon/Maisi6res and Bois common 
on the nth of November p. 884. — Engagement at Beaune la Bolande on the 2SUi 
of NoTcmber p. 886. — Battle of OrK^ans on the 2nd to the 4ih of Deoember 
p. 837. — Porsait and obserration of the divided French army p. 841. — Advaooe 
upon Le Mans p. 844. — The crisis at Le Mans p. 348. 

11. The operations of the Northern Army 351 — liM 

Battle of Amiens on the 27th of KoTcmber p. 868. — Advance upon Rouen p. 866. — 
General Faidherbe*s offensiTC p. 367. — Battle oa the Ilallue on the 28rd of De- 
cember p. 869. — Combats at Bapaame on the 2nd and 8rd of January p. 862. — 
Battle of Bt. (juentin on the 19th of January p. 8C4. — 


The »>iK'ration!» of the South-Koiitern Army and the fall of Heifort 'MM — 4<H» 

General tou Werder's advauce iu October p. 3ttb. Fiffht ou the Oignon p. 371. -- 
March U|>uu Gray !>. 372. — Occupatiun of Dijou p. 374. - (teucral tuu Werder's 
advance upon Auxonuo and Dijon in Novoinbcr p. 37&. — The fiftht at Nnits 
p. 374. -- The iuvustmunt aud bombardment of the fortress of Helfort p. 3M. — 
Bonrbaki's approacli p. 3h6. - Tho battle of Relfort on the l&th, 16th and 17ih of 
January p. 'ibH. — Mautouffcl's arrival and Itourbaki's retreat iuto Switserland 
p. 393. — Tho fall of Belfort p. 399. 

C!oiiclu&ion. The euiiveiitioiid of Vcrauilies and Helfort 401 — 409 

Calender of the eani|>ai};n , . 410—414 

Index 416—420 






The great war of 1870 and 1871 was carried on between two 
natioDB wliotte warlike renown was equal whilst it stood far above 
that of any other nation. This war in which proud France bowed her 
head to the German conqueror, in all its principal phases offer, 
examples of the art of war which indicate a new epoch, and in com- 
plete variety give new laws to the generals for new and hitherto 
unlieard of problems. 

It is tme that (Germany is not indebted to her arms alone for 
victory, nor solely to the genius of her generals and the ability of 
her officers and soldiers. These grounds of victory which are at once 
apparent to the eye of the observer, are only tlie evidences and effects 
of higher laws , in the fulfilment of which nations rise and fall in the 
ocean of straggling humanity. Moral force decided this conflict for 
(fcrmany. Victory resulted from the application of the strength of a 
whole nation, which rose superior to its foe in earnest morality 
and high intelligence , and borst the narrow limits of the false and 
obsolete statesmanaliip of its enemies both abroad and at home, as 
a giant breaks the chains witli which dwarfs encompassed him whihit 
be slept. 

Yet manrels enoogh are to be found in glancing at the external 
phases of this development of noblest powers, and in following the 
victorious advance of the German army upon the enemy's territory. 

Uaviag the same object of operations in view as in earlier wan 
with Praaoe, namely the complete overthrow of the enemy in Ids 
capital Paris, (German generalship has accompliHhed feats in tliis war, 


with forces eemented in the Bame nuuraer as formeriyy which have 
never been approximately reached in any previona war, both aa re- 
gards the mass of the troops and their provisioning, aa well aa in their 
employment in the greatest combined operations. The capture of the 
whole army which France had formed in the beginning of the campaign 
for the invasion of Oermanyy together with the reserves called ont after 
tlie first great defeats, is a wonderful fact, nnparalleled in the history 
of wars. The single results also, each considered separately, the 
investment and conquest of the Fortress of Paris, a city within 
wliose walls were half a million of men bearing arms, whilst three large 
armies were in movement for her relief; the capture of one French 
army exceeding a hundred thousand men in strength, with the head of 
the state himself in their midst, through the capitulation of Sedan; 
tlie surrounding, encloBing and capture of another army of two 
hundred thousand men, the spedal corps d*^lites of France, in the 
fortress of Meti; the defeat of an army of threefold overpowering 
ifiimbcrs in the three days battle at Belfort, and its being driven 
on to the neutral ground of Switaeriand, are events of war such as 
absolutely never occurred before. 

These incomparable successes must be regarded, in general, as the 
results of ."i military science which understood how to take int4) account 
the improved means of transport, the altered army organixatirm and 
the arms of precision, new fact^irs which the a4lversary was as yet 
unable to appreciate; of a military art whicli knew how to mobilise 
with the greatest rapidity armies of nnparalleled magnitude, pr<»vided 
with weapons brought to great perfection, and to move them according 
to new principles of strategy and tactics, whilst the adversary, it is 
true, also iMisKessed larji^e armies, yet did not understand their or^an- 
izjition, and (^mploycnl them a(*cordin^ to ancient rules. 

Siuc>4^ the rapid a<lvances in scit^nce exereise their intiuence upon 
military matters, so that new and more perfect fire arms an* pn>vided 
every ten years, it is the constant endeavour of army-leaders to adapt 
their tactics Xo this te<*hnioal prop*t*ss in the vari4Uis kinds (»f wea|H>ns, 
and t(» make such changes as their new claims demand. This can tmly 
be successfully done by the earnest persevc»ring endeavcMirs of 
intelligent and discerning men. It is a very lab(»rious and ditlKcult 

When this earnestness and judgment are wanting, the inclination 
is to trust to the weapon alone as an efficacious lever of victory; 
endeavours are made to employ arms of a particularly deadly and 
perfect kind, the spirit is neglected and the machine is confided in. 

Thus it was with France. Possessing a superior infantry rifle 
and a description of gun, not in use in the German army, the 
FVench believed victory to bo certain, as, from a superficial judgment 
of the Prussian victories in 1866, they had attributed their success to 
the needle gun alone. They consequently practised the single tactical 
formations which most enhanced the efficacy of their fire arms, for 
example, the fighting of the infantry from shelter trenches, but the 
general character of their tactics remained upon the old system. No 
one who has read the French regulations for the use of the Mitrailleuse 
and the report of the commission upon the trial of the (-hassepot rifle, 
can avoid the conviction that the French actually grounded their con- 
fidence in victory for the greatest part, in the superiority of their 

A strange delusion! 

Tlien again Stratefjy is a science, which always progresses and 
takt'A account of the changed laws of arms of modern times in the 
same way as she employs the new means of c^immunication, the 
railway and the telegraph, for their corresponding ends. The 
universal obligation of arms, whilst considerably increasing the 
strength of the army, alters the rules of strategy. 

Armies of half a million of men can no longer be moved upon the 
principles which held good for those of a hundred thousand. 

France, as well as Germany possessed an enormously large army, 
but she did not understand how to make these masses flexible, to 
unite them upon the decisive points, or to throw them quickly from 
one line on to another. 

The German leaders possessed this skill. They understood, in 
the first place, how to make use of the numerous lines of railway 
which lead to the frontier, simultaneously and without confusion, in 
such a manner that masses of troops were enabled to form up 
againat the enemy with astonishing rapidity, np4m points which had 
been previously decided upon. Then in the whole further course of 
the war, ttanka to the capability of the officers and to the superb 



discipline I ihoy understood how to make judicious use of so many 
roads and ways nmning parallcli that armies of a hundred tiioasand 
men were moved forward, united and divided, with the rapidity of 
small divisions. 


The Prussian staff has called mio life an entirely nmv 

The different armies march in such connection with one another 
that their heads form a single strategical front. During the advance 
so many roads near one another are made use of, by which the 
columns can move forward level in height, that the quickest develop- 
ment and concentration to the front can take place at the moment of 
collision with the enemy. Thus the enemy who perhaps hoped to 
overthrow a dismembered army or to break through its line, imme- 
diately finds himself kept back by the ranks quickly deployed in his 
front and energetically supported, and he is entangled and surrounded 
as if ensnared in the meshes of a net which is drawn together rotind 
liini. This is the only explanation for the enormous number of 
prisoners made by the German armies. It is a phenomenon which 
has occurred in no previous war. The plan of a concentrated attack, 
of outtlanking and of surrounding, predominatert in all the battles 
as well as in all operations which have a battle lor their aim, 
and has produced more brilliant results tiian any other previous 

The beginning of the war offers a striking example of this strate<]:y, 
whilst ;it the same time it throws a clear light \\\M}\\ th(* defects (»f 
French generalship. 

Th(» German operations at the commencement of the cam))aign 
consisted in a convvntrated stratviiival attack upon the whole of th«' 
enemy's position. 

A plan which aims, at once, :it surrounding ami cnishiii;r the 
enemy in front and<»n both tiaiiks, can only be carried ont with a pros 
jKH't of success by an army numerically superior and under a Direc- 
tion which is secure of the most precise execution of its complicated 

In earlier wars similar plans have frequently been propose<l but 
havi* never been carrii'd out so effrctiially. 

A plan of this kind can only succeed with completely drilled 


and diflcipliDed troops, under distingnished leaders. This has clearly 
been made evident in history. The frequent failure of the concen- 
trated attack had even led to the opinion, that operations such 
&A Prussia undertook in 1866 and even in the last campaign were 
entirely faulty. 

It is true that, generally, in a concentrated attack the danger 
for the assailant is great, the moment that any part of the army 
machinery fails. The different bodies of troops advance upon lines 
of operation which converge, but only meet upon the enemy's 
territory, consequently at a point the possession of which must first 
be obtained. The danger is imminent, lest the enemy with concen- 
trated forces should defeat these bodies one after another by attacking 
them in detail. 

Prussian generalship however succeeded in holding together in 
one hand all the threads of the numerous members. 

There was always a single direction in chief. 

With this idea of a concentrated attack, it knew how to combine 
and carry out a tactic, which at the same time secures to itself all 
advantages and avoids all disadvantages, which is able to bring into 
full effect all the superiority of the means of communication of pro- 
gressing modern times, above all the telegraph, and fire arms brought 
to the highest degree of perfection. 

.'/ comparison of the different battles with the strategical 
operations as a whole, clearly shows how greatly this idea of the 
concentrated attack lies at the foundation of the whole Prussian 
war system. In the same way that armies advance surrounding 
and closing in towards the enemy s forces, so do regiments and 
battalions march upon single positions in the battle^ out-flanking 
and enclosing them. Tactics and strategy come from the same 

The final aim of the strategical movements has, also, frequently 
been the object of the concentrated strategical attack, whihst at the 
same time the final aim was the object of the concentrated tactical 
attack. This was the case in the battle of KdniggrHtz. 

On the other hand the campaign of 1870 took another form at 
the commencement. 

The FroBch army was divided into corps, each of which took np 


independently, an excellent taetical poeitiony withont perceptible eon- 
nectiony and withont eseentiml mntaal Hnpporty forming altogether a 
Htratogical line, still not having a disposition in common^ no oppor- 
tunity was offered for a general engagement. 

The single direction was wanting . The corps gave battle 
independently by standing in the way of, or throwing themselves 
upon the German armies which wore pressing forward in pursuance of 
a previously determined lino of operation. 

They were oonqneredy completely broken up, destroyed and taken 

In contrast with German leadership^ the French generals still did 
homage to obsolete traditions, to which the name of Napoleon I. 
imparted sacred lustre. Instead of the well grounded military instruc- 
tion which gave a secure foundation to the original plans of the 
German leaders, tlie French, for the most part, only possessed a mili- 
tary routine, above whicli they were never capable of raising them- 
selves, being entangled in the fatal illusion of their own absolute 
superiority. The French had fought against the Chinese, the Kabyles 
and the Mexicans, for which no particular art of war was necessary ; 
here they had conquered by tactical routine and the bnivery of 
the soldiers as well as through superior arms. They had further 
triumphed over the Russians and Austrians. Here also their superior 
tactics and the impetuosity of the troops were the grounds of victory^ 
wliibit their faulty strategy in the Crimea and Upper Itiily had 
well merited such defeats as Prussian generalship prepared for them 
at last. The strategy of the Russians and Austrians was however 
still more deplorable than that of the French. 

In order to pve j;i*eator Ireedom of action ti> the in<lividual corps 
leaders, a system was current in th<^ French army which left each 
corps to follow a particular stratofry for itsi-lf, that should, however, 
correspond with the general plan. This systi*ni had already home 
evil fruit in the (Viniea and Tpper Italy, irndertakin^s such as Mac 
Mahon s tlank march from Chahtns to Sedan, and exhibitions such as 
the splitting up of the Army in the bt*<;innin^ of Auj^ust lH7n were 
nothing new in French p*neralship. Similar things had happened 
in 1H51) and as jrreat follies had also taken place in l^r>i. In both 
wars although the French con(|uered, a great want of unanimity was 


exhibited in military action; however, since victories had been won 
in former wars in spite of faulty generalship, tliis generalship was 
estimated as being of the highest genius, and its maxims were 
established in the heads of French strategists as approved principles. 
The generals who had commanded in the Crimea and Upper Italy, 
in Mexico and Algeria were esteemed distinguished commanders, and 
in 1870 the Emperor committed to them, in full confidence, a power 
of authority which he ought to have kept in his own hands if he 
had possessed the capacity for it. When these generals now saw an 
enemy opposed to them who did not remain inactive and waiting for 
them, but who unexpectedly attacked them, they fell into the greatest 
embarrassment and each caring for himself, left one another in the lurch. 

Thus, the superiority of the German art o/ war was established 
over that of the French. 

But the quality of the materials which formed the armies is 
another important factor, the military capacity of the officers and 
men, as well as tiic moral qualities of the private soldiers. 

The Germans have gained many victories by understanding how 
to collect superior forces upon critical iioints, others they have won 
with equal forces through skill and bravery, and in is^dated cases 
when they have been inferior in numbers, by the tenacity and courage 
of the troops alone. They have proved themselves superior to the 
French, batUilion against battalion, squadron against s<|uadron, battery 
against battery. 

At the same time, the arms of the French infantry were superior 
to those of the Germans. 

There can however be no doubt, that as the German officer stood 
above the French officer in education and military capacity, so the 
German soldier was also superior to the French soldier, and for the 
following reasons : 

The motive powers in the French army were chiefly ambition, 
vanity and avarice. These ((ualities are only rcstained with difficulty 
by discipline, and in victory only by good fortune. 

In the African regiments this army had received elements 
which had a destructive influence upon its spirit. The lic4*nse 
which it was necessary to allow these troops of low moral stand- 
ing, whilit endeavouring to gloss over their licentiousness by flattery 


about their warlike fierceness , was a contagions example for all 


The motive powers in the German army were chiefly a high sense 
of duty, love for the fatheriand and exasperation. 

The discipline in the German army was at the highest pitch that 
c^nn^ in general^ be reached; the faculty of obedience is especially a 
(lerman quality. 

The French army was in a high degree warlike, the German 
army as far as the men were concerned , peace loWng; but this 
lov('. of peace did not injure their courage in the smallest degree. In 
general of a prevailing melancholy temperament, the German warrior 
much more frequently went into action with his thoughts upon 
death, tlian did the French who was of a prevailing sanguinary 
teiiip<rainent; but just because he Imd made himself familiar with the 
king of terrors in his thoughts, nothing was able to shake him. He 
had made up his mind to conquer or to die, he carried out his reso- 
lution with the greatest integrity — his bearing when advancing to 
the assault, terrified the French. 

Tlierc is still an element in the German army which is not 
to be found in the Fi-cnch. This is the number of highly educati'd 
men who cjirry the riiie. Thes(i men transportrd into a position 
which rouses all the faculties, and inc4)rporated in all parts of the 
tro<4)s, exhibit warrior qualifications, which being deveh^pod in theni 
by culture, might still never have been drawn out in peace rela 
tions, an<l a light of intelligcMiee spreadiufc from them as it were, 
illuminates a wide circle of tii(»ir less cultivated comrades and is 
eai>al)lc of ennobling the spirit of the whole army. 

Thus a iii^rlily educated uation, trained for many years iu p*avc 
disi'ipliuc nud tin* uiosl cli'vatfd scieuccs stinws tlir slowly rijx'ncd 
fruits of an liarumniuus ;;rowtli by the results also of a dcveloj)Uient 
«>f its warlike power. 



frontier fortresses nor the aceamiilation of garrisoM in the threatened 
provinces, nor m standing camp. Except at the fortresses of 
Cologne, Coblenti and Ifayonce, the Pmssian Rhine provinces lay 
open to the enemy, and a large portion of the army had to be 
broiiglit a long distance from the eastern provinces, to tho threat- 
ened frontier. 

If France, as she had reckoned on, had only had the North 
German Confederation opposed to her, probably the occupation of 
the left Rhine territoiy by the French army would have formed the 
commencement of the war. 

The condact of the South German States first gave the war an 
unfavourable turn for France. Surprised by the adhesion of these 
countries to the alliance with the Confederation, the French Govern- 
meat found itself compelled to change its war plans, and even apart 
from political grounds, this change in the military situation explains 
in a great measure, the delay of action. 

The theatre of war extended along the whole frontier from Saar- 
gemttnd to Httningen, and it must have been the consideration of an 
attack from Baden or from the Bavarian Palatinate, wliich paralyzed 
the advtince of tlie French army into Khinish PruBsia. 

in order to compensate for tlie numerical Buporiority of the 
German armies opposed to the Emperor Napoleon, which the con- 
duct of the southern states now made still more striking, the French 
Dir<T.tion conceived the idea of passing (quickly over the Rhine in order 
to hinder the junction of the North and South German Armies, and in 
the hope of gaining allies among the neutral states, through the 
impresHion produced by a first success. 

In conf«»rmity with this iil«':i the French active forces were formed 
lip in throe large bodies, disposed in such u manner that the enemy 
rthoiiUl be kept in i»^norance as to tiieir destination. At Metz ir>o,(U)0 
men were to be concentrated, loO^ooo :it Strashurj;, and 5o,(HK) in 
the vamp of ('hulons. This arranf^ement pive scope l\)r the conji»ct«re 
that an att;ick would be made either a<;ainst the Rhine provinces or 
against Baden. 

AtHer the concentration was coniph*ted , the Fjnperor Napole<m 
would unite the Metz and Strnsbur^ armies and cross the Rhine at 
Maxau with an army of 2r>o,(KK» men, leaving Kastatt on his right 


and Gennersheim on hiB left, and thrust himself between the North 
German Confederation and the Southern States. 

Meanwhile the army of ChMons was to direct its march upon Metz 
in ordef to cover the rear of the invading army and to watch the 
north-western frontier ; at the same time a fleet with an army to effect 
a landing, would threaten the Prussian coasts from the North-Sea and 
the Baltic, and retain there a portion of the North German army. 

It will not be uninteresting to mention the grounds given by the 
Emperor himself for the failure of these plans, in his publication 
''Des causes qui out ameu(3 la capitulation de S<^an'\ 

He here says : 

''This plan had not a chance of succeeding, unless the enemy 
C4)ald be outstripped in quickness. For this object, not only must 
the required number of soldiers be assembled at fixed ])oints 
in a few days, but also the essential accessories, such as waggons, 
train, artillery parks, pontoons, gunboats to protect tiie passage of 
the Rhine, and finally tiie indispensable provisioning with biscuit for 
the 8npp<»rt of a numerous army marching in an united body. 

"The Emperor flattered liimsolf that these results could be 
attained, and this was his eiTor ; for like every one else he cherished 
the illnaion that a concentration of so many men , horses and war 
material could take place by the railways with the nec>essary order 
and precision although it had not all been regulated by a oiiretul 
administration long beforehand. 

''The chief cause of our retardation lay in the faults of our mili- 
tary orgauiuition , as it had existed for flfty years, and which 
showed themselves from the first moment. Instead of having army 
corps always organized as in Prussia, which are recmited in tme 
province and possess the necessary material and accessoric^s upon 
the spot, the troops forming the army of France are scattered over 
the whole territory, whilst the material is accumulated in a few cities, 
and stored in magazines. 

''If is required to form an active division upon some point of 
the frontier, the artillery usually ex>mes from a far distant place, the 
military train and ambulances from Paris and Vernon, almost the 
wIm>Ic of the pn)visioiiing from the capital, and tlie soldiers of the 
reserve from all parts of France. The railroads art* insufficient to 



transport the* men ^ the hones and the nuiterialy oonfluion every- 
where arises y and the railway stations are. often fnll of objeeti, 
whose natare and destination are unknown. 

''In 1860 the Emperor had decided that the recruits of the seeond 
category of the contingent should be exorcised at the depots of their 
departments^ in order in time of war to be allotted to the regiments 
taking the field. This disposition combined the advantages of the 
Prussian system with those of tlie French. It was only necessary 
for the reserves to repair from their villages to the chief towns of 
their departments where they could be collected^ equipped in a short 
time and enrolled in the different regiments. 

''Unfortunately this system was modified by the war ministry 
in IHGGy and from the first moment of his levy each soldier was 
told off to a certain regiment. By this plan the reserve troops^ 
when called to arms in 1870| had frequently to reach their regiments 
in the most complicated manner. For example those in Strasburg 
and wliose regiments belonged to Alsace, instead of assembling in 
the Strasburg depots, were sent to their respective depots, perhaps 
in the south of France, or even in Algeria, and had to return again 
from there to Alsace in order to be incorporated in their regiments. 

"it will be understood wlmt delay such an organization must 
4>cca8ion in collecting the reserve troops. 

"The same thing occurred in the camp equipage of the men and 
officers, as well as in the ambulance waggons. 

"Instead of being distributed in the depots in the centre of each 
department, they were stored up in a small number of magaziiiCH, 
and by this means a large number of reserve troops cjime to their 
re;rini<'nts very impertVctly eijuipped, without knapsiicks, tentes-ahri, 
disJM'i*, Hasks, conking kettles, all objects of absolute necessity. 

"To tliese faults must be added the small initiative committed Ut 
the ;::(*nei'ais who C(»mmaud(>d the departments an<l to the intcudants. 
A luiiiistcrial order was necessary for the smallest article. For examph», 
it was iinpossihle to givt» the oflicers what indispensable, or even 
the necej<sary arms to the soldiers withiuit an order from Paris. 

."This routine t»f administration d«*privi'd the generals of all that 
activity and foresight which sometimes redeem the faults of or- 


''We will therefore hasten to say that in order to place an army 
together, the intelligence of individuals most not be so much depended 
on, as a solid organization which sets in motion a simple machine 
capable of working with regularity in war, because it has been 
aeenstomed to work with regularity in peace." 

Thos spoke the Emperor Napoleon. 

The weaknesses which have been disclosed in this representation 
may be considered as really proved by what the German troops saw 
and beard when in France, and especially by a great number of docu- 
ments found in the Chateau of St. Cloud, which bear witness to the 
profligate confusion and unprepared state of the French army, and 
famish a wonderful illustration of the fact, that the French provoked 
the war, in the opinion that they hail brought their preparations to the 
highest point of completion. 

Bat Bopposing that these weaknesses had not existed, that the 
Emperor Napoleon had even been able to mobilise his whole army 
as quickly as Germany, the attempt to throw it between North and 
•Sooth Germany would have been a ruinous imprudenoxf. The army 
<if the North German Confederation alone might luive been able 
to cause m deplorable fate for the invading French army. 

That Napoleon actually wanted to carry on an offensive war, is 
fnlly proved by the circumstance that ma])s of Germany only, were 
diatribnted throngh his army. 

In the faee however of manifest impossibilities, he gave up all 
bold plana very soon after the declaration of war. 

Thus a delay arose in forming up the French army, which gra- 
daally broagfat the intended offensive into a defensive dispositi(ni. 

For on the German side, the mobilization of the immense forces 
t«M»k place with anparalleleil celerity and circumspection, and in the 
-tpaee of foarteen days overtook the long preparations of the French. 

In consideration of the supposed French plans, the (piestion arose 
for the* German Direction whether it would be m(»re a<lvantageous in 
the first instance, to keep back a French invasion with stationary 
troops, or whether a concerted moremeni should be made at the 
rink <if abandoning the frontier pn)vinces. 

The latter coarse was decided upon. The garrisons stationed 
iieareai to the frontier only, were to form a frontier cordon in order to 


deceive the enemy, whibt the mobiliittioii wai being pieMed forward 
in the interfor of the oonntiy^ with that steadineei whieh a laati^g 
army direetion alone renders poMible. 

Brilliant generalahip and the sacrifice of weak detachments, whieh 
tlio safety of the frontier required, made the execution of this bold 
idea possible. From the moment of the declaration of war to the 
storming of Weissenburg, a period of seventeen days, a few isolated 
regiments held the whole of the French army in check, by raising 
the belief that there were already considerable corps on the frontier, 
and so made the French imagine that the whole of the military 
preparations were completed. 

The sirategicat formalion of the French army immediately 
after the declaration of war, which only imperfectly corresponded with 
the above quoted idea of the three bodies, was as follows : 

lit CorpSf Commandant^ Marshal Mae Mahon, head-quarters 
Strasburg. The railway lines from Lyons, Epinal and Nancy eoa- 
ducted the troops to this place. 

The bth Corpi^ Commandanty General de Failli/y composed 
of four Infantry and one Cavalry Divisions, head-quarters Bitsch, joined 
tlie left wing of the 1st Corps. This corps had no line of railway to 
itself but must base its operations towanls the rear either upon the 
line already named, or on tliat from Metz and Thionville. The front 
was directed towards the railway from Kaiserslautern to Zweibrtickcn, 
and the line from Landau to llastatt. The left wing joined the 2nd 
Corps, Commandant, General Frossardj head-quarters St. Avoid. 
This village lies to the north of the railway between Mftz ami Saar- 
briiekcn, only a few miles from the Prussian towns Lauter and Karls- 
brunn to the south of Saarluuis; here there is an iin])ort;int juneti«ui 
of roads whieh permits of operations being carried on towanls Saar- 
brih'ken and Saarlouis, or towards IJitseh and Strasburg. 

The 3rd Corps ^ Commandant ^ Marshal Bazaine^ was basinl 
upon Metz and threatened the f(»rtress of 8:uirlouis, by the high n»ads 
through lioulay and Houzonvillc. 

The \lh Corps, General LadmirauU , forming the \v{\ wing, 
rested u[hmi Thionville, and eould advance by two roads into \\\i*. 


Moselle country. One towards tlic iioi-th, heading by Sierk to Saar- 
burg and Trier, the other through Bouzouville to Saarlouis by the 
road joining that from Metz. 

CanroherVs Corj/s at Chilloiis, fW/./- Douuy's at BcU'ort and 
the Imperial Guard under Bourbaki in and about Nancy, formed 
the second line. 

The French army was therefore extended upon a line 20 miles 
in length (72 English miles) threatening South Germany with its right 
wing at Strasburg, the Prussian Saar with it« left wing at Thion- 
%'ille and Sierk, and the Bavarian Rhhie Palatinate with its centre 
at Bitsch, whilst the Guards, Canrobert's and Douay's Corps formed 
the reserve. 

During the last few days before hostilities began, a change was 
made in this original formation, on account of tlie concentrati(m of 
considerable (jierman forces in the Khine Palatinate and in the s<mtheni 
part of the Prussian Rhine province, which made Napoleon appre- 
hensive that his long line might be broken through. Marshal Mac 
Mahon was ordered to draw nearer to the main army and to march 
towards the neighbourhood of Bitsch. This retrograde movement in 
the defensive was, already, the surrender of all the earlier offensive 
plans against South Germany and the Khine, and the French, con- 
nequently, now entrenched themselves in great haste in all their p<»si- 
tions. Mac Mahon pushed forward Abel I)ouay*s Division towanls the 
Laater, to occupy Weissenburg for the purpose of covering his intended 
flank march. 


al the bcgiiiniiig of the war. 

C< ni of i : J 

! }1 A : JO 

J — 1 

— < ii< n >f 

Of A 
— 04 of 

of U 
— C 

eror Ncgpokon III. — Chief of th« 

— Depaty chief of the Staff: Qenerai 

of the Staff: General of DlTielott 

neert: General of DiTWon Soleitti. 

: General of Dimion CoffmUnB iB 


General of Division Bowrboki, Chief of the' Staff, General Daavergne. 


1st Inf. Dir. 
General of Division 

1st Brig. Gen. Brincourt. 

Jagcr Battalion.— Ist and 
2nd Voltigeur R. 


2nd Brig. Gen. Garnier. 

3rd and 4th Voltigear R. 

2nd Inf. Div. 
General of Division 

Ist Brig. Gen. Janingros. 

Zouave R. — Ist Grena- 
dier R. 


2nd Brig. Gen. Poiiovin. 

2nd and 3rd Grenadier R. 

Ibt Brig. Gen. du Frclay. Guides K. — Chafjscur.s R. 

Cavalry Div. 

General of Division -^^ ^"g. Gen. dc France. 


3rd Brig. Gen. du Preuil. 

Lancer K. — Dragoon R. 

CuiraJMier U. — Carbi- 
neer R. 

The Garde Corps numbered 21 baUalions, ti eqiuuiront and 18 baiteriet. 



(The altaraitont which took pUce ftfter the b»tUe of WCrih are shown in pArentheeit.) 

Manihal Mac Mahon, Due of Ma^^cnta. (General Ducrot.) — Chief of the 
Staff, General Colson. (General Faurc. — Col. Robert.) 

— ?T — 8— 


\bt Inf. Div. 
General of Division 
(Gen. Wolff.) 

2nd Inf. Div. 

General of Division 

(Abel) Douay. 

(G. Pelle.) 

3rd Inf. Div. 

General of Division 


4th Inf. DiT. 

General of Division 

de Lartigue. 


Ist Brig. Gen. Wolff. 

2nd Brig. Gen. du Postis 
du Houlbec. 


13th Jager Bat. — 18th and 
96th R. of the Line. 

45th R. of the Line. — 
Ist Zouave R. 

Ist Brig. Gen. Montmarie. 

16th Jager Bat. — 60lh and 
74th R. of the Line. 

2nd Brig. Gen. Pelld. 

78th R. of the Line. 
1st R. Algerian Tiraill. 
Ist R. de Marcne. 

1st Brig. Gen. L'llerillier. 
(Gen. Cartret-Treeourt.) 

8th Jager BatUlion. — 36th 

and 48th R. of the Line. 

(2nd Zouave R.) 

2nd Zouave R.— 2nd R. AN 

2nd Brig. Gen. Lefebvre. !«^"*" '^''^^ ^},^'}' ,?' ^^ 
** the Line. — 1 Bat. rranc- 

tireurs from Paris.) 

1 1st Jager Batt. — 56th and 

, ^ r, . r^ f u 1 * ' S'^th R. of the Line (rc- 
1st Brig. Gen. rraboulct. • j • t?. i /^, i t* 
^ mained in Strasburg (2nd R. 

' de Marehc). 

2nd Brig. Gen. Lacretellc. 

3rd Zouave R. — 3rd R. 
Algerian Tirailleurs. 

'1st iSrig. Gen. dc Septeuil. 

Cavalry Div. 

General of Division 


3rd Hussar and 11th Chas- 
seur R. 

o I t> • r' I M . 2nd and 6th Lancer R. — 

2ud Bng. Gen. deNansouty. -^,, ,^ ,, 

*=* •'10th Dragoon R. 

3rd Brig. Gen. Michel. 8th and 9th Cuirassier R. 

The flret Arm/ Corps nombered in July, 6i battalions, t8 squadrons and is batterie*. 

■ s, y 



Geneiml of Dividcm F^romard. Chief of the Steff, Genofal Saget. 

DI » ISI0N8. 




l8t Inf. IMt. 

General of Divirion 


Itt Brig. Gen. TIader, later 
Gen. Letellier-ITalas^S. 

3rd Jagcr Bat. — SSnd and 
66th B. of the line. 

ind Brig. Gen. JoUvet. 

76th and 77th B. of the 

2nd Int DiT. 

General of fHriiion 


lal Brig. General Ponget. 

ISth Jager Bat. — 8th and 
28rd B. of the LfaM. 

SndBrig. G. FanTan-Bastool. 

eeth and 67th B. pf the 

3rd Inf. IHt. 

General of Division 

dc Laveaneoopet. 


Cavalry DiT. 

General of DiTiaion 


Itt Brig. Gen. Doene, later 
Gen. Mandhny. 

10th Jager Bat. — Snd and 
68rd B. of the Line. 

8nd Brig. Gen. Michelet. 

24th and 40th B. of the 

lat Brig. Gkn. Valabr^gne. 

4th and 6th ChaMcnr B. 


2nd Brig. Gen. Bachelicr. 7th and 18th Dragoon B. 

The second Army Corps numbered 89 battalions , 16 squadrons and 16 baiteriM. 


Marshal Bazaine (later Gen. Decacn, later Marshal Lebocnf). Chief of the 

Staff', General Maneque. 




Ist Inf. Div. 
General of Division 

2nd Inf. Div. 

General of Division 

dc Ca*itagny. 

3rd Inf. Div. 

General of Division 
do Mcttinann. 

4th Inf. Div. 

General of Division 



^ ^ „ . ^ . , ,18th Jager Bat. — Stst a 

l8t Bng. Gen. Aymard. g^^^ ^ ^^^^ ^ine. 

I ___ 

2nd Brig. Gen. ClinchHut. 81stand 95th R. of the Line. 

15th Ja^'cr Bat. — lOth and 

1st Brig. Gen. Cambricls. 

4lst R. of the Line. 

2nd Brig. Gen. Dul^le^sis. 69th and DOth R. of the Line. 

17th Jager Bat. — 7lh and 

Isl Brig. Gen. dc Policr. 

29th R. of the Line. 

2nd Brig. Gen. Arnaudiau. 59th and 7lstR. of ihcLinc. 

i . n ' f. 1 T» llth Jager Bat. —44th and 

1st Brig. Gen. dc Bauer. . ^«.i i, r • w • 

" I • 60th K. of the Line 

i2ud Brg. G. Sangle-Ferricrcs. ,80th and 85lh R. of the Line. 




I l8t Brij;. Gen. Bruchard. 


2nd 3rd and lOtli Chas- 
8cur K. 

Cav. Div. 

General of L)ivi»ion — . . . . 

dc CMcrauibault. 2nd Bri^. (ion. Maubrunohcs.' 2nd aind 4th I)ra;;oon U. 

,3rd Brig. Gen. dc Juniac. { 5th and 8th Dragoun K. 

Tb« third Axoijr Corps oumber«d 6i batUUons, to tquadrout and 18 t>aU«ri«s. 


(tcneral of l)i\i>ion ilv Ladmiroult. Chief of the Stafl", General DeMiiiit. 



!m Inf. Div. , l>t B^i^^ Gen. Brayer 
ljien<'ral of DiviAion 
de Cij»4>ev. 


20th Jaicer Bat. - \»t and 

(Uh R. of the Line. 

2nd Inf. Div. 
General of Division 

3rd Inf. Div. 
General of Diviiiif)n 
de Lorcncev. 

Cav. Div. 

Cteiieral of Division 


2nd Bri*;. Gen. de Colb»»rt. .">7th an*! 73rd R. of the Line. 

l^t Bri;;. (ien. Belkvourt. 

,.'>ih Ja^er Bat. - 1 3th and 
43rd R. of the Line. 

2iid Bri^. Gen. I'radier. JUth undOHih R. of thcLine. 

^ . ,, , ,. 1, • 1 •2nd Jai;er Bat. — 15th and 
Xtit Brli;. Gen. rajol. .,., , ,, ^ ^j , . 

^ ■' 33rd R. of the Line. 

2nd Bri;;. Gen. Berber. 54th and C5th R. <»f the Line. 

iHt Bri^. (xen. de Montai)^u 

2nd Bri^. G. deGondrccourt. 

2nd and 7th llutwiar R. 

3rd and 7th Dragoon R. 

Tha fooftb Anay Cori»s noaik>erod 39 UUtaliooa, 16 •qoadrons and 15 batUriat. 


<reneral of Divicion tie Failly (later dc Wiinpffen). Chief of the Stafl, 

(tcneral Beaaon. 


I»t Inf. Div. 

General of Division 


BRIGADES. Brig. Gen. Grenier. 

2nd Brig. Gen. Nicolaa. 


4th .lager Bat. - 11th and 
46th R. of the Line. 

6Ut and HBth R. of the 


. 2nd Inf. IHt. 
General of Divifloii 
dc rAbfldi«. 

3rd Inf. IMt. 

General of DiYisiofi 

Guyot dc Letpart. 

Cavalry DiT. 

General of Divifion 


Sod Brig. Gen. de Mastfion. 

URTAflH Eft. 

Itt Brig. Qen. Lapaaiel*}. 

lat Brig. Gkn. Abatacci. 

8nd Brig. Gen. de Fontange. 

Itt Brig. Gen. de Bemis. 

8nd Brig. G. de la Morti^re. 


Uth Jager BM. — 4Mi and 
S4th R. of dM Line. 

88tli and 97 A B. «f tfieLine. 

19th Jager Batt. — 17th and 
87th R. of the Line. 

80th and 68th R. of the Line. 

6th HoMar and 18th Chaa- 
senr R. 

Srd and'^th Laneer R. 

The filUi Amy Oerpt Bwabartd M IwHaltou, U tvoadsoDa and U hattvlM. 

Bianhal Camvberi. Chief of the Staff, General Henri. 


l8t Inf. Div. 

General of Division 


2nd Inf. Div. 

General of Division 




Ist Brig. Gen. Pechot. 

9. Jager Batt. — 4th and 
10th R. of the Line. 

2nd Brig. G. Leroy de Dm.-J^** *■«' ^'J^e.^*" "' *" 
Ist Bri?. Gen. Noel. i9th and 14th R. of the Line. 

a A T> ' n xt ;20th and 30th Reg. of the 

2nd Bng. Gen. Maunce. t • 

** Line. 

3rd Inf. Div. 

General of Division 

Lafont lie Villicrs. 

. , „ . ^ JO 76th and 9l8t Reg. of the 

1st Bnff. Gen. de Sonnav. r • 

. , „ . >^ .^ ,. 93rd and 94th Reg. of the 

2nd Bni*. Gen. (olin. ^ • 


4lh Inf. Div. 

General of Division 


Ni Hriir. G. de Mar^nonat. 25th and 2^thR. of the Line. 

2nd Brivr. G.deChanaleiblpw. 2ftthnn(1 70th R.ofthoLino. 

Cav. Div. 

General of Division 

de Fcnelon. 

1st Britr. 

Gen. Tilliard. 

2nd Brijr. 

Gen. Snvnrrsse. 

3rd Brig. 

Gen. de Bcvillc. 

1«t Hn«««nr and 6th Chass. K. 

Ist and 7th Lancer R. 

5th and 6th Cairassier R. 

*) Thia BrifTftde which held pocMuion of 8«Arg«mQnd in th« beginning of Augasi, got Mpa- 
raUd from the Corpt In the rtlr«at to Chalons, and r«iir«d npon MeU with the third Corps. 


Tb« Bizlb Anny Corp« namb«r«d 49 b»lt*liont, 24 tquAdTons and 18 balltHtt. 

TIm 14th t<Kb and SOib RafflmenU of the Line w«rf> separated from the sixth Corp* at 
Pronard, and afterwards joined the lith Corps which was reformed in Chalons. The whole 
Cavalry Oiritlon waa unable to reach the Corps in Mets. and later formed the cavalry of 
the ISth Corpe. 


General of Division {Feiix) Douay. Chief of the Stuff, Gen. Kennon. 

l»t Inf. Div. 

General of Divuioii 

Cont*eil - Dumettnil. 

2nd Inf. Div. 

Cieneral of Divitfion 


3rd Inf. Div. 

General of Division 


Car. Div. 

licneral of Division 


l»t Bri};. Gen. Brettcville, 
later Gen. Morand. 

2nd Bri^. Gen. Mairc, later 
Gen. St. Ililaire. Bri;;. (ion. Giiiotnar. 

2nd Bri^'- (>. de la Ba-Mide. 
Iht Bri;;. (icn. Bordan. 

17th Ja^cr Bat. — 3rd and 
2Ut R. of the Lino. 

47th and 99th R. of the Line. 

6th Ja^er Bat. — 5th and 
37th R. of the Line. 

53rd and K9th R. of the Line. 

.'i^ind and 72nd R. of the Lino. 

2nd Bri;;. Gen. Bittard de».u^, , i q.j i « r .u r • 

^ ,, |82nd and H.-ird R. of the Line. 


Int Bri;:. (Jon. Cambriol. 

2nd Bri;;. G^. Jolif du 

4th Iliuisar and 4Ui and Hth 
Lancer R. 

()th llu8tiar and 6th Drag. R. 

Tka eaveath Army C«>rpe numbered 8d battalions. 20 s^iaadruns and IK batteriee. 
The tad Cavalry Prigade which was formed in Lyons, never reached the Corpe. 


General du Barrail. 

lift Brig. Gen. Margueritte. Ist and 3rd Chaiii»eurd d*Afn<|ue. 
2nd Brig. Gen. de Lajaille. 2nd and 4th — — 


General de Bonnemain. 

let Brig, let and 2nd Cuira<»»icr R. 
2Dd Brig. 3rd and 4th — 


let Brig. Prince J. Murat. 1st and 9th Dragoon R. 
2nd Brig. Gen. de Grammont. 7th and 10th Cuiraaeier R. 


The sirenglk of thU mobile Field Army^ ai the beguming of 
the irur is reckoned therefore in the following manner : The Infantiy 
Divisions oomisM aknoel without eieeption of IB Battalions, and the 
Cavalry DiviiionB of 4, 6, 6, even 7 B^ments. The BaltalionB 
numbered about 720 men, the Cavalry regiments numbered 500 










Garde C. 

























4 th 







— _ 













Total 241.200 27.500 


The Corps whicli was destined for landing on the German coast, 
or probably for co-operation with the Danes in Jutland, is not here 
taken into account, for its formation was not completed, by reason of 
the rapid victories of the Germans. 

I'his p/f'ccfivf* streiKjth of the army formed up in the eastern 
provhivvs at the betjitmintj of the war and estimated at a united 
capitation of :U(>,(M)() men, differs without doubt considerably from 

*) 111 order to diatinKuiah mor« eaaily betwe«n Ibe French and (terman Corpa. the 
former will be alwajrt indle»ied by Arftbio figures, and Uie Utter by Boman flgaret. 


the said strength of the whole Field Army, whose war st^ite in com- 
batants was reckoned an follows : 

304,(K)<) Men Infantry 
4(),0(X) „ Cavalry, 
46,000 „ Artillery, 
11,(KK) „ Engineers, 
10,000 „ Train, 
as well as 18,000 Officers of all arms. 

Total 424,000 Men. 

In Artillenj 3 batteries, includinp: one mitraillense battery, were 
allotted to each Infantry Division, and a reser\'e of batteries indnd- 
inj^ one horse battery to each Army Corps. 

Thus a Corps of 8 Divisions had If) batteries with 90 gnns, and 
a Corps of 4 Divisions IH batteries with 1(»8 j^uns. 

The Efiijineer troops in each corps were ci)mpos<'d <»f a company 
t>f Knpneers for each Division, and one company with the Hn^iiifcr 
Park for the Corps. 

According to the preceding order of battle the following Inwjps 
were m»t employed with the army in the field: tin* DJth \\M\ \VM\\ 
and 92nd Regiments of the IJne, \\ Hatt'ilions of African Light 
Infantry, 1 Foreign Regiment, the 8th Hussars, the Ist and 9th 
Ciuuisenni, and .*( Regiments of Spahis. These troops were stationed 
in Algeria and in addition, the 22nd 84th 58th and 79th Regiments 
t>f the Line which wert' stationed on the Spanish frontier. 

Ijftstly the 8r)th and 42nd R<*giments of the Line which were in 
Civita Verchia, and the 7th and Hth CImsscurs which were in P^anr«», 
but not with the Army. 


In contrast to the predpitate hasto with which the French troops 
had been thrown npon the frontier immediately after the declaration 
of war, followed by tlie loss of a series of da;^ in uncertain delays and 
iiirieciire operations, the strategical formation of tlio armies inOermany 
was only commenced after the mobiUzation according to a settled plan 
had been completed , and its accomplisliment was indicated by an 
immediate energetic advance , and a victorious encounter with the 
enemy upon hostile territory. 

Throe armies had been organized in the last week of July, and 
concentrated upon Coblentz, Mayence and Mannheim as their basis of 

The Firtt Armtfj under the command of General von Sleinmetz^ 
lK^ad (luarters Coblcntz, formed the right wing. 

The Second Army^ under the command of Pnnce Frederick 
Charicsy head (juartrrH Mayence, formed the centre. 

The Third Arrnt/j under the command of the Crown Prince of 
Prussia, liead ((uaHerd Mannlieim, fonned the letl winj^. 

Tliid disportition, owing to the peculiar rapidity and energy (»f 
Cernian Leadership, combined with the irresolution <»f tlu* enemy, 
rertulted in the desired power of taking the offensive bein*:: now 
entirely given up to the (Germans. Tntil this favourable stat<* o( 
affairs the (lerman Direction had to ctmsider the probability (»f an 
attaek on the part of tlie French, and eould not lose sij^ht of the pos- 
sibility that the French army would niaki' nse of the railroad sof;iNour- 
ably >ituated via Metz- Tiiionville- Liixenihnr;: for an invasion of tlu' 
Khint? ])ro\inct>s^ although in violation of the neutrality of Luxrni- 
bur^r. The positimi of the ri;rht winj: in (.'oblentz, was a |)osition of 
defence o])i)osite the Luxemburg frontiiT. • 

At the same time this disposition showed how dis^uhantapMius thr 
(lerman-French frontier was tor (SiTmany* Whilst the French army 
conld be ctMK'cntrated in the immediate nei'^hbourhood (»f the frontier 
upon secure |M)int8, the (iernian army must abandon considerable pro 


vinces in order to obtain a safe basis of operations. Between the line 
mentioned and the frontier such an one was not to be found. 

Besides the unexpected attack upon Alsace wliicli was carried 
into execution, the position of the German left wing also made tlie 
defence of Baden feasible, in case the French army had dinrctcd its 
attack against Soutli Germany. The enemy's entry into Baden would 
have been a flank march against the army (»t' the Crown I^rince. H(»w- 
ever the position of the three armies collectively, at onw removed the 
danger for South Germany, because by it the main body of the (ier- 
nuuis was brought nearer to its object of operations, just as the 
French army would have been nearer to theirs by an invasion of 
South (lennany. Paris on the one side, and Berlin on the otiier had 
b<H;n the chief aims of the strategical operations from the beginning, 
and all the movements which might have had other aims could only be 
of secondary interest. 

Thus, through its strategical ini|)ortanee, the dispositi(»n from 
Mannheim to ('oblentz defended South (lennanv. 

ill th» bejfliiitiii}; uF tlic wiir, iiiUll after tlie battle of (!nivdott« 

omumndiT in Pliief; King William In o/' /Vunia, - Ailjalanl lii-uvmlai 
Infiinirj' <J«awa] mm Biij/m, Li«ul. Uincrral von 'jyai-oir. Major t^eral 
Kiirdn tton SUmadxr, U*at. Colnnrl Count von T/^nilorff. Livnt. L'olunel 
AMim Haitimill, Li^ul. Catoa*! Conni von Wnldtriire, Mi^ut ixni ilMm. 
- iHitaf at Ih* ^alf of llio Armj: InUMrj Tinitntl Itaron von Moillv. 
— QnsrtM* nxlcr Gentntl : Licnl. (iraeMl ihin Poilbi*l*ti. — i>mnlj 
rliirf. of Ih* Slaff; Ueal. TolonPl Bron«in p™ ttrhMlmHarf. l/rul- 
Cnltinrl r«« JWrfj du I'n-no.V. I,i.-iil. C-lcnrl i-f.,! Hra,..ln,rtAH. 
Inxiivvror (Ivnfral or Anlllcrf ; Infniitr.v (Ivx. >• ftimlrrnn. Jiiiiifvtnr 

Geiiprai uf Knginf«ni: liinnl. Gviiu-al v. Klcul. 


naiiikr In Cblefr Inrnnlry Gmtral ron ArnimrM. — Chttifof iW SMff: 
njor (iporrid t, K)ierl<ng. - (Mel (Juartf-rnirulrr ; Cotntii'l Cimnt t. 
^*ilcn>lr(ien. - CoaitnBiidff of the ArtHlcry: [.imt, ClcnorNl Rrhoaru. 
- CutDmanilN' «r Ihe Enj^nnni «i>i| rionreri: Colonel Illvhlrr. 


ivBlry Crn. Iluro 

.n V. Maiilmjrel. f'liiefof iW Slaff, Li™i. Col. v. .1. Hiiri;. 



I>t Inf. Div. 

1>t Jtif. Ilri^'. Major <i<'iMTii]i;r.'<'T<>^iiPrMU'<>N».l. 
! V. (JhvI. l„r. It. X... 11. > 


V. Kalk.-ii.lrin. Iiiniiil. H. X... 4;l. 


Siul Inf. Uiv. 
Major General 
V. Priteelwiu. 




I 8rd Inf. Brig. ' Grenadier K. No. 4. 

Major General v. Memerty.' Infantry U. No. 44. 

^^_ __ __ - ~~i~ "~ " "~ 

4th Inf. Brig. Grenadier R. No. &. 

Major General v. Zglinitzki. InfantryjR. No. A^>. 

Dragoon Regiment No. 10. 

Regiment of Field Artillery No. 1, I'ioneer Battalion No. 1, Battaliou of 

Train No. 1. 

AUugetlMr <b batUliuDt. 8 tquadruns. 84 guns, bMidtt ploo«»ni and train. This Corpa U 
neruitmd in. and gamsona Kaat and Wast Pmaaia. 


Infantry (irneral v. Zwirow. Cliief of the Stnrt\ Colonel v. I'nger. 


13th Inf. Div. 

Lieutenant (leneral 

V. Gliimer. 


25th Infantry Brig. 

Major General Baron 

V. d. Ottten called Sacken 

2<Uh Infantry Brig. 

Major (General Baron 

▼. dcr Goltz. 


Inf. R. No. i:t 
Fll^ilier R. No. T.'l. 

Inf. R. No. Ifi. 
Inf. R. No. 55. 

.lager Battalion No. 7 and lIuMtar Regiment No. H. 

27th Infantrv Brij:. 

Fusilier R. No. 39 

14th Inf. Div. 

hieult'nant (teneral 

V. Kamei'ke. 

Major (teneral v. Frani,*ois.| Infiantry R. No. 74 

2Hth int. Bri<^. 
.Major (teneral v. Wovna II. 

Infantry R. No. 53. 
Infantrv R. N«». 77 

lIuHitar Regiment No. 15. 

Regiment of Field Artillery No. 7, Fioneer Batulion No. 7, Train 

Battalion No. 7. 

Alto|r«th«r ift l»altalion« 8 ttiuadrona. 84 vuoa Wtitlea piotta^ra ami tiain 'I li» t'orpa 
tt racrnitad in \^ aatpbalia. Niadvrrbriu and Hanov<>r and iiairiatma Wtalphalia and ttia 
Eliin« pruTlnre. 


Infantry 0«Mi«l T. Ooebm. CU«f of tiw Staff, Col. t. WteiadM* 




1 5th Inf. Dir. 

S9th Infantry Brig. 
Miyor deneral t. Wedell. 

Fns. Beg. No. 88. 
Inf. Beg. No. 66. 

Lieutenant General 
V. Weltiien. 

80th Infantry Brig. 
Mfjor General r^ Stmbberg. 

Inf. Beg. No. S8. 
Inf. Beg. No. 67. 

Jager BattoHon No. 8, and King's Hnttar Rqp. No. 7. 

IGth Inf. Div. 

8l8t Infantry Brig. 

Major General Count Neid- 

hardt t. Gnciaenaa. 

Inf. Beg. No. M. 
Inf. Beg. No. 69. 

Lieut. (General 
Bnron v. Barnekow. 

32nd Infantry Brig. 
Colonel ▼. Bex. 

Fnmlier Beg. No. 40. 
Infantry B^. No. 72. 

Haaiar Begiment No. 9. 

Regiment of Field Artillery No. 8, Pioneer Battalion No. 8, Train 

Battalion No. 8. 

Altof^^tbAr 25 battoliont. 8 sqaadrons. 90 gnus, b«tid«t pioneers and tmin. The Corp* U 
recruitod in the Rhine prorince and garrisons il, regim«nt No. SS in Kast Pnisfia. The C8lh 
and 70th remained in Coblents and Saarlouis m garrinons, and Iheir places were filled by the 
67th and 7-2iid regiments from the IV. Corps, but who afterwards changed again with them. 



1st Cav. Div. 

i..ieut. General 

V. llartmann. 


Isl (^avalrv Hii^. 
Maj«»r (fcneral v. i^iulcrit/. 

2n«l Cavalry Brij:. 
Mnjor (i<MH'ral Bainii^arth, 

Mil Cav. Div. 

Major (Jeneral 

Count V. il. (inx'brn. 

(itli Cnvalrv Hriir. 
.Major (it'll era! v. Minis. 

Ttli Cavalry Hrijj. 
Major CiiMi. Count zu Dohna. 


Cuirassier R. No. 2. 
Chlan K. No. 4. 
Chlan R. No. 9. 

Ciiira.sjiior \i. No. ;i 

riilaii U. No. H. 

Lilian K. No. IJ. 

Ciiira^.sirr R. No. 8. 
riilan U. No. 7. 

Clilaii K. No. ;'i. 
Chlan R No U 

AltuKetber 40 squadrons. 12 guns. 



Commander in Chief: Prince Frederick Charle* of I\wvtia. — Chief of the 
Suif: Major General v. Stiehle. — Chief Quartermaster: Colonel von 
UerVtheri^. — Commander of the Artillery: Lieut. Cieneral v. Colomirr. 
— Commander of the Engineers and Pioneers: Colonel Leuthaus. 


Cavalry (ieneral Prince Auywttus of Wurteniherg . (^hief of the Staff, Major 

(ieneral v. Dannenberg. 


iHt (;uard.*« Inf. Div 

Major (ieneral 

V. Pape. 


I iMt Guards Infantry Brig. 
Major General v. Kessel. 

2nd Guards Infantry Brig. 
Major General v. Medeni. 


Ittt Fo<it (iuanl'^. 
Hnl Fo<»i (iuards. 

2iid Foot Guards. 

4ih Fo<»t Guardh. 

FuMilier (tuardn. 

2iid Guards Inf. Div 
Lieut, (ieneral 
v Budriteki. 

(iuards Jager Bnttalirm. 

., , ^, 1 . J. . T» • Kaiser Alexander^ Gronftd. 
MA Guards Infantry Brig ■ ^,^^^,,^ ^^ , 

(ol. Knappe v. Knappstudt.!^^^^^^ Elizabeth's (Jrenadirr 
' ' Guards No. H 

Emperor Franx (irenudier 
4th (tuards Infantry Brig. (iuards No. 2. 

Major General v, Berger* [ Queen's (Jrenailier (xuunlM 
i I No. 4. 

(tuards Sirhiitxen Battalion. 

(fuanls Cavalry 

Lieut. General 
Count v. d. Golt/ 

l}«t (iuanls (^avalry Brig. 

Major (ieneral 
Count V. Brandenburg 1. 

2nd (iunrds Cavalry Brig. 

Lieut, (ieneral 
Prince Albert of Prusi»ia. 

Hrd (iuanls Cavalry Brig. 

Major General 
Count V. Brandenburg II. 

('uirafisier Guards. 

l<«t rhlans of the (iuard. 

Hrd I'hlans of the (iuanl. 

Hussar (iuards. 

Iht Dragoon (tuards. 

2nd Dragoon GuardN. 

2nd I'hltins of the (iuardh. 

The (JuanU Fitld Artillery Kegiment. the (iuard PionterR and the (iuard 

Train BatUlions. 

Altovf»lh«r i9 battalions. 8? tqu«4ront. WO ffunt h«»tJ<lei pion«>«r« and train. Tlii» 4'orpt 
It rrcrniud in lhi» whol« klutfdon. and chl«rty irarriaont HmIiu and lU o»lirhlK.arh«.od. 



SBOom Ama <iobp8. 

Infantry Qeneral v. Ermmtkif. Ghtef id 4ke 8uM^ CoIomI m* 


3rd Inf IHt. 
Major General 
V. Hartmrnnii. 

4th Inf. Dir. 

Lieut. Gkneral 

Hann v. Weiherp. 




6tli Infiuitry Brig. 
Mftjor GtaBna ▼. KobUaeki. 

6lh iDf. Brig. 
ColmMl T. 4, Decken. 

Frederick WBHam IVtli 
Grenadiete No. S. 
Inf. B^. No. 41. 

Inf. Beg. No. 14. 
Inf. Beg. No. 44. 

Jager BatlaHon No. % and 8rd Dnfoem. 

Till Inf. Brig. 
Migor General dm TroaMl. 

801 Infantry Brig. 
Major General r. Kettler. 

ColWrg Grenadien No. 9. 
Inf. Beg. No. 49. 

Inf. Beg. No. ft. 
Inf. Beg. No; 41. 

Dragoon Begiment No. 11. 

Regiment of Field Artlttery No. t, Pioneer Battalion No. S, Train 

Battalion No. t. 

Altog*ih*r t6 iNiltalioDt, 8 MiaBdroiit, 84 funt. betidM pioD«*n and train. Tha Corpa la 
racmited in tha proTineea of Pomeranta and Poaan, and garritona tbam. 


Lieutenant General v. Ahensleben II. Chief of the SuflT, Colonel r. 





5th Inf. Div. 
Lieut. GtMU*raI 
V. Stiilpna^el. 

I 9th Infantry Brig. 
Major General v. Diiring. 

lOth infantry Brig. 
Major General v. Schwerin. 

Leib Grenadiers No. 8. 
Inf. Reg. No. 48. 

Grenadiers No. 12. 
Inf. Re2. No. 62. 

Jager Battalion No. .H and 12th Dragoon.s. 

6th Inf. Div. 

Lieut. General 

V Budd en brook. 

11th Infantry Brig. 
Major General v. Rothmaler. 

Inf. Reg. No. 2t). 
Inf. Fieg. No. 60. 

12th Infantry Brig, 
('olonel V. Bismarck, 

Inf. Reg. No. 24. 
Fu.silier Reg. No. 35. 

Dragoon Regiment No. 2. 
Regiment of Field Artillery No. 3, IMoneer Batt. No. 3, Train Batt. No 3. 


AltoffsUMf 26 tellaliont. 8 tquiMlront, 84 Roat. beaide* piooMra aod trmin. The Curpt it 
r«eniil»d la lb* pcovlaM of Braadvabarg and garriaoat It. 


Infantry General v. Aivensleften I. Chief of the SuflT, Colonel v. Thile 


7ih Inf. Div. 

Lieut. General 

V. Gro88, called 

V. SchwarahofT. 


13th Infantry Brig. 
Major General v. Borries. 


Inf. RcK. No. 2«. 
Inf. Reg. No. rtH. 

I4th Infantry Bri^,'. Inf. Reg. No. 27. 

Major (ien. v. Zychlinnki. ' Anhalt Inf. Reg. No. l>3. 

tiager Battalion No. 4 and Dragoon Reg. No. 7. 

Rth Inf. Div. 

Lieot. General 

V. SchOler. 

15th Infantry Brig. 
Major General v. Kesslcr. 

16th Infantry Brig. 
Colonel V. Scheffler. 

Inf. Reg. No. HI. 
Inf. Reg. No. 71. 

Fusilier Reg. No. Hi>. 
Inf. Reg. No. 96. 

Hutf8ar Regiment No. 12. 

Hegiment of Field Artillery No. 4, Pioneer Battalion No. 4, and Train 

Battalion No. 4. 

AlUiftlber ift balUliont, 8 iqQ»druQt. 84 gona. beaidea plouetra and intn. Th* Corp* 
famaoM IIm purine* of Kazuny and Aabalt, and ia rt<miiUd frum tba aaoi* pUcaa mitk ib« 
•xc«plloa of Um 8«lb lUglmanl from SchUawtg Hol«i«iii« 


Infantry General v. Manstein, Chief of the Suft, Major Bronaart von 



18th Inf. Div. 

Lieut. General 

Bwom ▼. Wrangel. 


I 35th Infantry Brig. 
Major (yen. v. Blumenthal. 

36th Infantry Brig. 
Major General v. Below 


Inf. Rt^. No. th. 
Inf. Reg. No. 84. 

Grenadier Ri*g. No. 11. 
Inf. Reg. No. 85. 

Jager Battalion No. 9 and Dragoon Reg. No. 6. 

36th Grand Dnnl 

HcaxUii DiWrion 

Licot. OcaanJ 

Trine p Louii or H«H. ' 


|H««. I>rib-tiD«4 R. N«. li 

|Umh. InfuiUy Reg. So. S. 
jHcw. GuardJB(;orhl. No. I. 

Hegg. Lrib-Reg. Mo. 3. 

H«n. Inf. Reg. No. 4. 

[Iii». Ldbjkg. Bm. " ~ 

divUinn* of tha Snd Rggimml of Rdd AiliUer;, llowian Fitld Artillctj, 
'„ Fioncer BkUaHon No. 9, Hcarisn PLoncer COmpwij, ■/( Train Rkiu^ ] 
lioD Mo. 9, md HtMiaii Tnia IMvWim. 

*, M ■«■■. b 

Tb* 181b In&BliT DItWm, wbM pn 

M to Uw Mb ktmj ti'i 


Inrantry General v. Voigl*-RktU. Chier of the Staff, M^jor t. Capri*i. 

iOth Inf. DlT. 

Lieut. General 

V. Kchwankoppen. 

j BK1UAI»':S. 


37th Infantry Brig. 
Colonel Lehroann 

Inf. Reg. No. 78. 
Oldenburg Inf. B. No. »t. 

38tb Inbntty Brig. 
Major General v. Wedell. 

Inf. Reg. No. 16. 
Inf. Reg. No. 87, 

9th Uragoniis. 

39lh Infanlry Brig. 
Major General *. Wovna 1 

Inf. Reg, No, 17. 
Inf. Ree. No, 66. 

4ll*h Infanlr)' Brie. 
,ajor General «. Diiini;e- 

t of Field Anillerj No. 

Battalion No. 10. 

1 lieg. No. 16. 
o. Ill and Train 

AlUNOtbtr It bUtallOBI, t (qiuilnli 



General Crown Prince Albert of Saxony. Chief of the Staff, Lieut. Colonel 

V. ZeuchwitK. 


23rd Inf. Div. 

Lieut. General 

Prince George of 

Saxon T. 



24th Inf. Div. 
Major General 
Nehrhoff v. Holder 

45th Infantry Brig. 
Major Gen. v. Crauhhaar. 

4Bth Infantry Brig. 
Colonel V. Montbii. 

47th Infantry Brig. 
Major (leneral Tauticher. 

4Hth Infantry Brig. 
Colonel V. Schultx. 

Cavalry Division 

Major General 

Count zur Lippc. 

23rd Cavalry Brig. 
Colonel Krug v. Nidtla. 

24th Cavalry Brig. 
Colonel Scnfft v. Pilnarh 

Regiment of Field Artillery No. 12, Pioneer 

BatUlion No. 12. 

li*t(Leib.) Gren. R. No. KM). 
2nd Grenadier Keg. No. 101, 

Inf. Heg. No. 102. 

Inf. Keg. No. 103. 

Schiitzen Keg. No. 108. 

Inf. Reg. No. UU. 
Inf. Reg. No. 105. 

Inf. Reg. No. 106. 

Inf. Reg. No. 107. 

.lager Battalion No. 12. 

•lager Battalion No. 13. 

(luard Horrie Reg. 

Int Hor^e Reg. 

Uhlan Hor8«' Re^. No. 17. 

2nd llorbc Reg. 

3rd llon»e Reg. 

Uhlan HorM? Reg. No. IR. 

Battalion No. 12, Train 

Allof fftlMr t9 battaliuni. 24 •quAdruat. 96 Kont, betldM ploiiMra and InUn. Thruufihoat 
Royal Sazoa troopt. 




Uth Cavalry Brig. 
Major General v. Barby 

&th (^av. Div. 

Lieut. General 

Baron v. Rheinhahen. 

12th Cavalry Brig. 
Major General v. Bredow. 

13th Cavalry Brig. 
Major General v. Redern. 


i CuiraMiier Reg. No. 4. 
Uhlan Reg. No. 13. 
Dragoon Rrir. No. 10. 

CuiraMiier Reg. No. 7. 

Uhlan Reg. No. 16. 
Dragoon Reg. No. 13. 

Ilu«i«ar Reg. No. lo. 

lIOMar Reg. No. II. 

lirauuM'hw. Hub. R. No. 17. 

Itdi Cavalvr IMv. 
Uent. Gmral 
Dakc mUw 

I Ulk Ok*alr7 Bii)t- ' 

I Calond Bai«n v. Di«pni- ' 


CHiriiMisr Reg. N«. *. 



ammaiKlrr In CkirU Ofnur«l ol Ufaniry Crown Vnnw t'rtttenrt WiUiitm 
,'/ ;v.«fla, - Chief of Ihv KMIf! I.luut. (i«n»r»l v. Bli.nipniti»l. — Chi«f 
(jnaru-rniMlnr I Cnlond v. (initbcrg. ~ Cauiniuidwr of ihr Arlllln*: 
i.icui. G«B«nI HnlLl. — Comnuuidaf of chr Knijinrrra ■ml I'liincrn: 
Major Omtra) SehnU. 

Licat. GnanI r. JSp^tacA. Chief of tha Htor, Odoitl *. d. btdl, 


fiih Inf. Wv. 
M«jor Gcti«nl 
V. SMilnrt. 

tTtii liir>nir; BHk- 1 Inf. Ren-. Nu. iiS 
Colonfl V. Bolhnier. | Inf. Sqj. No. i>9. 

ma, InUtMj Btig. Klns'>Gr<«>diorRrg.Kc7 
Miqor Gm. r. Voi|{tp.Bhrt«. Inf. Bte. Nn. 41. 

Jagcr Batulion No. 6, Mid Dra«noii Rvg. Ho. 4. 

tOUi Inf. IHv. 
Major (irniTiij 

^"""tUT"" "" j •-r.IUs.No 4*. _ 

2.HI1 Infantry Brig. VyiMtt Jteg. No. ST. 
Major Ul-om.! Wdter v. ,„(. k^, (Jo. b» 

[)r>Kooii Beg. No- U. 



CAvalry General v. Tiimplmg. Chief of the Suff, Colonel v, Salviati. 


llth Inf. Div. 

Lient. General 

V. Gordon. 


Slbt Infantry Brig. 
Major Gen. v. Malachow^ki. 

, 22nd Infantry Brig. | 
Major Gen. v. Kckarttfberg.i 


Grenadier Reg. No. tO. 
Inf. Reg. No. lA. 

Fotfilier Reg. No. 38. 
Inf. Reg. No. 5t. 

Jager Battalion No. 6, and Dragoon Reg. No. 8. 

t2th Inf. Div. 

Lieut. General 

\. Hoffmann. 

28rd Infantry Brig. 
Colonel Gtindell. 

Inf. Reg. No. 22. 
Inf. Reg. No. 62. 

24th Infantry Brig. 
Major General v. Fabeck. 

Inf. Reg. No. 2H. 
Inf. Reg. No. «H. 

Dragoon Reg. No. 15. 

Regiment of Field Artillery No. 6, Pioneer Battalion No. 6, Train Bat- 
talion No. 6. 

AltofttilMV ih ImtUliout. 8 tnttadroni, 84 goat, bMidM piua««r« uid train. TU* Corp* \% 
rvcmiud in th« dUUriott of Bretlau and Oppeln and garrttuat thttm. 


Lieutenant General v. HoM. Chief of the Staff, Major General 8tein von 



2tf»t Inf. Div. 

Lieut, (ieneral 

V. .SchNchtmeyer. 

22nd Inf. Div. 

Lieut. General 

V. GentdoHf. 


41i»t Infantry Brig. 
Colonel V. Koblinnki. 

42nd Infantry Brig. 
Major General v. Thile. 


Futiilier Reg. No. .H4. 
FuHilier Reg. No. 80. 

Inf. Reg. No. 82. 
Inf. Reg. No. 88. 

Jager Battalion No. tl, and Dragoon Reg. No. 5. 

4.Hrd Inf. Brig. | Inf. Reg. No. »2. 

Colonel V. Kontzki. Inf. Reg. N<i. 9f>. 

» _ 

44th Infantry Brig. 
Major General v. Hchkopp. 

Inf. Reg. No. 8S. 
Inf. Reg. No. 94. 

HuMiar Reg. No. IS. 

Regiment of Field Artillery No. U, I'ioneer Battalion No. 11, Train Bat- 
talion No. 11. 



■ind Ctt. Ui*. 

Lieut. 0«net«l 

Couni ta Stolherg- 

4lh tavalrj' Brig. 

UajoT General Baron i 


4th Ca>. Di*. 

General of CaTklrjr 

Prince Albert at 


IDih Caialr; Brig. 
Major Gmcra) t. Kn»i« 


Chid or UiT esuir. 

I<l Inf. Kie. 
•ini Jnger Battalion. 
0th jHi;er Ratulino. 

■2ml Inf. Keg. 

lull Inf. Reg. 

llh Jat'er Rntlalion. 

Ul Cuira»icr Keg. 
■2nd Cuirawicr Htk- 
3nl Light Uonc Ucg. 






3rd Infantry Brig. 
Major Gen. Schohmacher. 

tSnd DiviiiioD 

Liest. General 

Count Pappenheiiu. 

4th Infantry Brig. 
Major General Straob. 

2nd Cavalry Brig. 
Major General v. Mayer. 

3rd Inf. Reg. 

12th Inf. Reg. 

Ist Jager Battalion. 

10th Inf. Reg. 

13th Inf. Reg. 

7th Jager Batulion. 

4th Light Hor»e Reg. 
l8t Uhlan Reg. 

let Regiment of Artillery, and 1 Field Engineer Division. 

Allof«UiM t9 batUlioDt. 20 tquadront. •« gant. 


General of Infantry v. Hartmann. Chief of the Staff*, Colonel Baron v. 



3rd Diriinon 

lAvnt. General v. 



5th Infantry Brig. 
Major General v. Schleich. 


4th Dirifion 

Lieat. General 

Coont V. Bothmer. 

6th Infantry Brig. 

Major General Joner- 


3rd Cavalry Brig. 

Major General Baron v. 


7th Infantry Brig. 

Major General v. Ribeau- 


Hth Infantry Brig. 
Major General Maillinger. 


6th Inf. Reg. 

7th Inf. lieg. 

Hth Jager Battalion. 

14th Inf. Reg. 

15th Inf. Reg. 

3rd Jager Battalion. 

Ittt Light Horse Reg. 

6th Light Horse Reg. 

2nd Uhlan Reg. 

5th Inf. lU*g. 

9th Inf. Reg. 
6th Jager Battalion. 
10th Jager Batulion 

4th Inf. Reg. 

Hth Inf. Reg. 

5th Jager Battalion. 

4th Cavalry Brig. 
Major General v. Tausch. 

2nd Regiment of Artillery and 1 Field Engineer Division. 

2nd Light Horse Reg. 
5th Light Horse Reg. 

AJlof«ClMr 29 iMiltalioiii. to sqaMlrons, H gnat. 

Rojal Wurtcmberg 


Li Kilt. Gtneral 

V. Oberafbu' 

Chief of 

Colon cl f. Book. 

Tli« WuMaktif lafMitir R*f imtDl* OBljr a^buid I bMUUoM . >k«*fat« 
«ltii«MlMr II WlWton. II aqiuilreiK, U (u*. 1 WtuUBbni nftBanta nmati 

(iruid Unv«l 

Baden Diriiion 

Lient. General 

I. Btyet, 

l«t Infantrj' Brig. 

Lieut, (ieneral B*n>D ' 

Larochc dn Jarrj. 

Snd lafantry Brig. 

Uajor General Baron • 


Cavalry Brig. 

Major General Baron v 


Ul Leib-UrB);uon Uck- 
Snd Drah'uon Keg. 
3td DraKOon Reg, 

Baden Field Arliller; Kegimont, detachmento of Baden I'ir 

AllOfMll*! IB bUlallsB 

•} AfMr lb* bauto cf Wonb lh« Corpa laUj wu diMolnd. and Irvm tlnl Um» tb« 





General of InfaDtry Vogel v, Faikmstem. Chief of the Suflf, Colonel Veit. 


General of Infantry the Grand Doke of MeckUnburg-Sckmerin, Chief of 

the SuflT, Colonel v. Kreniki. 




aard Infantry Bri^. 

Major General Baroii v. 


17th Inf. Div. 

Lieut. General 

V. Schimmelmann. 

(Belonging to the 
IX. CorpM ) 

:Uth Infantry Bri^c. 
(\>lonel V. ManteuflTel. 

17th Cavalry Brig. 
Major (ieneral v. Rauch. 

Fimilier Reg. No »(». 
Infantry Reg. No. 75. 
Infantry Reg. No. 76. 

Mecklenb. (Jren. R. No. 89. 

Mecklenb. Fusil. R. No. 90 

Mecklenb. Jager Battalion 

No. U. 

tut Mecklenb. Dragoon R. 

No. 17. 
2n(l Mecklenb. Dragoon K. 

No. 18. 
Uhlan Reg. No. 11. 

I , Regiment of Fielil Artillery No. 9, i'. Pioneer BHttaliou No. 9. < , Train 

Battalion No. 9. 

A U o gt h T It baltalioni. li tquAdrona. 48 mint. 

Th« IMTiflioB g»rriiona Srhl*t«lfr<HoUt#in and Mockleobarg, ib« fifth r*fiai«»nt la n- 
er«it«d ta']|af4«barg. the 7Mh and 78th in llaaaeatiwlten and llanovtr. th» nth I'hlana 
la Rraa4«ab«rf . 


C>aard Land w eh r 

Inf. Div. 

Lieut. General 

Banin v. L<»«>n. 

l»t Landw. Div 


Major < ieneral 

». Tre?ikou . 


: Ist Guard Landwehr Brig, 
(•olonel (lirodz v. (taudi. 

Ind (iuanlland\%ehr Hri^. 
Colonel V. Hoehl. 


lAt (iuard Landwehr Reg. 
2nd (ffuard Landwehr Reg. 

Int I'oui. Landwehr Hrig. 

(*(donel Baron v. Budden- 


2nd Pom. Landwehr Brig. 
Major (ieneral v. Avemann. 

2.Ht (iren. (iuanl Landn. H. 
'2nd Fren. (iuanl Liindw. R. 

l^t eonib. Pom. Landvi. Heg 
'2nd comb. Pom. Landw . Keg. 

3rd comb. Pom. Landw. Keg 
j4theomb. Pom. Landw. Keg. 


2nd Lmdw. Dhr. 


Major Genoml 

V. S«ldiow. 

Luttfwehr 'W^ 

3rd comb. 


Major GeDenl 


V. Sendcn. 

Kmoh Laoiwthr Btfli 

Ul BnadcBkirg Luidwcbr 


Colottd r. AnioMi. 

tad BrmdcBbiirf Lmdwehr 


Cokm^ Baaiieli. 




Potfen Landwehr Brig. 
Colooel r. GBIm. 

!•! comb. BnadMbwf 
IiMidwite Beg. 

Laodwiiir Beg. 

8rd comb. Bcpidcnbpig 
Laadwelur Big. 

4lb comb. BimiliAbiiig 
LMi4lir4ir Beg. 

West Prvmlui comb. Lei^ 

webr Beg. 
Hlcdenebl. comb. Leadwelur 



lu'eomb. Pos. LmmIw. B. 
tod comb. Pos. Leadw. R. 

of th« Oowd BaBbOTod t UltoMP— . 

B«gfaMalQf Ika 


Resenre Dragoon Reg. Nos. 1 and 8. 
Reserve Dragoon Reg. Nos. 2, .S and 5. 
Reserve Uhlan Reg. Nos. 2, 3, 4 and 5. 

Altogeihtr it R«Mrv« Cavalry RefimenU wera formed. 9 of tli*M m abov* wera allotted 
to th« mobil* Landwthr Diviaiona. the other 7 (2nd Reaerve Dragooni. lat, 4th and till 
R«a«rve Huaaan, and lat, 6th and 7th Reaervo Uhlana) war* appointad to oocnpy fori 


Reserve Foot divisions of the Guard and of the It Line Artillery Regi- 
ments, 3 batteries to each (18 guns). 

Of these balterisa only 9 were allotted from each division to the mobllo Laadw< 
Diviaiona. bat the third was anbdivided for the formation of i anrtie batteriea to each, 
aaaigoed to the garriaona of fortrrBii«*ii. 

Total of the mobile Landwehr-Diviniuna : 60 hittalinns. 36 ■i|iiudriin«. and 144 Riina. 

The flrat, aecund. and atxth C'lirps alsu remained behind in the rountry at the beginning 
of the war, and only Joined their reMt>ertive i^rmiea after th« befinniufr <>f hoatiltties 


Strength of the North German Army Corps. 


9 Infantry Regiments, 1 Garde -Jager and 1 Garde • Schutzen 
Battalion, 2 Regiments of Divisional Cavalry, 4 Batteries of Divisional 
Artillery, 1 Cavalry Division consisting of 8 Regiments with 3 Horse 
Batteries, finally 1 Foot detachment of the Artillery Corps. In addition 
to these 1 Battalion of Pioneers, 1 Battalion of Train and 9 Munition 
columns. Total 29,0()O Infantry, 4800 Horses and 90 Guns. 

The L, II., III., IV., v., VI., VII., X. and XI. Army Corps 
each consisted of: 8 Infantry Regiments, 1 Jager Battalion, 2 Regi- 
ments of Cavalry, 2 detachments of Foot Artillery, also a detachment 
of Foot Artillery and 2 Horse Batteries from the Artillery Corps, 

1 Battalion of Pioneers, 1 Battalion of Train and 9 Mnnition columns. 
Total of each Army Corps: 25,000 Infantry, 1200 Horses and 
84 Gans. 

The VIII. Army Corps counted 1 additional Horse Battery, 
consequently it had 90 Guns. 

Tlie IX. Army Corps consisted of the 18th Infantry Divinion 
and the Heslian (25tht Division. It numbered 8 Infantry Regiments, 
.'{ Jager Rnttalions , 3 Regiments of Cavalry, IT) Batteries. Total 
23,000 Infantry, 1800 Horses and 90 Guns. 

The XII. (Saxon"! Army Corps numbered 9 Infantry Regiments, 

2 Jager Battalions , 2 Horse Regiments and 2 detachments of Foot 
Artiller>'. It had further a Cavalry and Artillery reserve : 4 Regi- 
ments of Cavalry, 2 Horse Batteries, 2 detachments of Foot Artillery 
and in addition to these 1 Battalion of Pioneers, 1 Battalion of Train, 
and 9 Munition columns. Total 29,(HK> Infantry, 3G(K) Hor.Hos and 
90 Guns. 

Tlie first Cavalry Division consisted of 24 Squadrons and 1 Horse 
Battery ; the second numb4*red 24 S<)uadrons, 2 Horse Batt^Ties ; the 
third, If) Squadrons, 1 Horse Battery; the fourth, 24 Squadrons, 2 
Hone Batteries; the fifth, 3G Squadnms, 2 Horse Batteries ; the sixth, 
20 Squadrons, 1 Horse Battery. The first and thini were asKigoe^l 


to the L Armyy the fifth and sixth to the IL Arinyy 
fourth to the III. Amy. 

The 17th DifMon — 18,000 InfMitry, laoo Hones Mid M 
Gnns, as well as 4 Landwehr Divisions^ 8 of which oonsIsM of 9WM> 
Infantry, 1 ot 12,000 Infantry, with 600 Horses to each, aid 18 Gam 
remained behiad fbr eoast defenees. 

In addition to these, 4 Infiuitry Regiments remained heUad to 
garrison the fortresses of ICayence and Rastatt, and 1 IjiCuiliy Regi- 
ment was left at Cologne, 1 at Coblents and 1 at Saarkwis^ lone dt 
which have been hielnded in the order of battte at the eonmeneeBieat 
of the war. 

The mobUued Field Arm^ of" the North Germmm Omm- 

federation, reekoning the Battalions at 1000 men and the Candiy 
RegimenU at GOO Horses, consisted of .382,000 Infantry, 48,000. 
Ilun»e8 and 1218 Gons without including the Lanflwehr. 

The onited capitation of combatants in the North Oermaa FleU 
Army, exclusive of the Landwehr, was tlierefbre Aout 660,000 ■••. 

The JjMndwchr iiurobereil 198,000 combatants. 
The Army of the North German Confederation , including the 
Landwelir amounted in all to about 7r>0,(KK) men. 

Tlic Bavarian Army numbered IG Regiments of Infantry and 
10 Jnger Battalions; 10 Regiments of Cavalry, 32 Field Batteries of 
Artillery, iniiuding 4 BatterieH of Horse Artillery, besides 1 Regiment 
of Kii^ineers and 4 Companies of Train. Its strength without 
reckoning the Landwehr and the troops for replacing casualties 
.amounted to 58,mH) Infantry, 5800 Horses and 192 (inns. 

The ff'urii'mbenj Army ronsistcd of s Kc^imciits of Infantry, 
.*J Jager Hattalions, A Kcj^iiiicnts of Cavalry, '.♦ Field Batteries of 
Artillery, besides 2C<»nipanieH of PiomMTs and a detachment of Train. 
Its strength, exclusive of the Landwelir and reinforcing tro4>ps, was 
1(;,(K)0 Infantry, 24(»o Horses ami 51 <;inis. 

The Hadvfi Army nuniberetl Regiments of Infantry, W Kegi- 
ments of (*avalry, 9 Field Batteries of Artillery, besides 2 Companies 
of Pioneers and 1 detachment of Train. Its strength, exclusive of the 
Landwehr and reinf<»rcing troops, was lO,G(M> Infantry, 2S(K^ Horses 
and 64 Guns. 


The whole South German Field Anny is therefore reckoned jit : 

Infantry H4,(W)(> Men. 
(■nvalry. 9iM)0 lIorHert 

Artillery :J<M) Gnu>4 

i. e. an nnited eapitation of over 1(H»^(MM> Combntants. 

The iaial slretujth of the German Field Army at the 
beginning of the war amounted theref<ire to about H50,0<VO 

Tntil tlie eoneentration of these Armien was arrompliflhed in the 
lant tlayH of July, the weak detaehments upon the extreme fn>ntier 
were entirely without reservert, with the char^<' of making the enemy 
imagine that they were in conniderablc mannes. They Kueeeeded in 
thia so well by bold attaekH, by marcliing hither and thither, even by 
diisgniDeH which made them appear to the enemy like new kinds <»f 
troo|>8, that the aeeountn in the French newspapers of the iiermau 
forces in the Palatinate and Rhine ])roviuces, raised their strength 
t4i more than 2<K),<N><) men, and the French (Nirps were also S4> 
completely deceived tliat they would not risk an attack. A mixed 
Baden Corps composed of tlie tlirec arms rtms(*d the belief, at the 
same time, that South Germany was str(»ngly occupicnl, by continually 
marching backwards and forwards during the whole time and showing 
ifi«elf at different points on tlie Ihuleu Rhine frontier. 

The following are some of the smaller Fhjhts which t4K>k place 
with the French outposts, without reckoning the raids which were 
of daily occurrence. 

On the 19th of July, an encounter between French Chasseurs 
d'Afrique who luid passed the frontier at Saarbnivken aind Trnssian 

On the 21st of July, likewise at SasirbrUcken upon French 
territory, a skirmish between a part of the HohcnzolhTu Fusilier 
Regiment No. 4<» and French troops. 

On the 24th of July, the enemy endeavoured with «ine battalion 
to take possession of the bridge of // elinlen, it was however for(M*d 
to retreat by a battalion sent out from Sa^irlonis aiul a detarhment of 
Uhlans. On the same dav there was a skinnish at Uersieeiler near 
Saarbrflcken when a company of the Hth Rhinish Infantry Regiment 

■ A 


Nr. 70 took the cuBtom home at Sekreeklmgem, and UUaiiB of the 
7th Regiment blew up a viadaet at the railway jnnetion of Saar- 
gemflnd and Hagenan. 

On the 24th of July, French Infantry were repnlaed by Pnuaiaa 
IJhlanR and Pioneera together with Bavarian Jagera at the bridge of 
liheinhrim on the Bliea, to the north-eaat of Saargemllndy and a 
recognisance of the country round Hagenau was made by the Wurtem- 
berg staflT officer, Count Zeppelin with three Baden officers. 

On the 27 th of July three companies of French Infantry and 80 
men of the Cavalry made an attack at ySikUmgen to the west of 
Saarbrflcken and were repulsed. 

On the 29th of July, firing took place between Bavarian Jagen 
and French Cavalry KiSchweyen near Nenhombaeh in the Palatinate. 

On the 30th of July a French column of Infantry with Artillery 
made an attack upon SaarbrQcken without success. 

On this day however, the German Armies were already about to 
advan(*e. Prince Frederick Charles removed his head-quarters flrom 

Mayence to the westward, the Crown Prince of Pnissia repaired to 
Spcycr and General von Steinmetz directed hirt columns from the 
Rhine (»n to the line Trier-Saarlouis-Saarbrttcken. From thin moment 
the danger of a French invasion was averted, and the superiority of 
the strategical position on the other side, began clearly to show itself. 

The constantly increasing attempts made by the French to 
procure single advantageous positions, chiefly in the country about 
SaarbrUckcn, as well :i8 to induce the (tcrmans to devclope their 
strength, bore the character of indecision and ainilessness , until at 
last upon the 2ud of August, tlie atlavk of thv whole of Fros^arfPs 
Corps upon SaarhrUrkm, proved that a general combined oftensive 
movement no longer existed in the Fr4'neh war plan. 

This attark, in the presein-e of th(» Kmperor and the Prince 
Imperial, had apparently the sob* object of producing a vit'tory for 
the impatient French people, with wlii<'h the Imperial name should 
be associated. 

F(»r alter the battalion of the Hohenzolleni Fusilier Regiment, 
which h(dd Saarbnlcken all ahiue for an hour, had been compelled t(» 
retreat from the ti»wn, and it Inul been occupied by Fro8Siird*s Corps, 


the conqueror made no use of hiA ndvnntagoR, but wag Aatiflfiecl with 
holding a defensive position opposite the line of the Saar, until this 
ittrong position, together with the apparent advantages gained on the 
2nd, wjis torn from him on the r»th of August, by the Prussian Corps 
wliich had then arrived. 

Tlie helplessness of the French chief c<mimand appears all the 
clearer, if one eouhiders the grand preparati(ms which pre<'eded this 
theatrical manoeuvre. 

Frossard's Corps had been stationeil at St. Avoid since the 20th 
of July. Ladmirault's Corps had b<»en moved forwanl from Thion- 
ville towards Houzonvillc on tlie Nied, for the support of his left 
flank, Baz:iine's Corps to Forbach for the supp<»rt of his <'entre, and 
I^piu»Met's Brigade from the r>th Corps, occupied SaargeniUud in order 
to cover Frossard's right flank. Over ICM ),()()() men were brought 
together in order to assist at tin' Prince Imperial's baptism of fire. 

Upon the same day an aimless dem<»nstratiou was also made at 
Rheinheim to the east of SaargemUnd, by the advau<*e of a strong 
Freneh e^dumn. The c<dumn m<»ved back again atlter a vig(»rous fire 
n|>on (lerman patrols. 

Thus the energetic, powerful advance <»f the numerically superior 
C lerman Annies found itself opposed by an enemy, inferior in numlw^rs, 
:ind gtill with no decided aim. 

4 • 



After having carried out the (»r<ler, this Uenenil heant on the 
ffveoing of the 3th of August, of the approach of the thinl <iernian 
army, and coramuiiieatcd the intellipMiee to (leueral Duerot who was 
statioucd at Woertli, and to whom the Marshal had ^iven tlie command 
of the l8t and 2nd Divisions, eontin;;ently. 

(icneral Diicrot imparted to him, in tiie name, of tlic Marshal, the 
strict command to give battle. 

For t4ic 4th of August the following disp(»sition was given tmt for 
the Uonnan Ooq)d. 

^T he .advanced guard, I>(»thmerV Division from Hartmann'sliava- 
han Corps, to niov(» off from its hivouae at r» o'cUh-Ic a. m. in the 
direrti(»n of Wci8«<;nburg, an<l to endeavour to take 'poss<-ssion of 
the town. To Hccure its right flank by sending a detachment through 
Ii4*ll<'nhoni towanls the Hohenthal. The remainder of the <.*orps, 
Walthern Division, to move oiT from its bivona<' at -I o\*l<N*k a. m., 
anil marcli to DberOtterbach going n»und Landau through ImpHingen 
and ik'rgzabem. 

''Tlie t'avalry Division to c^mcentrate at (» o'chH'k a. m. im the 
(w»iith of Mersheim, and to march by Insheim , Kohrhach , Hillig- 
h<*ini, Itarbelroth, Kap|H*llen as tar as the Dtterbach, looo pact's to 
tii4* wcMt of Ol>cr-Otterbach. 

"Tlie V. Prussian ('«»rps to mo\c otT from its bivouac at IJillig- 
hi'ini at 1 o'chirk a. m., and to march through l(:irlM*h'otli and Nieder- 
IHt«'rba«>h u|Hm (iro>s -Steinteld and Kapsweyer. It wa^ to fonn a 
i^lMi'ial advauccii guard, which would cross the l^jiuter at St. Kemy and 
Wagliansel, and place out posts upon the liei;;lits un the oppo>ite side. 

"^The XI. <'orps to move otf at I oVloek a. m. from liohrbach 
ainl to march by Steinweiler, Winden, Sehcidt through the Hienwahl 
ii|M»n the ItienwahlshUtte. It \%as to form a >pecial advanced guard 
which would cniss the 1 winter and place out-iHists upon the heights on 
the <»ther side. 

••Wenh*r*s(*orp8 to maivh bv the hi;:li roatl towanls I^uterbnrg, 
Ui riHleavour to take possession of the place, and to plact* outposts 
np<m the opp4»site shore. 

-V<m der Tann's <'orp> to move ntf tVom its bivnuae at 


4 oN'lock a. m., aiid to march by the high road through BflbheiB 
to I^DgeDkandel, to the west of which place it would blYOoac 

"^Tiie head-qoarten woald be previoaaly removed to Nieder^ 

The fFeissenburg lines (v. map)^ for the capture of which these 
(lispositions were madCy offered military hindrances, chiefly* in the 
ancient fortress of Weissenburg, and in the entrenchments erected in 
oarlicr times along thcLauter. These fortifications were again brought 
into use the last time the frontier was occupied, and liad been aug- 
mented by artificial strengthening of theGeisberg, a position naturally 
diftlcult to assault 

The whole elevation rising about 8()0feet, with its north-eastern 
shipes falling to the Lauter, presented peculiar disadvantages to the 
a8K:ulauts crossing, not only from its lying behind the river and 
offering good positions for the Artillery, but also from its being 
i'rtpccially favourable for the fire of riflemen from behind the stone 
walls enclosing the vineyards. 

General Douajfy reinforced by the 74 th Line Regiment, the 3rd 
IluKsnrs, and i\\v, 11th ChasHcurrt acheval, thus having a force of 
1<) Hattalions, 8 Squadrons and i Uattcrii's including 1 Mitraillt^use 
battiTy, occupied Weissenbur^ witli I battalion of the 1st Keginient 
of Algerian Tirailleurs and 1 battalion ot* the 74tli He^iment, and had 
barrica<led the gates of the town. Ui>on tiic southern heights he had 
posted 2 battalions and 1 batt<'ry, and with the main body of his 
Division he stntngly held the Geisberg. 

The morning of the 4tli of August was dull and rainy. 

Tlie Crown Prin<M^ lelt Lan<lau with his statf and suite at 
r>. 15 o'clock a. ni. On his arri\al upon the heights to the eastward 
of Scli^iei;;en .at almnt l». l.") o'clock a. ni., the liea<l <»!' Hotlimer's 
ailvancdl ^ruarti )ia<l conic up in tVonI of Weissenhur^ and thr first 
shots jvtL The place showed it-^clf completely prepared tor dct'cn<M», 
the a<lvanced ;:uard deployed its :; battalions, the rc;;inient (»t' li^ht 
<'av:iiry and 1 Iwittery of artillery and opened fire, in order to await 
the arrival ot' tli(> remaining columns. 

In consequence of the cannonade lires very s(»on broke 4»ut in two 
()lace> in the to\^n. 


Meanwhile the advanced guard of the V. Oorpn, the 1 7th Infantry 
Brigade, after having crossed the Lauter, debouched at St. Remy and 
Waghinsely at a quarter to 1< ) o'clock, and formed for attack upon the 
opposite heights, where they received a vigorous cannonade at 
1(> o'clock a. m. 

An liour later, the 18th Brigade began to develope itself upon 
the right flank of the 17th, at 11.30 o clock a. m. it took Altenstadt, 
and debouched upon the south bank of the Lauter for the purpose of 
going forward to attack the (jlei^berg. 

Tp to this moment Bothmcr's Division had confined itself to a 
cannonade agmnst VVcissenburg , now however, the 9th Division 
having crossed the Luuter, it was also possible to make an attack 
opon the town from the south east; 2 battalions of the 47th Regiment, 
18th Brigade, and 1 battalion (»f the r>8tli Regiment, 17th Brigade, 
were sent out for this purpose fnmi Altenstadt, on to the south bank of 
the Lauter, and al 12 o'clock the (jencral storming offVeissenburg 

The barricaded gates of the town were broken open by 
artillery. The Prussian and Bav:u*ian battalions, attacking simul- 
taneously, t<><»k the entrance at the first assault. An obstinate fight 
then developed itself in the town, which ended in the garrison being 
taken prisoners. 

The southern height of Weissenburg was assaulted at the 
same time. 

At 11 o'clock the heads of the XL Corps arrived on the left, 
near the 17th lirigiide of the V. Corps. Ueneral von Bose had 
marched through the Bienwald and crossed the Lauter without meet- 
ing with oppoKiti<»n, and had then, in accordance with the orders 
given to him, continued the advance by Schleithal in the direction of 
Ingolsheim. Debouching upon S<*hleithal at 11 o'chn^k, the heads of 
the (M>rps were immediately directed t<»wards the Geisberg. 

After a vigonniH artillery fight, carried on by the V. Corps, in 
which tlie Artillery Corps also shared, the IKth Infantry Brigade 
advanced at 12. 15 o*clock from Altenstadt, and the 41st Brigade of 
the XL Corps from .Schleithal, thus marching in a westerly direction for 
a concentrated attack upon the (leisbcrg. 

The appearance of the 41st Brigade had already induced the 


enemy to throw baek his left flank. The lino of hit froat sow 
<orrc8poiided exactly with the conflgnntion of the QelihWf • Bwaim 
of riflemen earried on a devastating fire firom the yineyaids mpam the 
advuDcing eolumns, in which the Boperiority of the Ghaasepot rifle, in 
perciirtsioD strength at long ranges, was for the first time clearly 

The mitraillense battery opposed to Prussian artilleiyi did not 
answer the expectations which the French had placed on this newly 
introduced arm. Three shots only could be delivered| beltare a shell 
striking in the midst of the batteiy, produced such destmetioD among 
tlie serving troops, that it had to be withdrawn. 

The Prussian Infantry advanced in columns up the steep heif^t, 
with iucomparable calmness and bravery, in spite of the great 
ditrii-ulties of the ground and the murderous fire. The steady move- 
uient of the battalions never wavered for an instant 

Amid great losses, in which the King's GrenadierSi at the head, 
especially Bufl^ered, the outer premises were taken at 12. 80 0*eh€kf 
and at 1 o'clock^ the castle^ lying behindj in the first assmmli. 

At 1. 30 o'clock p.m., the Crown Prince rode througli Altenstadt 
on to the Geisberg heights. 

With the loss of this liill the French position was deprived of 
its principal point iTappni. The Frencii <*crtainly endeavoured to 
make another offensive attack at I. 30 o\'lm*k, but tliis fruitless efltort 
may nnly have been t^ cover tlie retreat, wliich was commenced, in 
three columns, towards the south-west, pursued by the Artillery fire of 
the two Prussian Torps, and from 2 o'clock <ui, by the two (.'avaliy 
Regiments of the Uth and lOth Divisions. Over UMM) unwounded 
prisiincrs, amongst wtiom were about 3() officers, fell into the hands of 
thr rou<|uerors, also a gun taken troin the fithJager Battalion, and the 
whole camp equipment and baggage of the 2nd Division. General 
Douay had fallen, iiis Divisinu had lost about V2(H) men in killiMl 
and wounded. 

The loss <d tlu* (iermans in killed and wounded was also great, 
it may perhaps hav(* surpassed that of the Fren<'li. 

All the German troops which had been in the battle moved forward 
as far as the heights to the south of the Lauter and pla<'cd out-posts. 
Werders Corps, which had not been engaged, had occupied Lauter- 


borg, pushed forward one Brigade tiiwardH Selz and stationed out- 
posts in connection with those of the XI. Corps. 

In winning this battle, besides tlie moral effect upon the two 
armies, the possession of the important niads lead'mg toStrasburgand 
Bitsch was obtained. Consequently the tight flank of the French 
position was placed in imminent danger; Alsace, unprotected, lay 
open to the third army, and the isolation of Strasburg could now 
hardly be averted. 

The valley of the Rhim^, extending open and free from the south 
of WeiHsenburg to Stnisbiirg, and thence beyond, is bounded on the 
rest by the Vosges, which rise from the Weissenburg heights, now 
taken by the third army. 

It now became necessary that the French Army, whose right 
wing had lost as it were the key of their position, should endeavour 
tbove all things to hold the passages of the Vosges, unless they al- 
ready wished to change the whole strategical front, and move back 
opon the line of the Moselle. 

Tlie flank of the main body of the French Army was separated 
fn>m the assailants by the Vosges. Mac Mahon's task should he to 
defend this <*hain to the utnioHt, for which object all his strength must 
be emphiyed, and the Mnrnhal determined to accomplish this task 
by a defensive batth' near Woerth. 

Upon the other side, the Crown Prince's Army moved off* on the 
morning after the virtorioiis flght^in order to follow the same dircM'tion 
in mhii'h it had hitherto advanced. This march direction must 
infallibly lead on to the flank and rear of the French position. It 
ofered the chance of complet^'ly rolling up this position, unices the 
Frem^h Army at «»nce commenced a general retreat. 

Tlie Crown Prince's Anny, being numerically superior to each 
liogle French i'orps, and even to two or three of them, was more 
than n match for any possible concentration of the enemy to the 
frrmt. It was foreseen that the French army could only ofl\»r sufficient 
rttistance to the Crown Prince by a c<mcentrati(»n t(»wards the rear, 
conseiiaently upon the left flank. Without however taking into c<»n- 
lideration the French confidence of victory, which this defensive 
movement did not revoke, such an operation on the part 4»f the enemy 
woild have had the disadvantage of giving full time to the first 

:ii)il Kpfond Ocmiftn nrmieB, to jnin in tlic artlnn dq thoir'dd^ «id faf 
II i)Iin[>le lulviuicu, ti> iinit<! willi tlin lliiiil Aniiy. 

A (wmbinrtl oiturHtioii on (lii; purt of (liu French Aimy oonld iiitt, 
lioHL'Vcr, be arrajiKed. As already tncntiuiictl, Msrsbal Mac Uslum 
threw hioisnir ulniie, a^HJimt tUo enom^ and nii (lit- Tith I'CAugaii 
orvuiwA K fiivournblu position nlong the Saiirrbnrh, ii|iiin tlio iinnUni 
idupn of the Voa^w iv. map of the battle of Wonrlti). Tlii* po«ition 
w»fl titly choiteii for Die defenHlvo, whiUt nlTcrlii^; at the aanie tima 
fiivixirablu uppurtnitiliut fur the ofTuiiittvi'. 

It was formed by the raJley of thu Sauer, K(M) paifca wide, 
i-uiiuiu); from nortli to aoulli, whoae ^cftterii bank, bordi'i'od by atw{i 
Hiid partly womlHl licighlN, indiirated the iiatiiral front i>r llie FnnKli 
j\rmy. The village of Klaiisliatucu, foriiiiug by its position on a titvf 
iiill a kind of retired bastiuii, wa« the key of the uholu poHltitm, ta 
^\]lkh the villa^ of Frowhwciliir wait a fiivourahle pomi ifa/ipm. 
Till- lliuik« vrerc protected by the villngi's of HorBbronu and Kbnrbwk 
ill the §outb, Neuwciler hi the iiortU. aa well aa by doep eutKocb- 
meuta uiost favuumbly pliu-ed. At the foot of t)ic whide pogilkn 
nboiit one aud r half hours*) wide, tin: liL(j;broiid luiidhig fnm 
Uagoiiaii to Woertli upon an nnibaiiknient formed a first rate Udd rf 
fuiniiiuoifation, wliilnt ild rlovation above the wide nicadow vnllojr tf 
the 8aiiur could «l«o be most advantageously used as t))e 6rtit Unit df 
defence, and was bo naed. Tlie eaatcru Hlo[>a»i, partly planted tiith 
vine*, which grejitly impeded the movt^ment of the (Jemtiui tnoft, 
fall down steeply towards the Saner, and iU-c commanded from Um 
opposite »hore. The Uttlo Hti-oaiu itaclf, only about Id pHOCH wjlfy 
liaM nnch Htepp bniiku, nnil after tlie eonlinu'-d rain waa to omft. 
swollen, that the Preneti commander in chief may probably lum 
eonsidercd it impossible to wade through. Tlie only paaugw 
aeroas this nioniitaiti etream, were at the IlnichmUhle, at Spxchbaik 
auil Woerth, 

It in, however, a great ^uetilion whether the Marshal actol 
wisely, in here placing himself in the way of the Crown Prince's fom, 
nlthotigh the position in ^ itxulf wag very sli-ong, and could be 
advantage riualy defended. lie must be prepared to resist an mtmij 

*) between 4 and 6 EDglUli iuMgi. • 

of much gi^ater streugtii and mimt bear in mind that if the 
Corpd had the misfortiiiie of being completely routed, the 
passage tiirongh the V'osgcB wouUI be (piite open to the German 
Army. The Marshal staked all his chaucoB upon one throw, by 
plju;ing his Corps in position at VVoerth, whilst had he declined one 
great battle, and by distributing his forces, occupied all the most 
important defiles of these barrier-like mountains, he would probably 
have succeeded in making a longer and more obstinate resistance in 
defence of the Vosges. 

On the day that Douay's Divinion was beaten at Weissenburg, 
Mac Mahon had three Divisions still at his disposal, concentrated to 
the east of Keichshofen. lie had been apprised of the attack upon 
Weissenbnrg after he had sent an (»rder by telegraph to the commandant 
of the 7th Cor|)s (General Douay), which was provisionally under his 
command, to dispatch Conseil-Dumesnirs DiviHion for his support. 
On the night of the 4th of August, he received the news of the defeat, 
and on the morning of the next day he made preparations to tleliver 
a battle in the position of Woerth amKiunstett, as he could not doubt 
that the Crown Princess Army would advance towards Ilagenau by 
tiie roads commanded from here. 

In a tactical point of view this p(»sition was , without doubt, 
excellently ch(»8en. But, even reckoning upon C^onseil-Dumesnirs 
Division and Douav's beaten Division, the Marshal eould not assume 
that he would be able to bring together more than r>o,(MM» men, con- 
sequently hiK plan was very rash, and testities to the want of a 
correct estimation of his adversary, whieli was so frequently to bo 
observed in this war. 

The first idea was to occupy the plateau of Gunstett with 
one Division and the heights upon the rigiit (west) bank of the 8auer 
with the main body; as, however, this |K>sition would have been 
greatly extended in proportion to the strength of the troops, the 
Marahal confined himself to the (»cciipation of the hitter entrenched 
poiutlon, and made the following disposition: the 1st Division near 
Laogensulzbaeh, the .'^rd near Wonlti, tlj^e Ith upon the right flank 
at EUaahausen, the Division retiring fnmi Weissenburg to form the 
Reserve of tlie centre, the Reserve Artillery to form up between 
Froschweiler and Elsashausen, the numerous Cavalry consisting of 


Boniieiiiaiii*8 Ooinader Diidsioiiy lllchel's and SepteoiTl BvigaiM U 
the plain in rear of the centre and right wing, and he then swatted Ae 
arrival of Gonaeil-Dnmeanil's J)iviBion to reinforee the ri|^ iriag, 

TUa DiYiflion was delayed although it still eamenp in time fiir the 
battle. On the 4th| upon the erroneooa announcement of a coneeBtn" 
tion of troops at LQrrach m the Black Forest, it had left Ita statta 
at Colmar to go to Mflhlhansen, to which place Libert's 8nd DMaioB 
of the 7th Corps was also directed, whilst the 3rd, Domont^ay was 
still being formed in Lyons. 

Conseil-Domesnirs Diyision had scarcely left the railway at 
Mtthlhansen when it was again embarked jn the evening between 8 
and 10 o'clock, and arrived at Hagenan at 2 o'clock on the mmlag 
of the 5th of August, from whence it took the route towards Beieha- 
liofen. Here it arrived upon the evening of the 5th, and was fonned 
up in rear of Lartigue's Division. The Artillery belonging to it, which 
wa8 upon the march from Colmar to Mflhlhansen on the 4th Angnsli 
was at Ensisheim when it received a counter order. On the 6th it 
inarched back to Colmar where it was embarked on the railway h 
the evening. Tlio 2ncl Division^ now commanded by General Pell^ 
which h:ul retired fitan Weiiirienburg to Ilngenau, arrivcil from tlicnce 
on the evening of the 5th, by railway, and was fonned up iu reserve. 

At the same time that the plateau of (Sunstctt w:i8 abandoned, at 
1 1 o'clock a. ro. ou the 5tli of August, the Marslial irwued an order 
that all the bridges over the Sauer, between VVoerth and the Bruch- 
mUlile, were to be destroyed ; which proves that he intended merely to 
deliver a defensive fight. An hour hiter, however, when the heads 
of the (iernian «*idvanced guard already showed themselves upon the 
left bank , he recalled the order , in order to k(M»p the possibility 
of an offensive movement, yet at that time he was carefully occupied 
with the lines of retreat, ht^ obtained detailed information about them 
from engineer oilirers :uMiiiaiiited with the country, and issutMl the 
nt'cessary instructiniis for a retreat, to which he added the HMuark, 
that they would have to deal with considerable forces, aiul a power- 
ful Artillery. • 

A dispatch from the Emperor however, which arrived at 8. 30 
o'cl<K*k p. m. announcing that the 5tli Corjis, de Failly*s, was placed 
at his disposal, changed this aspect of the militar}' situation. 


The Marshal immediately sent a telegram to General de Failly, 
the tenor of which was: ^The Emperor places your Corps at my 
disposal, endeavour to join me as soon aH possible." — 

The Marshal was so delighted at this unexpected reinforce- 
nent and had such confidence in the strength of the position he 
bad chosen, that he exclaimed joyfully ^Messieurs les Prussiens 
je poux tiensf' — 

On the 5th of August the Crotrn Prince's Army was moved 
fom^ard on the line of the Selz, the V. and XI. Prussian Corps 
io tlie centre on the road to Hagenau, the two Bavarian Corps 
on their right, the Wurtembcrg and Baden Divisions on tlieir left 
flank, the Cavalry 'Division in reserve. 

During the night of the 5th of August, tlic II. Bavarian Corps 
bivouacked at Lembach, the 1. Bavarian Cor])H at Ingolsheim, the 
V. Corps at Preusclidorf, the XI. at Sulz, von Werder's Corps at 
Aschbach and the Cavalry Divitnion at SchOnenburg. The Baden 
troops, which were* not engaged in this battle, were stationed more 
to the south, at Buhl. The head-quarters were at Sulz. Advanced 
posts were stationed along the Sauer towards the S4)uth and to the 
east of Woerth. 

The Croum Prince had issued no dispositions for the 
attack on the ijth of August, as it was not the intention to 
give battle upon that day. On the contniry, only a narrower 
concentration towards the fr<»nt had been commanded, in order to 
make a complete a])proach, witli all the Corps together, upon the 
FreDch position, before attacking it. 

The Wurtembcrg Division was to adv:mce from Aschbach to 
Hohweiler and Ueimcrswiller, the XI. Corps from Sulz to IlOlsch- 
loch, whilst the V. Corps was to remain stationary, fronting the 
Saner, the 1. Bavarian Corps was drawn near Preuschd(»rf towards 
the Centre, the Cavalry Division at Schduenburg, and the head- 
quarters in Sulz, would remain there. 

By day break, however, whilst the Corps which had to 
change their positions had Just begun to more, a small 
skirmish took place between the out-posts, of both sides, along 
the Sauer. 

AfMHiMMf^ Bkrattw OVJiH was on the extreme rijclit fluik, 
and 0OliHMr'k''DliUou of It ^n(wiintt«ri-(I the ndmnc^il tr<iii|M vf 
tiucrota Dtrlilot. "ne Igkt \.m hot nnd carnpiit, the BaviiTlant 
followed Vf ft* adrutagc wliidi tliey hful f;aineil beyowt Ltunbaeli 
as far M LugeoraUbMh. 

Upon GoBflnl DwiNf s uiH>iinc«:nK'nt uf the Itni-amns' ntbiok, 
Marshul Hio Ibhon reptired, at .iboTit 7 o'clock a. ni., to lila left 
flank for ti» pupoH sf ol»ii>i'vulii>ri. \\^ dts'liireil lli»l iho 
cneray co«U aot yet be mfSeiently far Hilvatic^ to make a real 
attack ; it was evidentlr nothisj; nioi-e tiian a dcmoriatntllou, and 
ho only expected the Iwttle on tha fdlluwiiig day. 

Thni the Marshal, judginj; from thtu - di«taiK4^ betwocn 
Wcissenborg and Woerth, and tiip (iHi-mau di«i)<mitioii8 based tbenv 
on, calculated quite correctly. Biii lie lind net tuki^n int» nrr^mnt 
the extraotdiaary warlike ardour smd ontliusiaBm of tlie German 
officers and BoldEers, which led to the vii'.tiiry 34 hoiint Koiiner 
than ori^nally intended by their coinmnndur incliicf. 

The Marebal therefore, doriu)^ the firHt itonra of the batU^ 
planned out instructions for Gem r^l lii- Fnill> , ftitnuli'il iijiiin the 
supposition that a battle would \:tVv |>Lii'i' i>ii tlir Tlli nf Aii-iiM. 

An officer of the engineers, well acquainted with the conntry, 
was charged with the delivery of this diapatrh. He left Froscb- 
weiler at 9. 30 o'clock, and selected for his road a neighbonring 
valley behind Reichshofen; for the nearest way, the valley of 
Niederbronn waa considered endangered by (term an econring 
patrols. He reached BitB< li at about I o'clock. Oeiieral de Failly, 
hiiwevcr, did not afford tlu- Marshal the reqntsite Hujijiort, although 
he received the order to march to Wocrlh, the previous evening at 
R o'clock. His condnrt offers a striking exLimple cif the want of 
a single Direction in the French Army, and of the defecttvenesi 
of a principle, uhieh allowed great independence to the intlividQid 
iVirpH leaders, and the initiative in Hitn.-itioiis of the gre.ttest moment 
and of entirely general importance. 

Of the Sth Corps, the Ist Division itiose'sl, and Mansdion'a Brigade 
of the 2iid Division (Labadie's'i were stationed abont 2 kilometres*) 

*) I Knglinh mile. 


to the west of Bitsch, and guarded the ddbouch^8 of the roads 
from Zwcibrflckeii and Saargcmflnd. The Ist Brigade, Lapassefs, 
of the 2nd Division, Labadie's, occupied the latter town. Upon 
General de FaiUy^s receipt of Mac Mahon's dispatch, instead of 
immediately commencing the march with his whole Army Corps, 
excepting the detachments of observation necessary for keeping up 
the connection with the Ist Anny (-'or]>8, he contented himself with 
issuing an order for the march of the 3rd Division on the follow- 
ing day. 

General ^uyot de Lespart consequently commenced the march 
early on the 6th of August, but a few hours after, the com- 
mandant of the Coq)S sent liim a counter order, commanding liim 
to halt, in the apprehension that he would himself be attacked 
from Zweibrticken. At this time the Division was at Pliilippsburg, 
at most 15 kilometres*) from the field of battle. 

When the engineer officer, sent from the Marshal, arrived at 
Bitsch at 1 oVlock, and delivered his dispatch, de Failly declared 
that it would be impossible to carrry out the order, his (*orps 
would be scattered, he dared not abandon Saargemtiud, lie must 
keep a Division with the reserve Artillery in Bitsch, and had many 
other arguments to justify his inactivity. Finally, however, upon 
its being reprcHcnted to him, how near Guyot de Lespart's Division 
was U* the field of battle, he decided to give him the order to 
advance, and it arrived upon the field of battle in the C4»urse of 
the afterno<»n, for the most part by railway. 

Major General ff^aither von Montbary commanding the 
ont-poats of the German V. Corps was, like General B<»thmer on 
the right flank. Involved in a fi^ht in the centre. lie could not 
help inferring from the movements of the enemy, that he was 
earr^'ing out a retreat, and therefore ordered a reconnaissance to 
be mllde. A battalion of the Westphalian Fusilier Kegiment Nr. .37 
was mc»ved forward against WiKTth, under cover c»f the fire of the 
oit-post batteries, in order to make the enemy unfold his fon*es, 
ind to gain an insight into his comparative strength. This battalion 

*) 9 Englitih milea. 


came upon a front which wm very atrongiy ooeupied, and 
conBeqaentljy drawn into a vigorona fight. 

General van Kitchbaehy commanding the V. CorfMiy howereTy 
ittBued an order at 8 o'clock, to break off the fight^ in psrsaaMe 
of the diB]M)8itions made for tills day by the commander in eUeC 

Bat from this point a lively cannonade was now audible npoa 
tlie right flank , caused by the fight of the II. Bavarian Gorpa, 
wliiUt on the left flank the XI. Corps was observed to be engaged 
witli the enemy. In consequence of this, the fight was alao 
oontJDued here at Woerth. By breaking it off, the adjacent Gorpa 
would have been isolated, and their flanks endangered. 

The thunder of cannon upon the riglit, had been perceived Vy 
Major General von Schaehimeyer^ who was with tlie advanced 
guard of the XI. Corps, as early as 7 o'doek, at HOlsehloeh. 
Soon after, the firing ceased for a short time, and the General 
ordered his Division, the 21st, to move into bivouac at the plaee 
named, in accordance with the previoosly issued dispositions. Froa 
hen*, the Fn*m*li camp could be seen upon the heights to the west 
4»f (lunrttett, on the opjiosite side of the Sauer. Gimstett WmA^ was 
iK'cnpied by 2 conipanie8 and 2 Hi^uadronH of the V. (^orps. Th6 
cannonade at Woerth now began afresh, and became more violent 
every moment. General »Schaclitmeyer therefore f«»nned hirt ad- 
vanced guard at the werttern egrcHH of the NicderwaUl lit was about 
H (/clock, when the 87th Regiment, the first corps, debouched from 
tlie Miederwald with (lunstett in its front), sent a battalion to 
reinforce the detachment at Gunstett, and directed the artillery of 
the main hody tc» the s:ime phice, for wlii<*h purpose it wtMild have 
to pass the Niwlerwahl. 

These pn'liminary movements had hardly been carried out 
when a Frenrh battery showed itself in position opposite, and 
Frt'ueh columns of Intantry \^ere also observed, marching on 

Immediately after the advanci>d guard had developed, the A 

Imtteriert formed U))on the height to the north-west of (lUUritett 

and opened fire; the order lieiug given to hold (lunstett, and the 
line east of the Saner. 

Thus at 9 o^rhck, the fiyht had betjun along the whole 

Im^^ although the greater part of the Corps were still far in 

r^or, Ab yet the I. Bavarian Corps had not bocii eiigai^od at 

ally <»f the V. Corprt only the adwuKM^I troops, thtr 22n(1 Divinion 

<»r the XI. <'orpH had jnst readied Snrburjr, and (Jenrral vt»n Wenler's 

l'«»r-pa had only arrived at Keiniei*swill<*r. 

The v. CN»rjw had b<M»n rnpij^ed, «infe sot»n alter H o\*h»ek, 
III z\ MTifinH attaek npon the position at Woerth. After th(^ Artillery 
••r tli<' advanced gnaid liad aj^ain ojienrd iin*, the ArtiUery <'orpH 
^a*** silso ordered to form uj) on the lieights to the east ot' Woerth. 
.S4»«»ti after, Hie 10th Infantry Division wau fornied np in the first 
iiia*', and the 9th Infantry Divisiftn in tho second line, both of 
til*- 111 ff vheral of the road from Prensrlidorf t»» Woerth. 

At lO oVhick all th<' 1 I Batteries k)( the Corps had opened 

fi*"**, and an honr later, >\hen the snperiority of this Artillery over 

tli^i-t of the French had heetmie evident, and the XI. <'orps had 

ali^« • made progress, CSeneral von Kirehhaeh eomnianded the 

a^lvsAneitl guanl to take Woerth, and esta!)lish itself npon the hillti 

"»t tlie other side. 

In the XL Corps, tlie 22nd Division which had made pre- 

pur:itionri t<» hivonae at Surhurg, was apprised of the state nf aflfairs 

">' th«' thuniler of eannon, and at the same time hy a report fn»m 

*"*• -1st Division, the (ieneral commanding, ron Hose, apiN>aring 

^'*'" it. The Division immediatelv conunenced to nmn*Ii on /w/w- 

*^^ffy the 4:5nl Infantry Brigade, and the Artillery in front, then the 

''*■* Infantr\ Brigade, both taking the rontr roniul tin' sonthern 

^»rn«.p ,^^ ^ii^ Niederwald. The lUh Thtlringian Infantr\ Kegiment 

' '^^ ^^, and the Artillerv were afterwards directed to the north <d* 

"OiiKti-tt, and the 2nd Thilringiaii Inljintry Regiment No. :'.2 t.. the 

•"■til ^,f (|||. village, on the K'Uierliach. 

^ General vt»n Werder's Corps nreived intelligence that the 
^■•-* had begnn, at 11 oVlo<'k. The (ieneral at once inih'red 

■ "■■■t S<'lieler*H Brigade of Ca\alrv and StarklofTs I nfantrv Brigade 

(wl . "... 

*••»*<• baggage was let't behind', from the Wurtend»erg Di\isii»n, 

^^^T Lientenant (ien»'nil \oii Obernitz, with tlu' Artillery belong 

•«» it, to move ofT fn»m UeiniMr-iwiller, by Siirbnrg, towanis (inn 

^* All the remainder waited in bi\onac reailv to maivh oil'. 

lu lA« wuttMwkUe a ehaitge kt 
right /hnt, Ike tffaeU of wAiek e»tand> w | 

Bh<atly Afto- the bftttln hid begna, on nodillig the intvUievim 
that the ArtUlery of the V. Corps wm to be Iroii^lil bitit lutliua 
upon the hwghtt agunst Woerth, u before inei)ti<i[Kid, llir Civwo 
Prince had ordered the fig^t to he hraken off Uitil the ulhtir Cwpa 
had come np in BufBeieiit strength. Bat before ilim i-»iuiiiaiii! li«d 
reached the fidd of battle, Bothmer'a Division, <.<( the U. Il«%'arira 
CurpB, had already gained groond towards Woerth be yuad Laiigcnsnlf- 
bach; thia General also wrongl; received the mmuiuiid hi break 
off the fight at 10. 30 o'clock, la conseqneiwe . »f #liicli hti now 
retreated npon the positioD at Langensnlsbaeh. 

Marshal Mae Uahon, being thos relieved npon IiIh kfl fUak, 
was BOW able to direct his whole force agunst Woi^rtli. 

ThU wot Me critical moment of the batitr. The V. 
Prussian Corps in a thrice repeated assanlt endenvtmred !o vus I* 
advance beyond Woerth. 

Whilst the battle was here raging at its liigttMt, the Qro« 
Priuce, accompanied by Lieutenant General voii ltliiuii;mlli&l uA 
suite, came Xo tnke the command uf the tr(K)pB r<<ll<-i-ii-<l upun tki 
battle field, and uccupied tlie rising ground imnicdiatrly in &Mt 
of Woerth, in the centre of tlie figlitiug lines, a.^ a. polut of o^ 
scrvation. It wan now about 1 o'clock. 

Tlic French offeiiKive hnd not been confinoil to Wxcrtli, 

At II). 3U o'clock, tlie xame moment ut wliii-h \\u: UavutaM 
broke off tliu fight, LacrctcUc's French Itrig.LiIi', comjioked of 
Zonaves and Algerian Tirailleurs, broke fll^wa^l I'rotn MomhiMS 
agiiiuHt Cundlett, ni>w occupied <inly by llio advaiKLiI (,'Tiiiid of tbt 
2\A Division. 

To meet this att:ick, tlic DivlHinti Ktrengthened tlie poMtwi 
at Gimslftt by 2 batlalionK iVoui lli<'. niuiii budy, pushed fonraid 
uni' battalion of tlii> KTtli H*-gini«-iit to the Ikuclimillile which WM 
u{tui]iie4] by a company of JagiTK, and sent U battiilious into tin 
ravine lo the north of the vilhigp of Spaclibach. This waa dOM 
under the fire of 2 of the cneiiiyV butti-riei) and n niltrailleose batteiy 
in pi'sitlon nppusite <liiii»letl, wliieh fire was soon after sngmeatel 
in a (langpriins iiiaiiiK]- by 2 I'resh Freiicli batteries which wen 


driTen np to the edge of a hill, flanking EUashausen on the eaat 
However the chief effect of these latter, was averted from the 
ooIqiuds of the 2l8t Division by the fire of a battery of the V. 
CorpSy in position to the north of Spachbach, and the 3 first mentioned 
batteries were played upon by the Artillery of the XL Corps, 
posted on the north of Gunstett. 

The French Brigade met with a vigorous reception at the 
Bnichmflhle; it was repulsed, and pursued across the meadows to 
the highroad embankment, where it obtained excellent cover. 

Further north, however, French tirailleurs Iiad established 
themselves upon ^is side of the Sauerbach, and French columns 
now appeared in still greater strength upon the heights. 

At 11 o* clock. General ron Bose came into Gunstett, promis- 
ing the arrival of the 22nd Division and the Artillery Corps. 

Ualf an hour later, the anticipated second attack upon Gun- 
stett began. It was carried on to the outskirts of the village, but 
was nevertheless repulsed, with the assistance of the Jager Battalion 
No. 11, which had just arrived. 

At about 12 o'clock, the 22nd Division was also seen 
advancing in the direction of Landsberg (also called Albrechts- 
haaaerhoO and Kberbach, to the south of Gunstett. 

The right flank of the French Army here made a desperate 
reaistance, but in spite of it, was forced to give ground, and the 
Artillery of both Divisions united upon the height of Gunstett. 

Thus the battle stood at 1 o'clock, sunjintj to and fro 
Wider the repulsed assaults oj the French Army; then the 
mrmal of the Crotrn Prince in the centre of the line of battle, 
mdieaied the commencement of the irresistible pressure of the 
German columns. 

About this time the Wurteniberg (.-avalry appeared upon the 
extreme left flank, the Artillery ('orps of the XI. Corps had arrived 
at 12.45 oVhK'k; up(»n the right Hank, the leading troops of the 
L Bavarian Corps began to draw near the line of battle, between 
Lmngensulsbach and (torsdorf and the ii. liavarian Corps Umk 
■p the fight anew upon the extreme right. The batth* having 
been maintained for five hours, by single divisions against a 
greatly superior French force, nuuierical tM|nality was nt^' restored 


by the gradual aniyal of freth ^ i 

every momuit b bswonr of tlie ( until at i 

ID nomben was alio entirdy on the German side. 

Oeneral Ton Werder had received orders, shorfly after 1^ 
o*clocky to leave one regiment for the protection of the IwmI- 
quarters on the south of Sulx, and to push fbrward witb aD hb H 
remaining troops through the Niederwald towards Ounstett in onter 
to support the XL Corps. HOgers Wurtemberg BrigadOi as yei 
ieft behind, as well as the Artillery Corps now immediately 
advanced, and carried out the prescribed march beyond Gumtett; 
the out-posts stationed towards the south were alK> withdrawn aad 
Beyer's IMidsion followed that of Obemits. 

General von Werder repaired to Gunstett just as StaAlof*a 
Brigade reached ii 

At the same time that the XL Corps, reinforced by ikfB 
Wurtembergers, was in a position to undertalLe a suooessfiil oflbnsivB 
attack, the V. Corps in the centre attacked the position of /F0erik 

with irresistible strengtli. Tlie village was taken by the advanced 
guard after an obstinate resistance. 

Twice the French columns threw themselves npon the Prussian 
Regiments to rescue Woerth, l)ut tlie village was lield, the French 
retired, the 19tli Infantry Brigside reinforced tlie 2()th and the 
wood to the south of Woerth was <KM;upied by a battalion of the 
IHtli Infantry Brigade. 

At 1 o'clock the Infantry of the 21st Division 4>f the XL 
(/orps under General von Tliile crossed tlie Saner to the south of 
Spaclibach. They were followed by part of the Artillery of the 
(N»r|)s whilst the <»ther part n'lnained in position at (iiinstett. The 
Division dire-cted its attack against KLsashaumm, At the same 
tiiiM! the Wurteinherj]: Cavalry Hrigadt* appeared npon the left flank 
to the west <»f (iunstett. 

Tims betireen 1 a/i// 2 o\*lock, the bow of the German 
front of attack had been drawn rtoser and firmer rotmd ike 
Fnmrh position , and encompassintj it jrom north to soyik 
beyan to stifle the desperate attacks of the marshal, 

(The^<iinent in the battle rt»presented on the map."^ 


Amid sanguinary fighting, General von Bose gained the high- 
road embankment and the heights to the west of it ; step by step 
the 3l8t Infantry Division pressed forward towards ElsashanseDy 
until at 2 o'clock, in conjunction with parts of the V. Corps, it 
Meceeded in taking the burning village, (ieneral von Bose was 
kere wounded by a shot in the thigh, but remained on horseback 
at the head of his Corps. 

In vain Marshal Mac Mahon made a furious attack with 
infantry and Cuirassiers from Frosckweilerj with the intention of 
breaking through the German centre. lie was repulsed. 

Tlie V. Corps was now j(»ined by the I. Bavarian Corps, 
which entered at once, energetically into the fight, in spite of the 
k>iig march it had already made, and to tliis was united the II. 
Bavarian Corps from the north. The brave Bavarians drove the 
left wing of the French before tliem with irresistible power. 
Upcm the left, the Wurtemberg Division joined the XI. Corps. 
Thus Frotchweiler J the centre and chief point (tappui to the 
French position, was attacked. 

This village, situated upon tlie hill on the n»ad from Woerth 
to Hcichshofen, c(»mmanding the surrounding country, was most 
obstinately held. Ik)th lines stood for a long time opposite to 
one another without wavering, whilst clouds of smoke rose up all 
over the battle field from burning farms and villages. It was liere 
tliat the F^'rench Cuirassiers were destroyed, when throwing them- 
aelves with impetuous valour upon the (ierman Infantr}*, in onler 
to break through the enemy, in old Napoleon fashion, by the 
weight of their masses. General von Bose was here wounded for 
the iiecond time. 

Froschtreiler was taken at 3. 30 o'clock. The Bavarians 
on the north, tlie Prussians on the east and west and the 
Wnrtembergers on the south, attacked on all sides and t(Mik the 
village with several thousand of the enemy enrlosed in it. 

ff^ith this the battle was definitively decided. 

The French Itegiments, which had been nnable to obtain any 

a ieec sa in spite of the utmost bravery, broke into disorderly Hight, 

aome t4>wards Ueichshofen, some in a north-westerly direction to- 

' wards Jilgerthal, some even back towsirds the south, leaving guns. 

I \srif» 



idea wm to break through the enemy's centre, by means of large 
Bnues. Assaults were made from Morrtbronn against Gunstott and 
ttpffially, at a later phase in tlic battle, from Frortchweiler against 
Hbtthansen and against Woci'th. 

At all events the Frencli fought very bravely, and until the 
nmerical saperiority of the Germans told, they offered a success- 
Ail rcDistance. 

The Marshal had, also, managed his troops well in the 
^le; this is clearly pn»ved, by the fact tlmt the (jcrmans after 
^^e fight estimated the strength of his corps, as greater than it 
•ctually was. 

His Army, after the losses in Douay's Division, may still 
k*ve numbered 33,0(M) Infantry, 3,400 Cavalry and 107 Guns, to 
*hich must be added Bonneniain*s Cavalry Division of K? scpiadrons, 
^onaeiru Division of 13 Battalions and 3 Batteries, and (iuyot de 
^«pirt*B Division of 13 Battalions and 3 Batteries which bring 
***^ whole force under the Marshal at the battle of Woerth to about 
*^,<XH> Infantry, 6,400 Cavalry and 143 (iuns. 

On the same day tliat the (Jerman left wing gained the victory 
*»f Woerth, their right irhnj stormed a strong position, which served 
lui a point of appiii to the French position at Saarbrdcken. As at 
Woerth, this fight took pUice a day so<mer tluin the General 
(ommanding hsid intenckd. 

The impatience of the troops to measure their strength with 
the French, 1(m] to a wonderful feat at Saarbrticken. The heading 
triMipft of the columns, an the line of march, fought a battle with 
the most fav<iurable results, which would have been the duty of 
the cfdumus themselves after they Iiad completed their formation 
IB position. 

Opposite the town of Saarhrilckeriy upt»n French territory, the 
heighta of SiHjichercn rise, with one corner jutting out towards the 
nitrth, and steep, partly wo<Mh»d sloprs towards the noilh-west 
and north-east, similar to a natural fortresK. (v. map.; 

I" 72 

difflentt lBr;^|MMifmi» Inkcs Htid ptmdit, nmt liy wiNxlril gniiinil 
whow (UAtifll^ dMUvilifM form ho many positions fur tb« moibat. 

ThW atnag poHliii.ti wnx^u-iiiipici] t>.v frottariTi Corfu, u4 
strengtlMHd Iqr utilidikl ilerooc^. 

Fnn bM«| SHrbriK^keu h;id been Ukcji ou tlie 9nd of Aufput, 
yet the oftwlw hul bocii uarrict] no furtlicr; the uiito»iibl«! p«rt 
of Saartfflak^ togetlier with tho ciuruising gronnd un the Mntk 
of the tow> hkd been (^vncimtefl, nad only the elupfr of tJie vallny 
fa the witt-weet of tlio cxoirisiiig grunnd, lun) ibo (inlgi^nberK 
bill lying beUad it; iIjuh the {[TouixI in front of tlie actual poailiuDf 
remaJned oerai^ed. Tlic Frunuh Direction havinif bt>eii cunvineud, 
unce the Snd «f An^-ust, that n« hoNtiltt fi<riwH would be o|i[K««d^ 
to Saarbrtekoi, BuiHioe'a t'orpa had beicu drawn utf towards thai 
east. Hk lit Divinioii liiid itiitrcbGd towardji tjiuirfftimnnt), 
strengtheo Liptwefh Itri^Mlc, the Sod Diviiuon lowordit I'utlliii 
aiid the 3rd and 4Qi liiul taiicu up a positjon b«twL-»i St. A* 
and Marinnthali 

MeiawUle the ^inrdg were moved from Hi^ts l"wanb BoiUfl] 
aud on the 6th of Aii^ukI were Mtationetl iit I'ihiitizIIiw, about 3 '^i 
miles*) in rear of i^i. Avoid. 

Froiiaard'g Curp-, on tliis day, wtut still iipou the 
Speicberen: Lkveauci'iijK't's Divitilou waH Htutixneil to tlin iinrtli 
this village, on the right of the road from Forbach to SaariHlloke% 
Vei^s DivieioQ wag on tho left of the road, Bataille's DiriikB 
formed the reserve. The Speicheron heights were especially -ilayftHl 
for the defence. Frosaard's Corps, encampe^ in the nnighbonrlnnd 
of Forbach, conld easily be reinforced by the railroad from HtltM, 
as wfU as iiuickly effect iU retreat; Saarbriicken and ttio line of 
the Saar in front, gave blm moreover, in great meiisnre, the power 
of obttcrviug the niuvcinents of the enemy. 

Nevertheless thiii observation was entirely neglected. 

Tho dispositions of the Commander in Chief of the first Gomiaa 
Army, on the Stli of Angust, had ordered the VII. Array Corps to 
advance as far as tlie Saar on the 6tli. The l.'tth Division was 

*) l&'/i Engliib mile*. 


directed towards Puttlingen ; their out-posts, in bo pushed forward 
IS Cur 18 Vdiklingen and Kockcrsliausen. Tlic 14t1i Division was 
to reach Gnichcnbach, and out-posts to be pushed forward t4)wards 
Saarbriicken and L<iuiscnthal. The Artillery Corps was to follow 
tile 14th Division as far ais llensweiler. These di8]H»sitions eoiucided 
vith the Diovements of the sec4>nd Army, whose head-quarters were 
removed to Ilomburg on the Tith, and whoso advanced guard 
ippniached the French frontier at Sjuirgeinilnd. • 

(ieneral von Kheinbaben's Division of Cavalry, which W2is on 

the strength of the first Aimy, had, on the morning of the Gth of 

Aognst, already pushed forward a Light Cavalry Kegiment as far 

tt the Saar, for the purpose of observing the position of the 

cBcmy. It was ascertjiined that SaarbrUcken and its envir<»ns 

*^rc evacuated, and that the enemy had withdrawn to the heights 

^ Speicliercn. The General nMumanding, I'on Zasirotrj received 

**» report shortly before lo o'clock in the morning, when he wjis 

^ the point of marching towards Dilsburg, and the news was 

^ilfirmcd and amplifieil at 10 o'eloi'.k, by a report fn»m lieutenant 

^Heral von Kameeke, commanding tlu^ 1 tth infantry Division, 

^^^irding to which the enemy had taken up a position on the 

■eights of Si>eieh(*ren, and appeared to be embarking on the rail- 

^*y at Forbach. 

In conse(|uence of this, (ieneral von Zastrow, at 1 o'clock, 
•ordered the VMU Infantry Division, under (ieneral von (ilUmer, to 
itUreh towards Volklingcn and Wehnl(*n, t<» push forward th(;ir 
^¥aucc<I guani across the Saar uixm F<irbach and Ludweiler, and 
t4» gain inf(»rination ]is to the strength and intentions of tlie 

The Mth Infantry Division was iu reinforce its advanced guard, 
vhtrh was t<» take up a positi<m near Saarbrflcken, upon the left 
bank of the Saar, and its main body to hv directed by Neu(h»rf 
ipon RtN'krrshauscn. Patrols to be sent forw:ird in the direction 
of Forbach. 

The Artillery Corps was to foUow to Puttlingt'u. 
The (lencrars intention, (»n this day, was to push up the main 
body of Ills (!4irps on to the Sajir, at Volklingcn and KcK'kershausen, 
•■d early on the Tth, Ut attack the enemy at Forbach. 


The independent advance of the 14tfa Infiutiy Diriaioii 
did not allow this plan to he earned ont, bnt brought on a 
serious enoonnter with the enemy on the 6th. Rheinbaben*8 
C/avalry Division was the first to arrive in SaarbrUeken* It passed 
tlirough the town at 12 o'clock, and sent out some squadrons to- 
wards the heights on the south side, who were fired npon when 
advancing beyond them. 

Between f2 and 1 o^ehck the lAth Division had already 
j'cached SaarbrUcken^ consequently before the General eommand- 
ing had given the order for it to remain at Rockershansen. It 
passed the town, and immediately attacked the portions of 
Fr(»s»ard*s Corps which were in the valley, below flie height! of 

The French troops were forced to evacuate the ground la 
fnuit, and were pursued aa far as the steep heights, which 
presented an extraordinary obstacle to the advance of the 14th 

General von Kamecke made dispositicinR for the attack of 
these iK'ights up(»n Ixitii iiauks, and sent information of his position 
to General von Z astro tr. He received this report at B o'clock, 
and immediately repaired to the battle field, by SaarbrUcken; yet 
betore reaching SaarbrUcken he heard tlie thunder of the fighty 
and s<mt an otTicer t^) inform the 13th Division at Vdlkliugen, of 
the aeti(»n in which the lith Division was engaged. 

The advanced guard of the 13th Division had arrived at 
Volklingen, in ae^*ordance with the order, at 2. 30 o*clock; the 
main body oommenccd tlie march from Tuttlingen to Volklingen 
at .*> o'clock. Nothing was here known «)f the light begun near 
Saarhriickcn, as the woody, mountainous country intercepted the 
sound of tin* firing. The informatii»n from (lenernl von Zastrow, 
bn»u;:ht l»v the officer menti«>ned, onlv reached its destination at 

f) o'clock. 

When (HMK'ral von Za.strow arrived to take command at 
•1. 3o o'cli»ck, tfn* sifuaiion upt»n the field of battle w:is as follows 
iv. this moment uptm the map : 

rptm the ttt'r/nan riijht flank, the 2Hth Infantry Brigade, 
after heavy losses, liad gained possession of the wo<»d, bordering 


be raQway between Drathzng and Stiring, and held it. In the 
froaty 6 batteries in position upon the FocksterhOhe and (lalgen- 
bergi had opened fire, viz: the foot division of No. 7 Regiment 
of Field Artillery and 2 batteries belonging to the VI 11. Corps. 
The Hohenzollem Fusilier Regiment No. 40, of the lutU's Corps, 
had also come up to the support of the 14th Division, and the 
General commanding, von GobeUj was himself upon the spot and 
eondiieted the fight. 

To the* east of Drathzug, the 15th Hussars, of the 14th, 
Infantry Division, and the 11th Hussars, of the 5tli Cavalry Division, 
were halted under cover. There was no infantry at all in front. 

Upon the left (lanky the 27th Infantry lirigade, commanded 
by General von Frangoisj had effected an unparalleled feat, amid 
the heaviest losses. Under the very eyes of the antagtmists, who 
were far superior in murderous artillery and infantry fire, it had 
dimbed to the summit of a projecting nose 4)f the heights, and 
eaUbliabed itself upon the plateau, partly in the midst of a W(M»d 
wliicb wma defended by the enemy. Here (loneral von Fran9ois 
fell, killed in the fight. 

The Hohenzollem Fusilier Regiment No. 40, was advancing in 
•apport of this brigade. 

Several n^giments cif the 5tli Cavalry I)ivirti(»n were in rear 
of the left wing, cimrealcd at the foot of the Iiill. 

The |HMiti<iii of all thene tmoprt was h:iz:irdnus in the highest 
degree. The overpowering enemy held the heights with inflexible 
irmneMi, so that the right wing, the 2Hth Infantry Brigade, was 
UMble to gain much ground. Witli the assistance of the 40th 
Regiment, which had come up, th(^ 27th Infantry Brigade HUco^HNled 
it is true in completely taking the wo(»d at 5 o'clock, but it was 
inposaible for the present to press furtlier fon^ard. There were 
•o more infantry in reserve. In endeavouring to push tui against 
tlie Krentzberg, fnmi the acipiired south-west point of the w<mh], 
the German lines were brought to a stand by the powerful attacks 
61 the enemy. 

The greattfHt devotion and bravery of these tnMips alone 
prerented the ground obtained, being again lont. 

The thonder of cannon, however, audible afar in the direction 


of Saarbrfloken and boyondy had reached the eolamns of the UL 
Army Gorpa, which was approaching the frontier; thej followed 
tlie direction of the sound in accelerated march| and at 6 o'doek, 
Oeneral von Alveruleben^ the commanding General of thia eotpS| 
arrived npon the field of twittle with 5 or 6 battaliom. 

These battalions were immediately sent to support the troops 
on the heights. 

But in spite of this most necessary reinforcement, they did 
not succeed in progressing further than the raving whieh the 
Kroutzberg forms at a particular segment of the Speicheren Jidgliti 
and which offered an especially favourable position for the Freaoh 

At 5. 30 o'clock^ the action hero came to a »Umd^ mid 
remained in ihe same position until 8. 30 o'clock. 

At 7. 30 o'clock the first artillery arrived upon the plateau^ 
a battery of the III. Corps having, by the utmost eiertions, suoeeedol 
in bringing the guns up the hill. It took np a position ^OB 
the B4)uth-west point of the wood, and fired with success upon tiie 
French batt^Ties. 

During these three hours Frencli columns advanced five 
or six times, but each time tlic att'ick was repulsed by the 

The battle at this place, only died out when complete dark- 
ness set in. 

The ir>th DivisitMi wliich reached Saarbrflcken in the evening, 
w:is placed at tiie disposal of General vtm Zastrow, in a reserve 
positi<Mi, l)y the verbal (»rder of Genera! von SieinmvtSj who 
appeared upon the field <»f battle at 7 o'cU^ck, having received an 
announcement of the fight, at r» (/clock, when at Kiweiler. 

Tint French nn the left also attempted an attack npon the 
(ierni:in right tiank at <>. .*«) oN-lock, and commenced it with a 
Mn»ng l)att4'ry in portition at Stiring. Hut the efficacious fire «»f a 
(iermau battery, concentrated upon this point, very soon obliged 
the enemy's liattery to drive off, and fniT<'d the infantry to 

About H o'clock in th<> evening, however, the surrounding of 
tlie French line of retreat towards Forbach was effected by tlie 


13th DiTisioDi upon the extreme right flank. This presHiire npon 
the French position, which General von ZaHtrow had pn^pared by 
his march dispoBitionn for tlie 7th of Au^udt, and accelerated by 
the announcement of the attack made bv the 14th Dividiou, induced 
the iseverely-shaken enemy to vacate the po8iti<m, ho long; and 
ulMtinately held, and at the same time caused a Division of 
Baxaine*8 Cor|)S, which was approaching to FroHsard^s assistance, 
to return to 8t. Avoid. 

Tlie 13th Infantry Division, which had crossed the Saar at 
Wehrclen, marched towards Forbach by Kosseln, the advanced guard, 
onder (leneral von der GoUs^ deboucluMl fnirn tlie Forbach w<nk1 
towards 8 o'clock, and 2 batt:i1ions of the ^.^tli Uegiuient with 1 
battery, immediately went forward to attiick the Kauinclien hill, 
which was strongly occupied and strengthened by cover trendies. 
Tbene trenches were taken just before dark, and the battery was 
CMibled to open fire upon Forbiich :uid the m:isse8 of the enemy 
ttill viBible there. 

At the sound of this fighting upon tlit* flank and in the rear, 
tiM troops, who were still energeticiilly defending the Kreutzberg, 
began a rapid and disorderly retreat. 

fVith ihijt (ht action came to an tnd. The fall of night 
pit a stop t4) the pursuit. 

To cover the retreat, several Iiatt4*ri<»s were driven up on to 
the Belschhrrg and its wch^tern projections, and C4»ntiiiued the fire 
for long, without however producing any eflect U|H>n the (lernian 
tniopa. At 1) o'cltK'k, the French Army withdrew by Ksling(*n 
ipon Blitt4'rsdorf leaving behind numerous pris<iners, the camp 
eqaipage, a pontoon column, several provision waggons, and large 
itores of fonige and ch)thing in F(»rbacli. • 

Tlie loss in killed and wounded, in this hot and murderous 
Ight, was extnumliuarily great upon both sides. It amounted in 
caeh Army t4i at legist r>(XN) men. 

Genenil Frossitrd had remained entirely without support fnun 
Baaaine. Mont*iudon*s Division of the .'inl Corps, which was 
itaticmed in SajirgemUnd on tlu^ r>tli and Otli of August, hml mov<*d 
back t4> the 2nd Division which held Puttlingcn, at -I o*chN*k in 
the allern<HUi <»f the r»th. The latter Di\isiim marched alxmt the 


whole day, now towards SMigemOnd now towaids SaarbrOfikflBy 
but not npon the field of battle. 

The important result of the three victories^ at Weissenbrngi 
Woerth and Saarbrtteken^ was that the whole of the Freneh Amy 
gave up its ori^nal position and began a general rapid retreat. 
By this means alone was it enabled to escape the £ite of being 
rolled up by the Army of the Crown Prince , at snrroondad 
forced back from its line of retreat towards the north. 




orth-eustof France, which beciune the theatre of war shortly 
German victorieu on the Gth of August, — the table land 
le and the Khine valley separated from it by the Vosges — , 
;ural fomiatitui and consequent limited military character 
3 operations of the war to be divided into two parts, 
acquisition of Strasbury was no less important to the 
^adership than the pursuit and destruction of the main 
he French Annv, wiiose next natural front must be the 
ie Mosotta. Strasbury possessed a double importance as 

by its position in front of the great passes <»f the Vosges 
e middle of the open plain, which leads in a southerly 
to Franclic Couite and Bourgogne in the centre of France. 
Vosges, th«* natural westeni boundary wall (»f Germany, 
*der the Khine valley on the west, rise quickly upwards 
phiteau land of the Burgundy gate in tlie south, and 
inbroken chain t4» the valley of the Lauter, diminishing in 
trards tiie ni^rtii, with steep declivities towards the Rhine 
ig gradually d(»wn towards the table land of liorraine on 
in the s<»uthcrn third, these UMiuntains attain the greatest 
(1 width, tiie riil^e is no where less than .'iO(X.) feet high 
led off, near the eastern side, the granite, wooded summita 

feet IiightT. 
re the granite masses cease at the sources of the Meurthe, 
aius are smaller, hiwer, and the peaks are less important. 

Then cinnefl the principal pa»s of Ihr moHnlaim, wbicli begin* 
on tbe viKilera nloiie at ZabivtiP (^Savi-rutit and lea<U by Kalshiii]^ 
to tbe Muurthc. titwitnlo I<iliievUl(\ 

Tliia jiass, ttip outranco gaU' aa it wont bctwix^n (iernanr and 
Franee, uinl tu'ur tlut (;ut« of I!uri;nudy wliich in iii'«a|>iucl by Uw 
rurtrenn nf Ih-Ifurt, kiu been, sineu tlio ni»Mt micii'iit timv«, ft nuul 
for thf- Kniaan, Frencli and Oerman Anny columin', and tlwt posi- 
tion of StnutLiirg wa« ilnRUiod emtential to it. Tbe railroad IVoni 
Paris, iiy CliAloHM and Tuul 1" 8tniNbi>i'^, ihwhch l.)iniii);b it, ani] 
the canal, vliicb in ita fnnber cuntJouatiou VvoAa Ui th» Marn«>. Ua 
the otijcr «ide of tlit; ptM, tli« laat Uiird of tliu uionntAiii nui|;ft 
begiiiB, stretrhing a» far aa tin.- I<nut<;r valluy, wbt^rc Ibu adfaaocd' 
tniopa of tbe Francli Array wi-ro ovortlirown on tht- 4llt of AMgiul,f 
and IB n very interoei'tril, Itilly i-jiuntry, with citadeb cmwalag i 
aammils. Tbe amall fortrvMtMi of Ilitiicii, Licbt^mbt-rg and LUi 
atein lie in Ibis uortlteninioitt part of tlic Voap»e, 

SlraikuTff, llic Ini^rnL lown in Abwee and the alrwitgiM fltttli 
in thia eaatern jiart oT tlic tlinnlrc »f war, formed a lialwaifc lu I 
great pass of tin; Vow(,*i'b JubI dtsiTibi-d, it wim alsn a ii-ntral poU' 
of dcfcnrt^ for lhi> Rliinc vulb'y. and Hie flrat rHUijinrf agaiiwi 
entry by tho gate of lluigiindy. 

For the succowfiil defenp* of thia furtrMS, the support of 
army holding tlie Vtutgiii wiia rfrtainly ni'<*>'wiiiry. Afttr Man 
was b4-atcn at Wm-rtli, ami Iiih triHipn liad ivwaati-it Ibt* paa 
the Voa{,'es in diaordcrly Might, Strasburg becamif an Uolated 
rem, hiniilnr tii the fiirtrti#!i of I'fnlKtiiirg lying liy itatilf in |fc| 
great parte; only mndi largnr, far niorr important in a pdlitfM 

point of vit'w. Mild ]>t'<>\i.le(l nilli :i i »'n<its |^:nTi»i.>i>. Mlilch mfgM 

Imve been ablu to iindertHke (langeruns operatiimd iu rear of tttt 
Uennaii Army, and became in coniiC(|uetiue, an important object «f 
npcrationa for tbe left wing of the advancing Army. 

The labte land of Lorraine which Htretdiex out as flv ■• 
the Ardennes towards the north, and to t)ie deeply indented nlley 
of the Mouse towards the west, became the other principal lliiwln 
of war, upon the further Hide of t)ic ViMgcts. The upper IotcI af 
this table land is Iiilly, itn Htreams mostly flow in deeply ent be(U» 
and are dlflicnlt to eruas. The chief river is tbe Moselle wUdi 


rises at Ballon de Sulz, south of the Vosges, and leaves the plateau 
of Langres at £piual. It forms an excellent defensive poHition 
thtongh its mountainous banks, and a strategical line of great impor- 
tance by the powerful fortress of Metz and the fortress of Thion- 
ville. Upon its right side, first the Meurthe runs into it, upon 
which Luneville and Nancy are situated, then comes the Saar, 
the stream which the first Army Corps and part of the second 
vict(»rionsly crossed on the Gth of August, which rises in the north 
<»f the Vosges, and upon which are the tiiwns of Saarburg and Saar- 

The effect produced upon the French armyy by the defeats 
9n the 4th and iUh of August^ was that all the Corps^ without 
reference to their original formation^ streamed on to the Mostdle 
line, fused into two large masses^ without any determined plan 
l^r continuing the defensive struggle. A rent went through the 
army, which even violently sundered the corps unity of de Failly^s 
troops, so that Lapasset's Brigade which was in SaargemUnd, sepa- 
latad itself entirely from its own Corps, and joined the 3rd Corps 
h the retreat towards Metz, whilst the main Ixnly, under the coui- 
BMid of the General himself, endeavoured to form a junction with 
the wmy which was being formed at Chalons. 

The retreat of the French Corps necessarily led to the forma- 
tioD of two diffen^nt armies, the army of Metz and the army of 
Ch&lons. The latter was formed of the Ist, 5th, 7th and the 
12th Corps which was raised at a later peritKl, and the former of 
the 2Dd, 3rd, 4th, Gth Corps and the Imperial Guard. 

After the defeat at Wocrth, the Int Corps fled, in the first 
iastanee, in all directions, the main body however arrived at Saveme, 
and upon the 7th of August some order was again restored in the 
legiments. The Marshal then made them march through the night, 
tad on the morning of the Hth they reached Saarburg. On the 
9th the C^»rp8 was at Blamont, <m the KHh in Luneville. Then, 
lider the apprehension that th<^ enemy might have pressed forward 
to Nancy and destroyed the railroad by Bar-le-l)uc to Ctiiilons, the 
Marshal decided upon taking a morvi southerly din^ction. He wished 
to Bake use of the railway which IoUowh the valley of the Marne, 
by Chanmont, Joiuville and 8t. Dizier. 


The march w«8 therefore directed by a btraneh line of that rail- 
way npoD NenfeMltean, firat to Bayon on the Moaelley where U 
was encamped on the llfh, tlie next day to Haron^y on the iSlh 
to Viclierey; on the 14th, the Corps arrived at Nenfehiteaiy tnm 
whence one part embarlced on the railway, so as to arrive at 
('hillons on the 15th, wliilst the remainder, especially the cavalry, 
marched, and only later made nsc of the railway at Joinville aad 
St. Dizier. The stren^h of the 1st Corps, on arriving at ChiloBS, 
was from 20,000 to 22,000 men. 

General de Failly heard of the defeat at Woerth on the evening 
of the Bth, and immediately gave orders to commence the retreat 
on the following morning. In the well gronnded apprehenmn 
that he might be cat off, he decided to move off during the night 
Tlie train was directed that evening towards Saaigemflnd, the whole 
of the baggage was taken into the fortress of Bitseh, and at 
8 o'clock in the evening tiie Corps began to march, and arrived at ' 
l^iltzelstein on the 7th, at 4 o'clock in the afternoon. From here tt 
tollowed the 1st Corps, keeping about two days march in its retTi 
eventuaUy covering lU retreat. On the Hth, General de Failly 
tirrived :it Lixheim, on the 9tli at Saarbnrg, on the 10th at 
Avrieourty and on the evening of the 1 1th at Lnneville. From this 
place he marched to Cliaumont, and dn*w in his rear guard, Guyet 
de Lenpart'g Division. From Channumt the Corps tnivelled by ra3 
to ChAlonSy where it arrived on the 1\H\\ and "HHU of Augnrft. 

The 7th Corps, which after the departure of Conseil-Dumet- 
nil's Division to the 1st Corps, 4»nly consistcnl of Liebert's Division, 
a Hrijjcade of Cavalry ant! the R<wrve Artillery (tlu» .Srd Division 
was still in eonrs<* of torniation in Lyons), had gone from Lh*lfort to 
MUhlliausen on tl^' Otii of August, for the purpttse of encountering the 
supposed enemy in the HIaek F(»rest. On the following ni<»niing 
(teneral Douay received a dispateli tVom Mac Malion, informing him 
of the loss of the battle at Woerth, and an lumr later a se4*ond 
dispatch which ran thus: 

**lf possible throw <ine Division int<» Strasburg, and cover 
Helfort with both of the other l>i\isions." signed: Nap<»leon. 

The ComniandtT in riiiel' of the army and the Chief of the Staff 
conscqm'ntly did not know that the .*lrd Division < DnniontV^ of the 


7th Corps, WM siill in process of formation in Lyons, and that the 
1st Division (Conseil - Dumesnirs) had been detached, two days 
bef<»re, to the 1st Corps. 

In consequence of this comniand, (ieneral Douay drew back 
towards Belfort. The departure from Mfihlhansen took place, at 
■idday on the 7th of Angiist, with real precipitation. These troops 
arrived in Belfort again on the 8th of Angust, and pi*epared to 
c(»mplete the fortifications of the pla<*c, especially the three advanced 
works, the Barren, the Orandes Perches, and the Petites Perches, 
tite earthworks of which had onlv been traced imt. 

The different portions of Dnniont's Division arrived in Belfort 
about the 13th of Angnst, and, besides tlii^ 1st Division which 
remained with Mac Mahon, <iiily Jolif dn Coulonibier's Cavalry Bri- 
gade was wanting. It was kept back at Lyons, and never joined 
its (*orps. 

This was therefore the next destiny of those corps which, later 
00, formed the principal part of the Army t)f ('h^hins. 

Tlie corps which formed the army of Metz arrived in the 
following manner for the pnrp<»se oi* concentration at this fortress. 

When the (jennan advanced guard approached SaargeniUnd on 
the 7th of August, (icnenil Fross:ird who liml on that morning 
retired there from Blittersdorf, considering it wiser to place more 
groaiid between himself and the enemy, departed at 1 o'chn'k for 
the purpose of reaching Bazaine at Puttlingen. He arrived there 
at 4 o'clock in the afternoon. This hasty retreat, before an enemy 
who had only just shown himself, brought disorder and mistrust 
among the tro<»ps, who had previously accus<.Hl their (ienenil of not 
liaving allowed himself to be seen during the action. 

lieneRil Frossiird had, in fact, biHrn engagi^d in business trans- 
actions about minor conci^rns with the Mayor of Forbach dnring the 
attack of Kamecke's Divisiim upon the heights of 8|)eiclieren. 

Upon receiving the news of the (»vertlirow of the 2nd Corps, 
Uarshal LelxMMif, the chief of tlit* Staff, orderetl an immediate con- 
ceatration of the 2nd, 3rd, 4tli and Guards Corps, arcmnd Mets. 
This was effected on the 7tli, Hth and \H\i of August. At the same 
tiiae the Ctli ('orps arrived, by railway from Cli&lons, at Metz, 
where the Imperial liead-<|uarters had been established, and thus 


five corpi were laaembled tliere, an urm^ of mh0iU SOO.O00 
men wiik 468 guns. 

On ike 12ik of Aupui^ these active forces were £i jm» 
ti'on on ike rigkt bank of tke Moselle^ under eater ^ ike 
eastern outer forts of Metx. 

The news of the condition of the anny, which had emannlMl 
from the French Chief command, had in the meantime fuo- 
(luced au uneasy feeling throngliout the whole conntiyi wUeli| 
reacting again, had a pernicioug effect upon the DirectioD of the 

Althon^ the defeats of the 4th and 6th of August moat have 
been a terrible awakening fr«>m the delusions under which Fnmbt 
laboured, yet only two corps and single divisions of two other eoipa 
had been immediately concerned in them, consequently only the 
Huialler part of the army, and it was the duty of the GUef 
i'onunaud to remind the army and the country, in an appropriate 
manner, of the forces still at hand. 

But the dispatches from head-quarters, instead of haviqg a 
e4iiming iufiuenre, represented a complete lieipleHsness in the Diree- 
tion of the army, and made a change in the Chief command 
necetjisary, in oppoHition to public opinion in tlie country and ii 
the ai'uiy. 

The kind of dispatches were as follows: 

Mctz, 7th August H o'clock a.m. 

^4t is necessary that France and Paris should prepare for 
tlie greatest efforts, for the greatest siicrifices. No weakness! 
Mac Mahon covers Nancy. Fi*ossiird*s Corps is well led. The 
rhief of the 8taff is with tiic advanced posts." 

11.55 o^'lock a.m. 

^^Tiic c(»ncentrati<»n of the troops upon Metz is carriinl on with- 
out difticulty. The trial which wc have t(» encounter is severe, 
but it d(»es not exceed the patriotism of the nation." 

•1 o'clock p.m. 

"Tlie enemy is not pursuing Mac Mahon. The Marshal is con- 
centrating his troops.** 


On the morning of the 7th, Paris had already heen declared 
in a state of siege, a decree called upon all young men, under 
30 yearK, to serve in the Garde Mobile, and all citizens, between 
30 and 40 years of age, to serve in tiie Garde Nationale. 

The Division, which occupied Papal territory, was embarked 
for France as early as the 6th of August, all the dispensable 
troops were bronght away from Algiers, and even some that were 
necessary there; the embarkation of an army to invade the German 
coasts was interrupted and the troops recalled, and even the marines 
were incorporated in the land army. 

The 12th Corps was also formed, under General Trochu 
• later LebruHy v. the order of battle^ and the 13th Corps, under 
Qeneral yinoy^ (the Corps numbered 8, 9, 10 and 11 were 
intended for the military commands in Paris, Lyons, Toulon and 

In the mean time the German Ai^my Corps ^ following up 
the advantages they had already gained, poured across the frontier 
ID nnintemipted succession. 

On the 9th of August the Chief head-([uarter8 were removed to 
Saarbrttcken, the head -quarters of tho second army, upon the same 
day, were in SaargemUnd, tlic iiead-ciuarters of the third army in 
Ober-Moddcm, having been at Mersweilcr on the 8th, and the pre- 
TiooB day in Ilegweiler, Ebcrbach and Surburg. 

The (iorman armies made a strategi<*al wheel to the right, and 
by that means gained a new front, which corresponded with the line 
of retreat taken by the enemy. 

This new disposition im|>osed the following conditions: that the 
country between the Saar and the Moselle should be firmly held 
by the first army whilst riMnaining stationary, that the second 
army should be opened out, whilst the heads of the columns only 
moved slowly forward, and that the third army should force its way 
through the Vosges oliain by rapid man^hcs. 

How far the second army extended towards the rear, in con- 
formity with the original disponition, at the time that the battle of 
Woerth was fought, is evident from the Saxons • XIL Corpse having 
(»nly reached Kaiserslautem on the 7th, Ilomburg on the 8th, and 
Saarbrttcken not until the 11th. 


But whilst the main bodies of the first and seeond andeiy soriag 
Blowly forward, were united in oompact membenhipy the faidependeBl 
cavalry Divisions at their heads formed an advanced line two days 
niar<*li in front, keeping at tlie heels of tlie retiring French eorpS| 
carefully watching them and at the same time concealing the Germaa 
operations by an impenetrable veil. As early as the 10th of Angwt 
these heads had passed the districts of Saar-Union, Groa-Tenqain, 
Fauiquemont, Fonligny and Les Etangs. 

The task which had devolved upon the third army, besides 
the advance through the Vosges, included various other operatioM 
against the fortresses lying among the mountains, and also the impor- 
tant detaching of forces whose aim was Strasbarg. 

BiUehf the most western of the Vosgos fortresses, bars a ems 
road through the mountains. Here three roads leading from the 
valley of the Rhine unite, and continue as two to the 8aar. Vwom 
its natural strength, situated upon the cone of a hill and on a 
lake, with bomb-proof casemates, a well 246 feet deep, rieUy 
providetl with stores, furnished with 80 guns and 1000 men, Bitseh 
oflered an invincible resistance to tin* (ieta<*liment of the LL Bavarian 
Corps, which had moved iorward to besicp^ it on the Hth of August 
and at once commenced the bombardment with a field battery. The 
corps had theref<»re t<» make a loii^^ detour by Lemherg, MontbroMi, 
and St. Lorenzen, by mountainous roads, with the greatest difficalty 
and to content itself with investing the fortress. 

The castle of Livhtmhcnj^ situated upon rocks, likewise re- 
fused the summons to surrender, sent by the Wurtemberg Divisioa, 
but capitulated however on the 10th, after the houses had been 
partially set on fire, the day before, by the b(»mbardment This 
success was piined by the \<>i and 2ii<l .lap'r battalions, the 1st 
Field Anillery division and tun ('(iinpanies of the 2nd Infantry 
Kej:im<*nt, under (ieneral llii;:<'l, wlim ^2X^^ prisoners besides the fort 
itself wiTi" delivered into tin* liands of the (iermans. 

Fort LYilzvlslvin {la Prlitr Pivrrv)^ lying somewhat further 
south, was taken by tlie ii. Bavarian Corps on tlie lUli of August. 

On the other hand, the impiirtant little fortress of Pfalzburg^ 
unusually strongly situated uprm a hill 11 HO teet high, in the 
mid<lle of the principal pass mentioned above, held out like Bitsfh 


and compelled the third army to make a circuit by Petersbach. 
The fortrens waa invested. 

The hcad-quartera remaincil in Pctertibach from the 11th to the 
13tii of August. Here the town of Lunevilie surrendered, after having 
been visited by the cavalry of the advanced guard. Nancy had 
already been ridden through by German cavalry patrols on the 
12Ui. Upon the same day the I. Bavarian Corps, on the right flank, 
reached Diemeringen near Sa^ir Union. 

Immediately after tlie buttle of Woertli, wliiUt the main body 
of the third army thus passed the Vosges, and witli its extreme 
right flank efiectcd a junction with tiie left flank of the second 
army, the Baden Division was moved forward towiirds the south. 
On the morning of the 7th, the cavalry brigade, under General von 
La Roche, appeared before the gates of Llagcuau, and took the town 
by % coup dc main, csipturiug over KM) prisoners, HO horses, and 
a great many arms and articles of cfiuipmeut. The Division marched 
in ou the evening of tiie same day. 

On the Htli, the Baden cavalry appeared before Sirasbury, and 
deatroyed the railway and the telegraph wires to Lyons; the divi- 
sion followed them; on the night of the 7th, the troops stationed 
at lUstatt had already thrown a bridge across the Rhine, by which 
24 heavy guns were moved over for the attack upon Stmsburg. 
On the lull, the north side of the great fortress was invested, and 
General ron Beytfr^ Commandant of the Baden troops, sent a sum- 
moos tu the Commandant of the fortress. General L'hnch, to surrender. 

The French General refused the summons. 

Strasburg is not laid out according t4i the most modern prin- 
ciples of the art of fortification, there are no outer forts; still it 
is am strong a fortress as Vauban's more simple system alone could 
produce; the Rhine and the HI usikl for inundating, offer a natural 
oieana of strength. A rich equipment of artillery was at hand 
for the defence, as the fortress had been destined for the principal 
point of exit for the invasion of Germany. 


The town, with a population of 84.000 inhnbitut% in 
rounded by a einetore of fortifleationa which neariy takes tke Ami dT 
a conical ballet, lying with ita blunted pomt towards the east sonth east 

Tlie longimeter of the fortress is 4 kilometres*), the tmavene 
diameter, measured at tlie base of the triangle, considered aa ai 
i8o»celcs, surrounding the fortress, is 2>/| kilometres**). 

On the east side, the fortifications extend as far as the western 
arm of tlie Rhine and enclose the citadel, which is quite separated 
from the town proper. Tlie citadel is an enclosed work composed 
of five bastions, commanding tlie wall of the eneeuite whieh snr- 
rouiids the whole town, and horn works are tlirown out below the 
citadel towards the north-oast and south-east. The enceinte eon- 
»i8t8 of bastions, whicli ean be inundated on tlie south-east ftoat 
by the Rhine and tlio 111, and are strengthened by advaneed 
works and outer lines tlie nortli and north-west frbnts, on the 
other liand, have large horn works and advanced lunettes, thrown. 
(»nt in front of the bastions. The railway station whidi nidfes 
t\\v line from Kohl with those from Paris and Lyons, lies behind 
the north front. 

An excellent 8y8teni of floodinp^ enables the east and southern 
frontrt to be inundated by the waters of the Rhine and of the 
navipible 111, whieh flowM throu|<h the town. 

The garrison of the fortress consisted of ll.(X)0 men of In- 
fantry of the Line and Artillery, besides (tardes Mobiles and Gardes 
Nationaux. On the other hand, Engineer tnKips were entirely wanting. 
A tolenihly large number of troops had, moreover, been driven 
int<» the fortress by the panic pn^dnced by the defeats of Wcissen- 
hur^ and W<M»rth, and foiined a motley crew, which had to be 
organized afresh in the n<*cessary fnrmatifai. At the beginning of 
tlie canijK'iigu, the defence of Strasburg had never been taken into 

The north side of the fortress had already, on the l»th, been 
invested by the Haden Division, as before menti<»ned, the head-<iuarteni 

•) "J' .. Kn;:li>!i lnih•^. 
; a))Ollt P 2 KIl;^h^ll mili'^■ 



were in Lampertheim. On the 14tby General von ff^erder was 
Boninaled to the Chief command of the siege corps, which was to 
consist of the Baden Division, the Prussian 1st reserve Division and 
the Qarde-Landwehr- Division, as well as the siege artillery and 
teelinical troops. Lientenant General von Decker was appointed 
to tlie command of the siege artillery, and Major General v. Mertens 
commanding engineer. 

On the 13th, the head-quarters were transferred to Mundolsheim, 
and the investment was drawn closer upon the north-west, north 
and east fronts, whilst the enemy shewed no activity in the of- 

On the 15th, Schiltigheim, Ruprechtsau, and KOnigshoffen 
were bronght into the cordon of the investment, but the regular 
tifge had not as yet begun and the guns required for the bombard- 
ment were still wanting. 

Upon the other side of the Vosges, the advance of the three 
German armies had progressed without delay. The UMa land of 
Lorraine had been passed as far as the line of the Moselle without 
igbting, whilst the first army continued its dirccticm towards Metz, 
the second army upon Pont-ii-Mousson and the third up<m Nancy. 

The Chief head - quartera were in 8t. Avoid on the 12th 
lad were removed, on the 13th, to Faulquemont, near which place 
ii the castle llcmy, 3 miles*), from Metz, in which the King him- 
lelf took up his quarters. 

The firnt army, now joined by the I. Army Corps and the 
1st Cavalry Division, had advajiced as far as the line of St. Barbe- 
Frontigny at midday on the 14th; their advanced posts were one 
mile^ from Metz and felt the enemy. 

The second army, whose head-<|uarters were transferred to 
Grot-Tenquin on the 12th, having satisfied themselves that the 

•) 13V» Knglish miles. 
**) 4*/j Knglitth mileii. 


Nied wodM not be defended by the French, in spite of the 
niont which had been thrown up and the Tillages hafivg 
placed in a state of defence, made preparations to cross the 
oil the 14th and 15th. For thin purpose the head-qnaiten aovod 
off, on the morning of the 13th, to Pont'h'Mowtsan^ the prineipsl 
pntMH^ over the river. From the different reoonnaissaocea which 
liad been made it was foreseen that no opposition woaid be oilBred 
to crossing at this place. Neither the stone work of the bridge 
ill tlui town nor tlie small wooden portion of it on the left bank, 
had been destroyed. As tlie German infantry were taking poaieesion 
of tlie town on the 13tli, a French battalion, which was eomiqg 
up by the railway from Mets, retomed to Metx by the same ronte. 
Upon tliis the cavalry destroyed the rails and telegraph wins 
upon the otiior side of the Moselle. On the following day the heai- 
<piartcr8 had, already, been established in the town. 

The main body of tlie third army was approaching Nanqr ea 
the 14th, on the 15th the 11. Bavarian Corps came npon the tattam 
of Alarsaly IVz miles*) from Nancy. This fortress situated in the 
marshy telU of the Seille, completely 8urrouiided with wet ditches 
and furnished with a garrison of H(H) men and 70 guns, formed 
the central point of a natural defensive position ; it offerc<l liowever 
no defence. Atlter a short bombai-dment on the south side, it capi* 
tulated upon the same day; 512 unwounded prisoners, about 600 
remounts, <)0 guns and a large quantity of provisions fell into the 
hands of the conquerors. 

In Nancy n(»thing was to be seen of the enemy, on the 14th 
the a<lvanced guanl of the (Germans had already reconnoitred the 
fortress nf Touiy and summoned it to surrender. 

'I'lic French army had, therefore, given up the whole of the 
country east of the Moselle, without making any further liglit. 
The positions cm the (icrmaii and those on the Freiirh Nicd, which streams 
unite ill the Nied, midway hetwecii »St. Avohl and Metz, 1* ^ raileH**^ 
north of the straight road which joins hotli places, were as little 
defended as thir positions on the Seille although an obstinate resis- 

••) Nrarlv 7 Kii;;li.<li iiiiU*^. 


Unee might here have been made by the rear guards and they 
were also found by the Germans to have been prepared for defence. 

It is doubtful whether the line of the Moselle might not even 
BOW have been held by the Freuch, by summoning up their whole 
•trength. The circumstance, that Pout-H-Mousscm was not wTupied, 
aid that, on the 14th, Toul had already been summoned to surrender, 
indicates that the general defence (»f the whole line was not intended, 
or elae that Mac Mahon had given up the defence of the southern 
tract in adopting the views of the French Chief command in oppo- 
sition to his own. 

With the paitsage at Pont-a-MouAson, the possibility of sur- 
roimding Metz at once appeared. 

In the publication*) inspired or written by the Fmperor Napoleon 
himself it is said : '^the Prussians concealed their movements so 
well behind their formidable curtain of cavalry, which they spread 
oat before their front in all directions, that in spite of the most 
persevering researches it was never really known wIiotc the main 
body of their troops was.'' Hut even had the French Direction 
been ad^nainted with the por^ition of the GormHus on each day as 
they advam^ed from the frontier, it still might not have been able 
to accomplish thi* defence of the line of the Moselle, but only 
to secure and hasten, in a more cautious manner, a further retreat 
to the line t>f the Meuse. For the insufficiency of their forces 
Bade it impossible to hold so long a line against such an extended 
assailant. It is true tlmt the srmy assembled round Metz was 
sufficient for the northern part, but as Mac Mahon was no longer 
able to take the field, or as yet unable to take it again, and his 
army consetiuently, not in a tit state to form the right wing of the 
position, even if a front had also been opposed to the secimd 
army, it would have been impossible to avoid a surrounding by 
the army of the Crown IVince. Under these circumstancex the 
iime of the Moselle teas absolutely untenable. And now the 
French Direction committed the fault, of not commencing the retreat 

•) CampafTiiP do 1^70. Df.i rniiHes qui oni ainime la capitulation dr 
Sedia par un ofKcier attachd ii I'dtat major general. BruzdlM, J. Kokcx. 


in time from this untenable poBition; they still retained tke anny 
in the f or t roM of Metz, whilst the first Oerman army appeared in 
front and the second army threatened the right flank. The inter- 
ference of the ministry in Paris in the military operations, as well 
siii the change made in the chief command bore no small share In 
the half measures of this epocL The defeats of the army, as 
prpviilnsly mentioned, had roused a general distrust in the general- 
ship of the Emperor; in consequence of this feeling, on the 
12th, he transferred the Chief command of the ''Rhine Army/' via. 
the corps united at Mctz, to Marshal Basaine^ to whose command 
(General Decaen succeeded. Marshal Lebmuf was dismissed from 
being Chief of the Staff. 

The Emperor, however, still romaincd with the army, his 
influence always carrying weight, the ministry sent urgent eonn- 
seiis, and a ruinous insecurity in the military measures neeessarily 
resulted from these complicated relations.- 

Tke German Direcliony on the other hand, well aware of 
the advantages of its own Hituation, and the disadvantages of that 
of tiie enemy, hoped to (jet in rear of the French Army^ hy 
makhnj a circuit upon the left hank\ whilst the advance of tke 
third army averted any damjer that mitjht by chance arise 
to the second army during the tvheef, from Mac Mahon. 

At midday on tiie 14th of Augunt, the i. Army Corps was 
rttationed on the French Nied, with its Ist Division at Courcollcs- 
ChaiisHVy 4»n the road from St. Avohl to Mrtz, and its 2nd Division 
at I/es Ktangs, npon the road from lioulay t<» Metz. Df the Vll. Army 
Corjis, th«* l.*Uh Division was at Pan«i;e, antl the 14th Division, on 
the same stream, at Donianp-vine. The VJll. Army Corps was in 
reser^T at Varize and Vionvilli* on the (iorinan Nied. Thr .*ird 
Cavalry Division was >tation<'tl n)M>ii tin* ri^ht wiii^ at i^Xv liarbe, 
thf 1st Cavalry Division on tin* irft vviiifr at Knmtijrny. 

Tiir FnMich army was, on the nn»rnin;r of this day, in larp» 
biv<»nacs to the i*ast of \\\v nntrr forts of Mft/ , and hi'twe«»n th<»m, 
upon thr ri;cht hank of thi* Mnsriir. 'Y\w tnmps stationed ftirthest to 
tht* fast oernpied rarth entrenrliini'nts at Coionihfv and Nouilly, 
upon tht* litth: rivuh'ts, which flow tu the Moselle from the right, 
about .'(4MM) paces beyond the outer f(»ilA. 


The ground between the (iermnii tntopg ami the outer tbrt8, 
offered hiudrane^g diffieuit to Hurmount^ in the projeetinic IkeightH, 
unking down to the MoBelle, which are here iutt^rneeted by nnmer- 
uu bnH»ks, and had been rendered of niilitary importance to the 
FVench by cover trenches and gnn-emplac45nientrt, one behind another 
Ib different linen. 

The 2(»th Infantry Brigade, forming the advanced guard of the 
m. Army CorpH, under tlie command (»f ( ieneral von der (ioltz, observed 
moi'ements in the enemy opposite, during the afternoon, which led 
til the inference that tliey were departing. In conise(|uence of this 
IB attack was ordered at about 4 o\'U>ck, for the purpose of 
making a reconnaissance, wliicii being dii*ecteil iigainst Colombeyj 
vould as4*ertiun whether tiiis was actually the case, and at the 
nme time compel the enemy to dcvelope his strength. In this 
attack the 2()th Infantry Brigade cnc(»untered an obstinate resis- 
tance fn»m the 3rd French corjis, and was involved in a violent 
fight, in which it suffered gi'cat losses from the energetic, deliberate 
fife uf the infantry lying concealed. General von Zastixiw ordered 
the 2&th Infantry Ikigade to m<»ve forward in support, from their 
bivHiiac at Pangc, -and directed tlicir attack against Marsilly bcytmd 
Colligny. At the same time the 14th Infantry Dixision received 
the order to move off from its bivouac at Domangeville, and to 
Barch upon Latpienexy. Tiie ailillery c<»rps, which was bivouack- 
ing at BaZ(»n<*ourt, was also ordered to follow the i4th Infantry 
Uii'isioD. Upon the right ning, the advan<*ed guard (»f the i. 
Army Corps, und«.'r the ctmimand of Major (teneral von Falckenstein, 
Bkived forwanl, at the same time, for the attack; the Corps 
followe<l the direction of the two high roads leading to Metz from 
Ik>aUy and 8t. Avoid, the 2nd division, under (ieneral von Pritzel- 
vitz, by the north road upon Noisseville, the 1st Division, under 
tieucral B«*nt}ieim, by the south upon Mnntoi. w. themaji tif the battle 
«>f Coun-elles. ' 

The 2(ith Infantry Brigade which was first engaged, came 
up<iu an overpowering enemy, whos(; masses were continually being 
mure strongly developed, and was in a very perilous position ; it was 
only by bringing up the last reser\es and by tin* greatest devii- 
tiun, that it was able to make a stand until the 2r>tii Infantry 


Hrigade had come up by CoUigDy, whieh did not Uko {daee 
until about 6 o'clock in tlie evening. Thig Brigade deployed no 
that three bntUlionB attacked the entrenchments in the wood to 11m 
iiortli of Golombeyy on the right flank of the 26th Brigade, aad two 
battalions remained closed to the west of Goincy. The artilieiy 
of the 13th Division eanio into position upon the liills to tlie eaat of 
(*ohiuibey, and prepared for the attack npon the Frencli position 
by opening an efficacions fire, even th<iugh exp<»sed to infantry fire. 

The French had by degrees developed two GorpSi DecaeB*a 
and Ladmiranlt*s. They made such a powerful offimtive attaek 
t(»wan]s Colombey and Noisseville, that both the 13th and the 
2n(l DivisioDB could with difficulty hold their positi^ma. 

At Colombey a more favourable turn was first produced by the 
arrival of the head of the 14th Infantry Division at G.5(> o'clock. 
(it'neral von Zastrow directed the 28tli Infantry Brigade, nnder 
Major General von W(»yna, against the riglit flank of the enemy, 
Htill in position at Colombey^ whilst he made the 27th Infantiy 
Brigade form up as a reser\'e, npon the heiglits to the eaat tf 
(\>lonib(\v. Tliirt attack upon liirt ri^lit Hank ronipolled the enemy 
to (^Ive way; lie iVll back slowly upon Boniy, and j^ave up tlie 
wood wliicli lies to till* soiitli-oaHt of thin placo, after an obstinate 
deteni'i*. The wo<id lyin^r to the north of t'olombey was also 
taken, after a severe fiKlit, by the 2r>tli Infantry Hrigade, under 
Major (leneral von Osten-Sacken. At MoUxvviUfy by the timely 
ro-operation of the Ailillery Corps and Infantry rerierves, the 1. Army 
(!orpH Hueeeeded in n*pulsin^ the enemy's astuinlt, and thus a great 
dan^cM' ft»r the \'I1. Army Corps was averted, its riirht wing having 
been threatened hy the Frfiicli otlens'iNc n)ovem«*nt at this place, 
(leiieral (*ount von tier (inilMMrs Cavalry l>i\i>ion, n)>on the extreme 
ri^lit tlank of tlie army, also took an active part in the tight, 
pri'ssinjr npon the h'l't win^ of the Freneli at Srr\ij^ny. 

The Frencli :ninv Irll h.irk sli»ul\. hohlin;: siir«*cssivelv the 
foilitird earth eutrenclinieiits, lyin^ one U'liind the other, and thus 
inHictin'T heavy losses on tli«' (iernian army. 

Hie 1st Cavalry Division upon the left tlank was engaged 
in the same \\:4y as the :{rd Cavalry lH\ision upon the right. 
Lieutenant (Seneral von llartniann, who was commanding, directed 


it attack against Mercy-le-Haiit, and commenced it witli liis Horse 
battery. It was support^nl by the extreme right flunk of the 
■eomd army, the 18th Infantry Diviriion, which took pnrt in the 
battle when it was at its height. The Funilier Kegiment No. 30, 
faptnred Jury and stormod Mercy-le-Hant, and a battalion of the H4th 
Hrgiment t<N)k Peltre. Tlins these troops gained tiie enemy's flank 
ud threatened his lino of retreat. 

Towards 8 o'chwk in the evening, the French army was 
repulsed on all points, and driven ba<'k until it was between the 
i>ater f<»rts, Quenlen, Ia*s Hotttw and St. Jnlicn. The (Sermans, 
saturally, eonld not attempt a further purnuit, as they would have 
come nnder the Are of the* fortifications: thev bivouai*ked in the 
position wrested from the enemy, in order to insnre the care and 
transptirt of the nnmerous wounded, although contrary to the order 
uf the Commander in (*hief of the Hrst arniv, who had directed 
that the original position, on the Nied, was ag:iin to hit occupied 
m tbe night. The VIII. Gernnin Army Coqis was not engaged 
ia tlie combat. 

In forming a judgment upon the importance of this battle, there 
are manv sides to be considered. 

The circumstance that the attack was only begun t^iwards 
e\'ening, and that it was undertaken with a comparatively weak 
fiifce, indicates that, at midday at h^ast, it was not the intention 
to give battle, but that the alteration in the military situation, 
thruDgh the departure (»f tlu* Khmk^Ii army, which was iH)ticed by 
tke advanc(*d guard, had induced the (ierman attack. It therefore 
kecame tin* dutv of the iirst annv to attack the encmv, in order 
tu hold him f:ist in the retr(*at N^liich he appeareil Ut be beginning, 
bat in other rt*spects to maintain the waiting position it had 
taken up. 

The position of the French army on the 14tli, indicated the 
intention of a battle u)Mm the right bank of the Mosi*lle, nither 
that a preuiediUite<l retn\*it The whole army stood that morning 
in the opiMi country, with an entrenched line, *J kihmietres*) in 

*) &i 'y Kii^li.ih inile». 


leiij^h, their rear covered by the nnasBaiUUe fortifiealioiw ef Moti^ 
c<»u8equently in an excelleut tactical poaitioiiy careftilly |iw p af Bd 
for fighting. Tliifl. poaltion raiBed tlie conjecture, that the realataMa 
origiually projeeted on the Nied against fiirther pnimit having 
been made, a pitched battle was to be fonght here on the i6thy Nnpo- 
Icon's fete day. 

Tlie obstinate, partly offensive fight which was carried on al 
Col(»mbey and Noisseville, has akio more the appearance of ft 
deleusive movement for tlie purpose of holding the poaition than 
of a retreating fight. Had the French Direction really mtended 
to evacuate the right bank of the Moselle and the fortreaSi befbn 
the attack of Goltz's Brigade, it surely, could easily have eaniad 
out this movement in spite of this attack, when lo oloae to 
the outer-forts, by withdrawing the army completely between the 
fortifications, whilst leaving a rear guard behind. Baiaine ahoold 
eitlier liave attacked the first army with his whole force, or retirad 
in giKMl time. On the part of the French, this battle waa ft half 
measure, resulting from complete ignorance of the enemy*a flM»v^ 
mentrty aud from their own want of design. That the Pmaaian 
divisions should have been allowed to deploy in front of an army 
of more than <><).<x><) men, whilst there was not a moment to be 
lost, iri an incomprehensible error, its principal fault being that it 
permitted the surrounding movement, by the second army, to be 
CJirried out 

Various important Htatenientrt exirit concerning tlie French Amy 
Direction, whicli lead Ui the conclusion that the retreat upon Verdnn 
wan a settled affair even before the beginning of the battle, and 
tliese agree with the rep<»i1 of Major (tcneral von der Goltx on 
the afternoon 4»f the 14th. *'The enemy has begun his retreat, 
and the :ulv:inrcd guanl will tlicrcforc nttark hiin.'* 

Again, it is nigniticaiit that the Kniperor letlt Metz with the 
Prince Imperial at "J o'clock in the al'ternoi»n, and at 1<) oVlock 
in tlM' evening of this day sent off a dispatrh from Ltmgeville, (^uuder 
Mont St. Quentin, iirar Metz). *'Our anny r(»ninienceH to retreat u|>on 
the Ifft h:\uk n\' the Muh-IIc. in the nioriiing, our rec4innoitriug 
patrols hail not rc)M»rtt'd tin* prci^ence df any hostile Corps. When 
however, the half of our army had crossed the Moselle, the l^usssiaus 


attacked ns wilh coMiderable forces &c." TlienMarBhaIBazaine»ay8*): 
'^After the brilliant fi^lit at Bumy (on tlie 14tli to the eaHt of Metz> 
the troops engaged in it re<*eived tlie command, on tlie morning 
vf the 15th, to ronimup their retre<nting movement upon Verdun, 
in the two direetionn assigned to tliem." From tliis it follows 
tliat ti retreat upon Verdun had b(^en < ordered, even before the 
battle. The Marshal further snys most distinctly in anotlier publi- 
cation**): "1 had instructions to lead the army from the right 
banic of the Moselle, wliere it liad been united since the 11th, 
over to the left bank, in order to direct it upon Venlun. In the 
middle of the exei'ution of this movement on the 14tli, which t(K>k 
plaee frf>m both flanks, towards 2 o*<*hM*k in the afternotm the 
German troops began the attack upon Mcttman's Division of the 
3rd r*<»rps. . . . We had not the satisfactitm of frustrating the 
eiemy*s plan, which was to delay our concentration upon the 
pUteau of Gravelotte, and so gain time to arrive there before us." 
In another publication***^ whi^-h appears to be drawn up fn>m 
excellent sonn*es, it is maintaine<l that ;i council of war was held 
it Mets on the 13th, which led to the decision that a retreat should 
be made upon diAlons. Orders were therefore given to commence 
the march of the troops upon the morning of the 14th, and tlie 
Jnd <.'or|)s began to retire at 3 o'dork a.m. of this day, but had 
**ly progresse<l very 8lt)wly. 

If one now consi<h>rs the observations in the publication men- 
tione<i above as pro4-ee<liug from the Kinperor himself "on the 
I4th of August, as also upon the H!tli, n(» one had an idea that 
^»e whole of the enemy's arrtiy was before us, and no one doubted 
•t Ciravelotte that it would be possible to reach Verdun with ease 
'*P*»n the foll(»wing day," it is probable that the restdution for a 
l^neral battle upon the right bank of the Moselle^ was definitively 
•btiKJoncd when it was learnt that the enemy's reconmdtring patrol> 

*) Kapjiort tin MurtM'hal liazainc hutnillc dr Kc/onvillc lo (» Aout 1H70. 

**) Huppfirt Mottiiiinin* mir U-r* ()|M'rnttiin'< ilr {'nrnu'C dii Khint* du l.'t Aoiit 
im 29 Ortobn* lS7o, pur !»• cniiiinniKhiiit vn t'\\v( Marrchal Hn/uiiH*. 

***) La raiii|iaf;nc il«' 1H70 juM«|u*au l<*r S<'|ifiMiibrf, |ittr un oflititT ilt* 
i'tfiufe tlu Khiii. 



liad arrived in VignealleB, and in the oonntiy roi Brieji-'Oli lim 
line of retreat towaida Verdun^ and the move of the feeMl 

army towards Gorae also became known ; therefore on the monlag 
of the 14th or even on the 13thy although attention had been drawn. 
to the threaten^ danger, it was imagined that there was still time. 
enough to escape from it. 

The first army consequently obtained a brilliant result, ii 
oblii^ing the enemy to show front, when on the point of with- 
drawing. The Battle of Courcelles (Borny) rendered possible 
the surronnding of Metz and the battles on the 16th and 18th. 
Without this conflict the French army would have been aUe to 
commence its march towards Verdun on the 14th and 16th under 
cover of tlie fortress, unencumbered by a large number of wounded, 
and with their organization undisturbed by a defeat. In Marshal 
liazaine's first named report it says: ^'Tlie delays occasioned 
to tlie 2nd and 3rd Corps, by participating in the battle of Borny, 
unfortunately prevented their being able to begin their movements 
l^tlie retreat on the 15tlO sutliciently early to enable them to eon- 
pletc it in tlie time fixed/' 

On the nioniing after the battle the Kin^ made a reeonnaisHance 
{}i* the field of battle in person. From tlie lii^liest points nothing 
more could be seen of the enemy upon the ri^lit bank of tlie 
Moselle. Tliick clouds of dust upon the other side of the river 
discli»sed the departure of the F'rench :irmy. 













valley, had only two gUnding bridges, which the Fnneh had 
iie|?loct(^d to break np, at Pont-k-MonBHon and at Nov^ant 

TlipMonelle hills apontlieriglit bank from Meti to Poiit-4-Moiiaion 
are only 8mall, rising abont IINK) feet, with narrow, diffknlt, 
transverrtc valleys at Corny, Arry and Champey; the hills beeome 
higher and wider to the sonth of Pont-a-Monsson , where they are 
intersivted by the valleyri leading to Dienlonard and Marbache. 

II10 heights upon the left bank are steeper, and a few 
liinidred feet more lofty, their average width is a German mile*). 
They sink gradually towards the west, whilst falling pre- 
(•ipitiMisIy towards tlic river. There arc only a few narrow defiles 
leading from the Moselle, in a north-westerly direction, towards 
the road from Metz to Verdun which the German army had t4» 
reach, (iune and Onville are situated in the only two vallejrs Ut 
the north of Pont-a-Mouss4>u. 

Thus the Army Corps which had commenced the marrh 
HimultaneouKly, were obliged, for the greater part, to make consider- 
able (letourri to the west and Huuth-west, in onler to gain gronnd 
witli4»ut stoppa^et» and e(»nfut»ion, and then by \\lieelin(;^ to the north, 
had to press torwanl afrainst the line of retn^at of the French 
aruiv between the Moselle and Meiwe hills. The nearer to 
Metz that the corps concerned could penetrate the chain of hills 
so much the quicker uould they reach their destination. TiiiMe 
diviMons only, \ihicli, hein^ furthest towards the north, had to 
describe the smallest arc, could advance huftieientlv far to be in 
time to cross the eueuiyV line of march, aud it therefon' depended 
upon their tenacity whether tin* euemy could be d(*tained sufKcient 
ly lon^% to allow the remaining corps, which were wheelin^r nuiml. 
to be brought t'tlectually into operation as they, };radually, eame up. 

Ponl'ii'MoHsson , when* the Commander in Chiefs head 
4|uarti'rs, ot' the ?»ec<md army, wen' eMablished durin;; the wh«»le 
of tlii^ dt'tonr, wah fnun its situation, the proper t'ocUK of :ill the 
(»pt>r:itiMn*>. From this place a iimd travei'ses iMith chains (»f hilU 
in an nnbroken line, and roads also lead to the iinrtli and sonth 
on both ballk^ of the river. Besides these*, the principal roads for 

*) I' I Knt;U!(li miieii. 


the movemento of the troops were those which led across from 
DienloQArd and Marbache by I^es SaizeraiK, and all the causeways, 
hihg roads and by ways which run parallel with the Moselle, 
in the approximate direction of Toul, towards Conilans. 

The ordering and execution of these marches by so many 
different roads, through a counti*y in which there was the greatest 
difficulty in keeping up the connection between the cor])s, is a 
master work in tactics. 

On the 15th of August, Prince Frederick Vharies's Army 
Corprt, which had been aj)pointed for operations upon the left 
bank, oc^cupied the following poHiti<ms and was carrying out the 
following movements, i^v. the general map.) 

The 111. Army Corps was on the march from Vigny to 

The 6tli Cavalry Division was pushed forward, on the right 
flank, towards Metz. 

The Xll. Aimy C'Orps uSaxons^ was stationed at Soigne. 

The X. Army Corps wa8 passing Pont-a-Mousson, the advanced 
guard was beyond it. 

The Tith Cavalry Division was stationed at Thiaucourt, upon 
th(' left hank of the Mortelle, and towards the road from Metz to 
Verdun. This Division wan, tlioref*U'e, the most advanced. 

The (tarde C<»rps was stationed at Dieulouard, with the 
advanced guard at Len (piatre Vents. 

The V. Army Corps was 4ui the march from the Seille to- 
wards Marbache. 

On the French side^ the whole army began iU departure 
by both road* towards Ferdun, upon the moruimj of this day. 

The 2nd (-orps was ordered to take the southern high road, 
by Kezonville, Mars-la-Tour imd Manheulles, followed by the 8tli 
(-orps, the Imperial Guard, the reserve Artillery and Parks; the 
:ird and 4th Corps were to move by the northern road by 
(*onflans and Etain. The first column was protectnl by the 
Division of res«»r\e Cavalry under General de Forton, cimsisting of 
two lh*agoon and tw4» Cuirassier Regiments, and the second column 
by the Division of reserve Cavalry under General du Barrail, 
consisting of f(»ur Regiments of Chasseurs d'Afriqne. 


The potali to be veMhed m Om Iftlh of Aagvl^ 
viUe by the Sal Oiffpi» BAWNnrille 1^ tke Sth, DoMitly Ibi 
4th, St llmal flMl VenwviUe hj tiie 8id Corpti IWChMis 
wero to oeoapy flimnlottB| in reienre. 

After raMbfaiK ViomdUei de Foiton's DiTitkHi wm to to- 
vestigatc the eontry towards the nwth-weily and di Jtomffa 
Division was to hold Jarnyy and wateb the road to Confana. 

Tlie baekwardneaa shown in the devetopoMnt of 4iw Pirk 
and Train oolanmay and the retardment of the 2nd, Sri and 4th 
Corps occaaloned by their partidpaiion in tiie battto ef OonreelkBy 
prevented this army (whieh afaMo the eommeneement of 4iw war 
had been porsoed by the miafortnne of being a nip t he d to ito 
formation), from eompleting this intended eoneentraflon nmnd 
the plateaux of Gravelotte and VionviUe in snflfeient tioM. 

The drd Corps, whieh was to hare followed tho 4lh, told 
talcen the lead, whilst the 4th was altogether nnaUe to eomnmnee 
the march npon the 16tii« But even the 8rd Corps waa only abto 
to reach the plateau of Gravelotte at 10 o*eloek in the evering 
of the 15th. 

Only the 2nd and 6th Coq)8 with the Guards arrived near 
the points appointed for them. 

In the course of this day the German Chief command was 
convinced that an offensive movement on the part of the French 
was not to be expected, but that Baaaine's departure for the weat 
had been commenced. Orders were therefore given for the further 
advance of the 5th Cavalry Division vKheinbaben's") at 7 o*cloek in 
the momin;;, towards the road from Metz to Verdun, in connection 
with the Dragoon Guards Uri^^adc (Count Brandenburg ID whieh 
had drawn towards the nortli from Kogeville; part of the X. Army 
Corps was to suppctrt tliis cavalry by marching upon Thiauoourt; 
and finally, a reconnaissance was to be made upon the left bank 
of the MoKelle towards Metz, by portions of the X. Army Corps. 

At 2 o'clock ill the afternoon, the 111. Army Corps wait 
ordered to cross the Monelle by the bridge which had been Uiid 
at Champey, and tliat corps was to advance, on the following day, 
by Gorxe to Mars-la-Tour, and the Xll. Army Corps, at Nomcny, 
was ahK) to advance. 


On this day Marshal Bazaino had learnt the movements of 
the enemy npon the left bank of the Moselle^ and inferred that a 
strong concentration would be made upon his left flank. As he 
would be able to offer an energetic resistance to any possible 
attack, and was sure of the reciprocal support of his two great 
columns^ he issued commands, in the evening, for the corps to 
maintain the positions they then occupied until midday on the 16th, 
in order to await the amval of the 4tli Corps. 

The conjecture that an attack would be made, was, without 
doubt, well founded, l^ince Frederick Charles issued the follow- 
ing Army order, at 7 o'clock in the evening, at Pont-a-Mousson for 
the 16th of August (v. the general map"): 

The III. Army Corps and the 6tli Cavalry Division will 
cross the Moselle below Pont-a-Mousson, and reach the road 
from Metz to Verdun at Mars-la-Tour and Vionville, marching 
by Novdant-sur-Moselle and Gorze. 

The X. Army Corps and the 5th Cavalry Division will 
continue the advance, by the road towards Verdun, nearly as 
far as 8t. Ililaire and Maizerav. 

The XII. Army Coi*p8 will march from Nomc^ny to 
Ponta-Mousson, with the advanced guard as far as Regndville- 

The Garde Corps will march to Bem6court, with the 
advanced guard as far as Rambucourt. 

The IV. Army Corps will march to Les Saizerais and 
Ifarbache, the advanced guanl to Jaillon (upon the road to 

The IX. Army Corps will march to Sillegny in order to 
follow the III. Army Corps, across the Moselle, and by Gorze 
on the 17th. 

The II. Army C!orps will march with its head as far 
as Bnchy, and will commence the passage of the Moselle on 
the 17th, at Pont-a-Mousson. 

The head-quarters of the army will remain at Pont-ii- 

Tliesc orders were modified in the evening after receiving 
directions from the Chief head-quarters, dated Uemy, 15th of 

Auguttt A', ii'olock fi. tn., tlmt two (-orp6 were tn uke np a 
piMitiup on tbe Uqc fmin Arry to Pommcrieux <iii iIil- Ifitli. Hk 

'~; iitvi* tutpiM I 


tgmiii8t the Metz and Verdun road. The poAition of the points of 
operation, Vionville, Mars-la-Tour and St. llilaire, offered however 
the probability of Htill being able to stop the enemy, even it he 
had continued his march towards tlie west with unforeseen rapidity, 
and so had escaped the effective flank attack of the columns 
pressing forwards by Gorze. 

// wot about 9. :5n o'clock on the morning of ihe 16/A 
trken the French viil cites ^ upon the plateau of Vionville^ 
perceived the approach of the enemy, (v. the general niap.> 

At this moment the army, under the command of Marshal 
HazainCy was standing with the 2nd Corps to the west of Kezon- 
ville, and with the 6th Corps, in the same line, to the right of the 
high road. Three Divisions and the Cavalry of the 3rd Corps were 
between Vemeville and 8t. Marcel, but Mettman's Division was 
still on the march to join his Coqis, the 4th Corps was marching 
b the direction of (^onfians, but was, as yet, far behind. The 
Guards were at Graveh^tti*. 

Tlie out-posts had hai'dly announex;d the advance of the 
Germans, when two regiments of the <)th Cavalry Division, ac- 
companied by horse artillery , <iebouching at Vionville , rushed 
upon the bivouac ot* de Forton's and Valabregue's Cavalry 
Divisions of the 2nd (/orps, and drove them back in rapid Hight 
to Rezonviile, behind th<* bivouac of the 2nd C*orps. 

At the sound of tlir c;innon (Senrral FroMxard made his 
Corps seize their arms, and oecupy the positi(»ns which liad been 
reconnoitred for this piupose <mi thr pi*evious day. Hataille^s 
Division deployed upon the right Hank, (»ii the plateau command- 
ing Flavigny, Verge's Division to the lell, up<m th<* same rise of 
ground. Ijapasset's Brigade, of the .'Jiil Corps, wheele^l to the lef\ 
in the n»ar, in order to watcli thr extensive* w(mhIh to the south 
of R<*zonvilIe and (■raveh>tte, and to eover the exit (»f the defile 
from Gorze. 

Marshal Canrobert also <irploye<l hi^ (*orps and 4K;cupied 
the ground lietween the road to Venlun and the village of St. 
Marcel ; Tixier*s l)ivi^ion on the right , the \H\\ Kcgiment of Ww 
hue (the only one belonging to HissonV Division which had 
arrived) and Lafont de Villier's Division on the left, with the left 


Hank rencliing to the road. In rear, and parallel to this higbwmy, 
by which it had advanced , Lcvassor-Dorval's DiviaioB (formerly 
Mart imp: cy*ri) took ap its positiun. Its mission was to snpport 
liapasHrt'n Hri[cadc and to watch the numcrons gullies wUeh lead 
tVoni Noveant and Ars, through the woods, on to the flank and in 
rfjir jif the army. 

Marshal Leboeufj who commanded the 8rd Corps (General 
Dccavn having been severely wounded in tlie battle of Couroelles), 
was ordered to wheel up his left wing and seize the assailants 
in flank. 

The French position thus presented important taetieal ad- 
v:uita<>:e8. (Commanding the plateanx of the heights, so difllcalt to 
surmount, in possession of the debouches of all the defiles, master 
of thi> hijrhrosids which facilitated the communications of the troops, 
Marshal liazaine's army had considerable advantages over the 
(icrnian army, wliosc leading troops had to climb laborionsly up 
the Iit'i^hts from the narrow valleys. The French, m o r euv cr , 
were nmsiderably superior in numbers, and were almost 
coniph'tcly united, whilst th<' (icnnans had to earry on the fight 
tor many hours with only the 111. (*orps and parts of the Corps 
which wan next coming up. 

But rren at this wovirut . in spiff o/' all tactical flrf- 
rantntjesy the situation oj the surroumlvd nrmy^ in a stratrgical 
point of rinr, miyht In* cultvd a (ivspn*utr one. Kvon had they 
succeeded in conipletely beating the assailants lor the moment, and 
thntwin^ them back upon (S(»rze, they would have been exposed 
to Hank attacks, from the corps niairhin;: in the direction of 
Mars-la-Tour and St. Hilaire, whilst proM'cutin^r their n*treat ufion 
Verdun, and would, be-^idch, be exposed to the pursuit of the 
enemy who in the tir^t instance had been repulsed. 

Hut tlicy did not e\rn succeed in vam|nii«hin^ the first 
4'nem y ; (ifueral \on AlvenslelM'irs ('«»rps suiticed to stop them. 
It is tnir thi-^ Ma^ only done amid the p*eatest losses in the 
(icrmaii rr^rinnuts, which attacked \Nith matchless pertinacity. 

After a nM-onn;Hssance hati been made (»f the enemv's out- 
poKtr% at Tnuiville and Vionville, Huddeubn>ck's Oivision had 
c(»ntiuued its march bv Unville in a northerly direction as far as 


the ed^ of tlie platean to the south of Vionville, And there, in 
A covered poaition, awaited tlie approach of the Bth Cavalry 
Division. At H o'clock, a second report from the patrols led to 
the supposition that the enemy was departing in a northerly 
direction, and the Division was therefore ordered to continue its 
march in the direction of Mars-la-Tour and Jamy. Upon arriv- 
ing at Tronville General von Buddenbrock received the command 
to wheel to the right, and to proceed to the attack. 

The 6th Cavalry Division had by this time reached the 
plateau, and by its unexpected attack, had thrown back the enemy's 
cavalry upon liezonville, which compelled Bazaine to devclope 
his army. 

On the German side, it was known that the rising ground 
round Vionville and Flavigny was occupied, whilst the mass of 
the enemy was stationed to the north and east of Vionville and 
at Hezonville. The artillery opened the battle by firing upon the 
French positions. 

By the march towards Tronville, Buddenbrock's Division and 
Rheinbaben's Cavalry Division had become connected. The latter 
had bivouacked at Xonville, h:ul moved off from the bivouac at 
8 o'clock, and had felt de Forton s Division at Mars-la-Tour. At 
9. 15 o^clock, they trotted on from Puxieux towards Tronville, 
taking with them four battenes, two of which had been supplied 
to them for this day by the Artillery Corps, (ieneral von Rhein- 
baben announced that he was to support the attack of Budden- 
br«K:k's Division upon the left flank y by Mars-la-Tour, and at the 
same time to send word to the X. Army C^orps,- on the march 
to St. liilairc. A detachment under (*olonel Ijehmann, commander 
of the 37th Infantry Brigade, was allotted, in addition to support 
this Cavalry Division, on the DUh; the detachment consisted of 
the 91st Regiment, the Ist Battalion of the 78th Regiment, the 
2nd and 4th Squadrons of the Otii Dragoons, and a heavy battery. 
(*olonel l/chmann had started from Thiaucourt at 4. 15 o*clock, and 
moved on to the battle field by Dommartin and Chambley. lie 
kept up the connectk>n with another dotachiient under Colonel 
von Lynker, which had jojned the 5th Infantry Division tStUlp- 
nagel's). This conalstod of the 2nd and Fusilier Battalions of the 


7Htii Regiment y the Ist and 3rd Sqnndroiw of the 9tti Dragoons 
and a lifj^lit battery, and wa» pushed forward on the 16thy horn 
VHiidiei-ert t«» Nov^ant Stttlpnagers Division mounted the plateau 
upon the niad fn>m Gorze to Vionville before 10 o'eloek, hit upon 
the enemy's infantry to the west of the thicket near Vionvilley 
who were endeavouring t4) reach the edge of the plateau fron 
Kezouville by Fiavignyy for the pnrp(»se of preventing the Divuiion 
from (Ichoucliiug. A vig(»ruus c<»mbat was here carried on between 
the enemy and General V(»n StUlpnagel, supported by Lynker^s 
(ietaehmenty which ended, after a bayonet lights in the retreat of 
the Frenelt upon Kestrnvilley and a cessation for a short time. At 
tlie same time, 10. 15 o'clock, Buddenbnick*s Division had abm 
moved forward, and taken tlie rising ground in front of Flavigny 
and V'ionviHe after a severe Hglit, and had then wrested the villages 
from the enemy in the first assault. 

During tliis engagement, the Artillery Corps liad taken ap a 
pohititm upon the edge of tlie heights, in front of the road Amn 
(lorze to Vionville, witli tlieir left flank near Flavigny. 

As soon as Mai*shal liazaine rh>arly underst<NKi the direction 
ot' the attacks of the twn (termun Divisions of tlie III. Annv 
Torps, itiw from thr >outh, the other from the west, he eompleted 
the dis|M»siti(»nrt already made, by ordering tin* Guards to take up 
a reserve position before (travtdotte with their fnmt to the spnth- 
wi'^t, hcing espe<*ially anxious t<» seeure his left flank and fearing 
the h>ss of his line of r«*tivat to Metz. At the same time he counted 
upon Ladmirault's ('(»rpH e^iming up to the assistance of the Ard 
Corps, which had ht^cn wli<>cled, in order to eomc upon the left 
flank of thr (it'rmans hv Ih'iiviile, and at tli«> samt* time t<H»k into 
coiihideration the •safety ••(' his ri^lit tiank, iM*f'on- th«' airixal tif tlit* 
.3ni r'orps in the lint' ••!' hatths by fonnin;; d<* Foiion's DiviHon 
in ivar •»!' thr Htli Torp^ with its hack upon tin* wood Villers- 
an\-Hi»is. At tlM> same tinic, the 12 -pounder batteries of the 
n-MTM' artilh-ry wen* drawn t'<»ruard, in nrdcr t«» oppose the 
ttcnnaii :irtilhT\ in position, taring the 2nd t'orps. 

(went*rai ron ^lrtiix(phrn hml la varrtf on Ihr fiyht alone, 
with his Corps ^ thv two Varulrif Dirixions and Lynker"* 
IMarhfneni atjainjst these greatly superior forces^ nntii 11. 3o 


o'clock^ and then only an inc<»n8iderable reinforcement arrived in 
Lehmann'8 Detachment at Tronville. 

The X. Army Corps, whicli wsis the nearent fur the support 
nf the III., was widely distributed over the ground t4» the 8<mth 
of the Metz and Verdun road. Lieutenant General von Schwarz- 
koppen, commanding the 19tli Infantry Division, had still for 
duty under his immediate command, after deducting Lehmann*s 
and Lynker's two Detachments, the 38tli Infantry Brigade (von 
Wedell's^ and two batteries, and had commenced the march from 
Thianc(»urt, by St. Benoit-en-Voevre, upon St Ililaire at 5 o'clock, 
in connection with the Dragoon Guards Brigade. The 2()th 
Infantry Division ^Kraatz) and the Artillery C<»rps were moved off 
from I\»nt-a-Mou8son at 4. .'(o o'clock. The latter, at Thiaucourt, 
was commanded t4) march U) the field of battle at 1 1. 30 o'clock, 
and Lieutenant General von Sehwarzkoppen , at St. Ililaire, at 
12 o'clock. Colonel Lehmann h(»wever, being nearer Ut the field 
of battle, t4»ok the road by Chanibley, upon the sound of cannon 
bec*oming audible, and Count Brandenburg 11. that from St. Ililaire 
with the Dragoon Guards Brigade. 

At midday the HI. Army Corps held the positions whirh it 
had gained at Flavigny and Vionville, an<l with the aid (»f parts 
uf the 0th Cavalry l)ivisi(»n whirh at 1 iiVltK'k in the afternoon 
attacked in the direetion of the high road, le.tving Flavigny on 
the left, successfully repulsed all attempts made by the enemy t<» 
retake Vionville. The French General of Division, Bataille, was 
wounded at 12. 30 oVloek, his Division began to yield, and this 
iu(»vement drew back part of Verges Division with it, tiie left 
wing of which, together with Lapassefs Brigade, alone remained in 
position. In onler to fill up this gap for the moment. Marshal 
liaaaine (»rdere<l a charge to l)e made against the enemy's infantry, 
by the 3rd Lancers and the Cuirassiers of the Guard. The attiick 
tif the I^incers was repulsed, and the Cuirassiers, who eharged in 
three eehellons, were unable to shak<* the squares. A S4|uadron 
of the Brannsrhweigschen Hussars fr4>m KheinbabenV Division, 
pursuinl the retiring cavalry as far as a battery of the Guards, 
in the midst of which the Marshal himself was standing, S4» that 


}ie and his Steff had to draw their twordi and engage ta tke Cght 
with bare weapoiuk 

Oeneral von Baddenbrock was now ordered to direct hia 
further attack so aa to able to preas forward to the north of 
Viunville with the maaa of hia Division, for the porpoae of gainuig 
ground in the wood situated to the north, whilst hia right wing 
held Vlonville and Flavigny. The 24th Regiment sopported by 
tlie 2nd Battalion of the 9l8t Regiment (Lehmann*a Brigade) 
presned into the wood and carried on a vigoronSi obstinate fight, 
with varying success. 

Fresh troops were again brought forward on the French ude. 
Pie:mr8 Division, the Grenadiers of the Guard, onder the leader- 
ship of General Bourbaki, gathered together Verg^a and Bataille^s 
Divisions, and deployed on both sides of the village of ReMomfoille^ 
wliilst the left flank was supp(»rted by a brigade of Levaaaor- 
Dorvarrt Division from the 6th Corps. Deligny's DivialoB, Vol- 
ti^^Mirs of the Guard, was ordered to go forward aa far aa the Boia 
des Onions, to occupy it with a Jnger Battalion, and to wateh 
tlic d(*bouch(?s by which tlie plateau of (iravelotte conld be 

At the same time Marshal Lcbt^eurs manoeuvre, which had 
been ordered at the beginning of tlie flght, came into effect upon 
tlie German l(*ilt Hank. Tlie Marshal was on the man*li to Don- 
court with the .*{nl ('orps, when he receivetl the order t<» wheel to 
the left. After carryin<i^ this <Mit his tVtmt was t4»wards the sonth, 
and Huddenbr4»cks Division was endangered. General von Alvens- 
leben had tmly tw<» battalitms of the 2(Hh Regiment, which had 
been kept in res<*rvc to the stmth-west ot' Vi(»nvillc. and the 91st 
Infantry Ke«:inient which mTi\cd soon at^cr^ to op])ose t4» this neM 
enemy who was obscrvtMJ ascemlin;; the plateau to the south of 

Hruville. Towanls 2o'rlork, these ti ps were placed at the dispos:il 

of General V(»n Hudd<*nhvo('k. The *Jlst Kegiment, two battalions 
ot' \ihich were already <Mijrn^ed , was din'ctiil upon the wwteni 
border of the wooil, which li(*s to the ni»rth of Vitmville. To this 
place it was tolloxKnl by the 1st Uattalion of the 7Hth Regiment. 
beh»n;rin^ to l^*hmann*s ISrigade. Them* battalions aftf^rwanls 
tiNik their share in the heavier lighting \iliich some battalions of 


Boddenbrock*s DiYiaion had to guBtain to the north of f^fon- 

The fight m the wood was at the cost of immeiise sacrifices, 
because the French artillery, composed of batteries brought np from 
the reserve artillery, in a strong position to the north of the road, 
fired very effectively <m the wood as well as npon the German 
batteries stationed at Vionville. Buddenbrock*8 Division made 
assaults against this position of the enemy, whicli at length, 
resulted in driving tlie batteries from tlieir good position and in 
the capture of a gun. 

A second position of the enemy's artillery, upon the plateau 
more to the east, which endangered (jeiieral von Buddenbrock's 
left Hank, in connection with the 8uiT<imiding m(»vement, was 
attacked by Bredow's Cavalry Brigade, by order of General von 
Alvensleben. The gnmnd gained was worth maintaining at 
any price. 

General von Bredow advanced with the 7th Cuirassiers and 
16th Uhlans. Req^ived by a most vigorous fire, the Uhlans 
nevertheless broke through the infantry of the right wing of the 
0th Corps, and the Cuirassiers foiled theniHclves into the batteries, 
cutting down the men serving them. Thus they reached the 
second body of the enemy. De Forton's Cavalry Division, how- 
ever, threw itself upon their flank, the first body 4)f infantiy ch»sed 
up behind them, :uid they only efTected their retreat amid the 
greatest losses. 

Upon the right wing, StUlpnagers Division had maintained 
its position during this combat, and repulsed all the attacks of 
the enemv. 

Belireen 2 and .3 o'clock, the position of both armies 
was changed from what it had been at the beginning of the 
fight ^ the French front was no longer towards the west, but 
was now directed towards the south, and was continually being 
more developed upon the line of Mars-la-Tour and Gracelotte; 
the left flank of the Germans was always being further 
surrounded by the French Corps , although , it is tme, they 
still rictoriously held the positions they had originally taken 
around rionrille and Flavigny, as well as those places thetnselves. 


Marahal BaiidBa having observed the loniid of etumon Irom 
Hruville nt 2 o*oloek, had iaaned orders to Marshal Lqjboeiif U^ 
hold hi8 positions strongly with Nayrara Uivisioni to re establish the 
cunnecti(»n with the 6th Corps by qoans of Aymard's DMsioBi and 
to diriHst Montandon's Division upon Gravelotte, for the purpose of 
tK*€upying tlie d^boncli^ from Ars-sur-Moselle. Basalne made the 
DivirtitinM of the 2nd Corps, which had been repnlsed in disorder 'at 
the commencement, bnt were now again eolleeted, nuueh to the 
same p<iiuty and also caused 12-pounder batteries and mitraillenaes 
to form up in front of the d^mches in order to reeeive the 
enemy's columns energetically, which would endeavour to eome np 
that way. 

This strong occupation was -rendered necessary by the 
appearance of tlie 16th Infantry Division of the VIII. Army Corps, 
whi<-h had arrived in Arry at 12 o'cU^ck m»on, had crossed the 
Mo^M>lle at Nov^nt, and by malcing a further advance, wottid 
threaten the extreme left flank and rear of the French amy. 

In the meantime Ladmiranlfs Corps liad tontinued Ha nank 
an tar as the battle field, and hif« Orst troopK arrived in the line 
of battle at 3 ocl«K*k. (irenierV Division , led hy (Seneral I^ad- 
mirault himself, and supported by de (1ssey*s Division, at firet 
strengtiienetl the right wing of the Gth Corps, advance<l with it 
by St. Marcel and then directed its att:i<*k against the w«»od ti» 
the n(»rtli t»f Vionville, which was defended by HuddenbntckV 
Division; ClerambaultV Division moved f<»rward ifpon the right, 
accompanied by the 'ind liegiment of Chasseurs d*Afrique and n 
brigade of Cavalry of the (luard, I^'incers and DragiNins, which 
had juM eM*(»i1ed the Km)MTnr Na[>oh'oii as far as Ktain, and had 
now n'tiirnt'd <»n hearin^r tlie noise of the battle. 

This entire forre, wliirh by tlii** time e(»nsi.sted <»f the nniteil 
Corps of lA'lxM'nf, Ladmiraiilt and ranrolx*rt, did not, however, 
AUeeeed in dri\in;^ the ill. Army <'orps from its position round 

.7/ .*<. :»0 o'clock, the i'ommtifuler in Vhirf of ihc II, Annff, 
Prince Frederick Charles^ nrricetl upon the fiehl of baliie 
from Poiit'ii'Monsson . and reinforcemmis betjnn, tfrntfitaf/i/, io 
arrice from the A'., I' III, and IX. (*orpx. 


Knuitx*« DivisioD and the Artillffy Corps of the X« C4»rps 
had taken the road from Thlaaeoiirt hy Chamhley. From here 
the batteries of the Artillery C<»rp8 hastened forward in the 
direetion of TrooTille, and, at about 3. 30 o'doek, took up a 
pontioB to the west of this plaee, and t4» the north of ^e ntad 
froB Vionville to Ifars-la-Tour, to oppose the eolnmns of Leboenf s 
(Vn-ps on the march from Brnville. The leading troops of Kraata'a 
Division arrived at Tron\ille towards 4 o*eloek. The Division 
engaged in the fight, which was still being vigorously carried on 
in the wood to the north of Yionville, as the battalions moved 
np. Two batteries supported the advancing battalions. 

Eiglit battalions <»f Kraatz's Division were engaged here, 
three of which remained in resen^e with two batteries to the 
south of the wood, whilst three battalions and two batteries wero 
directed to Flavigny upon their arrival, and from here took part 
in the fights of StQlpnagers Division. Of Schwarzkoppen's Division, 
Wedeirs Brigade, with which the Division General was present, 
arrived at St. Hilaire at 12 o*clock, and from here went away on 
the right, to the battle. Towards 4 o'clock, it came upon Leboeut*s 
aad I^mimnlt's Corps at Mars-la-Tour, and attafted them, whilst 
tiw 16th Regiment by Mars-la-Tuur, and the 1st and Fusilier Battalions 
of the 57th Regiment together with two companies of Pioneers, 
leaving ILirii-la-Tour np4»n the left, went forward against the French 
position np4»n tlie rising ground to the n<»ith east of that village. 
Tfie attack was supported by the two batteries of the Division 
which had taken up a position in front of the village. 

As soon, however, as the 10th Regiment had passed Ifars- 
la-Tour, the enemy opened a vigorous bombardment which set 
fire Ut the village. It is true, that the battalions continued to 
advance beyond the heights, and over the ground l>ing to 
the north-east, against the hill up<in the other side, but there 
the onset was broken by strong masses of the enemy*s infantry 
who encountered them. The retreat had to be C4»mmenced, 
amid severe losses, under cover of the Artillery Corps of the 
X. Corps, which had followed the movements of Wedeirs 
Drigade and had taken up a position close to Ifars-la-Tour, upon 
the east. 


WedalTft Brigiifl tatmti at Tkottrillft, aid Hi lUhs bMk 
ttiM caiiaad a nlnpade MoraMit ii Kraatfa Dlviiia^i Owwnl 
von Voigti-Bhali, cwawMadiig fhe Z. Coipa, ordona j|M' OMdra 
Commmnte to ratm to tiie haigliti of TmTille fiir itm cacaption 
of Wedeira Brigada. Goont Bnuidaiibnrf IL Oaavl Jkacaoaa 
Brigade waal fDrwaid to releaae tiia ralnatiqg battalioM.inai the 
puniQit of tiia Freneh infiuitry. Dariaf the advaaee of WedelTa 
Brigade it had taken up a poaitioii to the north of MaraJft-IVNur, 
and after that the 1st Guard Dragoona had been detaehed to the 
right, for the protoetioii of the adTaneiBg ArtUleqr Ooq^ 

When Wedeirs Brigade waa foreed to retreat^ tUa ngteent 
endeavoared to eheek the punaU bj an attaek lyon tfie. Hgfat 
flaak of the approadung oieniy's infiuitry. The altaefc, eMi|e- 
tically carried oat^ waa aeeonpanied by heavy toiiea. The 9ad 
Guard Dragooaa had also, several tiawSi attaeked diviatona of 
iofantry. Further to the left, Bheiobabea'a DiviahMi with Btohgr'a 
Brigade aeeonpanied by the 18th Dragooaa and 10th HfWif% 
had gone romd Mars-la-Tonr. Here they eaae npon the Itaneh 
Cavalry Brigade of Guards and the 2Dd Re^ment of tte 
Chasseurs d'Afrifue, and overthrew the enemy in a brilliant attaek. 

Buddenbruek*s and Stalpnagel's Infantry Divirihins had maintained 
their positions all through this fight, in spite of the superiority of 
tlie enemy, by extriuirdinary efforts on the part of the troops, who 
had been under fire, uninterruptedly, since the beginning of tlie 
battle, and with heavy losses. When the enemy, after many in- 
effectual aMaults against the front of tliese troops, at last attempt- 
ed to surround them by presi»ing forward through Uie woods to 
the south of liezonvillc and Gravttlotto, he was stopped by parts 
of the VIU. and IX. Army Corps which had joined in tlie fight 
late in the afterntNin, and whose 'approach by Noveant, liad iM'en 
learnt by Marshal Baziiine sttoii after midday. 

After the march from Fnmtigny, IJeuteiuuit General von 
Barnekow h:id made his Division, the IGth, rest for one hour at 
Arry (,at which place the 11th Infantry liegiment, from tlie 
IX. Army (-orps, was attaclied t4» him by order of Lieutenant 
General von Wrangeli, until 1 oVlock, and then had arrived with 
his leading troops at Corse, by Noveant, at 3. 30 o^clock. 


From here, after a communication with Lieutenant General 
von StUlpnagel) three batteries and three squadrons of the 9th 
Ha8Bar8 were brought forward to the field of battle of the 
5th Division y wliilst Kex's Brigade, conBisting of the 72nd 
and 40th Infantry Regiments, in conjunction with the 11th 
Infantry Regiment, were directed by Cote-Mtiusa, through the St. 
Amould wood, upon Rezimville, for the purpose of attacking the 
enemy in flank and rear, in pursuance of tlie arrangements of tlie 
Commander in Chief. 

On account of the thick biiishwood these regiments were 
ordered to march by a road, and their heads only reached the 
outskirts of the St. A mould wood toward 5 o'ch>ck. The 72ud 
Regiment was ordered to press forwai*d out of the wood, in the 
direction of Rezonville, and the 40th Reginipit was to be the next 
to follow it 

The attack of this infantry w:is made under the greatest 
difficulties, caused partly by the rising, wooded C4>untry, full 
of hollows, and partly by the strong occupation of th(^ positions 
lying opposite. 

As mentioned before, the reserves of the •Garde Corps, the 
2ud Corps, and a powerful artillery fnrni the Reserve were 
formed up, and the deployment from the debout^lu'S liad to be 
effected whilst «»ppo8ed to these superior masses. The fight lasted 
here until dark, without any considerable acquisition of ground 
on the side of the Germans, yet it had the great result of 
keeping Bazaine in anxiety for his flank and rear, and he, 
therefore, could not venture to employ still stronger masses 
against StUlpnagers Division. Towards 7 o'clock in the evening, 
this Division had also /i*ceived some re-inforeements from the 
IX. Army Corps. At 12. 30 o'clock in the afternoon, Prince 
Frederick Cliarles, on receiving the first reports from the 
111. Army <Jorp6 , when at Pont - a - Mousson , directed General 
vun Manstein to cover the right Hank of that C«irps and 
to support it generally as far as his strength would allow. 

In consequence of this, the 49th Infantry Brigade, three batteries 
and the 1st Cavalry Regiment from the Hessian Division ^No. 25^, 
undi*r the leadership of the Divisiou Commander, Lieutenant 


General Priaee Loill of Emm^ eroMed flie MMIIe «t iTovAwl 
and moved ArMrd ttpoa Gone. Two batteriat o#*Wtirt|^agtfa 
Division wen bnMiglift oat fron Gonei aad jdhel Ttty 
efficacioiialy fai flie Iglit, towards oTenbiK, apon tka H|liit ftont 
of the artiDeqr <^ ^ Dividoo. The 49tti lofkntoy Brigade^ 
which waa IbDowed by one battery, waa direeted Hvom^ tbe 
Bois des Ognoaa. In fliia thick wood the 1st Beasian InflMtiy 
Regiment met with resistence from tiie enemy, aad a persUant ire 
fight was carried on there, first with six eompaaleai and later 
on, supported by two additional eoaqmniea aad the 9tod Hasalan 
Infantry Regfanent, which only ended with the lUl of nIgH 
Thns, whilst tnth forces arrived, at sanaei, In the right tmtn 
and upon the right flank, the left flank and left esoln onee 
again went forward. Ilie Prince ComnHuriiqg fat Chief made 
part8 of Kraata's and BnddenlHrock's IXvisions advanee Ul a 
north-easterly diredion, and the Artillery Corps of flie IIL Antf 
Corps in the mean time took np a position stUI tother ItanMi. 
Lafont de Vllliers* Division, in the French centre, waa ftnel in 
give way, the eagle of the 93rd Regiment was captured aad a 
gun taken. The%nemy was compelled to make renewed eflbrts 
and changes of position. Marshal Basaine stopped the march 
of Monteudon*B Division upon Gravelotte, and made him retarn 
for the support of Lebo^nfs Corps; he ordered de Forton's 
Cavalry Division, which had retired, to form up afresh at the 
wood of Villcrs, to tlie north of Rexonvillc. General Ddigny 
reinforced his 2nd Brigade by four battelions of Voltigeurs, for 
the purpose of supporting and receiving the retiring Grenadiers 
of tlio Guard upon the heiglits of Kezonville. General Bourbaki 
united all the guns at liis disposal in the centre, in one batter}* 
of r>4 guns, ngniust tlie pressing on III. Army Corps. Vala- 
br^gue*8 Tavalry Division clinrged f(»rward from tlie Resonville 
heights, and wrested the l(»8t eagle and gun from the Germans. 

It was t4»wnrds 8 o*c*l(K*k when the Prince Commanding in 
(iiief made the Brigades of the 6th Cavalry Division ride on 
to the attack in the direction of Rezonville, from Flavigny; it 
was here tliat the Zietensche Hussars, followed by the 16th 
Ilnssars, rode down the French squares. Tlie 5tli Cavalry 


Division also attacked with success, and endeavoured to snrromid 
the riglit wing of tlie French at Mars4a-Tour. These were the 
last actions on this day. Darkness setting in put an end to the 
sanguinary battle, (v. the map.) 

Both armies bivouacked upon the long contested positions. 

The loss of the Germans, amounted to about 17,000 men in 
killed and wounded. 

This battle, which had been carried on with marvellons 
tenacity and boldness on the German side, resulted in the 
frustration of the French plan of operations. Marshal Bazaine*s 
army was stopped on its march U* Verdun; he had lost the 


main road to the s<»uth, and saw the one to the north strongly 
threatened; tlie organization of the army was so shaken that the 
highest aims now attainable were securing the wounded, complet- 
ing the ammunition, and holding the line of retreat towards Metz, 
as well as the positions to the west (»f it. If they were unable 
to force the inconsiderable forces whicli opposed their further 
advance upon the IBth, still less could they think it possible 
to do so on the following day, for new divisions of the German 
corps, advancing between Metz and Venlun, were arriving every 

Ckinsequently the single tactical advantages in the battle 
of Vi(mville, which the French can claim, are entirely with- 
out significance. The continuation of the retreat, was alone of 
great importance to the Marshal. Even if he had purchased it 
at the sacrifice of a Corps, a success would have been obtained; 
but his having been forced to devel(»pe his whole Army, and in 
the evening his possessing less ground than in the morning, 
constitute a strategical and tactical defeat. Nevertheless the 
Marshal and France claim the victory, because the army was not 
completely thrown back from all its positions. 


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atod Iluainf hiowir, ll»» li <lill |^.| 


doubt whether Basaine's army was capable of repulsing the German 
army on the ITth, and that would have been necessary, in order 
to get to Verdun. A circuitous march by Briey, for instance, would 
only have led to a most successful flank attack on the part of the 

It is true that a moi*e talented General, and one of greater 
energy, would probably have made the attempt to defeat the 
German army on the llth. Hut such a general would never, in 
the first place, have got himself into such a situation as Bazaine 
had. The chances in favour of the French army, had become 
essentially worse since the previous day. What was impossible on 
the 16th, was still less likely to succeed on the 17th. 

The fault, lay in the short comings of the days from the 12th 
to the 16th of August. On the 17th, they could no longer be 
mended. Thus Bazaine may be called an incapable general, but 
none will call him a traitor after a careful and impartial examina- 
tion of his situation on the 17th of August. Such an examination 
leads one t<» suppose that Bazaine did not clearly appreciate his 
posititm, that he had not judged his opponents intenti(ms correctly, 
that he, perluips, hoped Mac Malion would in some way or other 
come to his assistance, or that he otherwise deluded himself. 

After the battle of Vionvillc, tiie Marshal informed the Emperor 
and the minister of war of tlie situation of the French army at 
Metz, in a dispatch dated the 17th of August, from which he has 
published the following extract: 

^^It is said to-day that the King of Prussia is in Pange, or 
in the castle of Aubigny, that an army of 100,<KK) men follows 
him, besides the numerous masses of tr(N)pB which have been 
seen on the road to Verdun, and at M<»nt-sous-les-C6tes. 

''What gives a certain pr«»bability to this news of the King 
of Prussia's arrival, is the circumstance, that at this moment, when 
I have the honour of writing to your Majesty, the Prussians are 
directing a serious attack against Fort Quenleu. They have 
erected batteries at Magny, Merey-le-Haut and in the wood of 
Pouilly; even at this moment the fire is pretty lively. 

''What concerns us is, that the Gorpi are badly off for pro- 


visions; I will mAmrnMi to have aond bcopght ii ^Hm 
road, whieh It rtU opoik GcMnl SoMlbv who I lnp» Mil tato 
the fortraMi IsfimH mb that ita aapflj <rf aummWii la aaally 
and that it can orij tanidi na with 8<)0,000 cartrligWi whkh 
is onedajfM aoaauq^tlon for oar soldieni. In the same waj an! tlMra 
is only a small amonnt of shot for the 4-poniider8, at haal," — 
lastly, he adds that 'HhoFjroteehnieeatabUshnoat haa Bot Oa SMaas 
necessary for replealshbig tbe cartridgea. 

''General Solaille haa been obliged to demand from Ftels^ tiie 
Indispensable aeeessariea for tbe instant repair of the laid toola; 
but will they arrire in time? General Prossard'a r^gtanmits have no 
more camp eqnipmenta and eanaot eook tMr providoM. Wa will 
do all we ean to make up onr storea of evnj deaertpttoB| ao 
that we may be able to eommenee onr maroh again in two dayap 
if possible. I will take the road by Briej. We will laaa no 
time, provided that no fresh battle frnstratea my plana." 

In corroboration of this dispatch, tiie Harshal wrttaa Ii Ua 
** Rapport Som muir^ : '' Coi^eetnres have been made aa to 
tlie possibility of having continued the march to Verdun in the 
night of the 16th. They are erroneous. Th(»8e who formed them 
did not know the situation. The enemy received considerable 
reinforcements every moment| and had sent out troops to oeeapy 
the position of Fresnes, before Verdun; the French army, whieh 
had been on the march for several days, had just fought two 
sanguinary battles, and parts of it were still behind, including the 
large army reserve park, which was kept in Toul, and waited for 
a favourable opportunity of uniting with the army, whieh it 
did n<it succeed in doing. The army might have received a very 
serious shock, which would have had a disadvantageous influence 
upon later openitions.'* 

Thirt representation <»f the French Commander in Chief is in 
accordance with the observations, made later, on tlie German side, 
and with the light thrown upon the subject by a series of dis- 
patclies found in the ch&teau of 8t. Cloud, relative to the defeetive 
equipment of the army in the field and of tlie fortresses. It is 
however c^mtested and maintained on the other hand, that 500 
waggons with provisions remained untouched at Plappeville. 


It Ui howevcTf cffrtaiHy thai after the battle of Honrille 
ike French army could not have carried out its march upon 
Ferdun^ even had it been completely supplied with provisions 
and ammunition, and had had the reserve park at its disposal. 

The road to Verdun could only have been opened on the 
17th of August by a victory upon the battle field of the previous 
day. The southern road to Verdun was no longer in possession 
of the French, the northern road lay so near the German front 
that a departure by it was a manifest impossibility; it would, no 
doubt, have been possible for a well e(|uipped army to reach the 
road by Briey, on which Ste. Marie-aux-Chenes lies ; but to arrive 
at f'erdun by it, with the German army against it would cer- 
tainly not have succeeded. Mars-la-Tour lies nearer to Verdun 
than Briey, and the German army could, therefore, have arrived 
at Verdun sooner than the French. Besides which, Briey itself 
could be reached by the German troops fr(»m Mars-la-Tour , by 
Jamy, just as soon as by the French from Gravelotte. Briey lies at the 
apex of an isosceles triangle, the base of which isjbrmcd by the 
points Biars-la-Tour and Gravelotte. 

If therefore the security of the wounded on the French side 
had been aband<meil, and the army had retired, even on the night 
of the 16th, by the road to Briey, there is no doubt that an 
attack of the German army against Ste. Marie-aux-Chenes on the 
17tli, would have burst in upon the middle of the army, retiring 
in long narrow columns upon the road, whilst at the same time 
a corps, marching by Jamy upon Briey, would liave come into 
coUirtitm with the heads of this column. A march of the French 
by Briey would, consequently, have resulted in their being driven 
towards Luxemburg and Belgium, whilst engaging in the most dif- 
ficult retreating fights, but Verdun and a junctiim with Mac Hahon 
would have been completely lost. 

The situati<»n of the French army would have had this dis- 
asterous termination, if it had undertaken the march by Briey, even 
sapp4»sing, that by extraordinary efforts, a sutficiency of provisions 
could liave been collected and that the numerous wounded, lying 
from Mars-la-Tour to Gravelotte, had been completely disregarded; 


bnt all the Meonnti prove, that the Fnneh trmy was in ao waj 
capable of nuurehing immediately. 

Withoat eonsidering the sAurdty of proviBionSy anrnttnition 
and water, which laat the Harahal eapeeially emphasiiesy the army 
wa8 greatly diaorganlxed by the battle of Yionville, paying no 
regard t<> their corps and diYiaional combinations. In order to 
meet the unexpected attack upon the left flanic, the troops nearest 
to thirt side had been deployed, and then were supported by the 
divis'Kms wheeling one after another, without regard to the order 
of battle. Tlie 4th Corps which arrived last, had taken up the 
retiring Divisions of the 6th corps. IMcard's Diviidon, the grenadiers 
of the Guard had fought intermixed with Verges and BataHle's 
Divi8i(»ii8, from Frossard*s Corps, to the north of Reionville. Deligny*s 
Divirtion, Voltigeurs of the Guard, fought at last, in the centre, at 
Rezouville, intermixed with tlie left wing of the 6th Corps, wUlit 
later, part of the Garde Corps, in junction with the diviaiom of 
FmsHard's Corps which had retired, carried on a fight in the wood 
to the 8outh of Oravelotte. Montandon*8 Division had become sepa- 
rated from its corps (JjebtK^iifri'^ during it8 engagement at Bruville 
and had been si'ut on t(» wards Gravelotte. In the middle of the 
march, at 7 o\'l<N*k in the evening, it received a counter order, 
and was sent back to Mars-la-Tour. The close, intersected oountry, 
abounding in w<M)ds, especially Ut the north of Viunville and round 
(iravelt»tte, must have transf<»rnied this mixture of the divisions int4» 
C(»n)|>lcte (tisoiiler. It was quite impossible to place this army on tlie 
nian'h under cover of the darkness, which lasted from 9 o*clock in 
the evening until about '^ o'clork in the morning. 

The OtniniandiT in Cliirf (leci<led to do the only thing which 
apiK'arcd to jiini c:isy, under the circumstances, lie endeavoured 
t<» take up a position whi4')i would otTer the greatest possible advant- 
ages of ground for the following day^A impending battle, and at 
the s;ime time devoted his attenti<m to the care oi' the wounded, 
and to eompteting the supply of ammunition and pn»visions. 

The dispatch quoted above, proves clearly that on the 17th, 
the Marshal was still in darkness as to the real importance <if the 
battle of Vifmville, and the main objtT.t of the (icrman plan of 
operations. The ccmjeetured presence of the King at Pange, eon- 


seqaently apon the right bank of the Moselle, as well as the con- 
strnction of batteries in front of Fort Quenleu occnpied the French 
Direetion ; the whole importance of the blow which had been 
directed upon the left bank, only appears to liave become palpable 
to them in the battle of Gravelotte. Perhaps no one at the French 
head-quarters believed in the possibility of wheeling an army of 200,000 
men, 3B0 degrees, upon a radius of 3 milcs*^, and in the most 
difficult country. They did not believe that the German Direction 
would have been capable of this roaster-work of energy, arrange- 
ment and rapidity, because they would have been unable to carry 
it out themselves. The attack at Vionville, on the 16th, was con- 
sidered a skilful diversion by a, relatively, small part of the cnemy*s 

Thus tlie battle of Gravelotte, this defensive fight on the 18th 
of August, is only a proof of Bazaine's incapacity. He fought this 
battle, not because it was necessary, but from embarrassment. He 
did not know whether to advance or retire, and consequently 
remained passive in a well chosen tactical position. * If, as he has 
been accused of d<»injr, lie wished to avoid any opportunity of a 
defeat, and to prewervr his army for a later occasion, it would 
have been simpler t<» have retired up<»n Metz, and not to have 
fonght at all. 

• Tlie position taken up by the French army, on the 17th of 
August, extended from St. Privat-la-Montngne in the north to Roz^- 
rieulles in the south. Thus the only line of retreat by Briey, still 
romaiiiing open, was held by the right wing, and at the same time 
the poBition offered advantages for a favourable defence. 

The German Direction, cm this day, waited for the battle to 
be renewed, presuming that the enemy p<msessed the same quali- 
ties as themselves, namely a clear appreciation of the military sitna- 
ti(»n, and a decisive execution of the measures considered advisable. 
In order to reach Verdun, it was necessary that on the 17th, the 
French army should renew the attempt to overthrow the German 
army, standing in its way. Upon the German side it was impos- 

*) 11V/» EnglUh miles. 


8ibIo that then eoald be preeiie infomatioa m to the Miidtgr of 
ammunition aad provitioiii| which prohibited all opentloM ob tfie 
part of the Frenoh amy. Sueh a icareity could not be laMnined 
in any army which had Just left the atroogett fortrcM and the 
chief place of anna in the country, and waa quite incredible. 

As early as 4 o'clock, on the morning of the 17th of Angnat^ 
Prince Frederick Charles, who had returned towards Qone, in the 
ovoniug after the battle, appeared again upon the battle field, and 
rude over it, in order to reconnoitre the poaitiona and aofementa 
uf the enemy. The King, whose head-quarters had been removed to 
Pont-it-Housaon on the 16th, arrived soon after 6 o'clock, npon the 
heights of Gone, inspected the field of battle, and meeting the 
Prince, took his reports. In the course of the mondng the troops 
which liad bivouacked in their positions of the 16tfa, the Z* and 
III. Army Corps, the cavahry divisions under Duke William and 
Kheinbaben, parts of the VIII. Corps and the Hessian Regiments 
were joined by the IX. Corps which took up a covered poaMon to tfie 
south of the load from Gone to Vionville. A strong line of French 
tirailleurs advanced against the German lines from Resonville; 
they did not, however, open the expected battle, but were, appa- 
rently, intended to conceal the retreat of the corps into the new 
position. Cavalry patn^ls pushed to the front, soon brought this 
departure to the knowledge of the King. 

The immediate pursuit of the enemy with the forces present, 
was not in accordance with the plan of uperations. A destructive 
blow must be given, and therefore the arrival of the remaining 
coq)s niuKt be waited for, before beginning a new battle. 

Tlu'se wert» approadiiug by ftirctni marches. The VII. and 
Vlli. Army Corps, had bi^en tirdered to follow immediately after 
the IX. over the MoHelle, the Garde Corps pursued the direction 
of Mars • la - Tour , the Saxnii Xii.i Army Corps even marched 
to this place from I'ont-a-Mousson, and arrived in the rendez-vous 
position shortly after midday, whilst the Guards movinl into bivouac 
at Mars-la-Tour, nrar the leA of the Saxons, at 3 o*clock. 

IletMinnairtsances brouicht iufnrmation that the French army 
was vncamped on the plateaux to the east of (iravelotte, and 
was in movement in the neighbourhood of Venieville, whilst their 


rear guards had passed the road from Doncourt to Conflans; cou- 
geqnenttyy there was an end to all expectation of a battle on this day. 
In conformity with the leading idea of detaining the left 
wing of the French at GravelottOy until the right could be 
smrrounded by the German left wing, the VII. Army Corps 
was directed to try and feel the enemy. General von Zastrow, 
therefore t<K)k np a position at Ars-snr-Hoselley and along the 
road leading from this place to Gravelotte. He pushed forward 
the 7th Jager Battalion into the Bois de Vaux, and extended 
his line of outposts as far as the plateau to the south of Grave- 
lotte. Here it joined the out posts of the VIU. Corps, which 
was stationed at Gorze. It could be distinctly seen that the 
enemy had brought up several batteiies to command the open ground 
round Gravelotte. 

The outposts of the second army joined on to those of the 
VIIL Army Corps , which formed a line from the Bois des 
Ognons, passing, south of Rezonville, to the northern edge of the 
wood which lies on the north-west of Vionville, and from there as 
far as the Yronbach. 

Towards 2 o'clock, the King, upon the height to the south of 
Flavigny, directed General von Moltke, tlie Chief of the Staff, to 
issue tlie following dispositionM for the next day : 

''The sec4ind Armv will advance at 5 o'clock to moiTow 
rooming, the 18th, in echellon, between the Yronbach and 
the Gonebach (the chief part between Ville-sur-Yron and 
Rezonville). The VIIL Army Corps will conform to this 
mo\ement, upon the right flank of the second Army. It 
will be the duty of the VII. Army Corps, at the commence- 
ment, to secure the movements of the second Army from 
any p<issible attempts made by the enemy on the side of 
Metz. Further directions will depend upon the measures 
taken by the enemy. Reports for his Migesty the King to 
be sent, at first, to the height, south of Flavigny." 
From this disposition it is evident tliat the departure of the 
enemy by Briey, was no longer considered possible, altliough a 
battle was expected in the positions in which it actually took place 
on the 18th. 


The King retained towards eveoiiig to Pont-it-lldiiiOD, uA 
Prince Frederick Charles established his hesd-qiisrtors ia Bnuitoes. 

Nu slterstioa took place in the situation of aflhiii nntil the 
m(»niing of the 18th of August , no dishvbanees had taken place, 
uimI the Prince issued the following dispositions, in aceoidance with 


the arrangements made by the King on the previous day: 

^The second Army will continue tlie advance to^y, endea- 
v(»iiring to force back tlie enemy from his line of retreat, 
and to beat him wlierever he may be found. * 

^'The Army will advance in echdlon from the left of the 
XII. Army C«>rps, which will march at 6 o'clock, in the 
direction of Jamy, tlie Garde Corps next to it on the right, 
in the direction of l>»ucourt. The UL Army OoqM will 
move off at 6 o'clock, upon the right rear of tlie Oarde 
(.'urps, and march between RetonvlUe and Vionville, leaving 
St. Marcel close on the left in its ftirther advance. 

''The VIII. Army Corps will conform to the eeheUon 
movement in the right rear of the IX. Army Corps. 

'4n the rtceoml line, tlie X. Army CorpB, with Rhein- 
babcn's Cavalry DiviBJon, will follow the Xll. Army CorpH, 
the 111. Army Corps and Duke William of Mecklenburg*s 
Cavalry Division, will follow between the IX. and Garde 

'The advance is not to be made in columns of march, 
hut the divisions will move forward disp<»8ed in separate 
musses. The Commander in Chief will be in fn»iit of the head 
of 111. Army C<»rps." 

In conformity with tlii's<' dispositions, (Sencral von Stcininftz 
leA tilt* VII. an<] VIII. .Army Corps, in tlie p<»sitions which they 
had orcnpie<I on the 17th. 

Tin* MTond Army moved «»fT at the time appointed iv. map 1.'. 
The Kiii^ liad left Pont a MiMisson as early .nt 4 (Tehn^k in llie 
morning;, and driven towards (i(»r/e, >^liere he mounted his horhC 
and arri\ed up4»n the height i>f Flavjtniy at (! o'clock. 

Tlit> rep4»rts all a^^reed that the enemy was not departing 
to\^»i'ds the ni»rtli, but had mneentrated hi-* priiieipal strength to 


the west of Metz. Gravelotte was not occupied by liiiii, and the 
rem* guards had quitted Bruville and St Marcel. 

Apparently the French army wa8 now in the hopelens situa- 
tion, which had been the aim of the German operations. It must 
either tight or retire into the fortress. The exact position that it 
had taken up was not, however, known, and tiie advance of the 
sec4»nd Army towards tlft north was provisionally arrested until 
clear inf(»rmation upon this p<»int had been obtained. 

The IX. Army Corps, took up a position, at 8.30 o'clock, fo 
the south of the road from Gravelotte to Doncourt, with orders to 
reconnoitre towards St. Privat-la-Montagne and Amanvillers, and 
also to establish a connection with the Garde Corps. The latter 
w:is ordered at the same time to halt at I)onc4>urt, the XII. Army 
Corps at Jarny, and the X. at Bruville. 

Cavalry were puslied forward by Giraumont and Jouaville 
upiin Cinnville, near the road to Briey, upon Stt\ Marie-aux-Chenes, 
and in the direction of tiie heights of Amanvillers. 

Soon after 10 o'ch»ck, the position of the French army was I 
accuratel}"! ascertained, (v. map I.) 

The undulating plateau on the west of the Moselle, with hills 
and dales extending in every direction, forms sevenil lung ridges 
in front of Metz, the occupation of wiiich wen* favourable for tiie 
French army. Excellent defensive ptmitions were formed by this 
chain of heights lying, (»ne behind another in front of the fortress, 
t4»wards the north-north-west, extending fn»m Mahinconrtby St. Privat- 
la Mtintagne, Leipzig, and Moscon, as far as Ars, :is well as by 
tht' iieight.s of the Bois de Sanlny, and the plateaux of Plappeville 
and St. Quentin, lying still nearer to Metz. Marshal Bazaine had 
<K'eupied the first line, and held his reserves in n^adiness upon the 
plateau of Plappeville. His position was very well chosen, and 
every thing was done ti) increase its natural strength by artificial 
means. The ground lying in front of the lieights was for the 
mortt part free and open, so tiiat the assailants would liave U) pass 
o\er a long tract, without protection frtmi the enemy's fire, whilst 
the defended positions were provided with cover trenches and gun 
emplacements one above another. The villages of St. Privat-la- 
Montagne, Ste. Marie-aux-Chenes, St. Ail, and Amaiivillere as well 


numenms fluins, were espeelally adapted fbr the npport of the 
defence along the whole froat. The bnlldiiigi are h g eae r a l 
massive, the rooCi eovered with tiles, the gardena and pvMjr OYen 
the fields eneloaed irith walls. All thia atonework ofltaed oppor- 
tuuities for keeping ap a rapid fire en masses with the eteellent, 
long ranged iMea of the French infkntrjTi whilst under aafc cover. 
Tlie ptmition was especially well fortifieJTapon the right flank ; the 
village of St. Pri vat, on high ground, with about 100 housea and 
farms, f(»rmed the principal point d'appni ; here the 6th Corps waa 
placed, Ut which the Guards Grenadier IMviaion waa sent, later, aa 
a reserve. Upon the left flank it Joined the 4th Oorpa, which, 
again, was united with the 3rd; the 2nd corps finrmed the left 
wing, whilst tlie Guards with the Resenre Artillery, were fbnned up 
upon the plateau of Plappeville. The object of thia reserve waa 
to support the fVont line, but at the same tine to foil any poaaible 
attaelc against the communications with Meta, by Vans and St 

f Knfline. 

i Tlie Qerman corps received orders towards 10 o^dodci to 

re-commenee their movementn. The IX. Corps was to advance to 
Vernevilh* and Iai Folie, the (iarde Torps to investigate the country 
towards Amanvillen) and 8t. Privat, the XII. Corps was also to 
march towards the road to Hriey for the pnr|>ose either of stop- 
ping the enemy, if by chance he had begun fo depart in the direc- 
tion i»f Ste. Marie-aux-Chenes, or of attacking his position. The 
VII. and Vill. Corps, wen* to begin a detaining fight at Grave* 
lotte, carrying it on until the left Hank could be surrounded. 
The 11. Army C4»rp8, which had left Pont-a-Moussou at 2 i/clock 
in the m(»rirni^, wan to follow tlie first Army and the 111. and X. 
Army CtirpM Ut follow the 8ec4»nd Army in tlie second line. 

Bi/ (/if'xe disponilions thr fitjhl irhich was now about lo 
heyin, took the vharactn* of a front attack which wait to he 
hroutjht to a crisis by a pressure upon the right flank of the 
French at St. Prirat. 

In eonrtf<|uence of the nature of the ground, the battle consisted 
ehietly in infantry and artillery fights for single p«isiti4»nH, and 
the German artillery was 4if even ^*ater iiiip(»rtance than usual, 
for m»t 4>nly did it 4ipt'n the battle by firing for an hour, ahiug 


the whole line, bat it was alrtu frequently obliged to auppoi't the 
iDfautry, who after havin^r begun to attack the euemy*H pobitiouri 
were nnable U} appn»ach nearer on account of tlie overpowering 
fire of tlie concealed French infantry. 

The centre of the French Anny was attacked first, by the 
bmtterieH of the IX. Corps in position up4Mi tht* heights near Aer- 
netiiif; this was at niiddly. 

The corps was marched up<»n the farm Taulre, leaving St. 
Marcel upon the left, and tiad established itself in tlie wood t«» 
the north (»f this place, the Hois de la (*nsse, as far as Ammx- 
Ut'Orangt*, whilst the enemy opemul a vigomuK fire of shell and 
shrapnel, against the advanced troops , from its batteries at 8te. 
Marie, ^t. Privat and AmanviUers. 

The situation n'mained the same lien*, in the centn*, until 
4 o'cl«K*k in the afterrnKm. The fire «»f the artillery corps of the 
IX. <'orpH, supported by the batteries of the infantry divisi«inH, 
endeavoure<1 to shake the enemv ; the infantrv firinlv held the 
p4isitions they had occupie<l, and ser\'e«l as a protection to the 
artillery against the assaults which w(*re attempted from time to 
time. On the side of the French, a continued concentrated can- 
nonade was directed a^^ainst the artillery and tlie woikI , which 
oceasioneil considerable h»sses Ui the (Germans. At last, at 
4 o*ch»ck , the (iermaii sidi* obtained the prepoiiderancr of fire 
by the arrival of the batteries behmging t«> the (iarde Torps, upon 
thff lelt wing. 

<ieneral von Steinmetis, who was opposed to the left wing 
of the French, gave orders f«ir the attack, when the thunder of 
cannon s4Miiule«l across from Verneville, and aiUKMinced the eugap'- 
ment in the centre. The Artillery of the VII. Torps deployed upon 
the heights to the siMith and east tif (iravelotte, and thru advanced 
mider the mi»st vigorous fin* of tht* enemy, as far as the edge «if 
the plateau, where in tlie course of about an iiiMir it silencrd the 
French batteries opposetl to it. (Solt/Zs ISrigade, which was stationed 
at Ai*ssur-M«»selle for the scruritv of the vallev «»f the .Moselle, had 
previously been engag(*d in the fight upon the extn^me right Hank, 
it had taken the villagt* (»f fatw in the Moselle valley ami then 
stormed the heights of Juxsify and kept ptissession of them. The 


main body of tlie infantry of the Vll. Corpse remmined provisionally 
ill :i covered position in the wooded valley which sepantes Grave- 
lottt* fn»iii the farm Point-dn-Jonr. Simnltaneonaly with the advance 
of tilt* VII. Army Oirps, the VIIL Army Corps commenced to move 
forward in an easterly directi4>n from ResamfiUe, It, at first, 
deph»yed a strong force of artillery npiin the road in its front, 
whilMt the 1st Cavalry Division took up i concealed piisition in rear, 
and the infantry advanced to the attack of the wood lying in inmtf 
wliich was strongly occupied. Here a very sanguinary engage- 
ment took place f4>r an hour, in which, owing to the ground being 
of 8ueli a nature that it was impossible to overlook it, the con- 
tending parties fell into complete confhsion, so much so that some 
partM of the German line which met witli the most obstinate resis- 
tance, were only able to press sUiwly forwards, whilst other parts 
soon reached tlie eastern edge, and debouching fr(»m it, even began 
the attack upon the further heights and the £srm of Si, Uumieri, 
Thin la8t was finally taken by stiirm and maintained, after repeated 
attuckn and lieavy hisses, whilst all efforts to press flirther forward 
up to tlie cnlge t)f the heights failed in conrte(|nence of the strongly 
occupied C4>ver trenches, owin*; to which the infantry tight here 
came to a stand. Sinmi after 3 o'clock, there wa^ a pause in the 
tig;ht upon this Hank, as the French artillery were silent, and tlie 
Ciermans could not aw any objtnrt in their fn»nt, for an efficacious 
bombardment, (ieneral Steinmetz C4mld not help assuming that, 
piMHihly, th(* enemy was withdrawing, and theref4»re on1er4*d llart- 
niannV I'axalry Divisitm t4» cr4»HK the 4letile in fr4)nt and to follow 
the departing enemy, and eventually, tt> furuinh informati4>n as U) 
tlu'ir new |»ositious. IV^wards I o'cl4>4*k, thiTi'tViiv^ t\\(» Imu'm* hut 
terich, and th4' 1th I'lilan k4*;xinieiit advanced a4'ros.s the dctile and 
tormi'4l up halfri^^lit. Now, ho>^c\ci', it Ixn-amc e\ident that tht- 
enemv had not MJthdniun, hut had oulv I'onceaUMl thcm.M'ixcs from 
the h«)t artillcn fire. Tht* tr(Ni|is whit'h had pme torx^ard, ftll 
inKt4*a4l into a uiurderoU)* infantry tin* , .sU|i|Mirtfd h\ pnis an4l 
mitraill«•u^4*rt. NumcrouK kilh'd anti \i4>umU*d marked tht* roa4l 
which tlu'se hraxt* troops had taken, u<'\erthclt'ri^ lioth battcri4\<> 
dismounted uml«*i' the enemy's tire and p4»>xerfully replied tu it, 
HhiUt the caxalry Untk up a p4».Hi1ion in rear for th«'ir support. 


Tliese two batteries lield out in tlieir exposed pi»8itioii until far 
on in tlie evening, and were only brought back late by the mwist^ce 
of reserve horses sent after them; ov(*r half the men and horses 
were left upon the spot. Towards 4 oV*l<K*k, the artillery upon 
the heights of Gravelotte re-opeued fire, the enemy having again 
shewn themselves cm this advance being made, and with such good 
effect that they were deterred from any further attempts; they 
also set fire t<» the farms lying within their range, so that the 
tr<»ops holding them were driven <mt, and in their departure were 
most effectively cannonaded. The thick black cU>uds from the 
burning farms were now added to the smoke of the powder which 
rose up from afar all over the field of battle. 

In conformity with the dispositions of the Chief Com- 
ma nJ j the German right winy ^ thus held tlie enemy last 
even to the ventre ^ without pressing him too strongly^ uniii 
the left winy was able to surround the French riyhty on the 
other side. 

The French, undoubtiHlly, opposed the execution of this idea 
of battle, with great tenacity and bravery, but without the initiative 
of a counter plan, and without success, lu general they remained 
00 the defensive, and submitted to the military situation imposed 
upon them by the Ciermau side, as had been the ease from the 
beginning of the war. 

It is true they made use of the utmost exertions to contest 
the possession of the w<N>ds in the centre with their assailants, for 
they recognizHl the importance of this point d*appui to the whole 
GerniMU order of battle, but their struggles here had the least 
prospe«-t of success, because the reserves could have been brought 
into use in case of nwessity, with the greatest rapidity. 

The IX. Army f'orps, however, fonght tlie battle alone until 
the engagement of the (iuards and Saxons. 

The French infantry columns advanced, several times, against 
the Bois de la Cusse afler preparation had been made for the 
attack by a fearful cross tire of guns and mitrailleuses. But the 
(Serman tnxips, although terribly weakened by the shots striking* 
in the \^4km1 \iUe Army Corps lost about 5<K)<» men in this battle^, 
kept their ground through all the attacks, and drove the French 


back into their forlMM poHitions. In the same way the Tehement 
attacks of the French infantry against the PmaaiaB hatteriea upon 
the heights of f^ememtlef were repalsed, and in a paranit of the 
French, who again gave way, tlie Fasilier battalion of the 85tli 
Kegiment (HoUteiner) reached even as far as the height in fmnt 
of the village of Amnnvillerty wh««, however, it lost half its men 
and its commander. 

^A furious combat was also carried on an»und the Boh des 
G\fnirtmu:j opposite the farma I^a Folic and Leipaig. Here 
the IHth Division (Wrangers) was engaged. The enemy had occu- 
pied the edge of the wood in fon*e, and had strengthened it with 
deep trenches and earth ramparts so that the assailants could be 
received by a fire en Stages, besides which the appnNu*h was com- 
manded by mitrailleuses. In spite of this a repeated attack was 
attempted, which although not completely successflil, led to the 
occupation of the south part of the wood as well as of the farm 

Tlie severe fighting, in whicli the IX. Army Corps had been 
involved, iudncetl Prince FrtMlerick (liarles. wlio had been present 
and liud then ^one to tlie (lurde r<irps, to place the 3rd Garde 
Infantry Brigade, \iith the (iarde ScliUtzen battalion, and a battery 
at the disposal of (veneral von Mansteiii. 

The din of the combat at Verneville, made the Garde 
Corps hasten its advance, towards Batilly, which had commenced 
ut 10.30 o'clock from l)onc4»urt. From Hatilly, their march was 
directed to the castwanl, against the positions of ^SV. Priraf, 

The line of hills wliirh stretches IVom Amaiivillers bv St. 


Priral and Hofirouri to Ma/uttrouri, lies in a noiiherlv (lirecti«»n 
with a sli«;ht forward bend towanls the w(*st. The ;;encral hei^'^ht 
«>f the hills at Amanvillers i> lir>o tVH, at 8t. Privat loj^<, and 
at Malancourt ll*7s tVet. The western slope is pretty steep at 
the conmiencenient, (i- 8 defrrees, b<*coniing m«»re gradual further 
on, and is di\ided \nU* different sections by some small descents. 
^ Sir. Marie-au.V'Vhrufx lies npon a projiH*tiim of the slope which 
forms a kind of plateau. A small bnN)k rises in the village, which 
Ht»>^s thn»n^h a valley in a northerly dinH*tion, eiH*losed by sti*ep 


slopeB. TowanU the east two small neighboariDg valleys open into 
it The western declivity of this projecting plateau sinks at first 
in levels, forming several tray^ and inflections, but afterwards des- 
eends with steep sides into the valley a8 far as the brook of 
Habonville. The hamlet of iS7. Ail lies upon the road to the north 
of Habonville half way to Ste. Biarie-aux-Chenes, with about 140 
inhabitants, consequently about 30 houses aad farms. The village 
of Ste. Marie-aux-Chenes contained 330 inhabitants and, perhaps, 
^0 houscH and farms; it resembled an irregular pentagon, the high 
road to liontmMy forming a street through it, from which a second * 
street branches off at the church in a westerly direction. 

The village of St. Prirat'la-JUontagne, 2500 paces to the 
east of Ste. Marie-aux-Chenes, lies a little to the JHirth of the 
high road which leads straight from MctK. It has iui open square 
■ear the church, and four pillage streets leading from it. The 
little cluster of houses called Jerusalem Wen upon the high road. 
The village contains 480 inhabitants with about 100 houses and 
farms; there is a thicket upon the ridge of the heights to the 
west of the valley, through which the brook flows which rises at 
Habonville, and to the south of it is the village of Batilly numbering 
akoot 200 inhabitantM. The French artillery, in position at the 
fbol of the Ht(*ep nlopc of 8t. Frivat together with the infantry in 
the gardens and buildings of Ste. Marie-aux-Chenes, held the country 
inder fire as far as the (ulge of the valley. 

This unc(»mmonly difficult section of the great battle field, 
most Mkilfnlly prepared for defence, was the object of the opera- 
tions of the Garde Corps and the Saxons. 

Thf Garde Corps commenced the combat, first of all, at 

The advanced guard of the 1st Garde Infantry Djvisi(»n, the 
Garde Fusilier Regiment, advanced with loud hurrahs and made 
themselves masters of the thicket, on the edge of the brook at 
Habonrillr, and of the village of St. Ail, at the first assault. 
Shortly before midday, the 1st Garde Infantry Division ^the 1st 
and 3rd, 2nd and 4th Foot Guards, the Garde Fusilier Regiment, 
and the Garde Jager Battalion) had arrived in the little ravine to 


the west of 8t Ail. Tho whole of the artillery eorps opened, siaial- 
taneoiirtlvyiivigonHisfire upon the oomnuinding poiiitionof 5l« PrtraL 
During thifi iittaek, and throvghoiity no cover waa to be obtained. 

A mnrderona fire was conducted by the infantry, wlio were 
almost invinible to the GermanSy from the maaaive bnildinga and 
from lipliind the atone walla, In conjunction with the artillery in 

An infantry advance at thid place waa, for a time, not to be 
thought of. 

The General Commanding, Prince Augnatns of Wurtemberg, 
ordorrd tlie fight to be carried on solely by the artillery, in order 
to sliakc the enemy*s position, and to wait for tlie arrival of the 
2nd Cinrde infantry Division and the Saxons. 

Major General Prince Holionlohe, Commander of the Artillery, 
who liad already had nine batteries in position, firing aince 1 
oVIock, and afterwards brought two more horse batteries into line, 
and latrr three batteries of Budritzky^s Garde Division, now 
Aolertcd a new poHition uoarer to that of tho onemy, and 
carriod out tho task rntruHted to him witli hcniir emiuranre. 

At 2..'lO o'rlock, the (^ommauder in Ciiief ot* tin; Kcrtmd Army, 
l*rinoe Frederick diarloK, who had hoon upon the liill t4> tlie wortt 
of Uahonville Hinre 2 o'clock, received the rejiort from the Crown 
Prinre of Saxony that the Xll. ('(»rpi( was advancinfr t(» the attack 
upon Sir, Mario with the 21th Infantry Division, and with the 28rd 
infantry Division, was on the point of surrounding the rifrht flank (d' 
the French by ('oinville, and the Kmall wcmmI Aitnated between that 
place ami Koncourt. 

At this time several batteries «»l* the Sa\ou <*oi'p> were in po>i 
tion tti the west «»!* Ste. Marjr, and ilireettMl their fin' a::.nnst thi- 
villajre, which ^a-^ *till iM'cupiiMl !»y the enemy. 

The 17th Infantry Hri^r.-HJe, ('olon«'l von Lmnhanli, HfpJoviMl 
in a north westerly dinrtion for an attack upon this place, and at the 
same time the advanced |:uard of Tape's <tarde Division uas on the 
march against the villap* from St. Ail. 

After a sh«»rt lifrht Ste. Marie was taken. 

The ^^axon Artillery Torps now moved forwanl into a new 
poHition to the north of the village, against St, Prirat and Ronvouri, 

, 135 

The Garde Artillery, in position between St. Ail and Habon- 
villc, had meanwhile silenced the enemy's artillery by their effce- 
tive fire, so that at 4 o'clock, Prince llohenlohc was enabled to 
bring up the whole mass of his fourteen batteries. In echellon, 
nearer to St. Privat. 

The artillery of the IX. Corps had also silenced the enemy's 
artillery at Montigny and Amanvillei*8, but had suffered consider- 
able losses, and fifteen guns were hors dv votnhat. Here the farm 
of Champcnois^ was taken by the Hessian Jager Battalion, and 
Wrangel's Division held the captured Chantrenne, Verneville, and 
the Bois de la Cusse, against all attacks of the enemy. 

Of the 2f)th Division, Prince L<»uis of Hesse*s, the 49th Bri- 
gade was st^itioned in the Ik»is de la Cnsse, the 501 h Brigade was 
in reserve between this wood and the Bois Deseuillons, with the 
Hessian Cavalry Brigade uflar it. 

Of the reserves of the second Anny, the HI. Army Corps ar- 
rived at Verneville at 3 o'clock, and the X. Corps at Batilly at 
2 o'clock. The former made the Artillery (Jorps take up a posi- 
tion between Verneville and the Bois des (icnivaux, whilst the 
latter halted. 

The Sa,ron yitmy Corps, had a very long duhinre to 
marchj and only reavhvd iho line heltwen Ste, Marw and Joetif 
at 5 o'clock. 

The advanced hour of the day did ni>t allow time t4» wait 
for the execution of the movement which had been begun against 
Roncourt by Montois ; instciid, it appeared nee^essary to bring on a 
crisis now with the (larde Corps, whose infantry was still waiting 
for the order t4) attack. The departure (»f the whole army ap- 
peared to be commencing, as large bodies of the French were 
already moving between St. Privat and Konc^Mirt, and dusk coming 
<»n would have aided the enemy in so doing. 

Prince Auguittus of ff 'uriemherg therefore gave orders at 
5 o clock, for the attack upon St. PHrat. 

The 4th Garde Infantry Brigade ithe Regimenta Franz and 
Augusta^ first received this order. They deployed and advanced 
up the edge of the height for the aasault, the artillery fire with 


their utmost efforto only' mMking them slightly. The enemy offsred 
the moHt tenacioiis rasietancei Bnaeen by the ttonDiiig GreMdieffti 
they opened such m fearAil| rapid , long-ranged flre, from their 
secure positions behind hooseSy walls, and from treneheti that in 
a few minutes the attacking troops snffered most tremendons loases, 
ospocinlly in officers. The two regiments, nevertheless , pressed 
forward irresistibly. 

In the meanwhile, the 1st Garde Infantry Division had also 
deployed, and a quarter of an hour later, engaged in the fight ipon 
tlie left flank of the Garde Infantry Brigade, whilst thehr advanced 
guard still firmly held the village of 8t Marie-anx-Chenes, which 
had been previously taken in the course of the afternoon. The 
Garde Fusilier Regiment was, however, soon brought forward in 
(»rder to render additional support to the left wing. The Ist 
<ianle Infantry Brigade, under the command of Mijor General von 
Kernel ithe 1st and 3rd Regiments of Foot Guards), and the 1st 
Ctimpany of the Garde Pioneers advanced upon the left faak, 
whilnt dnrtc tti them up<»n the right, the wliole of the 2nd Garde 
Infantry Brigade, \2nd and 1th FcKit Guards^ under the command 
(»f Major General Baron von Medem , rttormed 8t. Privat. The 
(ienerals and the Staff remained 4m liorriehack at the head of their 
tr<M>p8, but in a short time all their horrteit were rdiot under them. 
For about 15(K) paces in cin*umferenee, the ground and all the 
troopH were overwhelmed by a regular hail ntorm of bullets. 
The crash of the explosionrt drowned all words of command, the 
smoke of the pttwder together with the concealment of the enemy 
prevented the assjiilnnts from taking any aim and deprived them of 
the p4»\\cr of making use of their fire arms. 

The (teneral Tommanding who had been presi>iit during the 
first part of the fight near the artillerv corps, and at the beginning 
ot the int*:uitry attack had gone along the fnmt of the tth (iarde 
Infantry Hrignde to the western exit from Ste. Marie, could t»hsiT\e 
fn»m here, how s«'\en» were the htsses already sufTennl, and decided 
to check the further onset of the resolute Guanls still pressing 
forward, until the engagement of the Saxons could take effect. He 
eommand«*d that (>very thing slmuld stop. General von Pape, tlie 
Divisional (ieneral, at this momcnt*s pause, hurried along the front 


of Ihe troops to ODCoarage them ; in this ride he lost two aides-de- 
eaaipy aed twiee his liorse was shot under him. The loss of the 
Guards in officers and men was enormous. 

The artillery now carried on the fight alone, with admirable 
endarance, altliough tliemselves under the infantry fire. St. Privat 
began to burn at several points, but tlie French, nevertheless, main- 
tained their positions with courage and resolution, and their fire 
was not ill the least diminished. 

The Saxon Artillery were, at first, f(»rmed up upon the left 
flank of the Guards, and had opened fire against the enemy, at a 
great distance, between St. Privat and Roncourt. Tlie Saxon 3rd 
Infantry Brigade (Regiments 104 and 105) had then taken Ste. 
Marie -aux-Chcnes, in conjunction with the 1st Prussian Garde 

The XII. Army Corps tlius obtained a firm point d'appui for 
its wheel to the right. It had continued \U movement upon Ron- 
court. When the Artillery corps, endeavoured to take up a 
position against this place, such a hot fire was opened from the 
walls of the fields, and from the wood which projects between 
Malancourt and Roncourt, that it was necessary in the first instance, 
to take the wood. 

The 7th Infantry Regiment No. lOB, attacked tlie outskirts, 
although the greater part of it had been detached for other objects, 
and took the wood with heavy losses, which it maintained with 
the assistance of the 2nd Jager Battalion and other reinforcements 
who had taken Malancourt Thus the c<»untry was free and 
sixteen batteries were immediately deployed against the French 
right flank. 

The French adhered to their portions with the most te- 
nacious energy, but all resistance was in vain against the power- 
ful fire of the Saxon Artillery, carried on with the greatest cer- 
tainty and calmness. 

At 8.30 o'clock, the Saxon Grenadier Brigade advanced, and 
a quarter of an hour later, Roncourt was taken. At the same 
time the Prussian Guards, who had got breathing time daring the 
Saxon attack, again renewed their powerful laaault igaiast St. 


Priraiy m which they were Buppoiied by the Saxod 45th Infiuitry 
Brij^acle, Mayor Geneml von Craushmar^Sy and the bntteries of the 
2:\Td Division y Prince George of Baxony^s. The Artillery and 
Kraau'8 Division belonging to the X. Army Corps , were al84» 
moved forward from Batilly for the decisive blow. The Pnssians 
on the south-west y pressed into the fortress-lilce village, every 
house of whicli was defended with exasperation, some wliat earlier than 
the Saxons (»n the north. Tlie village was gained after a most 
tlosperate struggle. The enemy fled in the direction of MetSy pur- 
8ucd by 8<»me of the Garde Battalions. General von Cranshaar had 
fallen in the battle. 

Thujty W0S the fight upon this wing decided at 7 o'dock. 
The French Army W0s in consequence cnt off proM all possi- 
hiliiff of escape. 

Hut upon the German right wing, the fight still wavered, 
and in the centre the battle had * also come to a stand. When 
(ieiieral v<»n Manstein observed the attack i»f the Guards upon his 
left tianky s<Mm afler 5 o'clock, lie ordered the Infantry to break 
forwanl towanls Amanviih^rA from the liois de hi ('usac; tlie 3rd 
Ganle Infantry Hrigadr, wliicli liad been placed at his disposal, 
was dire<*t<Ml to *^\\ forward to the Konth of the little wood, 
llore also , the troops were obligtMl to advanee over quite open 
<cround, and they suftered the severest losses. They only suc- 
ceeded in piining ground upon the left wing, and were able to 
(K'cnpy th<* htMghts to the west of Amanvillers, whilst npon the 
right wing, (ieuf'ral von Hlumenthal had to be satisfied with main 
t^iining his position at Chantn^nnr. 

Thr Artilh'ry Corps only of the III. Army Torps, >tation(Ml 
hi'twrrn Vi'rnf\illt' and thr Hois des (tcnivanv, with a further 


reinf«»rr«'m«'nt of trn hatt«Tit's, had hern engaged in tlii* tight. 

TIh' lirst Army had a difti<-nlt position at (iraveli»ttr, as the Po- 
meranian Army Corps whi«'h was appointed to reinforee it wms still 
unahle tti draw near. \X 7 oVlm-k, when the victory inclined to tin* 
Itcrman side on the «»ther wing, by tin' capture of St. IVivat, the 
French here made a vigorous onslaught. Strong columns, with densi- 
and numemus swarmw of Tirailleurs in front , amid wild cries 
and incessant firing, came (»ut at full speed from b(*hind the 


heights of Rosen'eui/es y poured into tlie valley of the Roig 
de Vanx and the Bois des Ognons, and endeavoured to Rtoim 
up the other aide of the slope towards Gravolotte. Tlie Prussian 
battalions^ reduced by heavy losses, were overcome in the ravine, 
and there was great danger lest the German line of battle, 
at this place, should be broken through. The artillery, how- 
ever, firing over the heads of the infantry, from the heights 
of Gravclotte, had already severely shaken the French columns 
as they came [down, and the obstinacy of the infanti'y hi the 
valley brought them to a stand, and then caused them to yield. 

Nevertheless the situation was very serious, and the arrival 
oi* the Pomeranians was impatiently l(K)ked for. The French attack 
might be renewed at any moment, and the troops were fatigued 
by the long struggle. 

The King himself with his suite, had repaired U} the critical 
point, and remained at Gravelott^ exposiHl to the shell fire, whilst 
General von Moltke rode to meet the II. Corps. 

At last the first columns appeared with General v. Fransecky 
at their head ; (ieneral von Moltke drew his sword and led the 
troops himself to the rritical spot. 

In spite of the long march of 5 miles*) which they had ac- 
complished, the Pomeranians engaged with the greatest energy. 

The French were thrown back from one position to another, 
the wood and the villages were taken from them with the bayonet, 
the heights of RozerirulUs were occupied and, the battle was 
decided upon this wing also. 

The I. Axmy Corps, which occupied, a position upon the 
right hank of the Moselle, tf» the east of Metz had also a share in 
this great battle. Zychlinisky's Brigade with a battery and a squadron 
was moved forward along the right bank in the direction of / aujr. 
The battery came into pimiticm upon the northern edge of the height 
lying (»pposite to Vaux, and fired u|)on the enemy*s artillery at 
8ey, under Moni St. Quenlin. The infantry were shelled from 

•) 23 Kii^li.Hch miles. 


thi8 fort nod obliged to take ip m covered poiitioa. Thie divefftkn 
of the Brigade Bade it impoMible for the eneny to make aay 
attemptti to break through with single diviiuoDS towards the 
south; he was^ oo the eontrary, obliged to retaia l eae i 'f ee at 
Plappeville, which he would otherwise have enployed ia the lint 
line, for fear of aa attack beiag made in his rear. 

The battle was every and darkness setting in put aa end to 

the pursuit. 

Tlius the chief nucleus of the French active forces was cut 
off from all its communicationSy and eonstrained to retreat upon the 
fortrcHs ; it was brought into a situation fkom which there was but 
one escape, — capitulation. 

The eight German Army Corps which fought at Gravdottey 
Ktill Hmounted altogether to about 23<VXN) men, after the losses 
they had sustained from the 6th to the 18th of August. Reckoaing 
the loHD of tlie French in the battles of (Tonrcelles and YionvillCi 
at 20,0<M» men, the French Army at Gravelotte was 180^000 
Rtroiig. Tiie loiiD of the Germans in killed ami wounded exceeded 
20,<MM) men. The Frenrli loss is not known, but it appears to 
have been smaller. As at C'oiircelles and Vionville, tlie French 
IimI fouj^ht with the advanta^^e in |K)sitions and with a superior 
infantry rifle, but had rctin^d when these |)ositions were stormed 
by the Germans rominf; up in the open. It was at this moment 
tha{ they siintaineil the p:reatest loss, hut it did not last long as 
the darkn(>ss prevented a lengtht^icd pursuit. At the eapitulation 
of Metz tli<* stn'ngtli of the Freneh Army, inclnding the siek 
and wound<Ml, whose numlx*rs must liavr inen*ascd eonsiderably 
between the IHth of Aiipist and the 2Hth of Oetober, was still 
stated at 17.*{JHM) men^ in whirh the ^arris^m of Metz is, doubtless, 
reckoned. Very few prisoners were made, no colours or eaples 
fell into the h:uids of the victors, for the fortress was t<M» near 
at hand as a city of refuge for the defeated Army. 

The resistance miulv by the French Army had Im'cu most 
desperate, as ^^K^n as tht»y perceived that not only their honour 
was eoneerned hut the only road of escape* was endangered. An 
appreciation of the situatitm had eUHrtrified even the individual 


soldiers sad beariag in mind their high warlike renown, the Army 
had accomplished the utmost in courage and tenacity. 

Bot the German warrior also knew what was at stake; he 
knew it sooner and better than the French. Seldom in the events 
of war are the end and ipeans so clearly manifest as in this 
battle, and seldom is the logic of the Army Direction so evident 
and intelligible to each of the combatants as was the case 
in the surrounding of Metz. 

The prize of this victory had the prodigious result, that the 
principal Army of the enemy could be invested in the strongest 
fortress in the land, under such circumstances, that the powerful 
means of resistance of the enclosed enemy, were not only unable 
to render mutual support but, on the contrary, mutually paralysed 
each other. In this respect the investment of Metz, which c<»m- 
menced immediately after the battle of Gravelotte, is a remark- 
able and interesting event. 

The fortress is so strong in itself, that with a garrison of 
20,000 men and well pmvisioned, it might have been able to 
offer an incalculably long resistance. Bazaine's Army was still 
sufficiently large and fit for battle, to render important service in 
the open field. As soon, however, as this army was enclosed in 
a narrow space, with small debouchert, and its destiny ius<»lubly 
bound up with that of the fortress, its excessive numbers were an 
injury to the fortress, and the fortress itself was unable to employ 
them. On the one hand, the great mass of men and horses 
consumed all the provisions and necessaries of life in a much 
shorter time than the defence reciuired, and on the other hand, 
the army was unable to develope quickly enough to make a 
successful attempt to break through. Thus the size of the army 
diminished the power of resistance of the fortress, and the fortress, 
from its excellent situation in the centre of hills crowned with 
forts, hindered the development of the strength of the army. 
The strength o& both when united must come to ruin. 

Before the beginning <»f the battle, the Saxon Army Corps 
had, already, received c»rders to intercept the communications 
betweeu Metz and Thionville, this instruction was repeated in the 
evening, v.hilst attention was drawn to tlie importance of the point 


mnvod forward towwrds this river on the 17th, and on the 19th 
:iml 20th tlie whole of tlie tliird Army had cnmed, after having 
tiiiit rested on the day of the battle of tiravelotte. The march 
wad cuntinned on Bar-le-Dne. 

On the 20th, the Crown Prince left Nancy fur the chief liead- 
qiiai-ters, for a conference with tlie King, his father; on the 21 st 
lie removed his head-quarters to Vanconleurrt. 

An Army having been collected at Chftlons, under Mac Mahon, 
tills place became the next object of openitions, and tlie fortress of 
Toiii^ upon tlie direct line to it, was a considerable obstacle. TonI 
had refused a summonH to surrender, and defeated an attaek by 
a detHchment of the IV. Army Corps on the 16th of August, after 
which it was watched by a brigade of the 11. Bavarian Corpa. 

From Vaneonleurs, the head-quarters of the third Army were 
moved, on the 2Srd, to Ligny. 

The Army of the Crown Prince of Saxony, likewisei began 
the advance against CliAlonA, and left the neighbouiiiood of Meti 
un the 22nd of August. like the third Army, its charge was to 
t»eek out Mac Mahon, awl it niarchod bv the verv nmdA X\\ l^rvdun 
wliicli Bazaiue had in vain endeavoured tt) make U8e of. Against 
thirt f<>rtn»KK, an attack by KurpriM' wat* attempted on the 23rd, 
which, liowever, wan uiiKUccesKfnl. Tlie Saxon AnnyTiirps advanced 
t(»wardi9 Venliin, the 2:in] Infafitry Division taking the nwd by 
Ktaiii, tlie 24th infantry DiviHion ami the Artillery (Nirps taking 
that by Frennert. The advancinl giianl of the 2:Jrd Division, tlie 
.Schdtzen Regiment No. 108, gained p(»si4eHttion of the Faabi»nrg- 
le-Paiie with *creat bravery, and kept p4»KiM*KHi«»n of it in spite of 
the lire from the works, whilst the artillery vi«roroii8ly bi»mban1^ 
the fortiti<'ati<»iiH and the town itrtelt*. 

Vfitliin wart, ln»we\er, pit^pannl for defen<'e, siiflicii'ntly jrar- 
rirtoiicd, and Khowe<l ^uuk of liravy calibre. The Hiinniii»n8 wa4 
mortt decidedly reriiMMl, and the Xll. Corprt pi\e np the attaek, 
^^hicli 4'oiild «inly have been KnrcfrtSHfnl through a Hnrprine, and 
crosrtiMl the Mense ab«ive and Im»1ow Verdun, lea>in^' the 47tli 
Infantry Hrijrade t«» watch the finlreHsi. 

<)n the l*r>th of Anpist the fouiih Army had ad\aiiceil art far 
as (.'lcriii«»iit en-Arptnne, and the head -quarters of the third Army 



had already been establiRhed at Bar-le-Dnc on the 24th. Had the 
Freneh Aimy been still in the camp of Ch&lonSy it would have 
been attacked on two sides by tliese two Armies, the chief command 
being held by the King himself. But on tlie 23rd of August^ the 
tvprising aunonneement that Mac Mahon had evacnated CliAlonSy 
renehed tlie head-quarters of the third Army in Ligny. The King 
bad arrived this day in Ligny, and in the evening bin head-quarters 
were removed U) Bar-le-Duc. The German Army Direction was in 
eonplete ignorance of the line taken by the French Army, and 
yarkms possibilities were discussed between von Moltke and von 
Blnmenthal, the two Chiefs of the StaflT. It was thought most 
probable, that Mac Mahon considered liis army incapable of 
defending the position of Chalons and had retired t(» wards Paris, in 
order to gain an advantageous position or in other respects more 
favourable c<mditions and prospects for a great battle. 

Both armies were, theref<i»re, provirtionally to continue the 
advance on their previous lines of march. 

As it turned out the French Army was destined for an 
operation, which the German Army Direction could not foresee. 

Although it must always remain a matter of astonishment, 
that the feeling between the ftcrman armies and Mac Mahon's army 
was 84) Cimipletely lost, it must on the other hand, be :icknow- 
Mged as an admirable performance in French railway man:ige- 
Bent, that this large army could be united in OliAlons and convey- 
ed from there with such rapidity. 

Whilst the battles were tiiking place before Metz Marshal 
Mae Mahon had united in the camp of Chalons, the remains of 
bit army beaten at Woerth, with the 5th Corps which had retired 
from Bitsch, and tlie 7th Corps which was stationed at Belfort at 
the beginning of the war, and there also the 12th Corps had been 
newly formed. 

The Ist, 5th and 7th Corps had again nearly attained the 
strength which they had at the begiiming of the war ; the regiments 
had been made up tu their complements by numerous drafts of 
young soldiers of the reserve, and of the second category of the 
contingent as well as by the recruits of 18G9. 



The 7th Corps had, H is tniei only one brigade of eavalry, 
the otiier having remained in LyonSy as previonaly mentioned. 

The 18th Corpi waa eompuaed of 1 DivjHion of Inlaatry of 
the Line (the fonr Line Begimenta wluch had been on the Spanish 
frontier) ; 1 Division^ eonsisting of 3 Line Regiments and 4 Begi* 
meuts de marche, and 1 Division of Marine Infantry, 12|000 men 
in ritrougth. F^nAon*s Cavalry Division and 15 Batteries of 
Artillery were allotted to the Corps in addition. 

The Corps was eonseqnently , entirely composed of regular 
tro4>p8; the Garde Mobile Division, which was also in the camp 
of Chalons at the commencement of the war, had been sent to 
Parit) under the command of General Trochn. 


Commander in Chief: General of Dirition Lehmm, Chief of the Staff: 

Brigade General Greley. 


Ux Inf. Div. 

ttt Brig. Gen. Cambrielji. :i'^J!h..Kp ^f^^L^ 

22nd and S4tb R.of the Line. 

Graiidchamp. ^nd Brig. Gen. de Villcneuve. 58ih and 79ili R.of the Line. 

2nd Inf. Div. . 1.. w^., n«. n..^s«r ^-^^i*' 20ih and 30th R. of 

Ist Brig. Gen. Bcrnier. ' " tl I * • 

2nd Brig. Gen. Marquiitan. 2nd and 4th R. dc Marche. 

'«.*>• /^ i> u 1 l«t And 2nd R. of Marine 
:Jr«l (Marine) Inf. Div. I !•»* Bng. Gen. Rcboul. Infantn-. 


de WaH!ioii;nc. ^"^ Brig. Gen. Martin dn* 3nl and 4th R. of Marine 

l*aillil'rett. infantry. 

.« ,.. I l8t Brig. Gen. SavareMe. l«t and 7th R. ofLanccn*. 

(ienernl Fenclcni. ■ 2„t| nH-. (Jm. de Beville. Sthandfiih H.ufCuirasMer!.. 

In addition to tliis a new Ket»erve Cavulrv Division watjt 
furnu'd and allotted to Marrtlial Mac Mahon*H armv, whicii w:im 
rompoKod an followH: 


' « . i> - I' rr-ir 1 I i^< I^- of |{iifi<.an« and <>th 
J»tK«..rvi(»v. J)iv.' 1-t Br.K. «..n. rill.«r.l R. .,f n,..»ei.r.. 

Hrignde (icneral 

Mariciieritte. ^ i ii-: #' \f •.. i"** ••nl and 4ch H. of 

2nd Hn:;. Gen. Manjuentto. ,,, i. . i- . 

( liaM»eur.o d Afnqut*. 


Id these distributions it is to be renmrked, 

1st) tliat Bernler's Brigade of the 2nd Infantry Division 
originally belonged to the 6th Corps, and was cnt oflT from it at 
Fronard by the sorronnding of the second German Army. It had 
gOM to Ch&lons. 

2ndly> that the Regiments of F^n^lon's Cavalry Division and 
of TiUiard*s Brigade of Margueritte's Reserve Cavalry Division, 
likewise belonged to the 6th Corps, but had remained behind on 
the departure of this corps to Metz, and at a later period they 
were not able to reach it. 

3rdly) that tlie 1st and 3rd Regiments of Chasseurs d'Afrique 
had belonged to the Emperor's escort on the 16th of August, and 
had not been sent back to Metz. 

The Marshars Army thus consisted of 4 Corps and 2 Reserve 
Cavabry Divisions (Margueritte's newly formed Division, and Bonne- 
auuii*B Division which had been placed under the Marshal since 

The 1st Corps, Ducrot, numbered 40,000 men, 
6th ^ de Failly, ^ 25,000 „ 

7th ^ Douay, ^ 30,000 „ 

„ 12th „ Lebrun, „ 45,000 „ 

Total: 140,000 men. 
This Army had over 400 guns. 

The employment of this active force formed, however, a 
pouit of dispute between the political parties, and public opinion 
waa more considered than the rules of strategy. 

Although the Emperor Napoleon had been with this army 
siBce the 18th of August, and was still the Head of the State, 
yet the war minister in Paris, Cousin Montauban, Count Palikao, 
gave the final word, and it waa decided, after mucli wavering, that 
the Marshal should turn northwards, in order to reach Mets by n 
wide circuit, supported by the fortresses lying on the Belgian 
frontier, and relieve Basaine. 

Buecess alone could rescue this plan from the reproacli of 

This army was at the same time, the only one which Fnin(*«' 



lay in I of 

neh k plan, fat lUaf i 

• )" 

iW- Uniy wLkl 
OB Oe 9M of Aiimxt. tvwwili 
Ul d ia K F I inblintlm*), in (Im> futlAwla) 


'Tfae lit Corpi, fiwited for tin ehief pvt fnum tltr Afticni 
Kcfniueiitd, had given proof of heroic vnloar at FroBckweilerf wUal 
i-oiiiil imly bi< overcome by the overwhelming nnmerital soparioitt] 
III' till- enemy. Thou: troops, greatly affected by the defin^ ami 
by the eniahing effects of the PraMlan Artilter}', cutM awmj 
from the battle field bad tendi'nciea, which were xtiU mon aggofntti 
by the long, inceoaaut marcheu, aud material privatioH ia tti 
n-tn-at to L'hitlona. Marelial Mac Habon did not iaetin Mnrli 
on thiri point and wu aware that before bringiDg tkia afiii 
under (ire, it would have been wiae to have gma tbcM Hmt §m 
rcikmu', :u)d to resture sleatliiieM. They were our oldeM toopa 
surrounded with (he n>iiown which riglidy belongo to mir AMeai 
soldierx, iiitd they had amply jiulified it. The apectaele of tbeii 
diiH-onrap'nient befon' the rent of the annv, waa therefin doabi] 
to be (ean-il. 

"Thf .'ith Corpo^ partieulariy, had already aaSered fron Um 
etTei-ln. tAlciimted. .iImi, by the prt-cipitate uuuchea which It hai 
nude I'rum Itiuu'h acmsii the Voitg«ii, by Neuf-<^hitcaa asd li 

'< ■■|>i-> .'HUM-. .|ui "lit iiiK-iK- In ■■■(•itulniion il.- Sndn." 
NaH'«<> 111' 


Hsule-Manie to the camp of Chalons, liaving lost without fighting, 
a portion of its material and nearly all its baggage, the 5th Corpft 
presented an aspeet of lassitude and disorganization suflficicnt to 
eanae grave uneasiness. 

^The 7th Corps, whose late organization was scarcely yet 
eompleted, had it is true, not passed through the same trials as 
the two preceding Corps; but owing to the long retreating march 
which it had made from Belfort, through Paris, to the camp of 
CMilons, it did not present that solidity which could have been 

^As to the 12th Corps which had been quit« recently created, 
it contained elements of valour in great variety. The Ist Division 
was composed of new regiments upon which one had reason to 
depend; the 2nd was composed of four regiments de maivJie, 
fomed from fourth battalions with incomplete cadres, and of soldiers 
who had never fired a shot. 

^Lastly, the 3rd Division was composed of fonr regiments of 
■erine infantry, who behaved bnively at Sedan, but who being 
UMe accustomed to long marches, covered the road with straggleri^. 
— Such were the troops on whom was imposed the execution of 
the boldest and most difficult plan of the campaign.'' 

The observations on the (tcrman side in the further course 
of the war have confirmed the above criticism, with the exceptions 
ef the ciyoleries with which it is garnished. 

When first it was ordered from Paris that Marshal Mac Mahon 
shimld attempt to reach Metz, he declared that he could not 
eiqHise his troops to this danger, representing the imprudence 
of snch a hopeless endeavour, and, as he considered the positi<vn 
at Ch&lons untenable, he led his Army to Rheims on the 
2lBt. From here he could repulse an enemy advancing towards 
Paris, both on the side of Paris and also on that of Soissons, by 
a flank position. 

The Emperor accompanied the Army to Rheims. 

The command for the relief of Metz was, however, repeated 
from Paris, and the Marshal forfeited his renown as an able 
Coqunander, by obeying this order. 

Camsequenlly, on ihe 23rd ike ArmM/ ayam mored off 


from Rkeima^ md pneeeJmt in m mmik * mnimfy »d#iwi<wi> 
The marah ■IwM hm beoa eirried oil wifh pwl npHlfyy ibr 
speed WIS fhe Inl eoadWoB of ■MeeM, bift hnitf iMi ** dqr^ 
march beoi aoeonpUdiad and the army foraed ip ott tto Mpp^ 
in Bethaifllle, whai the diOeol^ of pmrialMd^; iMed the 
Marshal to appmeh the Um of railway. He sMido hb Ml whig 
carry out a Bovenenty and am ike S4lA a rriv ed ii BeiM tm 
order to provide his tnapn with the laeaas of siriMstaMe flbr 
several days. The distribstiofr of these oeeapied the whelo of tto 
25tb of August 

f>o» RMelf ike keed-puuHere were re m a eed ie Tmt- 

Here the Prinee Isnperial was seat awi^ Ami Urn km/k- 
quarters, on aeeont of the great dingers of the espedlthWi nd 
was condaeled to MMteeSi whilst the Eatpmer piasMiwIpib 
followed tlie army. 

On ike Viik Ae Armg errwed ei Cl^e pefwlewm. Oi 
this day the advaneed troops of de Fsilly's and Donay's Oerps 
encountered the advanced troops of the Crown Prinee of Saxony ; 
a cavalry fight at Busancy ensued. 

By this time it must have been elear to the Marshal that 
his undertaking would fail, and that he must give wp his base 
of operations, for to make a flank march in the face of the niawri* 
cally stronger Germans would, naturally, be tempting tiie enemy 
to attack liim upon his right flank, without his having a prospect 
of reaching Mets. There was absolutely no chanee of being able 
to appear unexpectedly at Metz, for he had already met with 
resistance tnim that army which he ought to have got round 

The Army of the Crown Prince of Saxony had siili 
contmued iU march atjamst Chdions on ihe 25/A, although the 
cavalry 1)1 visions, moving in front, liad brought the information 
tliat Ch&lons was found to be unoccupied. Taking int4> consider- 
ation the p^NBsibility of Ma<* Malion h reaching Mets akmg the 
Belgian frontier, although it was not thought probable, the 
destruction of the railway between Mi^i^res and Tihonville, by a 
party sent out to the side for that purpose, was not neglected. 


On this day the Army of the Crown Prince of Prussia took 
the little fortress of yitry le Franfaisj without resistance from 
the garrison, an important point for the connection between Nancy 
and Paris, as the fortress barred tlie passage across the Mame 
aad the railroad. The King's head-quarters were established in 

Perhaps, as it is maintained through the indiscretion of a 
French newspaper, or more probably earlier still by means of 
reconnaissances, the new, unexpected direction in which the French 
army had marched was now learnt, and the order was issued 
io both armies J during the night of the 25 M, thai each was 
io wheel at once, independently^ to the right, to advance in 
a northerly dif^ection, and intercept the enemy on his way 
Io MetM. 

The third Army commenced this movement from Vitry^ 
by St. Mhiehould and Suippes, on the 26M, the Meuse Army 
(fourth Army, Crown Prince of Saxony) wheeled at Clermont^ 
the Aing's head-quarters on this day, and in the evening 
reached Varennes with the left wing (the XII. Army Corps), and 
with the right wing (the IV. Army Corps\ Fleury, upon the right 
bank of the Meuse, wliilst the Garde Corps moved up in rear of 
tke centre hk far as Dombasle, on the road between Verdun and 
Clermont Tlie cavalry was pushed forward a long distance 
towards the north and discovered the enemy's encampment at 

On the 27th, the XII. Army Corps was also moved across 
the Meuse, in order that this important line might be most 
resolutely held, against any attack by the French from the west, 
especially at the points Dun and Stenay. The III. and IX. Corps 
of the army investing Metz, were also formed up with their front 
towards Etain, in a north-westerly direction, in order to resist any 
possible attempt by the French Army to break through between 
the Meuse Army and the Belgian frontier. The XII. Army Corps 
reached i)nn on this day, and bivouacked ne the parositions which 
had been selected for defence. 

The 2nd Cavalry Brigade only, whilst reconnoitring Busancy, 
came upon six squadrons of the 12th Ohaisenrs. An attack was 


here made by the lint uA half of the IMtti aqiuidieiie of the 3rd 
HorBe Kei^ment, whilst tlie fire of Zenker*B Hone Bettery obliged 
the enemy to give way. The Comnuuider of the Chaaeewr BigineDt 
WAH taken priaoner. This fight confiimed the aoppoaitioD that the 
enemy waa at Voniien and to the north of it, and the IV. Corps 
and Gai-dc Corps therefore contlnned their march 'upon Bnaaney 
and Voiuiera on the SSth, whilst the XIL Army Corpa reaained 
in position at Don. 

The royal head-qnarten were still in Clermcmi. 

The third Army had contiaaed on the mareh towards the 
north, on the 26thy so Uiat it maat eome upon the right lank 
of tlio enemy, whilst the Mense Army moved against hiai in 
the front. 

The Crown Princess head-quarten were at St Mteehedd on 
the 2Hth. This army liaving had a longer distavee to march 
was htill behind in comparison with tlie Mcvse army, and in eider 
to bring about a general eagagcment| the latter was obliged to 
make a slow advance. 

Oil the 28th tlie Frendi advanced tnN>pH were driven back 
by the ith Cavalry Divitiion, Marshal Mac Mahonti head-quarters 
were i^emovcd the same day, to Stonnc. The Marshal made this 
movement agaimtt his will. The encounter with the Saxons at 
Busancy on the previous day, had taught him the fruitlessness of 
his iiiideilaking y and he wished to retuin. The dispositions for 
the marcii to the wcHt liad already been made, but in the night 
of the 27th the most decided oixier arrived from Paris to continue 
the march to Metz. 

The (IrlavH arirtin): from tlioie alterationtf, made it impossible 
to concent ratr the army at Stoiine on the 28th. 

Thv Marshal delvrminpfl to ntach Sirnaif and from theHvv 
to get on to Montmrdy ; hut the enemy already i»ccupieti the 
first of theise towns. The (tcrman armies moved quickly, whiliit 
the French army had only accomplished 25 leagues*) in six davh. 
On the 20th the head-quartei'h were removed to lUucourt, and the 
army commenced the pasnap* acroi^a the Meuse at Mouzon. 

*> About 67 Kn(;h»h mile*. 


LebruB*s Ck^rps paaaed the river on tlic evoniog of the 20th, and 
the other corps were to cross in the eariy morning of the 30th, 
Generals de Failly and Doqay were to remain with their troops 
upon the left bank until the last, in order to cover the passage 
aipainst the approaching Germans, and tlien to go over themselves. 

On the German side, the possibility of the French Icflt wing 
extending its line of retreat towards the Belgian frontier, and 
perhaps even attempting to cross it, for the sake of safety upon 
Belgian territory, had to be kept in view; it was therefore 
determined to compel the enemy to give battle upon the ground 
between the Ardennes and the Mouse. 

The Armies of the Crown Princes of Prussia and Saxony, 
now united into one Army under command of the King, were 
advancing, on the 29th, in the following order of march: 

Of the third Army, the 1st Bavarian Corps, had, on the 27th, 
poshed forward by Vouzicrs upon the road to Stenay, as far as 
Bar and Busancy ; it was now marching upon S<»mmauthe in front 
of the enemy at Beaumont, and had established the connection 
with the IV. Ai-my Corps upon the left flank of the fourth Army. 
The 11. Bavarian Corps followed the first. The V. Army Corps 
was marching from Brigenay and Authe upon Pierremont and 
Oehes and thus formed part of the left wing. The Wurtembergers 
had taken the direction by Chatillon to Chenc-populeux. The XL 
Army Corps was also marcliing towards this point, but had taken 
the route by Vouziers and Quatrechamps, and, on the left of the 
Wurtembergers, a flank column of the XL Corps was to occupy 
Voncq on the Aisne. The VI. Army Corps was to march behind 
them towards Vouziers. The 5th Cavalry Division was to place 
itself in fn»nt of Ch^ne-populeux, to the west of the place whilst 
directing its msirch upon Tourteron, the 4th Cavalry Division was 
to follow the XI. Corps to Quatrechamps and then wheel up 
upon Chatillon, the Bth Cavalry Division was to advance upon 
Semuy, and push forward its out-posts as far as BouvoUemont, 
whilst it took tlie direction of M^ieres. The 2nd Cavalry Division 
was to halt near Busancy. 

The Cavalry received orders to retain feeling with the 


enomy, but not to engage in a serious Iglit as the inhatry were 
8till too far behiniL 

On the momiag of the 99thy direetions were ghren to the 
C-rown Prince of Saiony, to take np a defensive position with his 
army, between Ainereville and LandreSy on the left bank of the 
M^'iiHe, and to watch tlie Mouse ftom Dun to Stenay. In eon- 
i}(H|iu'tice of thisy the XII. Army Corps returned from the right to 
the loft bank, the Garde Corps took up a positwn on its left, 
and the IV. Army Corps formed the left wing; the Qarde Ca?aliy 
and the Saxon Cavmfa7 Division reconnoitred towards Oches and 


When the XII. Army Corps was moving towards Nonart, the 
advanced guard, the 46th Infantry Brigade, discovered at midday, 
that tlie heights in rear of this place were occupied by tlie 5th 
Frencli Corps. The iSaxons immediately attacked them, and Uy- 
wanl8 evening, aft^r a long re^iBtance, took the heights from tlic 
French. At the name time the cavalry bnmght information that 
another mass of the enemy'K troopH was formed up at Foss^, to 
the north-eaHt of Nounrt. The Crown Prince made his troops 
move into bivouac, and CKtabliAhed hirt head-quarters at Baricourt. 
The village of Voncq upon the left wing, occupied by infantry, 
had been taken by Htorm tlie rtame evening, by two dismounted 
8(iuadron8 of HusMrs. 

Every preparation wa8 made to dcrttroy Mac MahonV isolated 

Tlie difKcult problem c»f a change of front, and the di?tpoAition 
of both armicrt to the right Hank, wa»* completely solved and 
carried out with rturprining rapidity and certainty, in spite of the 
long dintanceK and the communications bf»ing in partu very imperfect. 



Tlie Btrategical disposition of the third and fourth Armies in 
one line of aboat 4 miles*) in extent, was so far completed on 
the morning of the 30th of August, that both armies, the fourth 
upon the right flank and the third upon the left, could advance 
to the attack in a north-easteriy direction, fairly in the same line. 

Mac Mahon had given orders that the 3rd Corps, which was ' 
still upon the left bank of the Mense, was to cross the river this 
day at any price. The 5th Corps was to march upon Mouion, 
the 7th upon Viliers, the Ist upon Remilly. 

General Margueritte was to cover the advance towards 
Mouzon and Carignan, and General Bonnemain to follow the 
1st Corps. 

The French Army was, however, interrupted in its passage 
across the Meuse, although it was only do Failly*s Corps which 
was principally engaged upon the left bank. 

The King's head-quarters were in Grandpr6 on the night 
of the 29th, and the head-quarters of the Crown Prince of Prussia 
were in Cenuc. 

At 10 o'clock, on the morning of the 30th, the Crown Prince 
of Saxony commenced tlie advance against Beaumont The IV. 
Army C(»rp8 formed the left wing, the XII. Army Corps the right 
wing, the Garde Corps remained in a reserve position at Nouart. 
The two Corps of the iirst line moved forward in four columns, 
each consisting of one Division, with cavalry for investigating the 
ground in front and upon the flanks. 

General de Failly*s troops were encamped opposite to them 
in a position that could be easily defended, namely upon the 
wooded heights in front of Beaumont, commanding the valley of 
the Meuse. One Division was laying to the north and the other 
to the south of the town ; although the Corps had been engaged 
the previous day at Nouart, and could not well ignore the vicinity 
of the enemy, yet it had marvellously, neglected to take the 
slightest precautions for security. The French troops bivouacked 

*) About 18«/» Kaglith miles. 


ontiroly without oni-poits in spite of the dmnger to whieh they 
yrvrc oxposed. 

Tlio recftnoAiflSAnces made by the fourth Army had hrooght 
infnrniation to the Crown Prince of Saxony, that the nearest 
stationary Division of de Failly'is Corps was in the act of cooking 
witli tlic greatest negligence. The colamns were therefore eoneealed 
as mucli as possible , and appn)ached the French camp without 
boin^ seen, a battery moved up quickly to within range and suc- 
ceeded in opening an unexpected fire of shells upon the encamp- 
ment, wliich was immediately followed by the attack of the two 
Infantry Divisions of the IV. Army Corps. The French fled in 
tlie greatest confiision, leaving behind them tents and other eamp 
equipage^ their cooking kettles and every tiling that could hinder 
a rapid flight. 

It is true that their leaders succeeded in brinj^ them to a 
lialt aflcr liaving gone some distance, but they were only capable 
of a sliort resistance, and quickly retired to Beaumont where they 
were collected and supported by the remaining parts of de Failly*s 
and Dnuny's Corps, so that a vigorous fight was now developed, 
in conse<|uence of which a brigade of Lebrun's Corps was brought 
bark fntm the right bank <»!' the Mcuso. 

Nevertheless the 7th Prussian Division, under the command 
of Lieutenant General von SeliwarzhofT, supported by the Hth 
Division under Lieutenant General v<m Schdler, took the town 
and forc<'d the enemy t(» rotroat towards Mouzon. 

The small wood of Giv(»deau to tlie north of Beaumont was 
still defended with j^reat obstinacy by the rear piard of tho 
FYeneh, and thus relieved the retreat upon the Meuse, yet this 
wood alsn was ultimatelv taken. 

The Freneh then "Uee apiin offered rcsii^taiico upon the 
hei;;hts of the rijrlit hank, in front of Mouzon. Tliey brought a 
numerous artillery into position, and for a time opened a very 
hot tire. At this place, only the ri^lit win^ of the Meuse Army, 
the Saxon Corps, took part in the fi^ht. 

Whilst the IV. Army Corps, upon the left wing, suppoilod 
by a Ha vari an i brigade of von der Tann*s Corps, attaeked in fnnit, 
the Saxons advanced up(»n Beaumout from Nouart, marching by 


LftBenville through the For^ de Dieulet. At the momeiit of the 
Attack being made against Monzon, the 45th Infiintry Brigade 
(Leib and 2nd Grenadier Regiments) with the Schtttsen Regiment 
reached the action^ and by vigoronsly pressing on with their lead- 
ing troopS; got as far as Villemontry. 

Night coming on pnt an end to the fight, which had delivered 
much booty into the liands of the Germans. 

Above 8000 prisoners, 19 gons, and 8 mitrailleuses were count- 
ed, with considerable war material, including several waggons. The 
hiss of the Germans amounted to 3000 men in killed and wonnd- 
ed in the IV. Army Corps, and between 400 and 500 men in 
the Saxon Corps. The loss of the Bavarians was small. 

The Army of the Crown Prince of Prussia moved on this 
day, from the south towards Oches, the Bavariuns on the right 
wing, the V. Corps in the centre and the Wurtenibergers with the 
XL Corps on the left wing, and the VI. Corps forming the reserve 
of the left wing. This army came upon the French 7th Corps. 

Tlie first shots fell precisely at midday. They came from 
the hills in fnmt upon the further side of the village of Oelies, 
where the French artillery had taken up a position and opened 
fire upcm some guns of the third Army, formed up on the heights 
behind Busaney. The distance being nearly 500f) paces, the fire 
of the French was inefficacious. It was ahio evident thst the 
French had no intention of offering a serious resistance here, as 
they immediately gave up their position when the German Csvalry 
advanced from the left flank towards Oches, and retired upon 
Stonne, following the chain of the heights which rises behind 

The Crown Prince had gone forward thnmgh Busaney with 
his Staff and snite, and taken np his point of observation on the 
same spot upon which the enemy had directed his cannonade 
shortly bef<»re. At first it was thought that the French would 
tr>' to make a stand at Stonne. However, in this retreat General 
Douay strictly followed the orders of the Marshal, who had laid 
down the passage of the Meuse as the object of first importance. 

Dispositions were immediately made to surround the enemy 
on the south, sonth-west and south-east, by a semicircniar 


formation, the tfltniMtiig points of which ihonld oortinnnlly 
encroach towaida the Borth| like a pair of pioeen, and nrnMUid 
the enemy. 

Tlie numrieal aaperiority of the Oermans was well mileilatfd 
for tluH plan, the aim of which was to destroy or take priaoner 
tlie whole of the Freneh Army, in caae it did not hasten to cross 
over at <»nce, into Belgian territory towards the north. 

The German Armies numbered in all 260,000 men with 
800 ^ns. Provided with a very nnmeroos Cavalry (fonr in- 
dependent Cavalry Divisions had been allotted to the third Army) 
tliey followed close upon the heels of the French Army, and 
kept them in constant danger of having to make ftont to the rear 
agaiuBt a surprise. 


After the victonouB combat at Beaumont, the German Armies 
bivouacked in a line, the approximate direction of which was from 
Raucourt to Villemontry. Tim Kiug'x heud-^tiarlrt^it were ai 
Busancj/y the Crown Prince of Prussia's at Rourmont^ and ike 
Crown Prince of Saxony's ai Beaumont. 

The King caused the following dispositions to given ont for 
the 3l8t of August. 

The Mouse Army will prevent the enemy's left wing 
escaping in an easterly dire4*ti<»n between the Belgian frontier 
and the Meune. 

The third Army will continue the advance, attack the 

enemy if he tak(*H up u portition (»n this side of the Meuse, 

and openiti* 8imultaneou8ly against the front and right Hank, 

in order to presH the wlioli* Frencli Army into the narrow 

ripact^ between the MeuM* and tlie Ih'lgian frontier. 

In accordance with the:»e arrangements the Crown Prince of 

Saxony ordered the (Sarde Corps to ct^m the Meuse at Pouilly, 

and the XU. Army C.Nirps at Letanue with direeti«»ns to advance 

towards the line between M«iuaon and Carignau. The iV. Army 


GorpB wag to move forward npon the left iMuik of the Menae to 
Ifouioii, and keep up the connection with the third Army. 

The Cniwn Prince of Pmsaia caoaed the L Bavarian Corps 
to march by Raucourt upon Remilly, the XL Army Corps from 
the previona day's positions at Stonne, npon Chemery and Cheveuge ; 
the latter Corps was ordered to halt upon the left bank of the 
Meuse^ and encamp in front of Donchery. Tlie II. Bavarian 
Corps was to follow the first, the V. Army Corps the eleventh. 
The Wurtembergers were to advance by Vendresse and Boutan- 
court t4> the Mense. By this means the lines of march of the 
third Army converged towards the fortress of Sedan, within whose 
walls and environs, according to tlie news brought, the French 
Army was concentrated. The task was to enclose the enemy 
in these positions and to force him either to surrender his 
army, or to take flight over the Belgian frontier. Ah the latter 
eventuality was not considered impossible, it was expressly stated 
in the order of the day for the 30th that the German Corps 
wonld have to follow the French without delay, in case they 
were not immediately disarmed upon Belgian territory. 

The 3l8t of August passed without serious fighting. 

Of the Mcuse Army, only the Saxon Cavalry Brigade had 
been engaged. It was ordered to cross the Mease at Ponilly, on 
the morning of the Blst, and to go forward down the valley of 
the Mease in connection with the Garde Cavalry Division directed 
to march by Sailly and Carignan, for the pnrp<»se of intercepting 
the departure of the Train belonging to the French army. The 
Division upon the heights to the northwest of the Bois>de-Vaux 
discovered some railway trains standing ready in Carignan and 
columns of the French 12th Corps movin;; off, against which the 
horse battery immediately opened fire with success. In . the ftirther 
advance upon Douzy, which was strongly (occupied by the enemy's 
infantry, and therefore could only be fired upon by the horse 
battery, an opportunity occurred of attacking a Urge train of 
provisions and ambulance waggons, partly horsed and partly nn- 
horsed. F4»r tli s object the Garde Horse Regiment had gone for- 
ward at Brevillv across the Chiers in order to attack the eolumns 
retreating up4>n the road; it could not however, press forward 

beymfd P<iiiilKBt»4Mi|7| wMI #IMl ]plM0 It #Mi flivA ttp0ll hf 
strong detifliiiMtt l# *B OMMy't takiliy «nI nijInMiHy tif A^ 
inhAbitaato, Mi to MUttj mi I* huA. 

An attelqit nftle by fke lit Dhlioi Ho. IT to iftm iirfo 
Dousy, fidlad it titt MMBeneemfliit 6b Mtouit bf a V)|bnNift 
infantry fire; tte T^giamit howeTer sneeMledi aftor fMitUr prth 
paration by the horse batfery, iti fotetiJK I>o«qr» ^^ lit luyfairitg 
the departing train, eoliiiithg dt iholit 40 #iip>M» eaeoiiel by 
two companiea of tte S4th Iidhiitry R^lneiity aad tbva ouide 
several prlsoaeii baddea getttaf posiSisto of 1^ trslto ataidfaig 
at tlie station. 

Of the tidrd Army, only the L AaTarian Ooipa bad an 
encounter with the enemy, tn advaaeiag beyoni fieallly a few 
companies of Jagera belonging to the I. fiavariaa Diviaion came 
upon the I2th Freneh Corps whieh bad oMted from Moaao* bj 
Donsy towarda Sedan, and oeeopied Baieillea. A lUkai |^ 
ensned upon the right bank of the Menae, b whieh the Batarfaiw 
were repulsed. 

In tlie meanwhile the main body of the corps approached 
the river and two pontoon bridges were laid at Kemilly. The 
Crown Prince himself was present at this fight. He liad taken 
up a point of observation on an eminenct*, just beliind the ehnrefa 
in the village of Stonne, from whence a wide survey of the 
country could be taken. After the fight was over at about 
G o*clock in tlie evening, the Crown I^nce went to Ch^mery, 
where his liead-qiiarters had been establislied. 

The «>ther corps had beiMi able to accomplish the marches 
prescribed for them, during tlie day, witliout difliculty; the 
French Army had retired to Sedau without any 'further attempt 
at resistance. 

On the evening of the 3lRt of August, the CSerman Armies 
oe^Mipied the following positions (v. map \.): 

The Meuse Army formed the riglit wing and stood thns: 
The Garde Corps at Carignan uptui the right bank of 
the Chiers. 

The Xll. Army Corps at Mairy. 


The advanced guards of both Corps fronted towards the 
west and north. They extended from Pouru - aux - Bois to Poum- 
St.-Remy and Douzy; patrols had feeling with the enemy and 
scoured the country as far as Francheval. 

The IV. Army Corps was on the left bank of the Meuse at 

Of the Third Army, on the evening of the 31st: 
The 1. Bavarian Corps was at Remilly, the II. Bavarian 
Cjorps at Rancourt, the V. Army Corps at Ch^hery, the XI. Army 
(.kirps at Donch^ry, the Wnrtemberg Division, at first, at Boutan- 
court; it afterwards advanced to Dom-le-Mesnil. The VI. Army 
Corps was only able to reach Attigny and Hemuy this evening. 
Thus, in case the enemy should really attempt a night departure, 
it stood ready to pUce itself in his front still further to the west- 
ward, and then bring him to a stand. 

It was the intention to have drawn all the Corps still closer 
together, round the French Army on the Ist of September, and 
only Ui offer battle on the 2nd. However the observations made 
on the 31st of August, upon the demeanour of the enemy, caused 
an alteration in this plan. 

It had become perfectly clear, that each hour the resistance 
was pnilonged, the enemy's troops lost energy in fighting; whole 
divisions had thrown away their knapsacks, and fled in masses; 
tlie roads were strewn with overturned waggons, and thrown away 
articles of baggage and equipment. It was above all, apprehended 
that the enemy was no longer disposed to fight, and perhaps 
meditated escaping during the night, as quickly as possible, to 
Mezieres or on to Belgian territory. 

In order to'prevent this, the King, after a long conference 
with the Crown Prince, his son, with the addition of General von 
Moltke and Lieutenant General von Blumenthal, commanded that 
the storming of Sedan, and the French fronts between the 
Meuse and the Ardennes, should be taken in hand on the follow- 
ing day. 

Even this evening, and during the night, the Wnrtemberg 

Division was to advance by Dom-le-Mesnil , lay a bridge there 


over ttie M«uae, uiil crow Iho river. TIm AtAnVnOaj^ tm . 
tu Uy twii briiiKtw at Uunrfii-o, xnd alio to «Nai ftftJHHNih ' 

r«ir* If «-a.t Ao;/ory /o ruf 0//' ftU rwW llBMlfc Iffallll 
from the Frr-nrh Armt/. . , '<i-(m 

JfmM Hip Ibkoi had mort pnUUr, latnM tei>^»»-^^ 
gone to MMhTM, b«t nut hm thoii|^ that tba« «V..ltM^ 
snfGcieDt tima to do w oa the Itt of Septaathflr. 

An«r HoniDB bad baen evaeaated by the tmmj ob tte 
evening of the SOtt, aad tba laat tntopa had heen wittdnva ta 
the left bafek of the Meaw, the Kaiahal nabc tha ma^M I»- 
poeaibilitf of biiaglag help ta Mawhal °'t'-t, or area af waeh 
ing HonbnMf , gave orden oa tba alf^ of Oa 80lh^ Oat Am 
umy waa to re&e npon Sedan. 

Ttiia meaanra wai without' dooht, 'tha want -if all. Tbi! luwn 
of Sedan, wUeh \a indaded la tfca e^agoiy oS furtruHMis, id com- 
manded oB aevazal aidea by groaad riaing above it, kihI i* unt 
well adapted to rtaiit modem atflnery. |lon->ivi>T it wan 
completely aimad, badly piovlaloiMd, and poanaaod no onter « 
of defence. It was of no sort of value sb a E.iit)i>i-i't ti> n 
ing army, and therefore, ita only importance consisted in ita being 
connected with H^iirea and Paria, by the railroad which paiaea 
by Biraon, and which was the sole means of replenishing the 
provisions and ammnaition. 

It might have been better to have remained at Hoaara, to 
have occupied the heights upon the right hank, and to have 
delivered a battle, which tbongh without hope of anooeaa, woald 
at least have offered the pouilrilHy of a retreat. 

But the Marehal piubably entertained the hope of reaching 
Hi'-zieri^ friini .Sedan. He wan, perhnpa, not infnrmed of the 
march direction of the left wing of the Uennan* Armies, as tho 
31st of August appears to indicate. 

The troops wearied by their uninterrupted marches, their 
moral element impaired by the discomfitures which liad followed 
one upon another, retired for the moat part in disorder upon Sedan. 

The lat and hi\\ Curpx arrived there on the evening of 
the 30th and early in the mirtniag of the 31st, and were formed 
■p upon the heights to the west of Oaigny and tiivonne. 


The 7th Corps reached the neighbourhood of ViUers-Cemay 
OB the morning of the 31siy and encamped there. It changed 
its poBition at 3 o'clock, in the afternoon; leaving a very on- 
favoarable tactical situation at Villers-Cemay, it took up a 
position to the north-west of Sedan, which it still held on the 
1ft of September. 

The 12th Corps remained at Mouzon until the last, and did 
not begin to move until the moniing of tlie 31st This was the 
only corps of the French Army eng^ed on Uie 31st of Angust, 
partly with its rear guard at Dousy, and partly at Bazeilles as 
already related. 

The Emperor Napoleon, who was with General Dnerot*s 
Corps at Carignan on the evening of tlie 30th, where it was 
intended to have established the head-quarters, received the news 
of the retreat during the evenitg, and Marshal Mac Mahon*s 
counsel to him to go by the railroad to Sedan. The Emperor 
took this advice and then remained in Sedan, preferring to share 
the fate of his Army, in this desperate situation, to ensuring his 
own personal safety. 

General ile Failly was deprived of tlie C4)mmand of his 
CorpH <»n aecnunt of liis bad leadership, and It was transferred to 
General WimpflTen. 

Thus on the evening of the 31st the different Corps stood 
as follows: 

(v. map I. of the battle of Sedan.) 

The 12th Corps with the right wing resting upon Bazeilles, 
the Ist and 5th Corps at Givonne, Daigny and Moncelle, as 
well as in the town itself, and the 7th Corps from Floing to 
Calvaire d*Illv. 

The /4rmy waf consequently formed in a semi'Circle round 
the toum ; both flanks resting upon the Meuse^ and probably 
no army ever stood in battle^ under more unfavourable 
conditions. The troops were threatened on all sides, and above 
all they liad no line of retreat. If beaten they must flee into 
the town, that \» into a number of defiles without exit, through 
narrow gates into streets that were overflowing with waggons and 


11 • 


Mtnhal Ibe MahoB amsty howevar, haye been vary ill- 
iiifunned aa to hia daqperate aitoatioii, wbidi ia ahown by Tarioaa 
circuiDBtaiioea tbat are related of the Slat of Angnat 

Even in the afternoon , when General Donay had propoaed 
to hiiu tlie ehaoge of position of the 7th Corps above mentioned^ 
he answered in the following terms i **I have no intention of being 
forced into the eomer, in a fortress, like Manhal Baiaine at Mets, 
but I shall manouvre before the enemy.** 

Whilst therefore, the 7th Corps exeented the movement, 
which he finally permitted, and whilst fighting waa going on at 
Bazeille's with the Bavarians, a peasant (aocording to the aame 
Frencli sonree) informed General Donay that the enemy were 
crossing the Meuse below Sedan, near Donch^ry, and 10,000 men 
already appeared on the right bank. General Donay gave thia 
information to the Bfarshal; he hiwever took no counter meaawres; 
he had even, altogetlier, neglected to have the eonrae of the 
river re(*onnoitred as fiir as M^i^res. He evidently reekoned 
upon being able to reach M^sieres upon the following day, and 
coDttidered tlie cri»H8in^ of tlie enemy at Doncliery as a mere 

in tlie same way, a stafT otYicer of the ncwlv foniied 13th 
French Corpn ^whirh was this day iu M^zieres), wlio had been 
sent by (Seneral Viuoy for the purpose of concerting some co- 
operations with Mac Mahon, atter waitiug in vain for four hours 
iu the ^LnrshalV anti-room, was finally obliged to return with 
his mission unfulfilled , as he feared that he might find himself 
cut 4»fr later. 

If such faults :is these can be rightly laid to the charge (»t' 
Marshal Mar Mahon, who had always provtHl himself to be a 
(reueral of capacity aud experience iu war, it must be concluded 
that the impossibility of the success of a plan, which was not his 
«>wn, had imp<»sed such a crushiug weight upon his mind, that 
through it, he had lost his clear judf^ut^nt. 



With the first glimmer of day, on the Ist of September^ the 
attacking movements of the German Armies commenced. 

The hour fixed by the Crown Prince of Saxony for the march 
of his Corps was 5 o'clock, in the morning; the (larde Corps 
and the XII. Corps were to advance in three columns from I^OQzy, 
Poom-St-Remy and Ponru-aux-Bois, against the line of Moncelle 
aid Givonne. The 7th Division was to remain in reserve at 
Mairy, the 8th Division and the Artillery Corps of the IV. C^orps 
were to advance towards Bazeillcs for the support of the 1. Bava- 
rian Corps. 

The Crown Prince of Prussia disposed his Army as follows: 

The 1. Bavarian Corps to cross the Meuse at Remilly and 
attack Bazeilles. 

The II. Bavarian Corps to go towards Wadelincourt 
and Fr^nois. 

The XI. Army Corps to direct its march upon St. 
Monges by Vrigne-auxBois. 

The V. Army Corps and the ith Cavalry Division to 
follow this movement. 

The Wurtemberg Division to remain on the defensive 
towards M^^res, and at the same time to be in readiness 
as a disposable reserve at Donch^ry. 

Early in the morning of this memorable 1st of September, 
a battle day, the results of which were the most brilliant if not 
the most important of the whole war, a thick fog hung over the 
heights and in the low land of the Meuse valleys, which com- 
pletely concealed all distant objects from view, as the Bavarians 
advanced against Baaeilles in the beginning of the fight It was 
only later in the moniing that this veil, which obscured the scene 
of the great event, began U^ sink, the heights became clear, 
the fog, becoming less dense under the influence of the sun, began 
to waver and fluctuate intermixed with the smoke of the powder, 
then withdrew into the valleys, until at last, at midday, all the 
movements of the army were executed nndef a clear sky. 



The village of BoMeilleM formed that poml iPmppm of the 
French Army, whieh was first contested. It lies abovt 4000 
paces from Sedan in the neiglibourliood of the Mense, and was 
the outermoat point of the semicircular line of villages, fiurmsteads 
and foundries which , following tlie cliain of heights on the right 
banlc of the Mense, indicated the French position. From Baieillcs 
in a more northerly direction the villages of La Moncelle, Daigny 
and Gifonne should be named as forming part of this line; then 
to the north-west Illy, FleigneuX| St. Monges and, to the south of 
the latter, Floing. 

Towards the east, the heights from Illy to Baseillea were of 
a nature to afford good opportunities for defence to the Freneh 
Army. They fall down steeply towards the brook, between 
Daigny and Givonne they are wooded; here, and also ftuiher down 
to tlie Mense, they are divided into several sections by snail 
parallel valleys, and offer good positions for the most efBcaeioos 
infantry and artillery fire against the opposite slope, from which 
the assailants must appn)ach. 

In tlio nortli, the Calvaire d*IIly, the height to the south of 
Illy, was (if great importanet^, and French [generalship must venture 
everything in order to maintain this commanding point, in the 
centre of the line. 

The French left wing, on the other liand, found less favour- 
able e<mditi(»n8 of gnmnd. The villager of St. Monges and Floing, 
with the eminence between them, here scr\'ed as pofntt ttappuL 
Genersil Douay, however, had done every thing to improve his 
position, he had made the Knginecr Corps lay gun -em placemen tis 
and put the w(N»d in liis fnmt into a state of defence. 

In the middle of this semicircle, one mile*) in diameter, lay 
the foiiress of »Sedan, a town of 1(>^INM> inhabitants, surrounded 
by extensive Vauban fortifications, wliicli could Uv advantageously 
rea<'lied with guns of long range from several sidea, and 
particularly well from the heights at Fmiois and Wadelincourt 
upon the left bank of the Mense , where* a mass of destructively 
eflicacious guns were formed u|) by the Ciermans, at a later 

*) 4V» KnglUh milo. 


period of the battle, when the French Army was retiring to- 
wards Sedan. 

At break of day the King repaired to tliis point for a general 
snrvey of the whole battle field, and occupied it until the end of 
the fight 

Marshal Mac Mahon had issued no dispositions for the battle 
(»n the 1st of September (according to French accounts), so that 
each Corps Commander was obliged to act according id^hh own 
judgment. As early as 5 oVIock, he went to the ont-posts, and 
soon after, whilst ordering some details for the 1st Corps, was 
severely wounded in the thigh by the fragment of a shell. He 
gave over the command to General Ducrot. 

The battle began at Bazeiliejt, This well surrounded place, 
completely built of stone houses, was occupied by the 3rd Division 
of Lebrun's C<»rp«, 12,000 men of the Marine Infantry, who 
defended themselves with the greatest obstinacy, and for nearly 
six hours c<mtested every foot of ground, each house and every 
step in the streets, with the storming Bavarians. 

The advanced guard of the I. Bavarian Corps, under Major 
(General Dietl, moved forward against Bazeillcs towards 4. 30 
o'clock in the morning, followed by the 1st and then the 2nd 
Division, so that the whole Corps was by degrees involved in the 
tight round this important place. The artillery wsis driven up on 
to the heights to the north-east of Bazeilles, and although the 
majority were obliged t<i venture into the fire of tirailleurs, 
they opened a vigorous fire in order to shake the enemy's divisions. 
The broad main street and the cross streets branching at right 
angles from it, the old wide village street lying next the Meuse, 
as well as the park of the Chateau Monville, reaching nearly to 
the suburbs, were advantageonsly situated for mutual support, 
thus considerably increasing the tenacity of the defence, which 
was efl^tively aided by cannon and mitrailleuses, whilst the French 
detachments engaging made a vigorous stand and frequent onslaughts 
with closed battalions. 

Towards 10 o'cU»ck, the whole place wis in the hands of 
the*Bavarians, and it presented a terrible picture of destruction. 
Not a single house remained standing. 


Meanwhile I the XI. Army Corpa was on the hill npoa the 
opposite side, after having aeeompliriied the passage of the Mease 
during the night; in its ftirther advance to Vrigne-au-Bois It had 
not met with the enemy, and it was therefore olear that ^ mareh 
to M^zi^res was not intended. 

Elach hoar the enclosing of the French Army pereeptibiy 
drew nearer to its completion. 

Tim leading troops of the Crown Prince of Saxony had com- 
menced fighting at Lameconrt and I^ Moncelley at 6. 30 o'clock 
in the morning. The 1st French Corps, itad strongly oecnpied 
Montvillers, La Monceile and Daigny, lying opposite, as well as 
the heights to the east of this place. 

llalf an hoar later the advanced gnard of the Garde Corps, 
on the right of the Xll. Army Corps came upon the French 
position, whilst its columns, coming up by Ponra-St.-Bcmy and 
Fouru-aux-Bois, in part wheeled gradually into line to the left, 
and in part contrnued the march in tlie direction of Fleignenx, in 
order to take up the connection with the troops who had advanced 
from Vrigne-aux-Boi8 to attack tlie Frencli left wing. 

in H abort time, the 24th l)ivi8i(»n Hucceeded in throwing 
back the enemy so far that it was enablcMi to deveh»pe between 
La Monrelle and Daigny. By tliirt means the SaxouH established 
connection witli the Bavarians. The first batteries of the Garde 
Corps came into position at Villers-Cemay, towards *J o*ch)ck. To 
oppose their attack, General Ducrot, the new French Commander 
in Chief, decided to take the offensive, and indeed, attempted to 
surround the (terman right wing, between Oivonne and Villers- 

For tills object, lie made the 2nd Brigade of (irandchamps 
Division advance from Daigny, and gave orders U\ Lartigue's 
Division to take the plateau to the cast of Givonnc. 

These triNtps made the attempt to c^irry out the disposition, 
but were mucli tiM» weak for it. They were repulsed , Daigny 
was taken by the Saxons at midday, and llaybes wsis >» rested 
from the French by the 2nd (tarde Division. 

At this time (teneral Ducrot was superseded in the C^hief 
command by his senior. General H'impffeHf who claimed it. 


The Prnwimn GAitle Corps continned its movement upon 
Fleigneux and Illy. 

The 23rd DiviHion also moved up the valley, and the 8th 
Division pushed forward into the space between its left flank 
and the Bavarians. 

All the disposable batteries were brought into position npon 
the stormed heigh ts, so that, upon this wing alone, about 1(X) gnns 
were in action. 

At 2 o'ciovky the riyhi wing of the Prussian Garde Corps 
untied with the left wing of the /^, Corps at Illy. 

Upon this side and at Floing, as well as in the south 
of Sedan, the battle liad developed itself in the following 

At 7 o'clock in the rooming the Crown Prince of Prussia 
gave orders to the XI. Corps, which was at Briancourt, to march to 
the front and wheel to the right upon St. Monges, the V. Corps 
to follow the XL, and the 4th C'avalry Division to conform to the 
movements of the last corps. 

From the violence of the cannonade at Bazeilles, it was con- 
jectured that the I. Bavarian Corps must have met with consider- 
able resistance. Walter's Division wan therefore also ordered, at 
7 o'clock, to move to Keroilly in support of the 1. Corps, Bothmer*8 
Division to Wadelincourt , and there to take up a position against 
Sedan. Walter's Division croiMed the Meuse in rear of the I. 
Bavarian C'orps, formed up upon its left flank, and in conjunction 
with it threw back the enemy by Bazeilles and Balan to- 
wards Sedan. 

At 7. 30 o'clock, the XI. Corps directed its advanced guard 
upon St. Monges, where the 7th French Corps had taken up a 
position, to tlie south of the brook. 

Here the first shots fell at a quarter to 9 o'clock. After an 
obstinate resistance the 7th French Corps evacuated the position 
at St Monges, and withdrew to its main position, upon the 
heights between Floing and Illy. 

The XI. Corps, perceiving that it could only f«lfil its charge 
by liking possession of the heights lying in fnmt, immediately 
drove np the two leadmg batteries on each side of the nnwalltd 


(;ardeiiy which lies to the Bonth of Bt. MbngeSy vpoa the heighto 
to thv, west of Floing, and caused the infantiy to follow. 

The V. Corps had placed its ArtiUery Corps at Its head, 
and passed the brook to the north of Fleignenx, and had Made 
lis batteries form np upon the heights to the south of Fleignenx 
against tiie enemy's position. The infantry formed for the attack 
in rear of the g^ns. At 11 o'clock, a vigorous caunonade took 
place, between the batteries of both corps and the enemy's 

The Wnrtemberg ENvision and the 9nd Cavaliy INtMoii had 
croKHed tlio bridges at Dom-le-Mesnil at 9 o'cloek| and gone in the 
direction of Vrigne-aux-Bois. At 9. 30 o*cloek, the first reeeived 
orders to move to Donch^ry, and remain in reserve to the Murth 
of tliat place. 

At 1 1 o'clock, tlie troops of the Third Army were diqioeed 
as follows: 

XI. Corps at St. Monges, the artillery to the south of 
the place. 

V. Corps at Fleipieux, the artillery also to the south. 

4th C^avalry Division to the south of Troisfontaine ; the 
horse batteries to the east of the copse, firing iijwn the onemy*ft 
guns at Floing. 

The Wurt<»nibcrp: Division on the march to Donch^ry; one 
detachment of lingers Brigade at the bridge of Dom-lc-Mesnil 
and towards Mezieres. 

The Artillery Corps of the I. navarian Corps was upon the 
heiglits of Wadelincourt , with two batteries upon tlie tongue of 
land to the north-east of Villette, engaged with tlie enemy's artillery 
at Fh»ing. 

The 1. lijivari.'iii Corps and Walter's Division nf the II. Corps 
in RazeiUes. 

The 2nd Cavalry Division to the west of Vrigne-aux-Bois. 

The !)atlrri<'s of the V. Corps, to the south of Fleignenx, 
constantly nuttlanked the right wing of the French 7tli Corps, 
and fnrce<l it 'to be always bringing fn'sh batteries into the line 
of fire. Conseil DumeHnil's Division was shortly after, orderA to- 
occupy the heights of the plateau towards Illy; Bordas' Brigade, 


betongiDg to Dnnonfa Division, was then Bent out in the same 
direction and had taken ap a position on the left of the road to 
lily, with its right flank joining Wolffs Division of the 1st Corps, 
which had occupied the woods upon this side. 

The fight along the whole line was originally an artil- 
lery engagement. 

Towards 10 o'clock, however, the French remarked that 
strong infantry columns were descending the heights from St. 
Monges, and moving towards the position of the 7th Corps. 

Two mitrailleuse batteries, which had been brought up against 
these columns (of the XI. Corps), no doubt inflicted groat losses 
upon them, but were just as little able as all the other means of 
defence, to prevent the extension of the German front of attack. 

At midday Genenil Wimpffen inspected the whole French 
line of battle, which still formed an unbroken semicircle. On the 
right, the 12tli Corps, supported by the 5th Corps, still vigorously 
maintained the defensive, although it had lost its original position ; 
in the centre, the 1st Corps fought obstinately with the victorious, 
but only gradually pressing on, Saxons and Prussian Guards. 
Upon the left flank, the Divisions of the Ttli Corps firmly held 
their positions. General Douay here drew the Commander in 
Chief's attention to the impoilance of the plateau of Illy for his 
Divisions, which, if taken by the enemy, w«»uld immediately make 
the position of the 7th Corps untenable. General Wimpffen 
assured him that this part of the battle field was already over- 
strong in troops. 

Shortly afterwards, however, the 7th Corps observed that 
the plateau mentioned was precipitately evacuated by the 1st 
Corps. The attack of the Prussian Guards had caused this retreat 

(fcneral Douay at once led two battalions to the imperilled 
p<»int, and requested reinforcements from the Commander in Chief. 
After some time he sent Lef^bvre's Brigade frf»m the 1st Corps. 

The resistance, however, was quite inade<|nate against the 
rfsolnte advance of the IMissian columns. tVhm the GnrHe 
('orps and the k\ Corps united, shortly afterwardsy upon the 
plateau of llly^ the haitle was decided. 


At 3 o'clockj (v. the map) the circle of the German Armies 
was drawn together »o clo$ely round the French Army, that 
Uie only apparent remammg choice lay between capitulation 
and destruction. The heavy battery at Fresnois opened fire upou 
the town, and after only 20 minutes, the falling shells produced 
eonflagTAtions in different parts. 

The King perceiving the desperate situation of the con- 
quered enemy , decided to offer capitulation. He ordered the 
firing to cease, and sent off Lieutenant Colonel von Bronsart of 
the Staff as a parlementaire, with the summons for the surrender 
of the army and the fortress. Tliis parlementaire whs met direct- 
ly by a Bavarian officer, who brought the news to the King 
that a French parlementaire had appeared at tlie gate of Sedan. 

Simultaneously, therefore, with the King's decision to offer 
capitulation, the Emperor Napoleon had inU^uded to propose 
commencing negotiations. When Lieutenant C<»lonel von Bronsart 
asked in Sedan, for the Commander in Chief, to his astonishment 
he was brought before the Emperor, whose presence in Sedan 
was not known for certain on the Oerman side, although it was 

In reference to the royal summons for a capitulation. Lieute- 
nant Colonel von Bronsart wait then referred to General Wimpffen, 
and the Emperor wrote a letter to the King in which lie sur- 
rendered himself as prisoner of war. The imperial' Adjutant 
General, Reille, reached the King with this dispatch at 7 o'clock 
in the evening, just after von Bronsart, who was somewhat in 
advance of him, had comuiunieated the presence of the Emperor. 

In this memorable moment the war had reached a crisis. 
The Imperial armies were vanquished. Whilst one, confined between 
the forts of Metz, had lost all communication with the rest of the 
country, the other now stood under the German guns, at the 
mercy of the conqueror. 

The object for which the French Emperor had begtm the 
war — moral and material compensatitin to the empire for the 
success of KOniggrfttz — must now be regarded as definitively 
wrecked. To restore peace on the other hand, if possible under 
acceptable terms, must now be recognised as the object to be desired. 


TliAt this peiod did not fdlow, after such dedihre evratai, h 
owing to the drasmitMioeB, which at thin momeBti tepanted the 
iiiterestH of France from those of the Empire. 

After the King had given tieneral Reille a letter for the 
Kmperor containing his acceptance of the Imperial sword, and at 
t\n* Buine time had veiiMdly laid emphasis upon the diiamwimimt 
of tlii^ French army as a primary condition , he gave over the 
charge of tlie diplomatic and military negotiations to the Chaaeellor 
of the Confederation and the Chief of the Staff, and repaired 
to Veiidresse for the night, amid the rejoicings of his troopn. 

Generals von Moltke and de Wimpflen remained together in 
IJoncliery until the evening of the 1st of September. 

They came however, to no agreement The French Genenl 
could not consent to the conditions offered, which inelnded the 
iniprirtonment of tlie whole army. He returned to Sedan and 
rtumiuoned all the Corps Commanders and Divisional Generala-to 
:i council of war. In this 30 votes out of 32 pronounced agaiast 
the reHumption of hostilities. General de Wimpffen had been ont 
of favour with his Imperial muHter before the war; he had only 
Ikm'Ii recalled to the army after the day of Gravelotte. Upon hin 
rep«»rt, perhaps on account of his urgency — French sources 
speak of stormy scenes between him and Napoleon — tlit* 
Hmperor decided in the night, to ent<*r into negotiations personally 
with Count Bismarck. 

Karly on the following numiing, in the cottage of a weaver 
n«*ar l)4inchery, a conference 4 >f several hours look place betwerM 
the Emperor and the Chnnretlor, in which General von Moltke 
at times took part. What panscd here has not, up to the present 
day, been made known. Hot uords may probablv iiave fallen on 
Napolcon*s side. 

It can well be iniagin^'d , that the conclusion ot' pcat'e \ias 
di<<eu«i<(Ml ; the demands liowfvcr^ which Count Uismarck put 
bft'orc the vau(|uished Kmperor, couhl not have appeart'il accept- 
able t<» him. 

Kven after the tirst batth's round Metz the Fi*encli pres^ 
niadt' use of the phrase, so ot'ten repcattHi later: **Fraiicc is rich 
enough to pay for her misfortune** ; after the panic in Paris on 


tiie 7Ui of AuguBty they had accustomed UiemaelveB to own the 
poasibility of a disasterous war. ^Money but not a foot of land** 
was their motto. 

The Btate of affairs was now altered. The mipreoedented 
aad extremely rapid successes, entitled the royal General and his 
connsellors to require more than money as the price 9f victory 
won by German strength, and tlie quantity of blood shed, laid 
them under an obligation, to demand ike country of their own 
tongue, which had been lost through German weakness, two 
hundred years before. 

Napoleon was unwilling to give his consent in authorisation 
of such terms, which liard as they might be, would liave spared 
France a humiliation unexampled in her history. He probably 
felt cx)nYinced that a peace whicli dismembered French territory 
would make his dynasty impossible, and therefore referred the 
peace negotiations to the Empress Regent. That is U^ say, he 
refused the peace , for the coming events which upset tlie 
regency, allowed themselves to be easily foreseen. 

Thus (xcneral Wimpffen found himself obliged before midday, 
to couciade with General Moltke the memorable capitulation of 

This served later as a type for mont of the other capitulations ; 
its tenor is as follows: 

Art 1. Tlie French Army, under the Chief command 
of (ieneral Wimpffen, surrender, as prisoners of war, being 
at the present time enclosed in Sedan, by superior forces. 

Art. 2. In consideration of the brave defence made by 
this French army, all generals, officers and official witli the 
. rank of officers are here excepted , as S4Km as they have 
given in writing their word of honour not to take up arms 
again until the C4)nclu8ion of the present war, and in no 
way Ui act against the interests of Germaiiy. The offic(*rs 
and officials who accept these conditions, retain their arms 
and the personal effects belonging to them. 

Art. 3. All arms and war material, consisting of 
C4>loars, eagles, cannon, ammunition &e., wiU be given up in 
Sedan to a military comaiflsion, appointed by tlie French 


(leneral, wlio will be held immediately reepoaeible for ilM« 
tu the Gemuui eommiasionera. 

Art. 4. The fortrew of Sedan is to be pUeed at the 
dinpoaal of hia Mi^eaty the King of Pranauiy in ita preaent 
condition y and at the latest ^ on the evening of the Sad of 

Art 5. Tlie offieers who do not ealer into the engage- 
ment mentioned in Art. 2.. will be diaarmed aa well aa the 
troopsy and ordered to surrender according to their regimenta 
or corps in military order. Thia meaaore will be comneneed 
on the 2nd of September and completed on tlie Srd. Tliese 
detachments will be oondneted on to the ground wUeh is 
bounded by the Mense at Iges, in order to be given 
up to the German commitwioners^ by the officers, who will 
then hand over their commands to their non-eommiaaloMd 
officers. Tlie army surgeons, without exception, will remain 
behind for the care of the wounded. 

(liven at Fresnoift, on the 2nd September 1870. 
ron Motike. Count irimpffen. 
The inlerview wliich tm»k place between the two Monarchs 
at the diateau Beiievue, on the road from Sedan to Donchery 
i^v. the map), did not occur until after thiH capitulation had been 
signed, it only latited for a quarter of an houi ; immediately 
alter, the captive Eniper<»r, accompanied at his own re^piettt, by a 
PruBHian escort, went by Belgium to WilhelmAhohe, the resideiK*e 
appointed for him. 

The carrying ont of the capitulation c^immenced forthwith. 
'J'lie FitMicli Army, witli(»ut means of subuiiitence fi»r two Jnyb. 
crowded to«^t'tlier in the narro\^ streetti and fort itic.-it ions in and 
round St'daii, already presented a picture of complete diti- 

Of the 110,rMN> gfddiers with wliirli Mac MahiHi had begun 
his march to the north, a small pai1 , about 1U,<><A) men, had 
escaped to Meziere« and over the Hclgian trtmtier, about 2o,<MH) 
dead and bounded covens] the battle field, alxive 2o,<NN) Ii.*id 
been taken priA4»neni during the tight, and through the capitula- 
tion, :i9 generally, 230 Held ofticent, 2095 subaltern onicent, 



exdnding 500 released on parole, and 84,433 men, became 
prisoners of war. 

400 field guns, including 70 mitrailleuses, and 150 guns 
of position belonging to ^ the fortress of Sedan, were amongst the 
large quantity of material captured. 

France*s last army in the field was destroyed. 

This enormous sucoess called forth the most general rejoic- 
ings in Germany; the end of the war was looked upon as imminent. 
These hopes were doomed to disappointment. 

The Republic which raised itself upon the ruins of the 
overthrown Empire, entered upon the fatal inheritance of 
this war. 




11 • 


The MiLiTABT Situation op France after the catastrophe 

OP Sedan. 

What means had Franoe at her eommand for firoaeciitiiig the 
war, after the Empire had been overthrown^ and the men, who 
previonaly had formed the oppoftitiony had nsorped the reins of 
gDvemment on the 4th of September, in order to carry on the war 
to the uttermost? 

What was the military situation of France? 

A victorious German armjfj of 240,000 men, confident of 
victory, was marching upon the capital; the cavalry of their 
advanced gu^^i^ was already sconring the country within a few 
days march of Paris. A second army of the same strength, was 
on the Moselle, and kept the strongest fortress in France and her 
only army, closely surrounded; a hundred thousand German war- 
riors held the captured frontier country, and were gradually enclos- 
ing all the fortified places between the Rhine and lha^B. The 
important fortress of Strasburg had nearly soccnmbed; 160,000 
men of the Landwehr were on the march firom Germany, and 
arriving by degrees in the theatre of war; lastly, over 300,000 
troops stood in readiness, in Germany, to replace casualties. 

On ike other hmnd, m French nrmy m ihe field did not 
exist. There were still about 96,000 inCuitry, 3500 cavalry 
and 60 guns of the Imperial nrmy, disposable for emplojrment in 
France; the rest could not, possibly, be witUmwn from Algiers. 
There were besides, a great number of depdta, from which bodies 
of troops could be formed in ease of aeed, and had already been 

fonned to some extent. The old eoldicra and ofSc«n of the 
empire, wlui had usrved »ut their tlmo, ronld bn Again etiriilled. Th«ii 
the Qanlc Mutulc could b« br«iight intti the field ; a lar^ Diimbcr 
of men, uho, however, at first, bonr vmy small ix^aombUnce to 
servicealiU^ tmopx ; laatly t)ii' (iarde Natiimnle, a combative detnniit, 
whose fitncM for war was c«rtainly very doubtful. J 

Thvre was a ^reut itcarcity of anna and horsee; many of thai 
(Ues were of obaolotc codkI ruction. 

Fraii<:i<, ucvertliolciait , poaacaaod namcrouii anil very strong 
fortreaacB, which might be able to douln tlie eiiemy notll ui 
army wm formed out of the undrillt^I, nnarmcd but nnmcrofls 
foTOflB, cii{mblp, with Huperinr handltoi;, of offerlof; some reaiBfauiee 
to tlie (ierniiiii Hrmie*. The (■re<Iit of Frnnw; mifflecd for Uie 
pnrohaae of arma and liorees, and lastly, her geographicRl for- 
mation ull'i-rnd very favoitrabU' iluiHitnta for a prolouged dofeuer. 

Under thesf ciirumBtflnceji , the nuw Itt^pubUcao govemmcnt 
fomwd tlie plan of proHccutioK tlie war agaliut the poweriUly 
developiil Ktreng:th of Oennany. 

The men, who had uaiirped IIk' reinx of government on the 
4th of September, in the faee uf tin- tnoHt daii^rouH elementn of 
rerolt by whirh it wa» thn-alcned, were i-ome "f Kr*nee'« beat, 
whh the f-neeplion uf Kocliefort ami a few insJg'iiifleaiil individuals, 
and to Ihem ii> iliif tliv iiicril of liuviti^-, by their iiHurp)ition, made 
the dominion of the Commiuuats, at that time, Impoaaible. They 
were patriots, they loved their oountiy, and were ready to iiBflJw 
themwivea for it, bnt— they poaacMed neither the jadfrneat, Mr 
the power of govemaig, nnder tlie difGcnlt circnmitaneea tn wUeh 
France waa then placed. In order to remain at the head, they 
were obliged to carry the tendenoies of public opinion, by which 
they were anpported and entirely borne, too far; repoblicana 
through conviction, and without being aiso endowed with special 
itateamanlike qualities, they confounded the means with the end, 
and pursued republican chimeras, nnder the delusion that they 
were serving France. At a later period, after having tasted the 
sweetness of oommud, a pure Inst of power was, in a few, added 
to their other faults. 

A great ooonlvj poMesMs rieh i 


quite one of the richest eonntries in Europe. A great power 
has further, by its very nature and propertieS| the advantage of 
canying within itself such an immense amount of strength, even 
after severe defeats, that its victorious opponent would willinglyi 
be satisfied with a cheap peace, contenting himself with the maiih 
tenance of his right to secure himself against future danger. For 
he knows, that a complete destruction of the conquered enemy is 
accompanied by immense sacrifices upon his own side, and for a 
long time to come renders a salutary intimacy, in every relation, 

Modem times have to some extent departed from the principle 
of former days, that a nation's strength is founded in its neighbour's 
weakness, and statesmen begin to discern that in destroying the 
prosperity of a neiglibouring state, the prosperity of a good cus- 
tomer is also ruined. The Prussian government, the most enlight- 
ened of all, certainly never entertained the foolish plan, imputed 
to it by French organs, of forcing France to the level of a second 
rate power. 

The means of resistance which France still possessed after 
the capitulation of Sedan, were quite adapted to serve as the 
basis of a peace, which, although probably painful, would not have 
been destructive to the state, and the republican government, whose 
supporters iu the legislative body had pleaded so zealously against 
the war before its conmiencement, would now have found the most 
favourable opportunity of offering the hand of peace, whilst imput- 
ing all the blame to the Empire. 

The members of the new government were, doubtless, not 
altogether impervious to this view of the case. Whilst the approach 
of the Germans and the investment of Paris was being effected, a 
step was taken, by the more moderate among them, which had 
peace for its aim. The clever parliamentary speaker, Jule» Favre, 
appeared several times at the German head-quarters for negotia- 
tions with Count Bismarck. These were, however, broken off 
chiefly upon the same grounds as those which had wrecked the 
negotiations with Napoleon on the 2nd of September. The men 
of the 4th of September, had started with the phrase: *'Ni urn 
pouee de noire terriioire^ ni ame fimre de nos foriereuesT 

ind fnnn npllin-illn (lie H-hi> Miaiid«Ml: "iVi im ifrv i/« 
tri*9rr Then, th<> repnblican ^ovcrnnif-iit winiUl not take u| 
itnlf IliP hlatne nf a •ejiaraHfui <if lerritnry. In (iii|io<ritii 
Frentli pprrplc, wi ilorply wi'imiloil m their vanity, i 
iiutically deceived, bec^ose in bo doing they fttretiaw tbotr oWI 


The weUiue of tha whole nf gTBat FVaiiM now fleB s 
to the alms of tbfi re]niMionn piirty, jnHt u It hud, pmlomljr, 
been aMtLi-iflc^ ti> tlic lirtrirottit <if the H(>n»piirt<> d)'Diu)tT. 'HUh 
arose rmm nn Inttvriitl ntt-d; it wan Ihi- ronsptincncc of oentnrUM 
of a [lerverted ty»\xm of govcmincnt, the terrible rwniH of which 
WM, tlmt nn g:i>vpniRmiI wbb nblp t<i mninUin iliwlf which dM mrt 
brreat the Htatv with (^itrrnnl tinlliiinry. 

In this state of alTflin, it becjinw llic «ai^r»d ilnty of the 
Oemnti ^ivenimiMtt t" I'btuin w^iitr pmrHnttyw for th" i-nn«lnBinii 
of a liwting pr«ce; eooecsHionfl, whirh might, perhapB, have bc«a 
praetirablfl if opposed to a alroni; (^orerument and Mond ubila^ 
conid n'>t bf mndr- in lln' cphemcrHl rnrnputiy i>f th<- HAtrl At 

Tlins iinliappy Franc? had to reap in t^ill incajtnre the bttter 
frnitB lit" long n«ciimulnt4H] faiilta; tin- tihlp of utatc waa drivrn, 
rnddf rlpKH, in tbr »tom) among roi-kii. Under a r-jmplolo mlBapiin- 
benskiii •'( thi>ir iH^k. nilli iin))HraII<-l<!il WMnlonne^x and hanmb^ 
bowtiug, the eitreoK:! party, wbtnie ihmiI wb« G*mb«Um, moh begu 
a work whieh, la a short time, tronbled and eEbaoMed tlw bMt 
soarcea of the nation's proeperity, and nprooted the foulaHsB af 
moral and *tate order. 

In order to Inflame the nation for the proMcntion of the war, 
a system of Ilea on a grand scale, was commenced ; the —e ecn a ee 
of the German arms were denied or leaaened and their own situ- 
tion was placed in a favonrable light This however, was managed 
in snch a ahort-sfghted and nnskilfttl manner, that, very mmi, 
the infatllble conseqnencee prodnoed by state lies showed themselves 
In general mirtnut and fear. 

In order to eollect the lai^ anniea which were reqiind, tba 
levy of soldien wn oarried to excen, and men were issembltd 
in great muaben In the napa, and led to tha battle Mia, mm 



of whom were unfit for fighting, and others were taken from civil 
podtkmSy from which they could ill be spared without considerable 
detriment to the productive strength of the country. Thus, at 
first despondency, then general indiflference, indolence and negligence 
gained ground amongst a population, previously famed for its 
diligence and industrial tastes. 

In order to strengthen and confirm their irregularly established 
gOTemment, the rulers of the National Defence gradually loosened 
ail the bands of order, which had been imposed by the former 
government, (^although at the beginning still making use of the old 
system, but with new members^, and made as it were a clear 
eourse, on which all the elements, bad and good, raged in unlet- 
tered confusion. They appealed to the sympathies of all the 
countries of Europe, but especially to the sympathies of mil 
republican parties, and at home they called up all the strength 
and talent, for an unlimited concurrence in the defence of the 

This produced extraordinary activity and exertion, but at the 
same time, great confusion and want of design. Not only the 
generality of the pai*tieH, but also all restless spirits, believed 
that the time and oppoHnnity had arrived, each for himself to 
make capital out of his own views. 

In the general disorder, adventurers were attracted from mil 
the principal countries^ in order to seek their own advantage, either 
by serving their factions, by pursuing selfish and ambitious plans 
or only by n)bbcry and plunder. With them came to light all 
those dark existences of the disordered country itself, who, from 
time to time, are obliged to conceal themselves from a strong 
government, in the hiding places of the great towns, and are only 
heard of, now and then, on the discovery of secret papers and a 
conspiracy. These men now emerged and formed bands of thieves 
and robbers, or became the heads of factions, in order to begin, 
later, the war of the Commune against the bourgeoisie. 

And hardly less, was the state iiynred by those more nobly 
oonstituted, but unpractical natures, who now eathnsiastically urged 
their chimerical ideas, with proposals and plans, and perplexing 
interfereooe, in the arrangements of tb« ofBdals and genermla. 


That aaid noh dtateUag m|M>niiM mI nior a iMinhlt 
Chief DireefloBi a eo MJ da rabto miatoMe dMmldi 
liave been ofiBrad to Oe Genaui annieai for alaost fvt 
loDger, is ui erideioe of the amoniit of idUteiy focliag 9mA 
of the ma^ reaooreea which Fraaee itiU po ae aaedy aad, oa 
the other hand, ahowa how favoimble the geographleal aal po* 
lltical poaitioa of the eootry waa far a defenaife war. 

With r^^rd to the latter, fliree pointa are coaapieooai^ aa of 
eaaential momeoi In ike fir$i plmce, ike mpoHamge ^ Pwrk. 
This giant eity waa ao completely the eentral point of Oe wkoln 
of France, where, without eieeptioa, all.flie tlireada of gofenaeat 
and adminiatratioa net together, and do poaalMlltgr of VKf allKi^ 
tion in tibia reapeet had ever been taken Into conaideration, that 
the occapatioD of thia capital, appeared to the enemy to be iMUa> 
penaably neceaaary for the eonclnaion of the war. The Claplial 
was, howerer, not only of the higheat hnpoftanee aa the eaatra of 
the state, hot It waa alao a fortreas of snch strength that tta eo»- 
qnest required an nnnanal exertion of power ; it needed aieh n vaat 
army to enciose it, that comparatively few troops were left for 
other operations. 

Secondly^ Bazaine^s Army and the forirets of Meiw, 
formed an important factor in every caiculatioii of the oventnalitiea 
of the war. These two means of strength, united together, hnng 
like a heavy weight on all the operations of the Oermana in the 
west. They represented a great combined force, which required 
the continual pressure of 200,000 men in order to prevent a dan- 
gerous explosion for the Germans. 

So long as Metz held out, the armies which opposed the 
advance of the Germans in the west, or moved on for the 
relief of Paris, had always a powerful ally in rear of the 

The third substantial support of the defence^ was the tang 
line of advantageously placed sections of country^ extending 
from Le ManSj by Orleans^ along the course of the Loire as 
far as the mountains of the Cdte d*Or, to the plateau of 
Langres and to the rosges^ and ending at the still unconquered 
Strasburg. Upou this whole line, which continually akirted the 


lines of eommmiieations of the advancing Oerman forccBy armiea 
eoiild be nnlted whieli woaid find powerful assistance from tlie 
extensive country in their rear, and find secure points of support 
In the nature of the ground. These armies rendered it necessary 
that the German lines of communication from the Rhine to Paris 
should be strongly occupied, and thus weakened the German armies 
destined for further operations, and, as soon as they had obtained 
a certain amount of organization and strength, even threatened 
the investing army round Paris. 

Again, in consequence of its having been proclaimed 'Hhe 
people's war", a state of general insecurity had been created in 
the provinces already occupied by the Germans, rendering the 
employment of troops everywhere necessary, especially in the 
mountainous and woody country of Lorraine and the north of 
Champagne. The safety of the Etappen stations and the transport 
escorts, employed a large number of troops, which reduced the 
effective strength of the corps in battle. 

Lastly, the whol^ of northern France is dotted with fortresses 
of different size and importance, which served as points of appui 
to the resistance, as places of refuge to the bands of Fraocs- 
Tireurs , as well as troublesome checks in the way of the German 
lines of communication. The con(iuest of all these fortified places 
was essential, and re(|uired a considerable expenditure of troops 
and gun material. 

To take advantage of these favourable opportunities for de- 
fence, this great country, of almost forty millions of inhabitants, 
offered a sufficient number of men who could be made into sol- 
diers by military art In fact, the government succeeded in 
bringing together a very numerous army, certainly of a very diver- 
sified character, and generally, of very little value in a military 
point of view. 

The active forces of France, at the beginning of September, 
may be divided into the following large bodies. 

Of regular troops^ only an insignificant number still remained 
in the field. 

Of Infantry there were only seven regiments, and tliree battalions 
left, viz. first, the 16th, 36th, 39th and 42ttd Regiments of the 


Line and Am PoffdgB Rfigimeily «• well at flma hittajfan of 
Zephira (Light lafimtiy, a kind of penal detaduarat). Thiib^ villi 
the exceptioa of the ZepUra, had already heea brom^ ofor Mo 
France from Algion. Soeondly^ the 35th and 43Bd Bughwl a of 
the Line, which had eomo from Civita Veoehia. 

Of Cmmby^ there were still ihre reglmeBlB of Oe Use 
existing, the let aad-9nd Chaaoeara and the 8th Ho8Bai% wUoh 
had, at firat, been left in Algiera; the 7th and 8th ClMBOBra, 
which had remained on the Spanish frontier in the begiudvg. 

Of ArUUmif^ in formed bodiea, there waa onlj one rs^meBti 
consisting of eight batteriea, dispoaaUe ; thia had been brooghl over 
from Algiera. 

For the f^rmaiwm #/* refulmr iroopt^ the iepdif weve the 
first available meana. 

There were 114 Infantry depdte of 6 companiea, 91 Jager iepMa of 
2 companies, 60 cavalry depdts of 1 squadron, and 91 Artillery depMa of 
400 men, in existence, besides dep6ts of Engineers and Tndn. 

To these foundations other soldiers ifere added, those who 
had MFved their time, partly reserves, partly old addiers who had 
been released from all dutv in the ser\'ice, but were now re- 
engaged, as well as the recruits who had been drawn in. Ont of 
all these tntops assembling at the depots, four batiaboms were 
formed at first, and fnim these battalions, Infantrjf RegimeHU Je 
Mnrche, ronsiBtin;; of three battalions, were formed. Of these 
regiments, however, four belonging to the 12th Corps had already 
fallen int4> captivity at iSedan. 

Altogether, there were forminl from such tniops : of In/anifyj 
56 regimentti and 14 battalionH :Jager battalionn de marche); of 
Cavalry, 8 cavalry reginientK de man*he, 4 ^uave and 1 Alge- 
rian Tirailleur regiment de marclie; a rtecond foreign regiment was 
also formed at a later period, ronipoHed of all 8orti> of elements. 
At the beginning of the new epoeh in the war the Arlillery 
wart very deficient in gun material ; there were however, a tolerable 
number of mddiers belonging to that brauelu 

ThuH there could he f(»rnied fmm 15(),00<) to 2<)0,(K)0 men, 
who received the name of ^^ regular triMips'* as a distinction, 
although the greater part could not raise a very high claim to 


thm fwlifiofttiaQg /^t soob troops, »oli4ity ia M^aaiMtioii, dlfloipline, 
and wili fvoundad mstroetion in tho ase of iif»i». 

Kaxt to thaao troops, there were lome tactical bodies compoaed 
aa follova: 

A provmonal Zouane regmeni in Paris, fomed from the 
liipnraed mmt of the old Zouuve re^imiiiits, further three regL 
ments of mixed cavalry ^ and lastly the regiments fonoed of 
the Oendanaea in Paris, 1 of foot and 2 of horse. Altogether per- 
haps 6000 nen. 

The contingent formed from the Marine service most next 
be mentioned, as a really capable and senriceable element for the 
defence of the country. The personal state of the whole fleet, 
including the colonial troops, mechanics and harbour workmen 
amounted to about 100,000 men. It is true that a considerable 
portion of the marine infantry !iad been annihilated at Sedan, but 
there were still about 6000 men remaining, and in addition to 
these certainly 20,000 sailors yet for disposal. These men not 
only formed excellent troops for serving the heavy guns, but were 
also employed in battalions in the fight. 

With regard to all the other active forces, we can only give 
approximate numbers j as their strength was subject to great fluc- 
tuations according to circumstances. In the fini line must be 
named the mobile Garde Nationale^ also called the Garde 
Mobile, This force, according to the organization laws of the 1st 
of February 1868, ought to have amounted to 550,000 men. The 
laws of organization, however, never acquired real vital power, 
and the number of Gkirdes Mobiles who allowed theoMelves to be 
engaged to carry arms during the period up to the 2nd of 
September 1870, will not be set too low at 400,000. These 
troops were formed in battalions and regiments, and also possessed 
artillery. Of cavalry, however, they had none. 

Secondly^ there was a mobHised part of ike established 
Garde Naiionale^ that is to say, those Gardes Nationanx employed 
on detachments oatside their native places, bat who were properly 
destined for the defence of their native towns. These troops were 
formed mto Legions, but there were, probably, iipt mora than 
50,000 men altogether. 


A. very Isi^ prvportivD of the nrmtd tr(H>|M <ru for 
thirdfy, by ihe eatabH»hed Garde Rationale (Gan/g SMatlairvJe 
Tat H in impo■Bibtl^ t» gire tlieir iiDinbfr*, bocaiise they spjicued 
ID no rc^Ur fonutiona, and nl»u very Trotiuvntly cliiMig») thdr 
cluiTaeicr and |)layed ttiu ))<ul »r ptiMcful citizeait. In Puis-aluDD, 
daring tlic aiegc^ tbe srmcd mt-n or llic Gurde NBtii>i»le eneeiled 
800,0()f) mnn. 

Ill tlio fourth place, tbore were- i)ifr<^Kiit Legitmt, Rome coBD- 
posed of iiativea, huoIi aa that of CoIodcI Oharetto, from tl>o fi»^ 
mer P:ipal Zuiiavvii, niiil othtfrii fonnod iif forfJgut^n like Oart^S 
bsldi's. It is aiHo inip<M«iblL> lu givt an cittimaU? of tlittM; fornOL -' 
Only \h\A rauoti can be maintained, tbat, when tiaribaldl'B li«gion 
wu at itA Klroiigcjit, aiid unit^id with Hevonil baiida of Praiu*- 
Tirenrv, ho had abunt 3(i,[X>(i mvn under )ii« «>ininiuid. 

Laxlly, in t)iit fiftk place thtvi) Franrx-TfreurM repre«enl«d 
a neanit tiT war. whicJi generally hIioutiI itneir only in smaU 
bodies, but Ikti' and llierc :ili><> in luindit of hnndrrdm ap U J 
thonuudu. TLuJi iiumbei' U buyuud all ruclmiUii^. To thcau tbt ■ 
Bummona in the press referred, calling upon every one to kill one 
of the eoemy whenever an opportanity offered. 

A wide field of wtivity wu thna opened for tiie iimgiaaBw 
of the rich as well as for the hatred of the whole people, aad 
nuuy assooiationa, in the moat wonderfal costtunes and with mU* 
tkiOB laws, joined the large masses of the poorer classes who weii 
oat in a more umple nuuiner to kill. 

It is eertain that not only all penuleaa Tagtuli, the prale- 
tariana of the plaina and the towns, formed the unclena of the 
Franc Tirear bands, bat also many a foolish and beguiled or inti- 
midated peasant, many a yoong man, in misguided patriotism, ^so 
associated liimself with theae lawless, robbing and murdering bordee, 
which Anally became more dangeroae to the proprietary olaBS of 
France than the Gennan troops. 

On the 2nd of November 1870 the delegation in Toura iasoed 
a decree, that atl mai from 20 to 40 t/enri of ago were to to 
enrolled tn the army. 

What auccesa accompanied thia measure will be shown in the 


deseripiion of the fighting on the Loire, in the north and in 
the east 

The active forces of France composed of such a varied assem- 
blage, already allowed a conclnsion to be formed, as to the kind 
of warfare that would now be developed. Indeed the observer 
who mvestlgates the war against the Imperial army, with a shudder 
on account of the enormous sacrifice of human life, whilst however 
delighting in its military grandeur, finds in the battles of the later 
period, a prevailing miserable spectacle and turns, with horror, from 
the single, bloody encounters, which spread beyond the limits of the 
battle fields, to the fields, woods, villages and upon all the roads. 

The ff^ar Direction of the Germans, remained as grand as 
before. Its hosts, now increased to 800,000 warriors, covered 
France's territory, and pressing forward without a pause, pursued 
great aims only with inexorable consistency, and without one unneces- 
sary step ; its art of war always stood as high as its policy, whose 
fixed and exalted aims it invariably served. 

But the undrilled, badly organized masses of French troops, 
almost without guidance, were no longer able to offer the spectacle 
of a scientific and tenacious struggle with the enemy, which the 
tactics of tlie Imperial troops had done; it is true that they were 
often thrown up(»n the decisive sp<»t by able generals, but even in 
battle, when considerably superior to the enemy in numbers, the 
French army resembled for the most part a flock of sheep being 
driven against the w(»lf. They certamly did not lack courage; 
they attacked and attacked again, but they did not understand 
making use of cover, neither did they understand how to take 
advantage of favourable chances in the fight, and the unrelenting 
sword of the practised warrior destroyed them; they fell in great 
numbers, the rest fled, and the prisoners could scarcely be counted. 

And very frequently, the German officer and soldier, through 
the frenzied warfare of the people, unacquainted with the first 
principles of war, and all the rules for ameliorating its horrors, 
were forced to have recourse to fire and the sword, whilst their 
hearts bled for the wretshed sacrifice, old men, women and children, 
whose welfare, means of existence, and whose lives were devoured 
by the war. 

Tli;Lt tbc klad Qf war vhkh coniiueiiced ttwa lliin ti^e, Hi 
not li'iul to gi-iiiiral bfirlHirily iuhI wtviigt^ry ii » proof of th* 
bijllh |)iiiut of Kaltivation ottaincil by butli nstioiu, the Fraiieli lu 
WtiH 'i» tlw Gonnton, bat L-atieuiiilly »r the tuiciillciit diacijttiae in 
the (junnao army. 

lu n long war even tlic btvt troops loai> pnre enthuaiaam, tliB 
Ool)l«r fi'uliti^ lire blunted, wur licctiuies it vUKloiiiJiry i-nploynent, 
and tlic mind u cKiefly dircdrd to nialorJal Hx-lfan.'. Wbca lo 
this i" Hddcd, Iliu Ronet^nt betrayal of tbe roiifidoncA wltldi tbB 
Boldur p\wn4 in lli« citleeim Hiid tbti pfiwaulry, wb<.-u Ibv rurbitiir- 
Ukce sLowD towards tlie bost of bin quartern is roovcrtcd into a 
meaiiH for bis own deetruotion, then bis ^ud dispooitiou is trans- 
fonned iiilo mi»trnal and L-xaspunttion, und be beginii to impoverlub 
«Dd ill use tbc popnUtioD. 11 required all tbv nubk olemeula, of 
which tbo German army could l>oaat, to maintain such adninlilf 
diaciplinc for so loiig a time. 

Tliai tbo French govcmmcut vtaa enabled to provide thoM 
mnUltudun cuUhI up for baltle, uilL u tainre or less ||;Dod equip- 
ment and armttmmt, a owing to the advantageoua coast fonaatioB 
of the country, which enabled large stores to he imparted from 
England and America and landed at several points from whenen 
they oonld be forwarded inland. Fiance's manofaottniea .flT 
aoBs alone, would have been inBofficient to have incwued ibf) 
existing stores to such an extent as was necessary for tho pnpt' 
cution of the war. It is tme that Paris, no longer able to isqpvi 
after the 19Ui of September, was chiefly furnished with bgqm- 
niade gnns and rifles, or witli tkoae in possession before tiie war, 
bnt almost everything wliicb the country and tlie fleet could pro- 
duce had, also, been conveyed there. The rest of the troops, 
raised in the further warse of tlie war, were for the most part, 
fiirnisbed with English and American arms. As early as the 17th 
of September an English newspaper, "The Daily News," brought 
precipe intelligence of 400,000 rifles of the newest construction, such 
as Martiui-Benry, Snider, Remington and 30 millions of cartridgm, of 
which part were in the course of coostmction on Freneb •onunis- 
sion, and part were ready, and on tbe point of delivery at Dovw, 
Folkestone, Newbaveo and Liverpool, for tbe porpoae of beipg tau»- 


ported to the Prench harbours. England, only, was eoneemed in 
this and it occurred as early as the 17th of September. Number- 
less supplies of rifles, revolvers and cannoi# followed these first 
consignments, and they were accompanied by large quantities of 
articles of equipment, such a8, shoes, clothes, and leather. Horses 
were imported from Algiers. In the autumn montlis of 1870, the 
equipment of the greater part of the French troops was compara- 
tively inferior — ri^es of old construction converted into muizle 
loaders, and but little artillery; the number of detachments supplied 
with good modem rifles, was, however, always increasing, and in 
the battles which took place later in the winter, there was by 
no means any deflriency in artillery. In cavalry the Germans 
always remained numerically superior ; yet this branch of the service 
was of less importance in the winter, than it had been in the pre- 
vious summer, becauHc the ground was frequently rendered imprac- 
ticable by snow and ice. It can also be easily understood that 
the other cavalry duties, patrols, reconnaissances and dispatch 
senice, were much impeded by the universally organised guerilla 
warfare. In many districts, especially in the south, on the Loire and 
at I^ ManS; enemies were concealed in every thicket, and marks- 
men lurked in all the houses, who endangered single horsemen 
and small patrols; even the peasant in the field carrier! his gun 
and fired upon the enemy, although seeing his own destruction be- 
fore his eye8. 

The German operalionsj after ihe capUulation of Sedan 
had the following aims: 

The c<mquest of Paris was considered tlie most important ob- 
ject. For this end the armies of the two Crown Princes, under 
the personal direction of the King, moved straight towards this 
capital, from Sedan. 

To bring about the capitulation of Metz, and of Marshal Ba- 
zaine, was of the next importance: and for this purpose Prince 
Frederick Charles remained behind, with more tlian eight Army 
Corps, for the investment of both. 

Then, the whole of Alaaee liad to be conquered, and above 


All the fortrcH fi SfFubwB', ft« BUMrt hqMtitant pUtut 
l>nTiDc«. TUl fllMUgs li»d bflW MBisUted to (Juiaral 

Lastly, tbc linoa of oomtnunimitiMn frmn nennnnjr Ui A1«w'4i 
and Iri-rraine, mtd fnrtbcr to the wt^«t m far aa Parbt, Dimt not 
ODiy III' lliurnuglily M'l-ateii rr<im nil hUui'Ich of tlit- nuemy, but 
freed from aU wMnwHilM, ud pv^md to Oe hm p1fc<ftf<>»' ' 
foiteiueiiti, pnrUaH, ■— Wo«, ud ttage |at te:E'lM|k^ri'V ' 
this it WM livartMt thrt aU Ike faihtw w betwMi|.fti.,J|tef 
and Puii ■haaU be lihM, eepeeWly the teta«« iT ,T«4f«|* 
barred the i^Mfpal nlbcwl, ead sIm, ttift ■& Ilw1uitj»fc 
■hoild be rtrMglr oeeiried. TUi daty IMt^lMr «• «»d|M> 
of tbe Laodmhr, a^ the eharge «f ewtytas <rt Ifea wHk |li«IP- 
tot opentiMM bi Ota ndine, waa wywiaUy eatnrtDi te A* 
Qnud Dske ef llMUariivg^ehweria, wttb ^ ITtk INvWnhJ* 
which other DbUtM wen aBotttd, HnetbMi ef Tiwlwak, UPW- 
times of Uae^ KHwrdif m flier wwe nqidnd. ,|., 

In oppofritka to Acm pbuM, tbe VtmA gsrenaart-MlM- 
vonred, first of all, to place Paris la as perfect a state of defttee 
aa possible. Almost all the disposable troops, IJoe, saikn, and 
Gardes Mobiles, were assembled here ; the heavy goat of the fleet 
were tued for arming the foit»; the euatJng fortificatioos wen 
Btreigtbened a« mneh as poswhle, and new temporary works erected ; 
pTOTisions were collected in eoormoiu qnantitiea. 

Then, new vmies destined for tbe relief of Puis, wen 
formed to the sonth of the Loire, and in the provinces of Artois and 
neardy in the north, as well as in Normandy and Brittany in 
the west 

Lastly, in Burgundy and Franc he Comt^ & petty wurfare 
was oi^nized nnder tisribaldi's Direction, for the purpose of inter 
mpting the cnmmnnicxtions <if the nerman amies with their base 
of operations. The hopes of the French defensive rested npon a 
long resistnnce being made by Meta and Paris. So long m Hets 
held out, there wan iilwitys the poraibility of beating tbe enemy 
before Paris by overpowering namben*. Paris had to liold oat 
a^inst an army of from 300,001) to 400,000 men, antll the 
armies of relief wen organised and fit for battle. 


Thus the sttccessfiil defence of Paris^ was the final aim 
of the French defensive, just as the conquest of tliis city was the 
ultimate object of the German offensive. • 

After the capitulation of Sedan, the whole war, including 
both the battles in the field and all the siege operationsy re^ 
solved itself into a contest for Paris. 

As the capitulation of Mets forms the peculiar crisis of this 
long and complicated military process y the development of the im- 
portant and extensive figliting round this fortress until its fall, will 
be given first, in the following narration ; whilst the closing event, 
and the consequences resulting from the capitulation, will appear 
in their corresponding places in the war round Paris. 

An account will then follow of the contests around the lines 
of communication, as well as those for the possession of Alsace 
and LoiTaine, especially the C(m(|uest of Strasburg; then the siege 
of Paris at its different periods, the capitulation (»f Paris, and the 
attempts made for its relief. 

The description of the siege of Belfort, and General von Werder's 
conflictK with the French eastern army, as well as the fall of Bel- 
fort, will form the conclusion. 


■p ' ' I I 




of tl 

the 1 







aud ( 



of fo 

it8 o. 








bvildiBg WM prepared for defence. The railroad to Thionville 
had been destroyed^ and the bridges over the Ome broken np. 

The conaeqnences of the BiarBhars dilatory, undecided gene- 
ralship, now stood clear and terrible before his eyes. He wot 
enclosed in the fortress mih his whole Army. In the early 
morning of the 19th of August, he had, at first, in all silenoe 
withdrawn his corps into a curved line, which still eneompasaed 
the heights of Plappeville and St Quentin, and extended from 
Longeville by Sey and Lessy to Lorry, Coupillon, and finally^ on 
the right flank, as far as the front of the Moselle fort. On the 
20th, these lines were still more contracted ; the Garde was drawn 
back to the eastern slope of St. Quentin, the 4th Corps to Tigno- 
mont, and the 3rd Corps placed in rear of the forts of St 
Quentin and Plappeville. The 6th Corps remained in the valley 
in front of the Moselle fort, the 2nd at Longeville. On the 22Bd 
three Divisions of the 3rd Corps moved on to the right bank, and 
the fourth Division soon after; and upon this bank entrenched 
works were commenced between the forts of St. Julien aad 
Queulen, similar to those which had already been set on foot on 
the left bank. For the Marshal now considered it of great impor- 
tance to fortify his position against attacks by the Germans, until 
an opportunity presented itself of breaking through. This in any 
case, WM8 very difficult to accompliah. 

On the west side, whicli was Bazaine*s natural line of retreat, 
a break through was quite impracticable. Here, the country was 
most unfavourable, hilLs stood in his front like a wall. To march 
down the valley towards Thionville, was likewise hardly feaaible, 
because an army on the march oould be reached and destroyed by 
a flank Are from the heights on both banks of the river. In the 
same way towards the south-east, the ground formed obstacles to a 
break through. The only possibility of escape was towards the 
north-east. Here the even undulations of the country, ba a tole- 
rably extended scale from the river to Colombey, would allow the 
development of the army with a wider front, and alihongk in 
this direction the departure would lead towards Luxemburg inst«ad 
of into the interior of France, yet the acquisition ef the plalean 
of Ste. Barbe would be a fint and flMSt importuit st«p towards 


their deliverance, which eonld he followed np by Iwther 
tionB agaiut the llttki of the investing army. Was tUa mm- 
ocBuvre, however , practicable? What was the streagth of the 
investing army? 

As yet Baiaine was not completely toolated, he sneeeeded in 
getting single messengers tlirongk the Qerman linoS| who 
reports to the Emperor and brought back news, and in tte 
wavering manner/ with the same absence of self confldeMO, tinl 
he bad previously exhibited in the guidance of the aimyi tte 
Marshal depended npon deliverance from without, initead of iinat 
ing to himself alone, and to the capabilities of his own aniy. 

''The Emperor was endeavouring to send his help; Mae 
lialion was on the march to his relief with a new amy. The 
(lerman Armies too, must take precautions against Mac MahoaTs 
Army; it was impossible that all their forces could be udted 
round Mctx. An energetic sortie, carried out in combination with 
Mac Mahon*8 attack ih>m outside, must make a way of escape 
from this terrible situation/* 

On the 19t!i of Augurit, Bazaine informed the Emperor: 
''The Amiy ik formed upon the left bank of the Moselle from 
Longeville to Sanmmnet and dcscriben a curved line, passing 
thr(»ugh the heights of Ban St. Martin in rear of the Forts St. 
Quentin and Plappcville. The tro(»pH are fatigued by the ine,es- 
sant figliting which huH not allowed them two or tliree days rest 
to supply to Home extent, their material wants. The King of 
Prussia was in Re^nville to-day witli Moltke, and ever}' thing 
indieates that the PrussinnM will eiiclorto Metx. 1 Htill intend U\ 
get away towardn the north, to Montmedy, upon the St. Menehould 
and ClialnnH road, if it is not t<M» stn»n^ly occupied. In this ease 
1 shall turn towardrt Si^dan and even towards Mezien*K in order 
to reach Cliahms." 

On the 2oth i»f Augurtt he informed the Kmpen)r: 

'*My trcNips still hold tlir name ponitionK. The enemy appears 
to be erecting batterieH, which are to he pointri of appui tor the 
blockade. He is constantly re<'eiving reinforcements, in Metz we 
have more than 1G,(NN) wounded.'* 

On the 22nd of August he informed the Minister of war: 


'^We are in Metz, we have proyisiona and ammiinitioiL The 
enemy is continually accumnlating more troops, and it appears to 
be his intention to enclose us. I have written to the Emperor 
who will have imparted to you my dispatch. 1 have received Mac 
Mahon's dispatch, and told him in reply what I hope to do in a 
few dajrs." 

This last message probably referred to Bfac Mahon's informa- 
tion about the famous flank march, which came to an end at 
Sedan, and in consequence of which measures were commenced, 
after some days, to lend a helping hand to an attempt at relief, 
by the army advancing from Ch&lons. 

Then, on the evening of the 25th of August, the Marshal 
first issued orders, with the object of a sortie upon a grand 
senile. These are worthy of notice, because, with some modifica- 
tions, they were given out, at a later period for the battle which 
took plac^ at Noisseville. They read thus: 

'^Tlie 3rd Corps will leave one Division at Metz, which will 
take up a position towards Origy, in front of Queulen. The 
three other Divisions, with the cavalry and artillery, will direct 
their march upon Noisseville, whilst keeping back their right wing, 
which will rest upon the road to Saarlouis; their left wing will 
come up to the Mey wood, upon the hill between Mey and 
Nonilly. The 4tli Corps will place itself 1800 metres (iVs Engliah 
miles) in front of Grimont, perpendicular to the road to Ste. 
Barbo, the right wing near the Mey wood, in connection with the 
drd Corps, the left wing 1200 metres (*/| English miles) from 
Villers rOrme, and the Cavalry pushed forward. The Corps will cross 
by the bridge above Chambi^re. The 6th Corps will take up a 
position in front of the Grimont wood behind Villers I'Orme, the 
right wing at equal height with the left wing of the 4th Corps, 
the left wing as far as the 216th mile stone, drawn back on the 
left of the Bouzonville road, and the cavalry in front of the bridge 
below Chambiere. The 2nd Corps, will form a second line in 
rear of the 3rd Corps, with its right wing resting on the farm 
Belle-(*roix, and its left on the heights npon the right side of the 
Vantoux ravine; it will take the road to Baarlonii, marching off 
through the Porte de France and then through the Porte dea 


Allemandii. The oavmlry Diviaions of the 3td end 2Bd Corpe, 
will place themelvei npon tlio right flankB of their reepeetiYe 
C<»rp8y for emptoyoieBt as Mairears. The reserve AiiiUeiy aad 
the companies of Engineers will follow their CJorps, and plaee 
tlicDiAclves in rear of the secimd bodies of each. The Oaide, the 
reserve Cavalry and the Artillery of the Army ReserVCi will take 
up a position between Fort Bt Julien and the Grimont wood,' a 
cheral of the road to BoaxonviUe, the left wing in rear ef Gha- 
tilloDy and the right wing directed towards Uie 2nd Corps. ThqrwiU 
pass over the Cliamhi^re bridges after the 4th and 6th CSorpSy 
probably at 7.30 o'clock a.m. The head-qnarters will be la the 
village of St. Jnlien. The whole of the Train and baggage will 
move towards Chambi^re. 

The 6th Corps, will leave behind, in its lines, one infantry 
and one cavalry regiment^ the 2nd Corps likewise, the 4tb GSorpa 
one infantry regiment only, and the 3rd Corps one battalion at Hon- 
tigny. These troops will show themselves as mneh as possible, 
and the cavalry will reconnoitre to the front. 

The tendency of thete arrangements was in short: The 
offensive of all the Corps massed together to the north -easiy in 
the direction of Ste. Barhe and Malroy-Charly^ for the pur- 
pose of opening the roads to Thionvilley lying nearest to the 
Moselle, whilst demonstrations were made towards the emst 
and west. 

On the moniing of the 2Btliy the execution of the movements 
commanded began, but met with several hindrances. The weather 
was cold and rainy from the rommencement, m» that the roads 
became heavy, ami botli men and liorsen 8uffered; then, of the two 
bridges newly built by tint aitillery, it >^a8 found that only one 
was servicrabh' for \\\v transit of waggons, whicii cause<l con- 
Hiderable delay. Laritly, a vioU*nt rttorni with gales and torrents 
of rain came on, wliibt the positions in front of 8t. Julien were 
being taken up in spite of it. 

Under these difficult cireumstani'es, Bazaine, considering his 
plan impra(*tieable, assemble<i a council of war in the, farm Ciri- 
mont, and then commanded that the tro<»ps should again take up 
their original positions. The advanced troops had come into 


oonUct with the German outposts ; slight skirmishes had taken place, 
and all the German Corps upon the right bank of the Moselle 
had developed, in expectation of a battle— but the French did 
not attack; they returned to their old positions and remained 

At the council of war held in the farm^ GHmonij a con- 
sultation took place, (according to Bazaine's testimony,) not only 
upon the momentary situation of the army, but also upon the 
direction of affairs for the future. He arrived at the conclu- 
sion that it would be to the advantage of France, if the army 
remained, provisionally, in Metz. By that means 2CK)y(>00 of the 
enemy were, at once, detained before Metz, and France gained 
time to organize further resistance; the fortress of Metz also re- 
quired the army, in order to be able to defend herself; without 
the protection of the army, Metz would be unable to hold out for 
fourteen days. 

Allowing that these assertions are cx)rrect, tliat council of war 
must, surely, have been obliged to acknowledge that the above 
named, beneficial results for the further resistance of France, 
would have been attained in a far higher degree by making a 
successful sortie, and conquering the Army of Investment, and as 
the invcrtting army wan rightly computed at 200,000 men, the 
question may, perhaps, be raised : Was the relative strength of 
tlie opposing armies such, that the French council of war was, 
already, obliged to forego the idea of victory? 

Tlie Army of Inrrstment, under the Chief Command of 
Prince Frederick Charles, consisted of the First Army under the 
command of General von Steinmetz, viz. the 1., VII. and Vlil. 
CorpH, besides the II., 111., IX. and X. Corps of the Second Army, 
the 1st and 3rd Cavalry Divisions, and lastly Knmmer*s Reserve 
Division, with the 3rd Reserve Cavalry Brigade. 

Altogether, eight- and -a- half Army Corps, and two-and-a-half 
C/avalry Divisions. 

After the losses in the previous battles, which, in August, 
had not .is yet been replaced (the reinforcements for the regiments 
only began to arrive in the middle of September), the strenj^i uf 
this Army, at most, was 200^000 men. 


The French Amy on the other hand, nvmbered 186,000 


The Oerman Corps stood in acireuitof abontTmOes (SSVi B'W' 
HhIi miles) round Mets, distributed upon both banks of the riier, 
whiUt the French Corps were united. Although on the Gemaa 
side numerous bridges had been laid over the rivcTi and above 
all, no measures had been neglected which would facUttate nqiid 
communication and mutual support of the Corps, yet the elr- 
cumRtance of theur extent allowed the possibility of an attaek bdng 
made fn>m Mets against some part of the investment, wiA anpe- 
rlority in numbers, for many hours, over the opposing forees; so 
that by a skilful use of the advantages gamed at the b^gfaaung, 
with a due reinforcement by reserves, the German line of de- 
fence might have been completely broken through, and eveb 
danger to the German flanks was not beyond the reach of pot- 

In fact the German Army was none too strong for its nader- 

It JH poRBJhle that the (lennan Direction had estimated the 
French Army at 80,0(X> to 40,0<K) men below its actual strength, 
and for thin reason a greater number of trooprt had not been left 
behind for the investment. TliiR low eatimat^ mav have been 
canned by ignorance aa to the presence of Lapasset's Brigade, 
of the 5th Corps, and especially by estimating the French losses 
too liiprli. 

•) Anonlin;; to the oflticial aocountb of the capitulation of MeU, 
wliich ro(.kr>n ttio p^i^ono^^ of uhf at 173JMH), th<' >tron^th »huuld he »et 
ilo^n a» still higher: yvt thc^r I'stiiiiHtfN whirh arc prohahlv made out 
from th«* iiiHiiit«M)an(*c •itatfo, umy al.HO iiirliiii(> thr (ianir S««d<*ntAire etc., 
ami thu'« <Io not >«hi)w thr (>oiiibHtaiit> of the n*^uliir Ariii\ only. A good 
authority (NotrH tn the t^ul^Iution of "the war round M«»t« bv a HniM»iaD 
(ii'ncrnl/* l>\ a Staff oftim ol the Uhiiic Arni\, which an* aacribed 

to ^la^^hlil Hii/ain«'. liiniM'lf) u'ivi'^ the htrinf^tli of the French Armv on the 
14th of AuKU>t at ICiH^tHNt men and ')40 cannon, intludinK 84 iuitraillea»ek, 
and the loti?. of the three hatth^ on the 14th, IHth and 18th of Augunt at 
32,817 men. unions whom were ir»42 otticern. Tho French anthoritv 
aUo reckon!* tho»e upon the maiutenance btaCoa. 


Public opinion in Germany, the press, wlilch drew its 
information from the army, always estimated tlie invested army, 
at that time, at from 80 — 100,000 men, and indeed still lower. 
(The Prussian ''Staatsanzoiger** , expressed astonishment, in the 
beginning of October, at tlie inactivity of Marshal Bazaine, who, 
even at the moment of the blockade, had an army of 80,000 
men under his command.) 

It in, however, als(» possible, that the strength of Bazaine's 
Army was not underrated by the German Army Direction, and 
yet the investing army could not be strengthened, or this would 
liave been done. By so doing the Third and Fourth Armies would 
have been weakened. Besides, dispositions had been made for the 
dispatch of troops to replace casualties, and for the concentration 
of a new Army ('orps, on tlio Seille, under tlie command of the 
Grand Dukr of Mevklenbury - Schwerin ; these reinforcements 
could not, however, arrive until the beginning and middle of 

Thus, in regard to the numerical strength of the opponents, 
Bazaine'H pronpects of breaking through were not, originally, so 
very unfavourable, altiiougli the country, doubtless, was very dif- 
ficult, and on the north-east side only, would allow of a proper 

The opinion of the council of war, upon the power of resist- 
ance of the fortress of Metz, is very surprising. It was always 
considered the strongest place in France, and was the principal 
depot of tin* French Army; it had been rebuilt according to the 
latest principles in the art of fortification, surrounded with strong 
outer fortn, and was naturally very favourably situated. But it 
has been proved without doubt, that as late as the 14th of 
August, the fortress was not in a condition capable <»f defence; 
that the fortH were unarmed, and not completely finished in the 
interior. In the battle of Courcelles, single detachments of the 
German advanced troops, pressetl forward, unhindered, up to the 
glacis of the fortn. 

It was besides decided, in the council of war, to establish 
partisau detachments both in the cavalry and the infantry, for 

the parpow af fttlgdng ftbe eieaqr Iff €&itf$ 40 fMin. Mlf 9k 
the same tbM^ of laUiig the moral elemeot of thdr owa mmf* 

On the SOth of Aogusti the protpeot of a iieeeHM attMipft 
to break thm^gb appeared to be approaehisg. A aoiie^gory wha 
had beea aeat by Basaine to the Emperor, retimod with tko Al- 
lowing bifimnation: ^^ 

'Tonr diapateh of the 19th, received in Bheuna. I am movinf 
in tlie direction of MontmMy; the day after tomorrow I ahaD 
have paased the AianOi and then, aeting according to dnmmalBBeei^ 
will come to yonr aasiatanee." 

Until now nothing had been lost On the eoatrary, by vartaf 
the army aince the battle of Oravelottei it had regafaMd the aoB- 
dity necesaary for a powerfhl oflbnaive. To nadertake l&e wUmk 
upon the mve»immU^ in connection with Mae MahoSi oAffod the 
most favourable chances. 

Baiabie undertook this attack. 


On the 3l8t of August and Ist of September. 

If, even previously, under normal conditions, an efcaiive 
attack from Meti had not been entirely without prospect of suc- 
cess, Mac Mahon's march towards the Meuse, in the last daya of 
August, produced circumstances, which now gave a very favourable 
turn of affairs for Baxaine. 

In order to oppose the probable attack of the Army of 
ChAlons, in case the Third and Fourth Annies had not succeeded 
in stopping it, the Army of Investment had taken up a position, 
during the last days of August, which left but a comparatively 
small f(»rce for the investment pn>per, whilst strong masses were 
pushed forward to the north-west of Metx, in the direction of 
Montmddy and Longi^y, as far as the line Verdun-Thionviiley aii 

On the evening of the SOth of August, the Head-Quarters of 
the Army were in Malancourt 





down, mtoeMinglyi on the 27th and 28th. Jn the meao tiiie the 
2n(l Ckirpe had been directed to Montigny, and had extended be- 
tween the MoeeUe and Le Sablon, whibt Marshal Leboeaf took Wf 
a position with the right wing of his Corps resting qpon tbi 


On the morning of the 30th of Angost^ the Corps Coouna. 
(Iant8 whOy for two days, had been in commnnication by telegni|h 
witli the head-quarters, were informed that an operation migbt 
possibly, be carried out at 1 o*clock p.m. The issue of two days 
rations of biscuit and bacon, was ordered to be set on foot at 
once. These orders, with little secrecy, were widely promalgaled 
in the corps, so that in a short time they were known thronghoil 
tlie whole camp and town. Towards 10 o*clocic, however, it was 
communicated that the intended operations would be postptined, 
and finally, in the evening, dispositions were issued, similar to 
tliose for the 25th of .August, but with the following modH- 
cations : 

''The 3rd Corps will commence its movement at an early 
hour; lU 3rd Divii»iou will remain in Metz. The 4th Corps will 
reach the Mooelle at G o*(*lork, at the latest, and cross it by the 
three bridges simulUineously. The Gth Corps will, as anticipated, 
begin the passage at 7.15 o'clock, the (jarde at 8.30 o*(*loek, the 
Artillcr\' of the Armv Reser\'e at 9.15 o'clock, and the reser>'e 
Artillery at 10 (/clock." 

Accordingly the passjige of the 3rd Corps (Garde, 4th and 
Gth) which were upon the letlt bank, was begun at 6 o'clock, on 
the morning of the 31st of August, by the three Moselle bridges, 
and the movement was completed at '> oVlock in the evening. 
The Artillery of the Army Kericrve, which, tor some days past 
had been placed under the command of General Bourbaki, did 
not n^ach the plateau until <*> o'clock ; the only troops which ar- 
rived after it was (teiieml Dcsvcauxs Cavalry Ci»rps, which liad 
been formed on the 2r>th of An;;uKt, from the ('a\alry Division uf 
the (lard«», and from General Fortons reserve Cavalry Division; 
its strength w:w ten regini(»nts. 

It ap|H'ars astounding and to have been a fault, that the 
artillery of the Anuy Reserve was not moved across in front of 


the other Corps, whikt, jnst at the commencemeDt, a sofBeient 
artillery could not be employed in the German positions opposite. 

In other respects the concentration of the army began at the 
right time. As early as 7.30 o'clock, the German outposts of the 
Ist Division, observed great masses of the enemy, forming up in 
position near the Forts St. Julien and Belle-Croix, with artillery 
in their front; at the same time the outposts of Rummer's Divi- 
sion di8C<»vered columns of the enemy, which were estimated at the 
strength of a Division; clouds of dust in the background, led to 
the conclusion that strong reserves were coming up. 

The situation was a very hazardous one^ for the Army 
of Investment, 

At ft o'clock in the morning, Lebtpufs troops occupied the 
positions assigned to them, namely three Infantry Divisions and 
the Cavalry opposite Noissevi/h, the right wing thrown back 
upon the Saarlouis road, and the left wing upon the hill between 
Nonilly and Mey. The 2nd Corps stood behind the 3rd, with 
the right wing near the farm Belle-Croix, and the left upon the 
hill of Vallieres. 

Within iibout an hour, the attack of the French might take 
place with a force of at least, 40,00r) men. The German troops 
in the first line were insufficient to repulse them, and in all pro- 
bability, would have to give up their first positions. Reinforce- 
ments for Rummer's Division and the 1st Corps could only arrive 
by degrees, after several hours, and indeed, owing to the provi- 
sional state of affairs, from the north side only; on the east and 
west the investment conld not be slackened, because it was not 
known upon which side the attack was directed, nor whether 
the development towards the north was anything more than a de- 

Had the French 3rd and 2nd Corps been able t4> obtain rein- 
forcements only quite gradually, yet at the same time uninterrupt- 
edly, and the sortie, even in the aftern(M>n, been able take the form 
of a veritable break through of the whole Army, Bazaine's plan, 
o( having all his Corps upon tlie right bank beforo attacking, may, 
certainly, be defended. 

But the whole development lasted much too long, and the 

morning nod midday were spent in demoiuitnitiniiR , whUit thit 
(icrmanM cudM iiiartly Uk<- prccnntiuiin to mcvt thi^t atUck. 

At tlie ruramutioemeut, tUe Fniiicli Horlie ajipeared to bu ntpc- 
ciaJly dirMt«d low&nls t)ic fjiRt. The roluiniu, ubservod to the 
KDUth of Ftfft 8t. Jnlieu, LiipiLsact'ii Bngado, iiudd(>u{y liMku fitr- 
ward a|;aiiut tint Oeniuui '2iid Divitilfm, and h1 9 u'oluck in tlie 
murning, were alrciwly in ptniMKiii-in uf Colombry. 

Before 8 o'clock, ou tlie lint reiwrtii of the tiitiveii>ent« at 
(lie enemy, Qenerml vun U&ntouffel hxd made ibe fuUowini; dii- 
pusitiuiu : 

"iBt) The 3rd Infantry Rri^ude of the 2iid Divittion, wUb 

Iwii batteric*, will move tu tiio SaarlirQckun road, in Um 

with Pacbe. 

Snd) Tlic Irt Cnvalry Brigade of the 3rd Cavalry Divl- 

HJon will march towards Ketotifay, for thti pnrpusv of nivwr- 

ing the eouiiCry between tlie SuurbrOcken and SaarlooiH ruada. 

[The whole of the 3rd Cavalry Oivi^n arrived there, bj 

• inltT of GcDerul voo Sl«inmetz.) 

:ird) One Cavalry ReKiinont and ime Battery uf Kiiiumcr'* 

Uiviaion will nrnve toward* Ste. Barbe. 

At the aame time, a notiflcAtion was Hont to th(> Friiice C<iin- 
uiBodttr in Uliivf aad lo tke Geantal vuu tit^inmeta. 

Prinee Frederiek Charles, having In view the pouibilitf of 
an attack by the ChUont Army, wonld not ^ve np Ua porittoi 
agaioat Hontntidy, but commanded all tbe Corps, at a dfctaaoi 
from Meti, to ooBeentratfl nearer to the fortraa. 

Oenerat von Voigts-Rheti immediately made the diapoaaUe 
portion of the X. Corps move back, by the bridge laid over the 
MoBelle at Haaconcourt, tu the right bank, in conformity wHh 
the arrangementa , previously made by the Prince, for linch a 
ease; the following orders were, beaides, isaned fmm tbe betd- 
qnarters at MaUneoiirt, in view of the above named general ikh 

To General von Hanstein, to concentrate the 2&tii Heuian IMvi- 
xion at Pierrevillera, tbe 18th Infantry INvialon and the Artillery 
Corps at RoDconrt, tt 8.30 o'clock a.m. 


To General von Fransecky, to concentrate the II. Army Corps, 
at 9.30 oVlock a.m. between firiev and Aubou^. 

To General von Alvensleben II., to march off, at 9.30 o*clock 
a.m., with the III. Army ('orpn, from Domuairt and (kinHans, up<m 
St. Privat. 

The Prince Commander in Chief repaired to the hill le Hori- 
munt, north of FeveH, fn»m whence a wide snrvey of the whole 
valley ol the Monelle, and of the fighting grtmnd, could be ob- 
tained; lie arrived there at 11 o'clock a.m. 

The French, as mentioned, iiad been HncccAsfnl in their firat 
attack, directed against Colowbey. It wa8 very soon evident that 
the security of the right flank ajid, at the same time, a demon- 
stration, were the only objects at tiiis point; for no very ener- 
getic attack was made upon the line Aubigny — Mercy -le-Hant, and 
after a long, stationary fight, there was a pause, which lasted 
until 5 oVlock p.m. 

The state of the fight appeared to threaten so little danger 
here, that Maj<»r General von Pritzelwitz, wh(» was bringing his 
Brigade (the 28th) from Pouilly to support the 2nd Division, 
allowed his men, quietly, to warm up their dinners at Courcelles. 
The cooking began at .'5.30 o'ch»ck, but was not finished, f<»r the 
attack was renewed upon Aubiyny S(»on after. 

Bazaine was (|uite right to be satisfied here with the posses- 
sion of Colouibey, for he had chosen the plateau of Ste. barbe 
as the object of the principal attjick. It was now expected that 
an energetic, powerfully supported, assault would be made there. 

Still, however, it did not come to this; nothing was under- 
taken upon the left wing but unimportant demonstrations along the 

At \y\.\M) o'clock, a single cavalry regiment and a single 

battery advanced against the position Ma/roy-Chariy, and (ieneral 

von Kunimer was able to drive away this detachment with some 

shots from his riHed gtnis. Neither can the fire of Fort .St. Julien, 

which now began, be considered as an efficient preparation for 

the attick at this point, for the heavy shot, thrown at intervals, 

inflicted no hisses whatever on General von Hummer's tro^ips. 


By tbis bnf; lntni«lnrti<iii i>f llii- atiaek, tlif (ieruiam k"'"<^1 
time Tor d«w ootiiiM' irM^iUiirtti. A« t)i<? iiialu bmly iif ttie Fr«-nrh 
Army, near Fort* 81. Jiili«n ami Ilclh-Crotx, wa* mnrtantly growii^ 
■tron^'ci', and, '>n tlie whale, it iiiij;lil well be uHHumed lliHt Ruaiim 
inteDili'il t<i niuve furnnril iif^intit tin- I'lolfou of Slf. Harhr, llir 
3rd lnf:intr.v Urigatlp wn» furniH up al Urt<>iif»y nnd Bcndni'i 
LandMclir IMviaiim nt Ste. liarbc. Tiii' dflacluueutit, )i)i|»itiitt.'d hi 
reinftiri'i- tlic X. and IX. Army IVrpn, wtre nliHr by tliiit titur 
appro:i chilly runi'iili-i-iibly llvarl^^ tu the bcmk; oI' Itic iinpriiiiiiip 
battle. Tbc h««d uf Ifai' a5tli DivisinD alU-r luarcliiirj; by IUd' 
concoiirl nnd cri-nNint; the Ui'ttelle lud arriviHl, at ^»'l<) •<'eliiek 
p. m., lit Atitilly, iuun<'diat«ly in rear uf Ull^ liiu' Matr»y — Cbjtrly. 
Nevertlii'lMH, sX I o'cluck, wh«i the attack on ihi- Preudi <ii.Ar. 
reall] ItcKa". ttit t-haiice* were Htill \ery niucli in Biusninf'* I'atoar. 
Three of ll)<^ miemyV Curpe wer*- still sbtxTbod in n-itlching f-ir Uh- 
Army <•( ('haUms, and, within tliv next twelv<- liouni, it was iw- 
poBBililc tluit more tliau 60,i>0i| (iennaiu, at lb« mcil, (^mld ht 
oonccntrntrd betwiieii Malroy aikd Fliutvilli^, If a nkilful dcmoiialralioii 
was iii.iiIl' towardH the xuuili, during llic break throiiKh, for thr 
pnrpom 'if cnga^iiiK the (iermaii VII. Corpn. Tlienc tiO.tHHi id<!Ii, 
moreoM-r, wmid only be broii](Ht togrtlier by dcgri:**; fur the 
oeit lt.'« liuun, tliL-ru wvrv uuly Iruu Aii,\MJO tu 40,uOO umu 

The French attack , conaetjuently, began at 4 o'clock p. ■., 
after the cuBeiderable forces, which had come up on the right bask, 
had pasaed some honra in making coffee. 

The 4th Corps had taken up ita poaitino perpendicular to the 
8te. Barbe road, the tith Curps prolonged this line, with the left 
wing upon the mad to Buuaiinville. The fiarde, the Army Reserve 
Artillery, and the Cavalry Corps were coming up between Fort 
.St. Julicn and the Griniunt wood, the left wing behind Ohattllun. 

The Corps, forming tlie lirMt line, stood from the right to the 
left wing thna: the :)rd, the ^tli and the Uth. These would hare 
tu commence the attack. 

Towards 'i oVIock, Marshal Uazaine had gone forward upoK 
the road tu Stc. Barbe, and on the left of this ivad (in line with 
the 261 St mile stone) he luid caused a breast work to be erected 


for a battery, for the support and introduction of the projected 
attack upon the line Servigny-FaiHy. At 4 o'clock, six 12-pounder8 
from the Reserve of the 4th Corps were placed behind thi8 breast- 
work, and another battery from the same reserve, was posted on 
the right of the road, opposite Poix. In addition to these, three short 
24-pounders were taken out of Fort St Julien, in order to be 
placed in posititm, on the right of tlie road, in fnmt of the farm 

The fire from these batteries, which bog:in at 4 o'clock, was, 
however, not sufficient to silence the Oerman batteries posted 
opposite. On the ctmtrary, these very noon gained the ascendency, 
and made the Freneli very sensible of the want <»f tlieir remaining 
re8er>'e artillery. Nevertheless, the Frencli attjicking C4ilunins went 
forward with energy. Metman's Division was directed against 
JVoi/i//y, Montaudon's Division, supported by Fauvart-BastouTs Divi- 
sion, attacked i\oisxevii/e and, with (»ne Brigade on the riglit, also 
attacked Moiiloy and FianviUe. 

The right intention lay at the foundation of these movements; 
which was t4> take tiie commanding position of Ste. liarbe, wliilst 
the eni^my wan engaged in the centre, and his left Hank surrounded 
by Ketonfay. 

In H))it(' of the strong artillery fire from the (lernian positions, 
in which, at 5 o'clock, all the batteries of the 1. Corps took part, 
Lebcjeufs Corps succeeded in advancing from Nouilly, against 
Noisseviiitfy in throwing back the German troops upon Servigujfy 
in establishing itself in and round Noisseville, in taking the batteries 
in rear, wiru-h were in position Ix^fore 8ervigny, by tlie fire of 
skirmisherH, and forcing them to drive off; 2uid then in bringing a 
numb(*r of batteries into position, which vigorously bombarded 
Servigny. Coincy was occupied, at the same time, by General 
Lapasset from C'oKmibey. It was now G.30 o'clock. 

With this, however, the good conduct of the sortie, again came 

to an end. Instead of sending sufficient reserves after the divisions 

wliich li}id g(»ne forward so surx;essfully, wliich Bazaine w«s quite 

able to do, \\v left the first line, for a time, entirely to itself; tlie 

4th and Gtli Corps waited for a further progress to be made 

by the 3rd bt^fore they attacked on their side; the 3rd Corps was 

u • 


not supported by the Sod, and liardlj advaneed at all — the 
attack was paraljied and eame eompleteljr to a itand. At dark, 
however, Memerty'a Frnaalan Brigade aneeeeded in re-taUng Noiaae- 
ville. At 9 o*ehck in ike evening ike mosi imferiani petlthMwere 
Qijam in paueeeiem ef ike Germans^ and the fight waa eonaidered 
at an end. The German troops in the first line were, indeed, 
kept under anna for the night and the Landwehr, trom Ste. Bnrbi| 
were drawn nearer ; bnt the ' 2nd Infantry Brigade wKh the 
Artillery Corpa, were moved back into bivooac 

Then, suddenly, at 10 o'clock at night, a (Ireah attack enaned, 
upon the whole line, with the greatest vehemence. Whether tUa 
WS8 conducted by Baiaine*8 arrangement, and in conseqnenee of a 
premeditated plan, or through accidental drcuttstanees, haa noi 
been Jiiade clear. According to a good French authority*), the 
impulse which led to it, proceeded from General CSuuiganier h 
an hour of general irresolution. Strong French masses went itar- 
wsrd from Lebcenfs Corps, upon the SaarbrQeken road| thai 
turning to the north, attacked Fianvilh and took the village with 
the bayonet, after an obstinate defence. 

From here they turned towardn Retcmfay and NoiitseviUe, and 
forced the German troops to retire m far a8 Chateau GraSj upon 
the plateau of 8te. Barbe. 

At the same time General Ladmirault had gone forward, 
witli (*i88ey*B Division, on tlie right of the road to Ste. Barbe, 
Greuier*8 Divisiou (»u the left of it, and I^oreneez's Division in the 
seccmd bttdy, and a concentrated attack by surprise was made upon 
Servignyy which was C4irried out partly by Metman^s Division and 
partly by the tHNips <»f the 4th Corps, (.'issey's Division. The 
French succeeded in getting posseKsioii of the f^eutest part of the 
village. (Srenier's Division aiMl(ieneral('issey*s 2nd Brigade, directed 
their attack up4»n Poix, to the north-west of Si»r\i^uy, and upon 
Failly, l»ut with only partial success, as this ni^^lit action was, in 
^neral, conducted without steadiness on the Frnnch side, and 
without -lasting force. Servij^iiy was very soon re-taken by the 
Germans, and the only positions maintained by the French, were 

*^ .lournnl (l*un ufKciiT cle rarmt**- ilii Khiti. Bruxcllei», ('. Muqtiardt. 


Noisseville, Coincy, Flanville and the country round these villages. 
Upon the left wing of the French line of battle, Marshal Canrobert 
had taken possession of OhieuUes and Vany with his partisan- 
companies; General Tixier wa8 established on the right, General 
Lafont de Villiers on the left, and General Levassor - Sorval in 
reserve, and cavalry fronted the debouch^ from Malroy. 

The retreating movement of the 4th and 3rd Corps, which 
soon followed, obliged Canrobert likewise to retire. 

The battle was concluded for thus day^ and the result of 
the '6\sl of August was ^ that the French Army — afler having 
been in possession of the most important positions^ and, in a 
tactical point of view, had been able to carry out its break- 
through — was turned back^ into nearly the same situation which 
it had been in bejore the attacks from the want of reserves 
being brought up in time. 

Once in the course of the afternoon , when Colombey and 
Noisseville were taken and Servigny strongly threatened , and 
again towards 11 o'clock p. m., when even Flanville and Noisseville 
had been taken, and a concentric attack could have been made 
upon Failly, tiic French attacking front was so extended, that 
nothing hut the want of will on the part of the Generals, stood in 
the way of bringing up Ktrong reserves. 

(■eneral Ladmirault had not, as yet, exhausted his reserves, 
the f)th Corps had hardly been engaged, the Garde and 2nd Corps 
were Htill completely intact; the numerous cavalry, which could 
act under favourable cii*cumstances against the roads to 8aarlouis 
and Siuirhrilcken, by which they could threaten to surround the 
enemy or attack the foe posted at Retonfay, had not yet taken 
any serious part in the combat, with the exception of the fight at 

The difficulties connected with the deveh^pment of large masses 
from narrow defiles, cannot well be mentioned, after the first body 
had already placed itself in possession of villages and other positions, 
extending over a mile of front ^^4^/5 English miles'). • 

Hut, how little Marshal Bazaine had the intention of pursuing 
a plan ti» break through at any price, is at (»iice pnived by his 

leaving thit bnUlu - tieltl , at ii'i\l«(Tk in<^ t^veiiiti);, before the 
Iwt nturk, xiid nrturniiig U* 61. Jnlirn. 

ftiizalnfi u-fu kfpl Imelt Ay ifir /'tmr of hrimg tft>»lroifat 
hy llw imrtmn>i fierman Armtjy tnwii ii/)--!- a smrMtful brtmk \ 

Altlinil^U, ttownvor, tlio ftvimrabic mitmhut IijmI iMton lust i 
the :nnt of Auj^unt, iiiii( Ihii >iiily .i4vuntj|f;(t tluit t'ltu \w numtim 
U remaining to tlic Pn^nch, wiw tlir urt^uptition of (he viUi^:<i« 
Coiiicy, FlatiTille ajid enpocially NmMcvillc, tlif utti'nipt In lirei 
tluniii;^!) wu repented un tlut lat uf 8c|)t<inibur, aui) iialumlH 
under fur more difficult circumotiuiccK, imd with fur 1cm pnMpc^ 


Tlin German .trmy, nUxid in ruailim-i'B, >m tim iHtofSepteBibi 
in [111- fotlowiof; "rdur: 

KFnnimcr'B Division ud tbo 1. Array Corpn, in tlio first liu 
upfii tlie battl«'11elda of the prrvionit iii|il)t; iti the itemnd linf 
at Antitly, anil on the march U> (.'hurly , Ok 'J5th niid Iflj 
DiviKinns (the latt«;r Iiad bMn marcliiiif; hII through the ni^rt)^ I 
that tlie wlwlt of lhi> IX. Army f'-Tf,K waa imw ready for I 
fight upon tli« ri|;lil bank of Ihn Mimcllr. 

'I'liu VII. and VIII. Army Ci<r|>i, rm uii llic provioua (Uy; 
the 11., Ill and X. Corp^, iipxit tl..- l.-ft bank of the MomIIc, to- 
wards Hontm^dy; the first two however were only I'/i mileB 
(6*/|i) English) from Metz, and the last were immediately oa 
the river, so tliat it would be possible for them to engage in the 
fight of the investing army witliin some hours. 

The Frmeh (li*pontions for this day, again indicated u 
assault upon Ste. Barbe, but thid was already restricted, by the 
command In rrrit satisfied with maiutaiuing the iioKitinns of the 
.tlst of August, until the evening, in ende the enemy had been 

The fight began at 4 o'clock a. m. on the (German side, by 
the Srd Infantry Brigade eudoavnuring to re-conquer the village 
of Noisaeville, which had been wrested from it. 

The 'morning was very misly , so that only tlw ti)ps of the 
hills could be dietinguishcd ; in the valley, however, only the 
objects near at hand were visible. 


The firAt attack of the Germans upon tlie village, occupied 
by Clinchaufg Hrigado and tlio 32nd Line Regiment, failed; the 
French held the village and even proceeded to make ttortien. 

General von Manteuffel brought up the 2nd Infantry Brigade, 
and begged for assistance from General v(»n Manstein, who support- 
ed him by sending at first, the 1st Hessian Infantry Brigade, the 
Artillery Corps of the IX. Corps, and the Hessian Cavalrj' Brigade; 
and later, after the 18th Infantry Division had arrived in rear 
of Kummer's Division, the 2iid Hessian Infantry Brigade. 

As soon as the Hessians were on the march to Ste. Barbe, 
the second attack upon yoisseviUe was attempted by the 2nd 
Infantry Brigade. It succeeded, with very heavy h>sses, in 
taking tiie outskirts) and part <»f the vilhige, but the French brought 
fresh troops into the fight, and also several mitrailleuses, and 
again drove the (lermans (mt. Three times the outskirts were 
taken and again lost, until at last, (ieneral von Manteuffel desisted 
from the offensive, withdrew his troops, and contented himself with 
opposing the further progress of the enemy. 

It was now H o'chM'k a. m. 

In the nicjinwliile, the announcement of the re-commencement 
of the battle had reached Prince Frederick Charles at Malancourt, 
to wliicli place lie had ridden back, from the hill at F^ves, on 
the previous evening. 

Here, in the head-quarters of the Army, between 7 and 8 
o>h>ck, the tire of cannon was now audible in the direction <»f 
MoutnuMly, as to the signification of which, conjectures only could 
be f(»rnuMl. It was the thunder of the action raging round 
Bazeillert, 12 miles (55* 5 English") off, the commencement of the 
battle of Hi'dan. 8oon h<»wever the hot engagement <m the right 
bank of the Moselle, drowned the dull roar in the distance. 

The Prince commanded Lieutenant General von Alvensleben 
to send an Infantry Division, strf*ngthened by Artillery, towards 
Maizi^res-les-Met/, made a part of the X. Army C4»rps move back 
upon the right bank of the Moselle, and shortly after H. o'clock, 
h(> again took up his point of observation of the previous day. 

As the sbite of the battle of Noiasevillc appeared hasardons, 
General von Za8tn>w received an order by telegraph, at 9. 15 


oVldcky to lend his whole Corps to the aasiBtaiiee of Geaenl voa 
ManteiifferA left wingy and to leave only a single brigade in the 
line of investmeiit. 

Simaltaneonsly with this, General von GAben received orders 
to purth the reserve of the VIll. Army Corps to the right| in older 
tfi be able eventnally, to relieve the investing line of the VIL 
(^'•orps entirely. 

(ieneral von Kummer was directed, at 9. 30 o'cloek, to 
place himself at the disposal of General von Manteuifel, witli the 
whole Division, as soon as it liad been relieved in its position 
by the leading brigade of the X. Army Corps. 

Whilst the German Corps were distributed, in this well eon- 
Ridered and carefnl manner f(»r mutual support and relief, Manhal 
Lehoeuf, on the French side, fought the hard battle of Noisae- 
ville, with Ids Corps almost alone, and even after the action had 
beeome general, and extended from Failly to beyond Flanvillei 
the Ith and 6th Corps did not engage in sueh a manner as to 
render him Hupport. To<» lar^e a part of tliene corps remained 
inartive, in rt»8erve. The 2nd Corps and the (Jarde did not even 
leave their reserve position this day. 

('onse(|uently, atlter the attack <»f the Germans upon Moisse- 
ville had been n'pnlsed, no energetic offensive was taken, which 
mii;;lit have turned to f^ood account the advantap.*s, won with S4» 
much difficulty. Marshal Leboeuf was satisfied with holding his 
position, and was obliged passively to allow one battery after 
another to l)e brought int<» position to the south of 8te. Harbe, 
oppONJte Noisscvillc, for the purp<»s(* of driving: him ont o( the 
villap* by artillery fire. The 1st Hessian Infantry Brigade, which 
arrived at iSte. lUrbe at H nVl<»ckf and live Hessian foot batteries, 
which came up a quarter of an hour later, appeari*d exactly at 
the ri^lit time for (ieneral von M:inteufTel. Not lon^ after the 
lleshian Cavalry Hri^cade also arrived, and was dinrted t«» supp<»rt 
(leneral von Memerty :ird Infantry brigade) behind his left wing, 
to the north-east of Ste. Harbe. 

(ieneral von Kinnmer reported that Wranjrel's Division ■ IHth) 
hail aiTived, and occupied the liois de Failly with Helow*8 Brigade 


(36th) And one battery, as well as that the 2nd Hessian Infantry 
Brigade was on the march to »Ste. Barbe. 

A rommnnieation ah)o came soon after, from the Prince Com- 
mander in Chief, that the X. Army Corps was to move over the 
Moselle in rear of Rummer's Divisicm. 

It therefore now appeared possible to General von Mante\iffel 
to gain possession of the village of Noisseville, and at first, he 
made 50 guns open fire, amongst which were the Hessian 
batteries, in order to shower rifled cannon shot upon the 
village itself, as well as upon the French reserves, standing 
behind it 

At the same time, the 28th Infantry Brigade carried out an 
energetic attack by Fuche, against Flanvilley which was successful, 
and was then directed agsiinst Coincy. It managed to drive 
Fauvart-Bastours F'rench Division from its position, and back to 
the SaarbrUcken road in a line with Coincy. As this retreating 
movement endangered the right wing of the Brigade of Montaudon*s 
Division, which had occupied Montoy and Flanville, Marshal 
I^boeuf ordered Fauvnrt Biistours Division to go for^'ard again. 
This did not however 8U<*ceed, and in face of the great losses 
among the troops. Marshal Leboeuf himself, now gave the order 
to retin;. 

This entailed the retreat of Montaudon's Division also. 

Noissevillc began to burn in several places. The bombard- 
ment had been continued for almost two hours, and at 11 o'clock 
a. m. the capture of the village was effected. 

Senden's Landwehr Division and Memerty*s Brigade moved 
into yoisseviile, amid inconsiderable fighting with the gradually 
departing troops of the French 3rd Corps, who had held out 
so brilliantly for seven hours. Thus the chief fight came to 
an end. 

But there had also been hard fighting opposite Failly and 
Bervigny, and, in a south-easterly direction, a demonstration had 
been undertaken from Metz against Mercy -le-Hauif which engaged 
the German Vll. Army Corps. 

These fights began at about 8 o'clock in the morning, and 
took the following course: 


The 4«k Oorpt mainteiiied its poritioa fbr a toaf ItaM, la 
front of Poiz aad SorigBj; Loraaeei'B Di?itioB kad laplaeai 
CiBHo/is DiTMmi ta the int line^ bat was oaable to gah aay 
^ound, aad retired. Geaeral Tizier had hegon the atftaek apoa 
Failly, with the 6th Ck>rpBy whea he peredved the iauaoUH^ of 
the 4th Corps aad afterwards its retreat, drawing with it the 
whole of Caorobert^s Corps. At 11 o*eloek a. m. the geaeral 
retreat was oommaaded. 

The Gonuuu had gauied the victory here, with Kaaunoi^a 
DiviHion, aad BeloVs Brigade. The Hessiaa Divisioa, aad the 
Artillery Corps of the IX. Army Corps still remaioed ia reaenra . 

UpoB the extreaie left flaalc, aiasses of Freaeh had advaaeed 
against Merey-le-Haat , to whom the castle had to be yielded* 
Towards 11 o'clock, it was re-taken, hot agaia had to be evaeaaled 
at 12 o'clock. 

Soon after, the iaflnenoe of tiie fight in the eeatre, aad apas 
the right wing, began to take effect ; the French retired hen alao^ 
and at 4 o'clock, the old positions were again taken ap. 

The lo88 of the Gorman Army, in the two day's contest, 
amounted to 120 oilicers and 2358 men in killed and wounded. 

Tlie 1(»S8 in the French Army amounted to 141 officers aad 
2884 men. 

The latter took up their old positions again tm the 2nd of 
September; the 2nd and 3rd Corps npon the right bank, and the 
remainder of the Corps upon the left bunk. 

On the same day, Prince Frederick Charles, after rereiriag 
tidingH of the action at Beaumont, and being set at rest in regard 
to an att^iek by Mac Malion s Army, issued new orders relative to 
the Investment of Metz, in conformity witli which the position of 
the II. Army Cori>s, to the north-west, was confined to the line 
Arbouc Hricy, wliilst the remaining corps returned to the enclos- 
ing of the fortress; and now, the south-eastern portion of the 
investment line was especially strongly occupied , for after tlie 
unsuccessful attempt to break through towards the north-east, tlie 
probability **( a sortie in tlie directi<m of Strasburg was increased. 
Also uptm the following day, the (trand Duke of Mecklenburg- 
6cliwerin s Army Corps, the XilL, consisting of the I7th Infantry 


Division, and von Selchow's and von Gayrs Landwelir Divigions, 
which until now liad been concentrated on the Seille, arrived for 
the reinforcement of the Investing Army. 

This was now distributed as follows (v. the map "Investment 
of Metz, on the 3rd of September 1870"): 

Tlic First Army, with the Grand Duke*s Army Corps, held the 
right, the Second Army the left bank of the Moselle ; and Kummcr's 
Division retained tlie positiim Malroy — Cliarly, which it had 
hitherto occupied, but later changed to the neighbouring position 
on the left bank; the 1. Army Corps joined on to its left flank, 
and extended its own left wing until it commanded the Saar- 
brttcken road. Then, the space from this road to Pouilly, was 
occupied by the Grand Duke. The VII. Army Corps stood upon 
b(»th banks of the Moselle to the south of Metz, and had detached 
Woyna's Brigade to the Seille, in order to hold the passage across 
this river. The country between this Corps and the Grand Duke's 
was occupied by Count Grdben's Cavalry Division, whoso line of 
out-posts was pushed forward as far as the Chateau Frescaty. 

Upon the left bank, the VIII. Army Corps occupied the space 
from .lusHv to Chatel, keeping, however, its Artillery Corps and 
one Infantry Division in reserve, so that it could be immediately, 
detached to the Moselle valley, for the relief of the VLL Army 
Corps, which in the event of Bazaine*s attempting a sortie to the 
south-east^ would move back on the Seille. The III. Army Corps 
stoiHl further towards the north , from Chatel to Saulny, and the 
X. Army Corps was in the valley of the M(»selle, to the north of 
Metz, and upon the heights of Saulny as far as Marange. At this 
point, Baza i lie's natural line of retreat t4) the interior <if France, 
the IX. Army Ci>rps stood in reserve, from R^mcourt to Pierre- 
villers, with its head-quarters in Montois. 

In addition to this, llartm:inn s Cavalry Division was detached 
towards the neighbimrhood of Jouaville, tor the purpose of observ- 
ing the tract rit' country from Ij<»nguyon to Etain, and securing 
the lines of communicati<m of the Meuse Army against the rmidt, 
which were attempted by the French from Verdun. 

The head-quarters of the Army, remained, proviBionally, in 


Bfulanciiiurty bit tooa after, m the 9th of Saptradieri tbBj wws 
removed to Conj. 

On the 2iid of SeptembeTy the news of the kettle of 8edn 
BpreHd throegh the OermMi Armyy end tiinnderiiig ihoili of Jej 
bore the tidfaigi to the French cemp. 

The eheaeee of eaoceM now left to the liardud for e breek- 
tliroughy were extremely smell. In the first place the ivrestfaif 
army wan stronger , and veiy jndicioosly distribated; it had 
made aware ol the weakness of its former positions ia 
particular, and was exalted by the feeling of having gained a 
victory under nn&vourable dreumstaaces; then on the otiier skh^ 
the battle of Noisseville had prodnoed a deplorable moml eoa- 
dition in the French army. Mistrust in their leaden and ia their 
(»wn powers gained possession, more and more, of the miada of 
the oflioers and soldiers, who were always oonqnered* 

The belief, that Mets might have been left on the 81st ef 
August, spread universally, and, everywhere, Marshal Batihrfb 
generalship and coigectured views were most severely eritieisedL 

jJnd in fact the conduct of the Marshal roused the eoa- 
jpcturey that he wished to acty not only as a General hui 
also as a Statesman; that he wished, independently , to make 
military action accord with political events; that he even 
believed^ he could pursue his own ambitious views and at ike 
same time the interests of France. The temptation, of playing 
an important political n>le in tlie genenil overthrow of existing 
afiaira, when at the liead of the largest military body which 
France poHBCHDed, no doubt came home t4i an ambitioutt Bonapartist 

When i^azaiue dlrectiMl the break-throu{?h on the 3()th of 
Augiirtt, he Icnew that Mae Mahon*8 army waii on the marcli. He 
very probably lH»ped to beat Prince Frederick Charles in co- 
operation witli Mae Mahon, but it could rt<*areely have been hiit 
plan to undertake the hazardouH venture, by himM^if alone. Even 
alter a rtueeeHMlul break-through , if he liad been followed by the 
whole (»f the Frince'H Army, whiUt Mac Mahon might also, have 
be(*n overcome on hi» nide, not only his own plans would have 
come t4) an end, but the army also. Consequently he did not 


hasten the attack, always expecting to hear the thunder of the 
cannon of the Chalons Army, from the north-west. Then, when 
the attack upon tlie investing Army had been developed, and there 
appeared to be a very good chance of effecting a break-through, 
he decided, notwithstanding the advantage gained, to go no further, 
but to content himself with holding wiiat he had got, because, on 
this day, nothing could be discovered of the Army of Chalons, 
but perhaps on the following day he might reckon on Mac Mahon*s 

When, however, on the Ist of September still no trace could 
be seen of the expected army of relief, Bazaine willingly re- 
conciled himself to the necessity of remaining in Metz. He had 
satisfied his military duty by attempting to break through ; as the 
second condition , the help promised by the Emperor had failed, 
his remaining in Metz was wiser in every respect, and also in 
regard to his (»wn ambitious plans. Probably Mac Mahon was 
conquered, he, Bazaine, was the commander of the only army 
which France possessed, the Emperor had be<*ome an impossibility, 
France must now conclude peace, and Metz was the pivot round 
which the peace negotiations turned. 

Tiius the Marshal might have calenlated. 

That he calculated fnUelyy is learnt by a succession of 
great events whicii deveh^ped themselves, in a manner unexpected 
by all the world. 

When the war was prolonged beyond all reckoning, when the 
army of Metz was in want of the necessary means of existence, 
Bazaine fell from his commanding situation, into one in which he 
was completely govenied. He was obliged to submit, very much 
against his will, to the plain military laws of war, altliough, even 
at the hist moment, fourteen days before the capitulation, he 
endeavoured to open political negotiations, and t4) give political 
importance t4i his position, by sending General Boyer to the German 

The military operations at .Metz, which were still attempted 
by the French after the battle of Noisseville, are of subordinate 
importance*. They were confined to skirmishes with the enemy, 
and S4»nie forties on a larger scale, for the purpose of occnpying 


the Armj, tad aoiiiifiBg tmall adYwitagM for tt^ oat p ii i peri* 
tions, M wall m of ea|rtiiriiig proTiiions. No attoHpt wat agafai 
t4» bretk throiiglu 

The MOft fanpcMrteaty and at the tame time the laat 
takings of tUa kind, were the attacks apon the poaitioa of Kmm^ 
mer's Diwkkm on the 2iid and 7th of Oetober. 

On the firat named day the sortie was directed agaiaat I*- 
donchampBy Sle. Agathe, St Remy ind Bellevne. The 
were driven from their most advanced linci from Ladonehampa 
8te. Agathe, but held the fortifled se< ond line, and* in the ftnfher 
progress of the fight completely re] Bed the Frenek 

Oermaa loss: 6 officers and 109 men Ulled and wonaiai. 

On the 7th of October, the French made an offensive maiwin 
on an extended scale. Towards 2 o'cIocIl in the aftemoosy €■ 
tlie left bank of the Moselle, French infantry eolnmns wtth two or 
three batteries were directed against Bellevoe, 8t Reasy, Gmnto- 
Tapes and Petites-Tapes, and threw back the advanced poils ef 
Knmmor*s Division, from all their stations/ after an obattaaia 

General von VoigtitRhetz sent the 38th Infantry Brigade to 
their support; (tcneral von Alveusleben 11. dispatched tlie 9th 
Infantry Brigade towards tlie wood of Woippy. 

This attac*k on tw<i sides caused the enemy to retire, and it 
ended, at the ciMnmencement of dusk, with the re-capture of all 
the positions. 

But a demonstration had also been made by French troopa, 
on the right bank, against the line Malroy — Charly, and such 
numerous u)hh84*s of troops liad cnmo up a^inst the 1. Army 
('Orps at Villers TOrme, that General von Maiitfuffvl soundi^d the 
alarm for liis whole Torps, and made* them move iiit4) |>osition ; 
the VII. Corps w:is, also, dophtyed, and the Priiin* ('omiuander In 
Chief made arrangements for tlit* support (»f the 1. Corps by detach- 
ments of the X. Army Corps. 

The fight in front of the 1. Army Corps had, at first, tlie 
character 4)f a demonstration, and ended in a hot tirailleur fight 
u|Mm the line Villers-rOrme - Ni»uilly. 

Nt» attack was made against the line Malroy-- ('harly. 


At 6.30 o'clock p.m., the fight on the right bank of the 
Moeelle was silent. 

The loss on the German side, in killed and wounded, amounted 
to 65 officers, and 1665 men, and chiefly affected the Landwehr, 
as Hummer's Division had been most severely engaged. 

The situation of the enclosed army, under the twofold in- 
fluence t)t moral and pliysical sufi^ering, became more deplorable 
every day. The months of September and October brought a 
great many days of rain, and made the bivouacs <iutside the town, 
in which the whole ma^s of troops was distributed, between and 
outside the Forts, comfortless and unhealthy. Tlie scarcity (»f the 
necessaries of life was detrimental in a still higher degree ; it was 
always becoming m(»re palpable, and from its m(motony engendered 
disease. Horseflesh had been almost the only food, besides bread, 
during the greater part of the time the investment lasted. The 
bread was given out daily in rationrt of 5(K) grammes , and in 
the beginning of October, in rations of even 3()0 and 250 grammes, 
only. The number on the sick list increased daily. 

The (iernian Army also suff'ered extremely from remaining 
stationary so long upon great battle fields, in wet weather. The 
sick list was extraordinarily great, and in many divisions amounted 
to 50 per cent. 

In order to hasten the capitulation, the project was, at one 
time, proposed, of advancing against Queulen from the heights to 
the S4iutli and east of this fort, and for this object 40 rifled 
12-pounder siege guns were brought up. The plan was, h(»we^er, 
given up, and the guns were distributed round the fortress, to act 
against p«)S8ible sorties. It was then determined to dam the 
Moselle, and cause an inundation which would make it impossible 
for the French to encamp in the valley. The army was <K*cupied 
until the end tif the investment, in constructing a great number of 
fascines for this purpose. The capitulation, however, commenced 
bef«»re the plan couW be carried out 

From the 1 Itli of August until the 7th of October, the French 
Army had lost in killed, w<iunded and missing, witli<iut reckoning 
the sick, 25 generals, 2099 officers of all ranks and 40,339 non- 
comniissioutMl olficers and soldiers. 

easily invented. It ilepended only, npou cuttliiK -itf Uu* 
front. Ah for die reat, tbe wide i-xtenl nf Hrtiliniiii iniini 
fonned a« miii^li an inveMUneiit for tlio b«»iegcd, m a itrotection 
againBt Wtv bcHiegerH. The investmeut wan all the eauier, as utilli- 
log wax iin<lertMl«^i] from i^triiMbiit:^ (■' liimW thi^ t-iK^my'ii iKtcnpa- 
tiuD of lii);li p'>int» Hnd pwitiiniM lying near. Tlno nef^lt^l on the 
part of tim defeiiC'C, ia HufScieatly oiplaiued by iht- defective utalJ- 
of the K*'"''!"""' TliB t'urjw whii-li firnenil Vhrirh tintted ondfr 
his commnnd in tin;) fottreM, Mnrng in uiimbrrM thr-ugh it waa, 
could 'iiily pniduoi' very few »ervii-i'Hble ulruieiiUi, Refiin* the 
battle of W<>erth, lhi> really ciipablc triiKp* in llir gnrrinon eim- 
fliBted •>]ily of two bntuliono of Artillery, »ite battalion of ]>outi»>n 
train, two !U|u»drnnH of cavalry, aud the marine trnopx of Ike 
Rhine flotilla. I'ioiiL'era ^ti-re rj>mpletely wantinp:, and tlieoe ftimld 
have bi'i'ii juot of thi- tnoi't importance. The rest »f the garrisoti 
cuuaiat'd of newly formed battalioun of tlie Line tiiid Unrdf^ 
biles, aliniit lo.tKMi men, upon wliom Oeneral Uhiich tantH 
■tufficieiitly depend for the difhcult operation of occupytng nd 
fending ttie ground iti front. 

Niitiirally iiUo, a tliomnghly good elemtml, luid not bem? 
tiuppli^l to him in the line troopa of the Army heutcn at Wocrtli. 
Half of tlieni vonniHted "f men, btdunKinj; to every variety 
regiment, demoralized by defeat; on the otlier hand, 
ing half, the 67th Regiment of the Line, nnder oommaBl of 
Colonel Blot, was a very valuable accession. Tlua regiBWM, 
whilst marching through to join Mac Mahun's Corps, on the 6tli of 
Aognet, had been commanded by the Haraliat to remain )■ the 
fortress . 

* About 7IMX) men i)f the Garilr Maliojiale tfdfntaire , of 
Slrasburg, made up the numerical strength of the garrison, by de- 
grees, to about 2f>,(MXI men; there were very few ofhcers, and 
only five engineer officers in the town. 

StrasLurg was provided with guns In very great number. 
Beiiides the filHl gims belonging to tlie equipment of the fortre«, 
there was tlie xiege train destined f»r the German fortresrtea, ao 
that the number of gnus amounted to about 12U0. The serving 
troops necessary for the defence were sufficient: with the pontoon 

ffth. ^ 


train and marines of the Rhine flotilla there were about 3000 
artillerymen in the place. 

ThuHy no hindrance on the part of the French waa placed 
in tlie way, of the graidual, close surrt>unding by the Siege CNirps, 
although at the commencement, until the 13th and 14th of Augoat, 
this only cimsisted of the Baden Division, and consequently was 
not HO strong as the garrison. From this time additional detach- 
ments, certainly, arrived successively: the 7th Reser\'e and (iarde 
Landwehr Division, 37 c*ompauies of Siege Artillery, a Prus- 
sian pioneer battalion and a Bavarian pioneer company, so that 
alt4»gether, the strength of the Stf*ge Corps rose U) abiive 5(),()0() 

(tfneral von Werderj in entering upon his command on the 
14th of August, found himself immediately <»pposite the outworks 
of tin* fortress itself, and accordingly, able t<» proceed at once to 
the attack , without a long detention at st-irting, by having to 
conquer the surrounding villages or earthworks raised on the 
extenor. The only question was , what manner of attsick it 
sliouhl be. 

The garris<»u of Strasburg was as little fitted for an intelli- 
gent and dc*voted defence, as the fortress was prepared for siege 
in a fortifieatioii point of view. The chief strength of the fortress 
lay in the inundations, which made an attack impossible, except on 
the nortii-west front ; on this side als4i, water was a main hindrance 
Ui the assailants, as several wet ditches had to be overcome. 
In other respects, however, the works offered no unusual difficultieB, 
though, at the same time, they certainly presented, throughout, 
nu particular weakness. 

The revetments are from 24' to 30' in height, 5' thick At 
the top, 12' at the Ixittiim, with IK' buttreases. In order to 
increase the capability <»f resistance of the masonry tlius formed, 
all the important lines are pn»vided with convrefacc*s aud counter- 
guards. The command of the diflferent linea of f4»rti(icati(»n is ver>' 
trifling, Basti<Mi 12, liavelin 50 and Lunette 52 have nearly tlie 
same height <if rampart. The dit<*hes of the fortress, which thruuf^i- 
out arc wet, have revetted escarps, and upiiu the north-west fhint 
the counttM*<^carp of the main ditch is als4» revett4*d. In the year 


18G7y Strasbnrg was provided with tmveneB, mi NapplaoB had 

ordered the fortreM to be put in order. 

The defence was very badly cirenmstaneed, in regard to all 
ineaHures of preparation, by the sodden outbreak of the war; it 
was without its proper truops through the laclc of foresight oa the 
part of the French Oovemment, and only scantily supplied wtth 
ammunition and (»ther material , but superabundantly with gnas ia 
respect to numbers. Very little had been done towards streagthening 
the works, and the security of the garrison by means of bonb proof 
cover, and through its inactivity dnring the first, important, period 
of the investment had imbued the besiegers with a low, bat 
quite correct, opiniim of the capability of the defence. 

Upon due consideration of the worth of the garrison, as well 
as of the nature of the works, no doubt could exist, in a milltaiy 
point of view, upon the kind of attack. 

Strasburg^ from a military point of view\ imHioi m 

The besiegers duty was to force the fortress tr> capitulate, as 
quickly as possible, witli the greatest savin<r of their own tn»ops, 
and they could count upon a bombardment completely demoralising 
the garrison , and moving the citizens to exert an influence upon 
the ctMumandant ft»r tlie purpose of a surrender. That this seci^nd 
element, the influence of the citizens, was rightly taken into con- 
sideration yi\\}iiri fr<»m frequent experience), is clear from a proclama- 
tion of the c<»nimandant, Uhricli, and the prefect, Ilartm Prtm, ttateJ 
the iOth of August which says: 

"To the inhabitants of Stnislnng. Disquieting and terrifying 
rumonrs, have been spread during the last few days, unintentionally 
4ir by design, in our hrav«* city. Some individuals have dared ti» 
entertain the idea that the place would surrender without striking 
a blow. We prot(*st energetically, iu the name of the counigeoiis 
French population, against this cowardly and criminal pusillanimity. 
The ramparts are armed with 4(H) cannon. The garrison is com- 
pt»sed <»f in^O(M) men, witlnuit counting the ijartip nationals jrr- 
(Irntairc, If Stnishurg is attacked, Sti'asburg will defend herself 
as IdUg as a solditT, a biscuit, or n caiiridge renmins. The gmid 


may re-assure themselves; as for the others, iliey have only to 
go away." 

This proclamation c(mfirms the fact that a smaller or larger 
party were disposed to surrender, even before a shot had fallen, 
and indirectly characterises this faction as Germany by contrasting 
it with the courageous French. 

As the necessar>' gunn were n<»t, at first, on the spot, for a 
heavy and surrounding bombardment, tiic cannonade was began 
with Held guns, and directe<l for the most part against the works 
of the fortress, in order to disturb the preparations for defence, 
which were only now c<immenced, after and during the investment. 
The garrison <mly began, on the 8th of August, t<» clear the 
ground in fnmt, to place the fortiflc^itions in a state of defence 
against a powerful attack ^armement de si!trete\ and in set ab<iut 
other works in the linoH. These works, instead of being the 
erection of bombpnmf cover and the c<»nHtracti<m of traverses etc., 
ctmsinted, solely, in placing palisades in the c(»vered way ; a super- 
fluous measure. 

TKe fire of the (lerman field guns, which was directed against 
these preparations, also reached the town in places, and wtmnded 
and killed some <if the inhabitants. The preparati<ms for the 
defence of the fortress wen; considerably hindered, whilst the 
damage tt» the t4»wn was comparatively small. 

On tiie IfUh of August the first S4»rtie was made, on the part 
of the garrison; it was very unfortunately conducted, the troops 
returned with the toss of 3 guns, 70 killed and wounded, amongst 
these a colonel of ptmtoons; they also lost S4»me prisoners. On 
the IHth of .August the German siege guns first opened fire, 
it was directed from the batteries erected at Kehl by the Baden 
Artillery, against the cit^idel and the military buildings on the 
esplanade, and^ then^forey was not as yet the bofnbardment of 
Ihii town. Nevertheless (ileneral Uhrich replied to this firCi by 
firing upon the (»p4Mi town of Kehl^ which was an unnecessary 
barbarity as well as a great folly, because, if the town of 8iras- 
burg was now bombarded, the besiegers would only be making 
reprisal^, and this they were formally challenged to do. 

in the meanwhile, the Prussian siege train wai gradually 

ami i*mm 

dnwiiig next, la tli« night of the 2!)rd of Angnat, 13 boBiM 
batteiit'-^ tN«8. 1 bi W) wtrc hIiU- t<> he rruftcd in tlie l!pe K*Ri 
boffeD - Ane, from IMJii t" I^Ud pacpH frum the- enfeinlr, 
were riiuipiW with itloMit I<>l> k"""- Tlttwe chiimUW, 
some n'lji'iiinil iii(irtni>, i>f rilled U'l-poaiKJeri;. 

On fhe fvenfnii of the iilh t/if firing upon thp 
eommmi-ed, and was eoutino^i/, vi'lh tirrft-al mlnrrti/tliOHM, j 
three ilayt. 

'I'hu doetructifin in the town was runaidcrablc ; many privnie 
hoiiBfit*, beHideH [mblic buildiuRH, were Ki^nlly duiiaKcd, i\i iuhibi- 
tuts, int'luiling Vi womt-n And ihildreu, wtru killed, uid a far 
larger numbi-r, about 1&<), wcro wxiukIckL 

The MiUDmouH to KorruDder was refiued by (icneml (JhrHtiL 

Thf hombardmeul of ike lomt tvmt stopped, wmJ 
regular sJrge heijan. 

'I'lie rcaaoDA Tur tliis change were, however, not nf a i 

XVith X reiDrorrcmeitt of th« canoiinadc by mortar batterioa in 
snrroniiding positiuoH, it wm nutidpnt«d thnt tiie rujiitiilatiorf wmilH 
follow :illi-r n nhiirl time. At \v*»l, i!\^vi\vini:v \\m prm-fd the 
efficacy >'i this mmns with t«x|vB other l'>ench tiirtrcflMe<» TonI, 
SoiaeoiiH, Verdun, SchlettHtadl, Ncii-Bi-eiaacli «illi i\iii MiKrtbv, 
ThioDvill.', Lim^Kv, MnriliiK-dy. l/i \\t<; M.-xiin-H »n.l IVronnr, 
which «iir :ill iiiken by hi.riibardiiiciit. During tiin wh-lr »nr, 
Paris excepted, the bombardment with siege guns has never fiU«t 
in its object of causing a Burrender. 

Straabai^ waa spared od political grounds. 

Strasburg, with itn renowned cathedral, and so many reminia- 
renres dear h) (icnnany, ito long a favourite rhild of the Geraian 
nation, became, after tlie firi«t victorious biittle^i in France, the 
ardently longed for, and eagerly demanded, object of universal de- 
sire. Strasburg must again become a German town. . 

On thin account the first shotit which fell in the town, «x> 
cited sympathy and indignation in Urrmany; one of tlie moat p» 
pnlar German authors gave eipression to his pain in tellnif 
language ; throngti the whole country the qnestion was heard : *% 
this then necessary?" Fablic opinion demanded the oeasatioB of 


the bombardmeDty with the game force with which, at a later pe- 
riody it required the bombardment of Pann, whilst the bombardment 
of less iuteresting fortressen passed by unnoticed. 

But the German Army Direction itself, had also decided 
with reluctance upon tlie militarily prescribed bombardment; 
for Stnisburg was to revert to the German empire. It was 
therefore given up as soon as the first terror had proved to be 

The German Army Directicm was already in such a favourable 
position, that it could allow itself to guide the war in a luxurious 
manner, on some points. It therefore took into account public 
opinion and its own winhes, and began the regular siege. It is a 
question whether the population really suflfered less from this, than 
they would have done from the bombardment, had it been con- 
tinued. It is probable that the smaller but constantly repeated 
losses during the long peri(»d up to the 27th of September, came 
altogether to a larger sum, than the greater, though transitory 
damages which would have been produced, had the bombardment 
been continued. The injuries to numercms civilians during the 
regular siege, were owing to several shot flying, unintentionally, 
over the rampart and falling in the town ; this was especially apt 
to be the case at night, when the exact aim could not be seen, 
and the artillerymen had chiefly to be guided by the laying of 
the i;uns. The sum-t<»tal of the losses sustained by the civil 
population is reckoned at 2Bi killed, and 110<> wounded; very 
heavy in comparison with the losses during the days of the 

It is, howerer, possible that greater conflagrations caused by 
a prolcm^cfl bombardment, would have quickly raised the losses 
c<msiderably , and increased the iiyury to the town. Thus there 
is always reason to suppose, that Strasburg was in reality spared. 

The tire of the French garrison had been unable to attain 
any hucccsh against the German batteries, and no fresh sortie waa 
attempted; after the bombardment ceased, no steps were taken to 
diHcovor the further intentions of the besiegers, no reoonnaissanees 
wore made, nc»r were electric lights tamed upon tlie works of the 
(verroans at night. They consequently succeeded in the night of 


the 29th of AngMl^ qoHe nndittorbed mi a a olwer ra iy 

Me firsi imrmllel, at a diataaee of from 700 to 800 

the outemioat glads , ander a Yigorons fire againafc Ihi 

It extended from the iBudatioii oa the left, to Kdnlftihnlw 

the right y waa half a Gennan mile (2*/i« Bngliih) ia 

4' deep, and was fhraishedy the same nighty with 10 aew 

lying behind it (Noe. 14, 16, 16, 17, 19, 20, 21, 22, 28| U^ 

46 rifled 12-ponnderB). At the same time, the eeotre aad 

muuicatlons were completed, by which a covered 

overlooked from the fortress, was established with tta 

in rear. ... 

On the following morning the garrison saw the gigsMtio w|t 
with surprise and temnr. 

The attack was, conseqoently, directed against the Forte is 
Pierretf front. • 

What reasons the German Head-Qnarters had fiar 
against this more difificolt front, rather than against the Porte 
nalc front, which is not covered by Innettes l3ring b^iora 1^ li 
unknown. It was learnt at a later period, that the FredUi had 
expected an attack upon the latter front, and, it was more strongly 
equipped with guuA and provided with a complete system of mines. 
It is possible tliat this was known on the German side. 

To oppose the fire of the besiegers, now strengthened by 
46 new guns, the fire of the garrison was only augmented on the 
night of the Bint of August, and on the following morning, it eer- 
taiuly obtained some advantages. But during the night the be- 
8ioger8 had again erected two fresh batteries, Nos. 26 and 28, 
and towards evening gained a decided superiority. Several French 
guns and many embrai^urcH were di8moiint4Hi. 

The superiority of the quality of the i^ssian artillery, both 
in mat4'rial and troopn, wari clearly hIiowu. 

On the night of the Int of September, zig-zags had been 
purihed forward, by roeann of tiying nap, from the Irtt parallel at 
two points, and the 2nd parallel hml been traced. The garrison, 
on the other hand, undertook two ri4)rties, directi*d against the 
railroad buildings and the island of Waaken. lk>th were repulsed 
after some fighting. The works were carried on also in the 


day-time^ but led to a misfortune. The Prussian engineer officers. 
Lieutenant Colonel von Gayl and Captain Hertsberg, who were 
conducting their men in the prolongation of an approach against 
the fortress, which had been erroneously traced in tlie night, came 
within range of the enemy'ri fire and were killed, together with 
several of the working party. In consequence of this the works 
were stopped during the day-time. 

From this time the garrison continued their sorties, for the 
most part, (*ertainly, with small forces. Their most important 
undertaking, was Colonel Blot's attack on the night (»f the 2nd of 
September. He directed it against the right wing of the attack, 
croeseil both parallels and came up to within 30 paces of the 
Prussian battery No. 4; here, luiwever, he was repulsed. 

In addition to hindrances of this sort on the part of the 
garrison, there was also very unfavourable weather; it rained al- 
most incessantly, so that the trenches were full of water. 

It wan only on the night of the 5th of September that the 
construction of the 2nd parallel was completely finished. Its length 
was 23(K) paces, width 12', depth from 4' to 5'. 

The cannon fight meanwhile, continued. On the (terman side, 
fn»m the :\rd to the Mh, the batteries 16a, 17a, 19a and 21a 
(taking the place of the batteries 16, 17, 19 and 21) and 
the dismounting batteries 29, 30 and 33, were erected. The 
mortar fire ui)on the works 4if the fortress was alsi> increaaed at 
the rtame time, by erecting the batteries 31 and 32, each for 
4 5opound inortiirs, and 3 emplacements each for 4 7pound mortars, 
indirated as batteries 34, 36 and 37. On tlic 3rd of September, 
two, ((uit<* new descriptions of guns, were added to the siege park, 
short rifled 24 -pounders and rifled 72pound mortars (21 centimetre), 
fn>m which lunette 44, which disturbed the siege works by a 
flanking Hre, was bombarded ^batteries 5 and 35). 

The Haden artillery at the same time, bombarded the citadel 
from Kehl, with 16 rifled 24-pounders, and 16 rifled 12-poaudcrB, 
as well as 12 25pound and 6<^>und mortars. 

Altogether l.')2 guns, including 52 mortars, were brought hito 
acti(»n against the citadel and the Porte de Pierres front be- 
fore the 0th of September, and on this day the fir« attained 


such F I kMig btfnUei 

show aay n . Chi tke olh« kal'lii 

garriiion I an ar fire npoo tta keri^fH% 

from tSy wUeby eonMaad vWi te 

fire from men*^ lumy a Tietim. The 

works, howe^ eo wifh gi atoft dreamqieettdiy hf 

skilful officers y and exe d by i nfooB and coora g eai #wp% 
progr ed wl idity. » 

In 1 it the 10 of ember, the approaAMito 
3rd pi J and the 3 rallel itself were e oaeUn tei 

the con sap, i in 1 rallel, 7poiind moftan 

mounted, 1 5( iind un (Noe. 45, M, 7a) 

even in fr< of ; d 6 en. 

The garrls' repU by rtar fire. 

In the n of 11 of i ember, the 3rd pandU 
completed; la i it of ) 13th, a half parallel wai 
out, which approaehed to within 40 paces of the edge of tba 

Mining operations, which were expected as soon as tta 
t4»uched the glacis, did not occur. To h certain extent, the 
inundation, which could not everywhere be appropriately made 
use of, may have been a hindrance ; on the whole, the blame lies 
with the passiveness of the garrison. £ven if miners were wanting, the 
French engineer ofHicers might still have managed some explosioas. 

But witliout auy such difficulties the rroirnmg of the glmeitf 
in ir<»Dt of the* lunettes 52 and 53, was accomplished on the 17th 
(»f September, after Captain Ledelxmr, of the Engineers, had diseo- 
vered and fired the mining system in front of lunette 53. 

With this the preparatory works came to an end, and the 
introduction to an assault could be. energi'ticnlly pntceeded with; 
that irt to say, the formation of a breach in Uie main nimpart, and 
a pr.MCticable road leading to the breach for the storming column. 

It is here worthv of remark that the breach was not made 
fr(»m the works crowning the glacin, as is the rule in siege opera- 
tions , but this result was obtained by indirect tire from the 2iid 

Battery No. H had aln^ady begun the breach, on the right 
face of lunette 53, on the 14th of September, and C4impleted it 


the day before tlie crowning of tlie glaciti. Battery No. 42, firing 
B short rifled 24-ponnder8 against baation No. 11, and battery 
No. 58, filing i guns of tlic »:\mc calibre against bastion No. 12, 
then laid open the breach in the main rampart by indirect firing 
at the distance <»f about 9<K) and KXK) paces. This breach 
was begun on the 2Hrd of September. The engineers, in the 
meanwhile, were actively engaged in forming the road to the breach, 
in which the ditches filled with water presented very considerable 

Possession (»f both the lunettes must first be obtained. 

Descents into the ditch were carried down to the water level 
from the crown-work. Tlie escarp wall of lunette No. 53 was 
brought down on the 2()th, to the width of 12', by a mine, and 
now the ditches of the lunette could be bridged (»ver by means 
of a dam, supp(»Hing they wore not defended. 

The bold attempt suc^.ee<Ied. The garrison had been driven 
out by the fearful artillery fire of the besiegers. The lunettes 
were given up by the French without fighting. 

Lunette 53 was approached by means of a dam leading through 
the ditchcK, and occupied ; the deeper ditches in front of lunette 52, 
were bridged over by thr engineers, with barrels and planks laid 
upcm them, \i\u\vr the direction of Captain Andrei!. 

Then, in the night of the 21st, a st<»rming column forced its 
way int4» this lunette also, with a loss, it is true, of 50 killed 
and wounded, caused by the enemy*s fire from the main rampart. 

From the lunettes thus gained, the sap could now be pushed 
forward up to the covered way of ravelin No. 50, and then along 
it , and at the same time the effect of the breaching batteries up^m 
bastions 11 and 12 could be advantageously observed. 

The ftrect of these was excellent. The batteries mentioned 
had been .lugmenUHl by three counter batteries, Nos. 51, 53 and 
54, <'rected in the crowning, and on the 27th of September the 
masonry of the right face of bastion No. 11 was brtinght down 
to a width of .30 pacen. 

In order to make the assault possible, it was n(»w only 
nee4»K8ary to bring down, by shot, that part of the earthen 
rampart, which still remained standing \U} make the breach oom- 

Iili-t«ly prMiti<!aU«), And U< rmitiilrtc Hh! ptuwign owr tlie Iwn wrot 
(lih^huN, Dpon tbia sldv unit thv Tiirtlicr side <if tlio ondniMod sad 
iiniK-ciipied cuiuitcr-guard. ^H 

'riu! (wroiitaiidHiit iif tkt> fvrlreMK, however, <li<l n<t1 wsH <t^M 
tlir iirelimifuu-y moKann-i' for thv HBiaalt hi be oDiuplctvil. ^| 

Ailer tbe drowning; had been acc4>mplidlind in front of the 
ciiuiiti-r-)[DKrd •>[ niveliii N'l. Ttl', uii tbi- itioniing of tbe 27tli uf 
^(iptniobiT, nnd uftcr the exiBtencc of a brexch in tlic main nun|iiu1 
\i:\<i been Gunfirmod, white Rn^tt nppenred upon the Calliedral 
Tiiwnr, and upon the attxcked wiirlu, nt A o'obiek, In Ibi; nfler 

This rapid san-enJer of the fartrest. immcdiatcl; aftar n 
brcaeji bad beon made, ubilat, Rtircly, tht> brewh itiieK might bave 
Imoii very obstinately iU-fende<1, givpa frenb pn-of, uf ttlwl h«4 
alrendy b«en indicated by the scarcity of nortiea, tbe Deglcrt of 
mining ojienUtiiuo niid utiier fanltH, tlint tbe ^nrriwin wan iutluildaied 
))y llie t-netEetii- maooM- of attack uf the besiegcin, and tvoi vtpo- 
cjnily disrounip'd by tbe superiority of tlie Prasaian artillery. 

A itilrcMt of tbo );nrriiM)ii to the lilaJel, whii-h (JeneralUlirleb 
lind spiikeu of nt tlie i-«inmeik)-euienl of (he *\egv, whk iinpuNMiblr, 
aa tile batteriea at Kehl had destroyed all the buiI(liDg« uf the 
t-it.idel, and |;riMtly injured the furtiAcatioiu. 

The «iege hud laiitvd 50 dny*, reekoning fruiu thti Kth of 
Aupuet, and the regular attnrk 31 diiys. The besieger* bronght 
iuto nrliou, in aiege ^uns, 4ti Iuiik rifled 'Jl-pounden, fj Hbort 
riflod 84-puDndcni, W riflvd 12-poundvra, 37 ftOpuiiiid and eopoutid 

*) Very diftetenl opiDioni have been axpresied, even by competent jadgaa, 
upun ihi* vapiluUtiun , an well u upon the who!c aiegc uf Slruburg. It U 
not surprising ihal in France . Ucneral Uhrirh ahouM have been mDcb ea- 
lollcd before he capilulaleil, and very hardly condemned nficr Strasburg had 
fallen, but witli su nmny divcrae judgments on the pari of othori, unc will do 
well to conaidcr tint, (he political point of view of the judge, and then alao, 
to remember that ■ siege ii alway* a favourable object for chlician aaJ 
counlcr ['riticitm. ll is ■ complicated process, in which always many itqa 
tniKhl have beeo dilTcrently carried out. 

On ihe whole, the aiege of tilraabur)- ran the course (hat was to bt 
expected. The well prepared, oxrcllvtidy ciinipped besiegers, flwhod wM 
rictory, made rapid progreas against the unprepared, ill-organiaed g 


mortarBy 24 25punnd mortArB^ 30 Tpound mortars^ 2 rifled (21 Cm.) 
mortars, and (ircd from them, altogetlier, 193,722 fihot and shell 
into the fortress. The total loss of the besiegers amounted to 
90G men, in killed and wounded, that of the garrison to aboot 
30fK) men. 

In tlie town about 400 houses were so much iiyured that 
they required rebuilding from the foundations. 

The tenor of the capitulation was as follows: 

"Lieutenant General von Werder, of the Royal Prussian Army, 
Commander of the Siege Corps before Strasburg, having been re- 
quested by Lieutenant General Uhrich, Governor of Strasburg, to 
cease hostilities against the fortress, has agreed with him U) con- 
clude the following capitulation, in cxiuHideration of the honourable 
and brave defence of the place: 

Art. I. At 8 oVlock, on the morning of the 28th of September 
1870, General Uhrich will evacuate the Citadel, the Porte d'Auster- 
lits, the l^orte des P6cheurs and the Porte Nationale. At the 
same time the (lerman troops will occupy thene points. 

Art. n. At 11 o\*lotk, on the same day, the French garrisim, 
including the (iardes Mobiles and the Gardes Nationaux, will vacate 
the foiiress by the Port<> Nationale, will form up between lunette 
44 and redoubt .*)7, and lay down their arms. 

Art. 111. Tlie troops of the Line and the (iardes M<d)iles 
become pris<mers of war, and will march off at once with their 

The Gardes Nationaux and Francs- Tireurs are frt^, under a 
written engagement, not to sene during the war, and must lay 
down their arms at the Mairie before 11 o'clock, a. m. The list 
of the officers of these tro4»ps will be given over to General von 
Werder at the same h<»ur. 

Art. IV. The officers and officials with the rank of officers, 
belonging to the French gairison of Strasburg, can depart to sncli 
residences as they may select, wiUxt they have given a written 
engagement , up<»n their word of honour. Those oflie^rs who 
refuse t4> sign this engagement, will go with the garrison t(» Ger- 
many, as prisoners of war. All the army snrgeons will eontinne 
their fnuetlMiis, until further orders. 


Art V. LiMrtaMiit « Ul eh 1 , <iiMl|jtti 

laying dowa of flie anns hai I j } , md 

military effect^ and all public )a etc, in the rqpdar 

through the ofleiala coneemedi to ) agents od this aide. 

The offieera and offieiab, who will be charged with Ada 
on each aide , will be at the Place Broglle hi Strasbnig at IS e^ekMk, 
noon, on the 28th etc etc. etc/' 

In conBeqnence of this capitulation, 17,111 mea a^ 451 
officers, abont 1200 gnns, 1843 horses, great tftotea of tlli^ 
p<»wder, prepared ammnnitioni and abont 10 millions of ftan ea, hi 
state money, fell into German hands with the fortress. 

The conqnest of the fortress waa ot great iSipnrtaMsa la 
the Germans. It was an impiNiing event, and dishearteifaig ksft 
for the Parisians, who liad already been inyeated abott 14 diga 
when they received the news of it, and were est off fnm aft 
intercourse with the rest of France, and alao for the haada if 
Francs-Tirenrs, who were wandering abont in the Voagaa. ' 

Fn>m Stranburg the conquoRt of the fortreBses 8chlettstadt| 
Nen-Breirtacli with Fort Mortier^ and Belibrt could be proceeded 
withy and, above all^ the whole of Upper Alsace could be subjected 
to the conqueror. 

Already tw<» days after the taking of Strasburg, three mobile 
cohimiiH, acting in concert under command of Major (teneral voa 
l>egenfeld went ofT^ for the purpose of clearing out and subjecting 
the Vo8ge«, which wen* strongly occupied by Franc8-Tirenra (v.. 
Chapter 12^ on the openitionH 4»f the rtouthern Armiei<\ and ai 
<»arly a** tin* iUh of October, Neu-Hreisach and St^hlettntadt were 

The conqueot 4)f tlu^He fortreiim^H was eiitniAted Ut the Aih 
Hesfrvt' DirUion (SchmfUntj\y which was ionncd at Freiburg in 
the Hreisg:in, in the beginning of Octnb(*r, and had crossed the 
Rhine at Neuenburg. The l)ivi^(ion firnt endeavoun*il to make 
MfU-Brfiaac/i surrcMider, by b<mihanling it with tield guns; tlie 
attempt, however, failed , and it continued the man*h to Schlett* 
8tadt, aAer the former fortrens had Uhmi in\e8ted. 


The siege train, for both places, was provided from Straa- 


Schlettstjidt, containing 11, 000 inhabitants, lies upon the left 
bank of tlie 111, which is navigable from Colniar, and by the side 
of which runs the upper Alsace railroad, the direct line of com- 
munication between Strasburg and Belfort. The place is favour- 
ably situated for defence, and is strengthened by inundations, 
which cover, especially, the east fnmt. All the ditches can be 
filled with water. The fortress has a high revetment, a great 
part of which is visible from afar, and a simple bastion tracing 
with several high cavaliers. The garris<m C4insisted of more than 
40<M> men, including the National Guard. 

General v(»n 8chmeling decided up<»n bombarding the fortress. 
He commenced the cannonade with siege guns (rifled 12-p<mnders), 
on the 1\H\\ of October. On this day howevtn*, only a single batter)' 
could be brought into action in front of Heidelsheim, fiir the rest 
of the sio^<* train had not yet arrived, and this bombardment was 
t4»o weak to produce any result 

In the nigiit of the 22nd of October he was able to open 
the l^t parallel, opposite the Colmar g*ate, at a distance of fh>m 
5<H) to 7o() paces, and to erect six batteries in it, which were 
equipped with H rifled 24 -pounders, 8 rifled 12-ponndeni, 
4 25pound mortars and 4 50pound mortars. 

The fortress vigorously returned the fire until noon on the 
following day; the fire from the ramparts then ceased, and began 
:igain in the afternoon, in an alterc*d form, as a mortir fire bi'hind 
the ramparts. 

Towards morning, however, after tlie 2nd parallel liad been 
laid during the night, the fortress capitulated with 2400 men (not 
including the (iarde Nati(»nale) and 120 guns. 

The KurrtMider was principally brought about, by the de- 
niorali/atiitii of the garrison pn»duced by the bombardment. Dis- 


eigiline i i 

Hrinatrh, i < Gen 


The town Hwlf had •nffered very little, fir tlii> hiliabiUato J 
liad gDuded thdr honsM well, uid tlie only bnilditipi wlticli wrre I 
destroyed wen tho§e eitiated on the front of tht- attiick, which I 
were mneh expoaed. 


Nen-BrebMsh, rimply % military firtnaa, vttti 
towers (rf defniee, and very pictnreeqnely ritnated, lia* il> twd | 
front roitinir upon the Rhone-Rhme tanal, lAliih itnsscD near tbt I 
tuwn. IV road panllel to the Rhine, ai wdl aa tlic \eM \m\\«it- \ 
taut one, whieb, cruasiag the BUne, leada ham AHitrcMAch 
Nen-Breiaaeh, ftvm whence it mns by Oolmar, thrdnji;!! titr Vub^ I 
t(> St. Di€, fire, the one u well aa the oilier, comiiiiinilfij ti> Uic 
fire friim the riirtri.>ae at the point where they rruut tliu ICbuuu- 
Rliiue canal. 

The fortress lies in an open plain near the Rhine; Dm 
(IctAi-lietl Fort .Murtier, a ()iiarter-or-an-h(Hir'e walk from the abate 
rampart of the Alt-Breiaach n>ad, is nniler the same nmimand a* 
the fiirtrces. 

The griinnd tracing of Ncn-BrciBacli, represents a r^nlar 
octagitn ; behind the rasemnted barttionH are hif^h tnwer redanb^ 
in front uf llioin i-iitworkti, Itim'tlcH .iiid denii-lunuit. The ditdiea 
an- Hlleil with water. itesiJipM tlitnx-, there wen* iiiimomns plao* 
itf nnificiHl (-over, "f advniitage to the garrisun. 

(ieneral von SehmfHttij hv^tm the invcKlment , as already 
lui'iiiiom-d, 111! the tltli »r (Mober, iiml on tlir 3ikI of November 
ojH-iiod tire njioii huth jiortioiiK of the fDrlrem. Against Nen- 
iln-isach, tliR-e hattcriM w<t<' creotod, st IlicMheiiii and Wolf- 
^iitxrn; iigiiiiwt Flirt Morticr, thn-c Imttcriiii at Alt-Breisacb. 
These wen- armed with H nlmrt rifli-d 'J-l-poiiiidprs, 4 21ceutimMtt 
mortnnt and 4 loiifr 24-|Kiiuidi'rN, takvii from Ote Frenrh. 


Fort Mortier capitulated in consequence of the bombardment, 
on the night of the 6th of November, with 220 men and 5 guns; 
the excellent cover places of the fortress, however, stood the gar- 
rison in such good stead, that they held out against the bombard- 
ment, f(»r nine days without capitulating, although, with the ex- 
ception of a few buildings, the town was completely destroyed by 
this long continued cannonade. 

Indeed the besiegers, doubting the success of the bombard- 
ment, intended to proceed to a regular siege, when, on the 10th 
of November, the capitulation ensued, in consequence of a mutiny 
of the Gardes Mobiles, which made it impossible for the com- 
mandant to continue the defence. 5000 men, and 100 officers 
became prisoners of war, and 100 guns were taken. 

The fortress of Belfort in the most southern part of Ahiaee, 
required a long continued siege, and the fighting round this place 
was closely connected with great operations in the field, (v. 
Chapter IJ.) 

Excepting Belfort, and Bitsch (which never fell at all), the 
last fortified place in Alsace passed into German hands with the 
capitulation (»f Neu-Breisach. 

In the adjoining Lorraine^ the places now in question were 
Pfalzburg and Thionvillej belonging to that part which was to 
be won back again; 21s well as Touly which was very important 
from being a bar to the only direct railroad to Fans; l^erdun^ 
ot great consequence as a point of support to the enemy's nnder- 
takinpt, and Lonyiry and MoHtmedjfy places which certainly were 
of le^s importance, but still could not remain disregarded, as they 
weie centres for tlie resistance of the enemy, in the midst of the 
German lines n( communication. 




The UI. i had mlmdy wne in eoatact with /jmUtm^ 
wheu n on the 8th of Aagmt, and on tht 14tfc il 

wa8 h whole of the artillery eorpt of tho YL 

Army Cor , with 60 Id gnn«. 

The 8 : o isisted !■ its porition wpom 

high rocky hilU. 1 » < Bmall, nnnberinf 8700 i»> 

habitanUy and waa gar o a battalion of the 68id lias 

Regiment, 100 ) : n, a 1 talion of the Oarde lloUI% 

and 6(K) men, o seat d Tnreoay Zonavea and otter 


As was always the case in the eonrse of the war, the horn- 
bardment of the works of the fortress with field gnns p rod nc ei 
no renult 

A eonsiderable fire was ignited in the town, filfy-i 
buildings were destroyed , hot the eommandanty Mi^ 
refused the Bummtms ti) snrremler, sent t4> him on the 15th of 

From the 16th therefore, only two battalioDS of the Line 
remained behind for the investment, and frc»ro the 19th, three 
I^ndwelir battalions from the Thuringian Regiments 31 and 71. 

This WAS a very difficult operation, for the country round the 
fortreKH can be but little surveyed, and in many parts is deeply 
intersected, so that the line of investment had to be extended to 5 or 
G hours (from IH to 2*2 English miles^ in length, and consequently 
a lar^i* number of outposts was neceKsary. Added to which, the 
^rarrJKon carried on a very energetic i)etty warfare. 

In consequence of two r<»nipanies being onlen*d away, aiid 
numbers falling sick from the fatipies of outpoKt duty, the 
^trenJ:th of the in\('stin;: Corps until October was n*duced t4» 17<MI 
men: bnt from the 20th t»f OctobiT it wns a;;:ain somewhat increased 
bv rfinfonM'iiieiits in eavalrv. 

On the iMtli of Aupist, the garrison made a strong sortie, 
whieh was vrry well iwiTuti'd. Abont Mon men advanced in 
echellon , with great rapidity against the village Tnter- Kicheu- 


Haracken, then anddeiily closing together, took the village and 
threw back the German out posts. As S(»ou as the investing troops 
were concentrated and brought np, the French moved back under 
cover of the gims of their fortress. Similar sorties were made by 
the garrison, on the 25th of August, against Mittelbronu, and 
again cm the 27th of August, against Unter-Eiehen-Baracken. 

The situation of the investing troops was expensed to danger, 
and did not change for the better until reinforced by the arrival 
uf a 4 -pounder field battery from the Strasburg siege corps. 

On the 14th of September the garrison made a sortie against 
Hilchelberg, which was very successfully repulsed. 

Until Strasburg had been taken, however, strong bands of 
Francrt-tireurs filled the c^mntry round Ltttzelburg, so that measures 
for security had to be* considerably increased, even in rear of tlie 
cantonment, and the powers of the men were strained to the 

This conditiim improved from the beginning of October, when 
the Franc«-tireurs departed t4» the south; a serious attack upon 
the fortress could not, however, be attempted. 

Neither the regular siege nor the bombardment had a pn>spect 
of succrss, for the nature of the ground rendered the formation 
of covered approaches very difficult, and thr rocky structure of 
the lofty fortifications offered too powerful a resistance to the 
shot. Besid<'s which, the phu*e was not of sufficient value t4i 
justify the toil and sacrifice of a strong attack, in order to gain 
possesriion of it. 

rpon one occasion, the 24th of November, a short Inuubard- 
ment from H(*ld gnus, was opened at 10.3<) o'chick p.m., t4> make 
reprisals for the frequent fire of the garriscMi upon single posts 
and patrols; but otherwise, the investment only was carried out 
with the object of subduing the place by starvation. 

These means gained the object. 

On tiie 30th of November parlementaires appeared fn»m the 
fortress, who tendered the capitulation, bnt also refpiinnl the frtM* 
departure of the garri8<»n. 

The offer was refused by Major ron Uietey commander of 
the investing troops. 


The eomwaiHlOTt of fhe fo r td W 

away the Gardlei llobilea in bodies as d «, 1 le triflk 


Then, iully, on the 12th of Deeembery at 3 o'doA f.m^ 
Major Tmttmii oflbred to aarrender at diaeretion. ^ 

On the 14th of Deeembery the oeoopatioii of the foit w ly 
(lennan troops easaed, 62 ofBeera and 1838 men beeamo firisoseim 
of war, and 66 gnna were taken. All these gnns had beea pre- 
viously spiked by the garrisoni all he powder and wmnaMffm 
stores destroyed I and 12,000 rifl brokea. No reproneh eaa, 
however, be made on this i t, as no stipnlation waa iMde ftf 
the artieles named to be delivei np, and no proloeol bftl beesi 
drawn up, as to tlie mode of snr er. 

The oommaadant of the fort lad simply deeland thai tte 
gates were open, and the gar n disarmed^ altbongh ttOt eoa* 
quered ; he had entered into no engagements in the way of tether 

It was notorious fliat nothing bnt starvation, eombiael wHh 
a small-pox epidemic, had bn>ught about the surrender, and it 
must be acknowledged that the defence had been excellent, espe- 
cially in regard to the sorties; also, on the other hand, that the 
investing troops, so weak in numbers, had distinguished themselves 
by their performances. 


^ T/tioTirtllify with S(KX) inhabitants and a garrison of over 
4(MH) men, had already been watched and invested during the 
investment of Metz, S4»on iiftcv the battle of Gravelotte. Thia 
measure wan neeesMary for the security of the investing army. 

The attack upon th<? fortress, however, only began after tlie 
fall of Metz. 

Situated upon the left bank of the Moselle, ab<»ut three miles 
(13^5 Kn^lish miles), d(»wn the stream, fmm Metz, Thi<mville has 
a regular fortifieati<»n, u)»on this hank, C4»mpos(*d <»f ravelins and 
basti4»ns, with count(*r-guanls lying in fnuit, and a ginlle of lunettes 


outside the covered way. Upon the right bank, there is a double 
tete de pout, for coveriug the passage across the Moselle and its 
neighbouring arm. 

The fiat Moselle valley, lying immediately around, is bordered 
by commanding hills, which endanger the fortress, at a distance of 
from 20(X) to 250<) paces upon the right bank, and 3000 to 4000 
paces on the left bank. 

The 14th Infantry Division, Lieutenant General ron Kameckej 
was charged with the conquest of the fortress. He moved off from 
Metz on the 9th and lOtli of November, and approached by both 
banks of the river. On the 10th, 11th and 12th, General 
von Kamecke made a minute reconnaissance, and then decided upon 
a bombardment from the heights mentioned. After this the fortress 
was ch»scly invested, thirteen companies of siege artillery belonging 
to Metz wei*e brought up, i. e. from Verdun (which at that time 
had already been taken), and bombarding batteries were constructed 
upon both banks. 

I'pon the right bank, i\ rifled 24 -pounders, rifled l2-pounders 
and 4 1.'^ inch French mortars were pl.'iced in the Bois d*Illange 
and the Wm d'Vutz, at a distance of about 2200 paces; besides 
these, four heavy batteries of the 7th Fi<*ld artillery Regiment were 
also bronglit into position upon the hill of Haute Yutz and the 
hill t4» the east, before lllange, partly for the purpose of bombarding 
the ti'te (le pont, and partly, the north-east front of the town. 

rpoii the left bank of the Moselle, at a greater distance, as 
much :is 504 H) paces, were erected two batteries of 4 rifled 24- 
pounders at (Miateau Serre; one battery of 4 rifled 24-p<»unders 
t(» the uortli of the road from Thionville to Marspich , one battery 
of 5 rifled 2 1 -pounders at Maison neuve, one battery of 4 rifled 
l2-pouu(lcrrt at Weynierange, one battery of 4 rifled 24 -pounders 
to the south of the road from Thionville to Bauvange, <me battery 
of 4 rifled TJ-pounders to the north of the road liauvange an 
4St. Michel, and three batteries of 4 rifled 12-pounders at Maison 
rouge, to the west <»f the Luxemburg road. 

This bombardment preparation was extraordinarily large in 
comparison with its object 

Favoure<i by the ground, the batteries could, for the most part, 

be (HinKtriiclod in llie dny tinii-; ttiMkiug ol\|ect!i « 
thai the werk wu but littlv cliHtiirlipd by tlie eiiefny. 

Ill the ni|;bt iif tbi- Ulnt «r Novi-itibcr tliii coimtniftinn ni nil 
tbe bntl^rioft wiu i-uiuploh*)!, unil nleo tlirir iHiuiprnttiit, hdiI, at Ihx 
Banc time, tbe line of iiivetttiucvt wsm ]iiiib(^ i-lonrr Ui Ibv rnrtmw. 
On the 33tiil uf Nuvembnr, at 7 i>'(T|«ick ii.m., tb** flntt nboU fvll, 
and n tT^Uil4:d firu wn« tbvii <i]i«-ik>(I, wbi«b IahIi'iI unlit D««n. 

Tbe fnrtreH rolled witb vif^ur, And witb wull nimi^ •ItnU. 

At 1 n'ctocJt, ttie Are ol' the bombarfimeut began afreali, 
and wKK idawly soMtAJwd imtfl tlu' fffllbwiag morning. 

OiirinK tbiB niglit tbe tint parallel was DpeQed at a ilistaDr* 
of 8110 pacoA to tbe west of the town, and tlda fliii«)ied the prepan- 
tioDK for a rti^lnr nttnck. 

Tbo followtog day the canuuuado wu conlinncil in tbr mate. 
manjier as on tlie 3:hid. 

At 1.30 oVI'ick p.m., tlu- liirirr»H li'iidted a wbitn <U([. 

Tbr oummandwit dcntandod a Tree dcpartnnt for tbe wiimHi 
and rbildrcn, and an armiatiec for 24 hcnm. Tbe oef^llatiaM 
were bnikcn off, and tlii> fiip whb HRain e'lnimniiced, ntid coiitinmrd 
until l(i..Hii o'ubx-k a.m. on l\u) •24tU. At thin liuar tbe white T 
Hag upprvrod arrcah ; the rominauilaiit, Chef de bataillon ManHctf ] 
had derided to Borrender. On tbe follnwing day the r»rtreaa t 
occnpird; l*ii> offlwrw and about 4IM10 men became priMnon of | 
war, 'ilKt guns were taken, and a great c|uaotity of war material'^ 
and Mflveral magazini^B filled with pMviitionB. 

The unlurky littlu l<)wn liad «u(fcrcd very conridcrnbly, 
raurv, eomparativoly, tlittn ^tnuburg. 


Tlie ('<ini|ue8t of Monlmi-ilif vna set on fuut, liy Lieutenant 
(ipiieral rmi hiimecke , immediately after the fall of Thinnville, 
and indeed BimullaneuUHly witb tbe obsorvation of Longwy. 

Tbe forlresK nf MuntmiMy, with a Bmall town of about 2500 
inbabitaniM, lies on tlic Cbierw, one mile v4*/i Engl, m.) from the 


Belgian frontier, and forms a station on tlie railroad between 
Thionvill*; and Sedan. The fortress is characterised by two divisions. 
The "r///e haule" situated upon a three cornered rock, 200' high, 
descending on all sides at an angle of from :)0 to 45 degrees, is 
very strong; it contains five barracks for 800 men, an arsenal 
and two powder mag:izines. The ^ville h(use'\ situated between 
the Cillers and the vHlc haulo^ is only defended by a loop-holed 
wall, which being exposed on all sides can easily be shot down. 

The garrison numbered over IJOOO men, with i\^ guns; they 
had brought themselves into notice on the 11th of October, by 
making a s<»rtie against Stenay, and seizing the German Ktappen 
command at that place. General von Kamecke decided up(»n a 
bombanlment, and, on the 7th (»f December, commenced to construct 
batteries. The rifled 2i-p(mnders ^8 long and 10 short\ 20 rifled 
12-poundei*s jmd 20 rifled 6-pounders, field guns, wore placed upon 
the lieiglits sun'ounding tlie fortress, at a distance of from 2000 
to .'JHOO paces, and 1 rifled mort:u*s in the valley, close behind 
the village of VigneuUes. The C4»nstruction of the batteries was 
a very difllrult uiid<*rtaking, botii on account of the activity of the 
garrison, wjiose cannon and rifle fire forced tlie besiegers to work 
exclusively at night, and also from obstacles of the ground — 
the hill and valley roads being covered with hard frozen snow, 
which interfered with bringing up guns and other material. 

On the morning of the 12th of December, however, the 
batteries wvyo ready and equipped ; the fire upon the fortress began 
at 7.:iO o'clock, in bright weather. 

After a shc»rt time, it was very energetically replied to, from 
Montnu'dy, and, although several guns upon the front attacked 
were silenced, the fire of the fortress lasted until dusk. 

On the following day, there being a thick fog, the cannonade 
was only continued slowly, in tlie same manner as it had been 
during the night; in the evening the town was observed t<» be on 
fire, and at 7.30 o'clock, a parlementaire ap|)eared, to negotiate 
th<' capitulation. A mutiny amongst part of the garrison had made 
it im)>ossihle t(» continue the defence. The surrender took place at 
2 i/clock p.m., on the 14th of December; in addithm to the garrison, 
23() (icrman prisoners of war aime into Germaui hands. 

Loiigirt/ linil bci-n iovt^^tcd nl tlix liitt<^r i-nil nf Nuvvaibirr, 
by C'<iliiiic-1 run CoukI, by urder of Oeiienil vi>n Kaiiit'cke, mmI 
the tiKtiibNrdmoiit hntt bcj^Hn »n tliif l'<Lli ••{ .Inuimry. 

Tbc fortnaw liee upon the ri);lit hiiDk of thit Uliium, tai, likk 
Hontmt^y, forms an tipfier and a lower town; the latter is nut. 
fortiHi'il at all, tlw ufipcr taiwii, howrvur, in HurrnuiidMi with bu 
rorti]i>'iiti»ii», niornnuin;; tu tliu shupc nf tlitt nx'k im wliii'h U lim, ' 
and in unuAualiy Btniiig. The fortrcBs wm* crertud by Vaiiban in 
16H<i, OH a cuiiulisr fort to Liutiinburf;. The town cimUiiiM alwot , 
270<i inUbitiuit*. 

Loogwy held out against tlic bombanlmcDt, frum the 16tb to I 
the 'j;itli o{ January IS71, Tuvoum^ by ltd )ii(;li tiltuatioi i 
Btrong rock fMrtifiiwlivna. ARisr that, tlie cnpUulnlloit cDfutiil, with ' 
a gaiTtsou of 4000 men aud 300 ^ns. 

ilr^iirrrM, an iiupurtaot point of aupfwrl for lli<> tVaiir-tirciin 
in thci AnlenndR, was iiiveHt«d mid ImHibardMl in vlit^ laUtrr daya 
of Duoouiber, aflKr tlin fall of Montm^ly. TUf xiogi^ curpa waa 
DDdcr lti<> i-Kininfttiil of Mnjor Ikncial ri/n It'ni/na. 

Till- n.rln** lies tiiMin tho nKlit bmik of ll.f M.iiw, 
bem) oi' ihi' liver, vhich lien- riiii» lui (-l>Mr that lhi> forlma 
retwmbleH an island. Thus ita capability of resistance lies , to a 
great extout, in tlie snrrouuding water, whicli fills all the ditches, 
and van be UKed for inuBdatiun. Tlie town has about fiOOO in- 
habitant!) ami forms the janction of the railroads tn Klieims aad- 
Thionville. The fortifications are characterised by a citadel with 
seven bastioiw upon the east side, widcli comoiands the Heuse, and 
a horn work npun the west side, from which a second horn work, 
with three Innettes, Is tlirown oat 

A bombardment of gome days, which inflicted great loam oi 
the garrison and inliabitants, resnlted in the capitulation; tbia 


took place on the 2nd of January 1871, and, with the fortress, 
20(X) men^ 10() guns and large magazines of provisions were 
brought into German power. 


The fall of Mi^l^res was immediately followed by the taking 
of Rocroy, Three days after the occnpiition (»f the former fortress, 
five battalions and two s(iuadron8 of Senden's Landwehr Division, 
with six batteries, under the command of General von tVoynay 
moved forward for the purpose of carrying Ro<'roy by surprise. 
Quito unobserved, in a thick' fog, they succeeded in enclosing the 
fortress in the form of a cincture, and in directing «3f> guns upon it. 
The commandant was only made aware of the presence of the 
enemy, hy the ariival of the German parlementaire witli the 
summons io surrender. The capitulaticm was refused, but marvellous 
t4> relate, U) the astonishment of the besiegers themselves, the fire 
fn>m the (tr'nnan guns which histed for five hours, pn>duced tbe 
most decisive su4'ct*ss, altli(»ugh there was no object for the gunners 
to aim at) nor could the elficAcy of the shots be discovered any- 

As it was imagined that the artillery ^rv.j in such a tliick 
fog, w:is us«'lcHs, General von Seuden, who arrived at noon, had 
even ^ivcii orders for the firing to cease at 5 o'clock p. m. and 
made arrangements f<»r the departure of his greatly fatigued troops, 
leaving a rearguard behind. He would not however, neglect once 
more summiming the commandant U\ surrender, and sent the parle- 
mentaire, First Lieutenant von Fdrstor, again, into the fortress for 
this purpose. 

Lieutenant v<m Fdrster was astonished to see that the shot 
thrown at random, had ignited considerable fires, and observed that 
the garris4>n and inhabitants were in a state of utter confusion. 

The i'oinraandant, threatened with mutiny, begged tliat a rapid 
entrance might he made by the German troops; the di84>rder had, 
howev(>r, already risen to such a height, that most nnostial steps 
had to be taken instanteneoosly. 


lu orier to take immediate poiWBnou of the gate, 
v<»i) Forater anned 8 liberated Oerman priaonen ef ,mr (5 ef 
tlie ravalry, 1 of infantry and 2 civilians) with rUha bela^giof 
to tlie Garde Mobile , and mounted a guard at the gate wUeh 
kept order nnttl the arrival of two Prussian companies. • 

There fell into German hands, with the fortress, 8 ofliean 
and 3()0 men ; 72 guns, one colour, many arms, 400 cwt. of powder 
and enormous stores of provisions, ammunitton and artielea of 
clothing were acquired. Possession was talcen on the 5th of 
during cutting eold weather. 


Tlie conquest of Tout, was made long before the forta sitoaled 
on the Belgian and Luxemburg frontiers liad been taken. 

Ah early as tlie 10th of September the Grand Duke of Meeklen- 

biurg-S<!hworin, who, witli the Xill. Army Ck>rpt», liad belonged to 
the invcrttiug army of Metz since tlie 3rd of September, received 
the misrtion of oceupyhig Cli^lons and Khelni8, in <»nler to secure 
the lines of communication of the German army before Paris, and 
to t^ike Touly which barred the railroad to Paris. 

The Grand Duke divided his Corps; the 2nd Landwehr Division 
was directed upon Cli^lonn, the 17th Infantry Division, reinforced 
by almost the wh(»le of the Artillery Corps', and the 18th Dragoons 
and 11th Uhlans (two light reserve batteries and the 17tli Dragoons 
followed the Landwehr) niarehed upon Toul, and arrived in tlieir 
cantonments round the fortress on the evening of the 12th. 

iiir(»rni:ition was obtained bv means of reconnaissanres , that 
Toul c<»uld certainly not he taken by a coup th mtthiy on aceount 
of its wet ditches and high walls, but that it could be Ixmibarded 
with a prospect of suc<ress. 

At present there were no heavy guns at hand, (with the 
exception (»f some French guns taken at Manuil, which, as yet, 
the artillery did not rightly understand how t(» use , and these had to 
be waited for, from Cologne and Mapleburg. The Grand Duke 


gave over the command to General ron Schimmelmann j and 
repaired to tlie chief-head-qaarterSy by command of the Kinf^. 

Up to the 19th of September, the attack wa8 limited to a 
cloge inveHtmenty and an occasional bombardment from field f^unR. 
On this day, the 33rd Infantry Brigade, the Uhlan Regiment 
and three light batteries were moved to CliAlons. 

The expected siege guns arrived on the following day, and 
on the morning of the 23rd, the construction and equipment <»f the 
batteries liad been completed. The Grand Duke was again present 
at the bombardment. 

At 4 o^clock in the afternoon, the white flag appeared on one 
of the towerrt of the beautiful cathedral, after the Are from the 
fortresA had been tolerably brisk during the day, and the suburb 
of ManHuy as well as the village of St. Evre, both of which were 
occupied by the investing troops, had boen set on fire. 

The capitulation, as was the case with alm(»st all the fortresses, 
was based upon the capitulation of Sedan. With the fortress, 
109 ofticers, 2240 men, 120 horses, 1 Garde Mobile eagle, 197 
bronze ^runs including 48 rifled, considerable st<»res of arms, equip- 
ment and clothiu];;, hk well as large magazines of provisions and 
forage , fell into th«* hands (»f the (iennans. 

S01S8( )NS. 

riic conquest of Soiuons likewise fell to tlie charge of the 
Grand l>uk(> of Mecklenburg's Corps; this fortress lay 8<» near to 
Paris, and was so dangerous to th(* investing army, besides being 
of much importance as a point of obstniction on the railroad from 
Khoims to Paris, that its capture was necessary. 

The present fortifications of Soissons are of quite a late date, 
- HJnce 1840; they consist of a circumvallation of bastions, a 
strong enilli rampart with high escarp walls, ravelins and several 
advanced h(»m works. The ditches are dry, but still the west 
front had biM'n inundated by damming the AiHue. 

The garrison amounted Ut about 480O men, and the e<|aipment 
consisted of 128 guns. 


The Skge dorps was formed of the 8fd Lendwehr DN^ 
\siou, four eonpsiies of Siege Artillery, sad two eompM lss of 
Pioneers; it broigfat 10 rifled 24-poaiider8y 16 rifled 1! 
6 7poand SMirtnSy 2 86 eentim^tre Freneh mortarSy sad 4 M- 
timdtre Freneh mortars, besides two field batteries. 

The siege batteries were ereeted partty upon the hill of VsK^ 
about 2000 paees from the enceinte, and partly Qp<m the hill of 
Genevi^re, at a distanee of about 8000 paees. The moiian wevs 
placed farther to the front, behind the railroad enphankmenL 

Tlie preparations were finished on the 12th of Oetoberi aal 
the bombardment commenced, oombined with an eilbrt to make a 
breach In the front lying opposite the hill of yaaz. In eaae the 
bombardment did not tfeet the purpose qniekly, an aasanit 
to be attempted. 

Tlie fire of the fortress was very well direoted ; it waa 
at the right points for disturbing the work, even dnriag the 
Btraction of the batteries, and after that, replied very energetically 
to tlie bombardment On the fin»t day too, the fortress had the 
upper hand in the cannon tight; it sucecedc'd in ilismountlng two 
of the enemy's guu8, whiUt the besiegers uuly accMimplished the 
ignition of some fires in the town. 

On the following day, however, the besiegers succeeded in 
gaining the advant^ige, and a breaching fire was begun. On tlie 
14tli of October, in the evening, mi^st of the barrelled guns of 
the fortress were silenced, and a breach was also effected. The fires 
in the t(»wn C4»uld no longer be extinguished. Nevertheless the 
garrison ecnitinued the mortar fire, from behind the ramparta, with 
great obstinacy. 

Hut on the l.^>th of October, at H oVlo<'k p.m., the commandant, 
urged by the inliabitants, and disquieted by signs of denionilization 
in a portion of his troops, commenced negotiations, which led to 
the conclusion of a capitulation, in the c^mrse of the night. 

The Grand Duke moved in on the KUh; UyX) prisoners 
wen; niaile, and V2H guns and gn^at de|H»ts and magazines were 



After the attack of the Meuse Army upon f^ertlun (v. 
Chapter 6.) during their march , had proved abortive, and thiB 
fortress had, for a long time, been a cause of disturbance to the 
investing troops before Meti, and to the lines of communieation of 
the German Army in the west, the observation of the place was 
changed, on the 25th of September, into a close investment, and a 
bombardment was projected. 

The Meuse flows through Verdun, it is surrounded by a cir- 
cumvallation of bastions, and has a citadel. The fortress is com- 
manded by heights, on all sides, at the distance of ab<»ut 3000 
paces. The garrison amounted to about 4000 men with 137 guns. 

A provisional bombardment with field guns having failed, 
just 2is it had already done on the 23rd of August, it became 
necessary to wait for the arrival of the siege guns. 

These did not make their appearance until the 12th of October, 
and had , for the most part , been captured in Toul ; they were 
however, French guns thronghout, — 14 rifled 24-pounders, 24 
rifled Ti-pounders, 4 22centim^tre mortars and 4 22centim^tre 
howitzern ; only two Prussian reserve batteries besides the French 
mattjrial, were at hand, — 12 rifled 6-pounders, with which the 
fruit lesH bombardment had been made. The besiegers made pre- 
paratioHH for the cannon attack , with an equal number of guns 
on botli rtidert of the Meuse; they took possession of the heights 
of Jielleville npiui the right bank, and of Thierville on the left 
bank, dn»ve the French out of the villages lying in (hint, and in 
the niglit of tlie 1 2th, constructi^ all the batteries, at a distance of 
about 30<H) paces. The bombardment began on the following morning. 

The C4»nstruction of these batteries had, however, been too 
hurriedly performed; the battery of 8 rifled 24-pounders, which 
w:is to make the breach, was erected on the ridge of the height of 
liellevillc, in such a manner that it could be* plainly seen and 
was greatly exposed. There was also a scarcity of ammunition, 
H4> that Home had to be manufactured during the night; added to 
' whieli, the serving troops were quite nnaoquainted with the 
French guns. 


The fire wm thus opened with very vnfaTomble 
and led to no ntiihetory remit. 

The girriion replied by n well aimed, effieseioni in^ ib- 
mounted serenl gone and inflieted serere lofsei upon the tnepi^ 
particularly thoae of the breaching battery, and finally attniBed 
a decided eaperiority; atthongh Bone firea had brolLen ont In the 
fortrewi and eonie gnnt had been diamonnted on the 

Towards evening on the 15th of October, the Germaa 
became silent from want of ammunition, and firom thia UMmeal the 
siege again changed into an inveatment 

The garrison, which, shortly before .the eessatioB of the boa* 
bardment, had already decided to capitnlate, now again took 
courage, and in a short time made a powerfkil sortie, in wUtk 
it ancceeded, nnder cover of night, in penetrating into the 
euemy*a batteries and spilling some of the gnus. 

Nevertheless on tiie 8th of November they snrrenderedi aller a 
considerable siege train had been provided from Heti, wUeh plaee 
had, in the meantime, fallen into German hands. 

The fortress capitulated with about 4()00 men, 2 generals 
and 161 officers, 130 guns, 23,000 rifles and considerable stock 
of war material of different descriptions. 


The fortress of La Fere, lyin^ on the left bank of the Oise, 
lM»tw«»i»n that river and tlio 8erre, next came into question; an 
army for the relief of Paris, liaving been organized to the north 
of that eity, it wan important to deprive it of thl:^ point of appui. 
I-*a F'ero lay in the radiurt of the French Northern Army, which 
made an attempt to relieve it on tlie 2<»th of November, and, as a 
nillyin^ point for the FVaucs-tireurrt, wan a troubletMmie neigh- 
bonrho4Ml to SoirtrtonK and the rturroumling: country, now occupied 
bv the (lernians. 

The fortrt^rt is not large, it had a garrison of 2<NM) men, * 
including the Gardes Mobiles and Franes - tiiXMirs, and was ei|uipped 


with about 70 gunB. Its main Btrength lay in tlie considerable 
inundationHy which however were so far disadvantagettus to its 
capabilities of reHiritauce that the water penetrated int<» the cellars 
and ground fItKirs of the low<lying town, so tliat the inhabitants 
could find no shelter during the bombardment. 

La Fere was unable to resist a serious bombardment, and the 
comma ndant was so much convinced of this, that before the invest- 
ment began, he determined to save all the artiller>' material by 
sending it off to Lille. The inhabitants, however, opposed this, 
and effected the relief of the commandant by an officer of marines, 
who declared that the fortress would hold out until its last 

In the night of the 24th of November, the besiegers brought 
into position to the west of the fortress, at a distance' of about 
2000 paces, 8 rifled 24-pounders, 12 rifled 12-pounders, 6 rifled 
G-poiiiiders and 6 mortars ; these silenced the gtms of the fortress, 
even on the first day, ignited fires in the toHn, and on the 2Gth 
effected the capitulation, without having suffered any loss. 


I'eronnt*^ lying \\\n)\\ an island in the Somme, is, similar to 
L:i Vvn\ pnitected by water; this fortress also obtained some im- 
portance ill tlic operations of the Northern Armies, and its conquest 
is wouIiv of rcni2U*k, because it resulted exclusively from the fire 
of captured French guns. 

The ;rarrison of Peronne, over .'MXK) men with about 70 guns, 
had hroii^lit itself int4i notice, during the time that part of 
General \km\ Manteuffers Army occupied Amiens, by seizing a care- 
lessly returning railway detachment in Ham\ and, in other ways, 
li.ul caused some uneasiness to the (itTman Northern Armv. 

111 eoiiscqueiiee of this the German Artillery commamhint of 
the citadel of Amiens, V'wA Lieutenant Schmidlj prepared a siege 
train ^ and upon a suggestion of his with respect to the Ixmibard* 
ineiit of IVi'itnne, W2U) sent out against this fortress, (which liail 


beeu invartsd for tome days), on tho 8(Hh i wM 6 rUti 

12poandeny S SSoentimMre mortars and 4 3! re howilmi!' 

rhd Freneii Army nnder CkAeml Faidherbe had, at tiiat tima^ boan i 

obliged to retire from the neighbourhood of 

Lieutenant Schmidt had selected the sonth-westem froal for } 
the attack. The expedition met with considerable diffleolttes from ^ 
tlie roads covered with slippery ice npon the hard froaen gfonif 


and was endangered by the neigfabonrhood of Faidheibe's Army. I 
The bombardment began on the mommg of the 2nd of Jaannyi i 
and was carried on for two days with favonrable results (the delay ? 
in Amiens having given the opportunity of becoming acqnafartai^ 
witli the French guns). Tlien, however, the bombardment had to be 
suspended for a time in consequence of the issue of the batfle of 
Bapaumcy after which both armies retired. The fire was contlmwd 
with three guns only, whilst the ranainder were held hi leadiMSS ' 
to drive oflP. 

After some days, however , the danger dhuippeared aad the 
bombardment began afresh , and led to a capitulation on the 
Dth (»f January 1871, after having lasted altogether seven days. 


Tlic defence of aluumt all the fortreBses was undertaken and 
pro8iH;utetl by tlie French with praiseworthy courage, and in some 
cases also in an intelligent manner. 

In almost all, the iKtnibardment produced the decisive result, 
it dcmondizcd the ^anisdii through the constant peril of death, 
and niovcil the inhabitants to intluence the commandant. 

The siiptTJor leadership and discipline^ on the (icrnian side, 
the superiority of the Prussian artillery material, the insi^^ht and 
en<*r;:v of the (iermaii offieei*s always bore awav the victory. 

TiiE Siege op Pabib. 

The 8ioge of Paris, whieli resulted in the capitulation of thin 
uit fortrertH, is, incontestably , one of the greatest military 
ectacles that the world has ever beheld; it was the most im- 
rtant event in tlie development of the whole war. Yet, looking 
it 8oh*ly from a military point of view, is not sufficient to 
tain a oorreet idea even of the military importance <»f the event, 
'ither the occurrences in Paris, nor the actions of the besiegers 
n be nieaMured by a military scale alone. 

It is the p(H*uliarity of this phase of the war, that not only 
d a complicated political state of power to be taken into ao- 
unt , but also perfectly new and unexampled factors of military 
•wer, and lastly the wavering humours of a large, helpless, ex- 
able and uncertain population. 

Never lias a policy had more reas4)n and better opportunity 
r acting with wisdoui, than Crermau policy after the (»verthrow of 
(* empire. The problem was solved with incomparable ability, 
d yet, as it was not omniscient, at the end a fault was com- 
tted which was capable of calling into question the fulfilment 
the p<*a<*e conditions. In stipulating the conditions of the 
pitulation, neitlier the disarmament of the National Guard, nor tlie 
cupation o( the city were insisted upon. Thus it was ponible 
iit an event so incredible as an out-break of civil war in the 
y at last delivered fr4»m the enemy, could take place. Certainly — 
lo can tell what harm might have resulted from an occupation 
the cit\ ! 



Mindfiil of its exalted portion, as the direetor of a 
cultivated nation , the ProMian Government oonld not^ tttA tte 
first moment of the siege , even when considered as a milllny 
question y overlook the fact tliat it was the most beantifiil tUj is 
tlie woridy although a fortress, with which the Oerman arms wen 
iu»w concerned. It conld not overlook the fact that the popalatkn 
of Paris, uniting all the weaknesses and vices of mankind witt 
the amiable and estimable qualities of an educated peoptei waa a 
most unusual object for warlike measures, not only on aoeonat 
of its multitude but also in regard to its character. 

Paris, the nucleus of unequalled treasures in art and scioM^ 
was the property of the whole world, and what France had 
forgotten in her downfall, great Oermany would bear in aund. 

An inextinguishable detestation pursues the destroyer of the 
great centres of cultivation of mankind; the righteonsnesa of hia 
cause will not, here, protect the conqueror. 

The melancholy occurrences of the civil war, which followed 
the siege by the Germans, liave shown to wliat horrors the eon- 
({uest of tlic city by storm could lead, :uid the manner of defence 
that the Parisians were capable of under the circumstances. 

it adds to the honour o( Germany, that it did not fall to 
the lot of German tnwps to carry ou the war which became the 
duty of French troops in May and June 1871, tlurc»ngli a weak 
and therefore unfortunate government ; and that German troops did 
not contribute Ut the destruction of the gorgeous, and historically 
notable, buildings 4)f the old, renowned city. 

The con(|ue8t 4»f Paris was in the highest degree honourable 
both for the rulers and warrit»rs of Germany ; but for France — it 
hiiri n(*eded the nanguinary h(»rrors of tlu* civil war to make the 
world forj^et, that the defence of Paris against the (iermans was 
well adapted to cover the French name with lasting ridicule. For 
four months and a half, h:ilf a millitm of well armed defenders 
(»f their country allowed themselves to be shut up, in the greatest 
fortress of tlie world, by 2<N^<mn» men, whilst, during the whole 
time, they iifver 4*eased congratulating each other u|H»n their lien»ic 
rouragi*, and threatening the enemy with total destruction. 

In order rightly to appreciate the vastness and multilateral 


mtmre of the tasks for the Direction of the Oerman nrmy and 
state, one mnst first recall the external and interior condition of 
ihe great object of operalionx — Paris, The natural situation of 
the fortress is not particularly favourable, but finds advantages in 
some heights to the east and scmth-west, for excellently situated, 
commanding outworks, and at other points, is protected from the 
approach of the enemy's siege works, by the course of the Seine 
and Mame, especially so in the west and north-west. Its main 
Ktrength lies in its , quit« unurtual , proportions , which have the 
effect (»n the one hand , (if making it impossible to attack the 
outer forti*, distributed in a circumference of 7 miles (32V5 English 
inileH^ by a cross fire, but in the front only, and on the other 
hand, of obliging the foe to accumulate extraordinarily large masses 
(»f troops for a surrounding siege. 

(Compare the general map of Paris.) 

There is a double line of fortifications. The town itself and 
part of tlie suburbs arc sun'ounded by a very strong enceinte^ a 
girdle of fortresses, whose longest diameter, from Porte Point dn 
Jour in the south-west, to the outermost point of la Villette in the 
nortli-«*ast is 1*^,^ of a mile (about l^j^ English miles), whilst its 
shortest diameter, a line leading through the intersecting point of 
the Seine ^ which Hows through the enceinte and Paris), in the south- 
east, by tiie Tuileries U\ Les Batignolles, is l^s of a mile 
^5^^ Kiiglish miles) in length. 

Tlie eiieeinte cimsists of a circumvallation of bastions, with 
masonry esi-arps, with(»ut outer works and without casemates; the 
ditch is .'J') feet wide, and can be filled by the Heine. Ninety 
four bastions jut out upon all sideJi, and enable a concentrated 
tire to W (»))ened upon the assailant. They are distinguish^ by 
iinmbers, and run from bastion 1, on the right bank of the Seine, 
at the point wli(>re it enters the town, to bastion 94 on the leil 
hank, exactly opposite No. 1. In the interior of the enceinte , a 
paved military road runs along the whole circumvallation, and 
besides tliis^ a railr(fbd belt, which at the same time, unites all 
tlir lines entering from outside with one another. Thus there it 
the must excellent communication within the enceinte; in a very 


short time, a eoB^denble nomber of troops can be 
upon any threateBod point. 

The BnbnriM extend beyond this uiner cfrenMvnllalioai aal 
from them, comtry honaes and villages, in unbroken sneesasisB 
for a mile (4*/ft Bngii^h miles) in extent. 

In an enter line of fortificationB , a cinetore of JeUicked fmU 
and red0ubU intersects these ooantless excrescences and sstelUtSi 
of the great city. They present the first and strongest 
to the besieger, and although they do not lie snfUeieotly 
from the enceinte, to impede, completely, the efSeaey of the 
guns of the enemy upon the enceinte and beyond, yet they grenllj 
limit this efficacy, and at any rate, prevent an immediate attaek 
upon the town. They lie partly on hilLi and partly in the plaui; 
on the eastern, Mmthem and northern sides they lie dose togetberi 
oil the west there is only one— but the most important fort Th^ 
lie connected in such a manner, that no enemy can penetrate 
between, and that any two or tliree of them, can coneentrate their 
fire upon one spot, whilst the assailant finds it impossible to bom- 
bard a siugle <me from different sides at the same time. 

The outer forts form different groups before the different 
frtmts c»f Paris. 

(Compare the three special maps of the soutli-west front, the 
east front, and tlie north front of Paris.") 

The south'weMt front is distinguished by the Fortress of 
Mont fateneUy a real fortress in itself, lying furthest towards 
the west, and then by the Forts Isst/^ f'anrres^ Montrouge, 
Arcueilj Bic^tre and /rry. Whilst tlie f(»rtress upon Mont 
Valerien is a full mile '4^ 5 English miles from the one lying 
nearest to it, Fort Issy — tlie interval is filled up by a bend of 
the Seine — , none of the remaining forts are separated tnun each 
other by more than from 2<>00 to 'MHH) paces, and thus lie so 
near one another, that even after one of them has been destroyed 
by the enemy, he would only be able to advance further under 
the cn»ss fire of the two neighb(»uring forts. 

In front of these works, however, af a distance of about 
15(M) paees, there are hills rising to above 4<X> feet, which if 
occupied by the besiegers, must greatly imperil the forts by (heir 


dominating fire. These are the heighU of Clamarty Mffudon and 
Chaiillon, As the limited time prohibited the construction of con- 
siderable works npon tliese heights, whicli, properly, were necessary 
for the security of the south-west front, General Trochu had to 
content himself with simple field entrenchments. Works of this 
description were laid out, before the arrival of the enemy, at 
Moulin de la Tour^ in front of Chatillon, at the village of 
yiUttjuify and to tlie eant of Villejuif, at Moulin Saquet. Moreover 
the villages of Villejuif and Vitry sur Seine were placed in a 
Htate of defence. The very important hill of Monireioui above 
8t. Cloud, on the other hand, was not fortified — time failed, and 
the labour force of Paris was not properly utilised. To the north 
of Mont Val^rien , liowever , a Me de pont was erected for the 
bridge of Neuilly j and a fortification raised upon the hill of 
SL Ouen. 

The east front is the stmngPitt of all ; the position of the 
fortificationrt lierc, c4>rrespond8 exactly with the formation of the 
ridge of heiglits whicli stretches from the suburb Belleville, '/| of 
a mile (about BV^ English miles) outside the enceinte towards the 
04ist. Towards tlie north these heights sink down to the canal 
de rOurcq , and in the south , to the Mame. They are occupied 
by a group of fortn which command all the approaches of the 
enemy from ChAlons, Troyes and Melun, as well as the passages 
over the Seine and Mame near the spot where they unite into 
one stream. The most northern of these forts is Ramamrnlle^ 
whicli lien only 1800 paces from tlie enceinte; below it, lines of 
entrenchments lead doom to the canal de tOurcq. At 20<X) 
pares to th<' east of this fort lies Fort Noisy^ which is connected 
with Fort Rosny, situated 26()0 paces to the south-east, by the 
redoubts of Montreuil and La Boissiere, Fort Nogeni and the 
redoubt oi' Fontenay situated to the north of it, crown the south- 
eastern extremity of the heights, which commence at Belleville, 
and lie about 3200 paces south of the most advanced lunette of 
Fort Rosny. 

To the south of this the windings of the Mame, which is 
here 100 paces wide, form a hindrance to an approach; and at 
the spot where the enemy would have the greatest facilities for 


breaking through, ia the event of his having snceeeded in eraesiBg 
the river at its aoath^eastem bendy nnmely in the defile fomei 
by the bends of the river running nesr one another, the road ia 
barred by the redonMs of Grmpelle and La Faitmiderie with 
the entrenehnents lying between them. Again, 2600 paoes fh» 
the redoubt of Gmvelle lies Fori CkaremioHj in the angle between 
the Mame and the Seine , uniting the east front with the sooth- 
west front. Then, m a seoond line, lies the fortified Ckmio&m 
of yinctmneSj on the east front, 2500 paces from the eaeeinle. 

Fori Si. Denis, Fori AtAerriUerM and the fortiiieatioaa 
along the St Denis canal form the north fironi. The town nf 
St Denis lies to the north of Montmartre (whicli played a part 
at the siege of Paris in the year 1814, bnt is now completely 
talcen up by the increasing city, and rises within the enceinte), 
is 4400 paces outside the walls and lias three forts: Donile 
Couronne^ de tEsi and de la Bricke, At a later period, another 
work was erected on the left bank of the Seine, at FiUemtmee 
ia Garenne^ in connection with the works of St Denis. Tlina 
8t. Denis in also a complete fortresrt in itnelf, and very strong; 
the w(»rk8 are all defensively luiittMl with ouv another, :uid their 
ditches can be inundated by the stream Kouillnn. Fort Auber- 
villerHy 24(M» pacoH from the nioAt nurth-ea8terly |K>int of the 
enceinte ; coverM Paris on this side^ and commands the road to 
Lille, but iH a long way from itn neighbouring fort — 44(N> paeeK. 
In order to give Kecurity to tluH wide interval, redoubts are erected, 
in a MH;ond line, along the canah of St. Demis and de fOurc^* 

AU thi^ forts were morvover united with one another^ 
before and tiurimj the investment ^ hif a runnintj line of en- 

Thirt miiKt be mentioned to the honour of (ieneral Chabaud- 
Ijitour, wlio (iirectwi the great workrt of fort ifieat ion. 

Parin i^ thuH Hurroumled by sixteen forts and, moreover, by 
a multitude of redoubtH and entn*nehinents, and in itK enreinte, 
preHentH to the Ix'sieger, wh<» has In't-n fortunate enough to over- 
come the first obntaeles, a very strong line of 4iefenc<'. The forta^ 
were new, sinee the year 1H40, very Htrongly and well built; that 
f>f Mont Valerien wa8 «if extraordinary solidity. They were all 


equipped with guns of the heaviest calibre , partly before and 
partly during the first stages of the siege. 

The commumcatiansy inside the whole circle of the outermost 
fortifications, are the best, altogether, that can be conceived. The 
ground is intersected in all directions by railroads, bread, well 
[>aved or macadamiaed roads, and these offer the most favourable 
means for collecting a considerable mass of troops , at any spot 
where the defenders may desire, in a comparatively short time. 
The Seine is crossed by a superfluously large number of the finest 
bridges. Telegraph wires united all the outer forts with the city 
and with each other, and in the city itself there was a telegraphic 
commiuiication between all the important points. All tlie aids of 
science were at the command of tlie defence ; the great mechanical 
establlHliments, as well as the Urge gun foundries and arm mana- 
factories of the state, were at its service. 

It is also important to observe, that for making sorties either 
on H small sciile or on the largest, with hundreds of thousands, 
no more advantigeous formation than that of the fortress of Paris 
ran be imagined. Each two forts make an excellent sortie gate, 
and thcHc ran prepare for it and support it by tlie fire of their 
heavy ^Mins. A whole army can, any day, be brought together, 
unseen, inside the enceinte or at many p(»ints immediately behind 
th(* forth ^ whicli might break forth between the forts the next 
morning at dawn, in splendid development, and always be four, 
five or six times superior to an enemy at tlie given point, who 
has not a whole million of soldiers for tlie siege. 

( Certainly if Mac ICahon liad been allowed to lead the army, 
which (tame to ruin at Sedan, to Paris, the German Army Direo- 
tiiNi wonld not have. been able to carry out the investment of this 
city, and if, instead, of going to the help of Baiaine, he had 
drawn towards Orldans, the siege of Paris could not have been 
undertaken at all. 

The forces of France were allied with unexampled miaforione ; 
they were squandered away before the siege of Paris, and trifled 
away whiUl U laaa going on. 

The following active forces were raised for the defence: 

i) a Corps of able, brave mem^ expert in armS| the 


mnd mariiMy uler tMr edoettod and iatolUgMit oflken. b aH 
aboat 15yOOO mmu Amngiii flieie regimoiitt of aniM faitatayt 
Genend Troohi hw dnwa attation to the rapaMrUy af Hoa. S6 
and 42. 

2) A Baaa af addien and other rtate ofikialiy wko wara as- 
perienoed in the ua of anu, bat not oigaaiaady and for tha bmA 
part completely demoraliaed — a real moaaie troop* Tliey weaa the 
depdt battalions of tlie foraier Imperial Gnard, the troopa af the 
Line which G^Mval Vinoy had brought away to Park tnm 
M^zi^res after the hattte of Sedan, and old, tiaM lenred mMkm^ 
who were agdn ealled ap, with Doaanien and Foreii-keepera af 
all kinda, and ei-devant Sergeants de TUle and Gendamea. Then 
were beeidea theae, the ftigitivee tnm prerioas battlea and meiahefc 
Ait<^her abont 70,000 men. 

3^ The Gardea Hobilee from the provinee, ehiely Btateas 
and Burgnndiaaa; then there were men from Berry, fivm Fmnebe 
Gomt^ and Champagne and other proTineee, men wbe prohably 
had no clear idea of what a rifle was, eepeeiaUy on the ^yatam 
of a Remington, a Chaseepot or Martini-Henry ; but who pose ea wd 
patriotism and good physical qualities, and after six weeka of 
judicious training could have furnished an efficient body of men 
under a capable leader. General Trochu estimates their number 
at 100,000. 

4) The Parisian Garde Mobile. This was a corps which 
combined all the bad qualities of the population of a great city 
with the weaknesses of the provincial Gardes Mobiles. Thew 
Gardes Mobiles had, already, been once attached to the army of 
Chilons, and had fmt brought Marshal Canrobert, into a state of 
despair, and then perplexed Marshal l^acMahon to such an extent 
that he decided on dispensing with tlieir assistance and sending 
them back to Paris. There might have been H0,0()0 of them. 

5) The (larde Nationale of Paris. This armed mass waa, 
according to Trochu's estimate, only 50,000 men strong at the 
beginning of the siege. In the middle of September a number of 
so called battalions existed, of abont KKK) men each, compoaed 
of citiaens, tradespeople, doctors, lawyers, and officials. They were 
reeruited from the mass of those, who followed similar lunds of 


occupation, in the Bame quarter of the town, and who were poeaessed 
of simiUr means; — during the siege thoy reached, on an average, 
a strength of 1200 men. These battalions, to distinguish them 
from those raised later, were called, old battalions. In the other 
quarters of the town, where this regulation did not as yet exist 
Uhe Government had always suppressed the legal formation of the 
Gardes Nationaux , from fear of revolutions), in the suburbs and 
districts of Belleville and Menilmontant for example, new battalions 
were raised when the siege was threatened, each if which must, 
very quickly, have reached a capitation of about 2000. Altogether, 
in the month of October, the battalions numbered 266, whose 
Htrengtii is reckoned by General Trochn at 260,000 men, and by 
other authorities at a higher figure, up to more than 300,000 men. 
Amongst these Gardes Nationaux the best and worst elements were 
to be found recklessly mixed together. Powerful young men stood 
shonlder to shoulder witli portly elderly gentlemen; men with 
patriotic entliUHiasm stood in the same rank with the most timid 
egotists. Highly educated men, who, even when pampered by an 
over-refined life always show themselves of moral courage and 
great sorvic/C in battle, were interspersed in a battalion with men 
who stood far below them mentally, and who could in no way 
make up for their want of military capability. 

At the commencement there was absolutely no selection, no 
division according to age or the good will of the men, and when 
it wa8 dcHired to begin this it was already too late. 

The rquipmeni of the army was very heterogeneous, still, 
thanks t^ tlio active manufacture of arms, all the combatanta were 
supplied with good rifles in the course of a few weeks, and finally, 
the nrtillory also, with numerous guns. Certainly the only arm 
which the Parisians, with Mime exceptions, understood how to 
serve ^ during this siege, was the stomachy which was contented 
with unusually frugal fare. On the whole an enormous material 
presented itself, the most part of which certainly, remained unem- 
ployed, but from which an able general might surely have pro- 
duced a servic^4ible army of 200,000 men, and from which a 
leader of gcninn, capable of carrjiag the maaaea along with him, 


might have laiMd a fomidaUe wmy for wiwtiMtp am lh» 
of the moaenL 

The CoBOMiider is ChM of this entirs amyy akoat tmM m 
million of OMUi^ iud however — and this hi the WMi 
of all the peealkritiet of the defeoee of Peris — f»r laore 
for Ilia own amy than for the eaeny; or rmtiiery he 
w^Jl grounded reepeet for the enemy , taut his fear of an 
in his own troops was so grsat, that he allowed his 
the enemy to give place entirely to his awdety fmr tntemal qaM; 
he arranged little npon his own initiativei bat| in HNNt of Us 
sctSy allowed Umself to be driven by the popnlathni — tki 
Garde Nationale. 

General Ih^ku was a very unfit Oosunaader in Chief ibr 
8ttch foroes. A soldier of scientifie edneationy experieneed aai 
Hensiblei tm possessed just sufficient penetration to see oloariy* aH 
the defects of his army, bat had not the energy and taleat An 
obviate these defects and to bring the strong side of It into 

It may be assumed tliat, throughout, General Trocliu did not 
deceive himself. He waA completely convinced that the fate of 
the capital, of which he was the governor, depended solely, upon 
what meaaures the Germans would or rx>uld take. If the German 
army in pursuit of General Vinoy^s defeated troops, had passed the 
outer line of forts on the 19th of September, suddenly taken the 
rnreinte by storm, and appeared before the Hotel de Ville on the 
first day of the siege. General Trocliu would have been one of 
those, least surprised, at such a rapid solution of the affkir. If 
the (Sernian army IimI destroyed some forts in the first four weeks, 
and then undertaken the assault. General Troehu could not have 
prevented it. 

Ah li(»wcver the Cicrmans took a different and a wiser course, 
which M to peace as well as U) the capture of the city, he was 
tilled with amazement at the enemy, and at the same time with 
satisfaction in regard t4» his own situaticm. General Troehu was 
an actor from the first day of the siege to the last, and was 
obliged to be so in order to retain his position. 

Hut why had he undertaken such a post? 


He thought that he was m well able to fill it as any one 
else, and to perform his duty as a patriot. 

Having fallen out of favour, on account of his work on the 
French army in 1867, and being an object of suspicion to the 
Court as an Orleanist in spite of his service in Italy and Africa, 
he had received an insignificant appointment at the beginning of 
the war, and only on the formation of the 12tti Army Ck>rpA had 
he been named its commander, and on the 17th of August, 
(tovemor of Paris. 

The General has given extensive eapplanalianSj in the sittings 
of the National Assembly on the 13th and 14th of June 1871, 
:iH to Ills perHonal position both witli regard to the political and 
military situation of Franc^^, some points of which will be found of 
interest here. The General affirms, that even before the French 
defeats at Metz^ he had point<*d out to the Emperor Napoleon, the 
npceKKJty of a ra|>id retreat of the whole army upon Paris, that 
his motion approved of in the council of war, but tliat advices 
from Paris had prevented the retreat from being carried out. 

Later, at another council nf war, presided over by the Em- 
peror, he was appointed (Jovemor of Paris with the charge of 
announrin^ and preparing for the Emperor's arrival there. He /ir- 
eeptfui, but only on the (Mindition that Mac Mahon should lead 
his army to Paris. He, Trochu, was to be named Commander in 
rhief of all the forces, whilst tlie Emperor himself would resume 
tlM» n'ins of government. 

(hi his arrival in Paris, he was however, received with great 
distrurtt by the Empress Regent, who declared that the plan of 
the retreat upon Paris was (|uite altered. 8he asserted that the 
Emperor %as not cx>ming to Paris, but wonld remain in ChAlons; 
Trocliu might defend Paris without the Emperor. 

('ontrary to his own conviction, he, yet, accepted out of 
loyalty and composed a proclamation beginning : ^l come as Governor 
of Paris, appointed by the Empenir, with the charge of pro- 
claiming a state of siege.^ 

Fhe Empress wished to have the Emperor's name removed 
from the pr<K*lamation, and In spite of his resistance, insisted upon 
this alteration. 


The WW ntatater, OoQDt F^kao, had raeeivvd Ub m %ellflr 
tliMi the B^geaty aad even deehied to Mb UmI Us anhal 
frustrated all fhe well prepared meaanrea fer the defaMe. Cfndm 
liad become a bvonrite wifli the oppoaitiony atoee fhe laperU 
GovemmeBt had alighted him.) 

On the iright of the Srd of September he had leant, from 
an officer m the atreet, the news of the eapltnlatloB of SedM, 
and General Sonmaio had afterwarda given hfan proof tiMt| ma- 
beknown to him. General Pallkao had been placed over Mae 
army and atao over fliat of Faria. Hia eonnada wore o^lj 
with miitmat bbfli by the Empreaa and the Uniatery FdOtM^ aal 
the latter had broken off all bnaineaa relathma with him. 

From thia moment, hia efforta were only dfaeeted towaria the 
defence of the legialatire againat the aeditiona mnltttnde. SvmmoMl 
to take part in flie government now forming at tbo Hotel de IflUe^ 
he bad undertaken tiie Preeideney. 

In regard to the defence of Pariai Troehn then givea the 
following explanation: "On the 5tli of Septemberi my eoHeapiea 
Jules Favre and Picard, required me tc> state what deterred me 
from the undertaking ; 1 answered that every fortified place, which 
is not supported by an external army, falls into the eoemy'a 
power; that Paris, with her emotions, would be subject to thia 
axiom more than any other town ; and consequently, since an army 
no longer existed, we should be uniting in an heroic lolly. Bat, 
1 added, this heroic folly is necessary, to save tlie hononr of 
France, and to give time to the amaxed world to recover. -^ 
1 confess that I counted upon Americans remembering I/afayette*a 
comrades, England tliose of Inkerman and Italy those of Solferino.** 

Trochu further says : ^Tlie chief difficulty was to mike people 
helieve in the siege of Paris. It was d(H*lared that the enclosing 
was impossible, or maintained that, if it were possible, the city 
would not liold (»nt for fourteen days. I mvHelf only believed 

in a reHiHtanee of 60 days The fortifications of Paris 

were made for another description of artillery, and for other riflea. 
Kverything had to be made anew **. 

Upon the subject of the German lines of fortification, Trochi 
said: "^Tlie Prussian works are tlio strongest that have ever been 


made. I thank heaven, that I postieased the firmneas to withstand 
those who would have forced me to make an attack upon them. 
Had I led my troops out beyond the first line they would have 
been lost. It is a consolation to me that numerous families have 
been spared this misfortune. Recollect gentlemen, the exertions 
of the insurgents; facts have proved the value of the defensive 
positions which covered Versailles." 

In the further course of his speech, Trochu related how he 
had followed the plan, projected by General Ducrot, of making a 
sortie on a large scale from the peninsula Oennevilliers in the 
direction of Rouen, for the purpose of forming a junction with the 
Lille Army. 

(iambetta's opposition had frustrated this plan. **6ambetta 
portKessed considerable patriotism, but two innate faults. He thought 
that, after having called up all the strength of the country, he 
must transfer the guidance of it exclusively in the men of a certain 
party, and then he was involved in the military traditions of 
1792, and believed it possible to fight with undrilled qpasses against 
organized armies. That this was not the case, even at tliat time, 
is attested bv the memoirs of Dumouriez.*' 

General Trochn^s further explanations al&) prove that the 
measures whicli he took, especially the sorties, were f(»rced upon 
him against his better conviction, partly by the population of 
Paris, and partly by Gambetta. 

"^More tlian twenty times'", declared the General, ^I was on 
the point of sending in my resignation; I did not do so, 1 swal- 
lowed the most cruelly bitter words, because 1 looked upon it as 
an act of cowardice to resign." 

For the German DirectiMi, on the other hand, the problem 
of the conquest of Paris, was combined with very many considera- 
tions of the most diverse kinds. 

The aiiaifimeni of a favourable and secure peace was and 
con tinned io he the mam point. The capture of Paris inas 
important J for it was anticipated that it would hriny on the 
peace, only Paris mwft be the capture of Paris ^ that is^ of 
the Mfat of the government and of prerailinff influence upon 
the whole country. 


of a bombttdmait k eoBlhgralioii| but not only it the eUy m 
enormouily laige tlist the ihelli and shot firom rifled gum, m\ 
be too widely diftribiited| bat the houses mre also bdtt^ with 
solidity that only Tory ineonsiderible danuige eonld be eaieed hj 
the shot, and ignitions only exeeptionally prbdneed. A shoti irideh 
in Strasborg woold have thrown down a whole honsOi in Pftris^ 
tliat combination of colossal stones, knoeked ^ hole in the wall^ 
or fell through the rooi and a couple of floors, destroying aone 
furniture bat without injuring the stability of the house. Thare- 
fore, for a bombardment of any importance, sudi a large park of 
guns was neoessary, that several months must elapse befim il 
could be procured. 

To provide this, however, and the ammunition, neeessary tar 
a protracted bombardment, such an enormous transpoft material 
wad required that the army supplies might have snffered ui eon- 

In order to judge of the difficulties caused by this alone, oae 
must consider that the investing army required on an average imbff 
15(),0()<) 3lb. loaves y 1000 cwt. of rice and barley, GOO oxen, 
that irty their weight in meat or bacon, 150 cwt. (»f Dalt, 28,(KN> 
quarts of brandy; in forage, 10,000 cwt of oats and 24,0O0 cwt. 
of hay; and that there was a monthly contfumption of about 
1000 cwt. of tobacco and 12 millions of cigars. 

Thus it wasy that it beiny desirable to spoi'e the troops 
a* much as possible, and at the same time only to destroff 
Paris in case of the most uryent necessity, nothiny remained 
but the slow expedient of the investment ^ with eventually ike 
regular sieye. 

Astonishment has fre(|uently been cxpresi»ed , even by i\ume 
who nnderstuud the tiuiiject, that the en^ini*er and artilhTy attack 
wan M long deferred , and it has been said that even if the 
yeneral attack wan nece8saril\ dclayt^d throngh difticiilties i\T4)giiised 
on all bides, still that un attack upon some one sinyte point 
might havi* led to the ruptnre of the line of fortifications far 
earlier than it actnally took plac4'. It is, n«) donht, proliable, that 
alter six weekn, nnfticieiit siege material con Id have been at hand 
tor a suei*essful attick, f«ir instjinee, upon Forts Issy, Vanvres, and 


Montruuge, or even St. Denis. Siege guns were on the spot as 
early as Uie middle of October. It may also be assumed that the 
forts would have succumbed to the attack some weeks later , so 
that, consequently, the enceinte might have been attacked about 
tlie middle of November. It is however, very greatly to be 
quortticmed, whether any considerable advantage Would thus have 
been gained towanls the attainment of the final aim. Strong 
Halli«»8 would, shortly, have been directed against the threatened 
point, which, in any case, would have exacted many victims. 
Then, however, even after a successful assault and considerable 
.^^acrifices , there was still the risk of encountering long continued 
street fijicliting and p'cat destruction, the very evils which it was 
dcHirahle to avoid. If only some of the fort8 had been taken, or 
perhaps the town of St. Denis, then the attsick by storm would 
liave to be decided upon. To stop half way was out of the 

T/ie other e.rpedienl led far more surely^ and with fewer 
losses, to the object — that of first conquering the papulation 
mornllif, and then of bringing on a capitulation by threatening 
the city generally. 

Investment, with starvation for its object y had plainly a 
great {irospect of succohs at Paris, contrasted with the disadvantages 
of tlie otiier means of attick. 

Hut even this way presented considerable difRculties. The 
army appointed for the investment, must be sufficiently strong to 
oppose all sorties. The cincture of the investing corps must be 
between \) and 10 miles (41 to 4G R. m.) in length, so that the 
trcHtpi) rtlionld not be place<l immediately under the guns of the forts ; 
that is, al)oiit 22,000 men of the investing troops to each mile 
(l^'ii E. m.'^, eonse(juently a very small number. If the investment 
l:iste<l Huffu'iently long for the Paris troops to be formed into a 
f^erviceahh' army, the position of the investing troops would become 
v(*r>* hazanlouK. Tlie Parisians could have no difficulty in attaeking 
any point they miglit choose with a fourfold, or still greater 
superiority in forces. It was anticipated however that Paris would 
be unable to endure, for long, a rigidly carried out inveatment. Cut 
off from all intercourse with the outer world and deprived of its 



supply of proyWonSy it wm generally bdieved that the Inxarkm 
city would very looii eapitaUte. Even in the Gernum hend-qttuton, 
it was probably not expected that four and a half montha reaiataaea 
in privation I would be encountered from the spoilt , exeitabley 
swayed -by -every -windy unstable foe. 

But in this respeet Paris deeeived all expectation. Itffttred 
vanityf scorn of the ^barbarian^' and fear^ wore so siromg^ 
that in spite of all the hunger and miserly one dm/ a/fcar 
another of passive resistance passed away^ until a series mf 
months was gone. 


After the news of the capitulation of Sedan had spread in 
Paris, after the first panic had been overcome; then after some 
days had been uselessly spent in general rejoicings on aeoonnt ef 
tlie republic of the 4th of September, the city set to work, in 

anticipation of the cnemy^s approach, tc» prepare for a lengthened 
siege, and engaged witli renewed zeal in hiying in provisions and 
in the equipment of the fortifications. 

The accumulation of the necessaries of life for Paris was 
an immense task, and it was acconiplislied in a surprisingly grand 
way, wliich does great honour to the imperial minister of com- 
merce, Clement Duveniois, wh«i had been occupied with it as a 
precautionary measure since the first defeats of the army. 

The new repuhlican government carried (Mi successfully, the 
work whicli had been begun. 

The wliole population of Paris had In^en raised by the fugitives 
iVcmi the neighbourhood, and the (lardes Mohih's, to a capitation 
of al)out 2,1(>0^(K)(). During tlic siege this mass of liunian beings 
needed in bulk the following quantities*): 

*) Acconlin^ to a rnlciilntion liy A. F.mnnn;:haus, wliich i«. baM-d upon 
thf >t:iti!(ti('al «'«*tinint»'S <»f IIu«<son*> work "Ln roiiicmnnatinn tlf I*aris** ISfiO 
aiul upon the ,, Journal divH hU'onnIniMt('^*^ 








and cut up for sale 



V\^ . . 









Horses . 



Food for these animals, 

in hay 



Oats . . 









Or th<' wliole value in 

liay . 



Salt . . 



Butter . 



^Ki^ ' ' 





Coffee . 



Olive oil 



Beer . . 






Spirits . 



A ^n*Mt <|uantity of other provisions, however, of which no 
r.-ilrulatinii ran be made, are not here included, such as milk, 
fowls^ salt fisli, fn^sli water (ish, oysters, ice, and especially such 
vuluiniiinus <'(libles as vegetables and potat^>es \^those mentioned 
iihitxr , were as fo<Kl for animals), which Paris requires in large 
<|iiaiititi(>s iiiuler ordinary circumstances; therefore as these articles, 
with tlir t'xcv'ption of milk, could not be procured afresh, and very 
>noi) ('<>as('(l to be in store, a still greater need of the above 
inciitioncd articles becomes evident In horses, for example, it is 
<'<-rtain that dnriiig the siege a far greater number were consumed, 
and the (*orn'S))onding amount of hay, oats and straw in hand 
would be far fj:roater. 

The bulk of fuel cimsumed has not been reckoned. 

A Paris newspaper of the 4th of October gives the following 
o(TK'ial list of the provisions then in hand: 

"^In the different parks of the capital, as tlie Bois de Boalogne, 


276 , 

Luxeinbourgy and others, there are About SSOyOOO sheep, 40,000 
oxen, and 12,000 pigs. 

""In flour, PliriB has a store of 300,000 ewt., besidea flie 
Hiip])lies at the bakers, which are estimated at 200,000 ewt. 

""There are from 30,000 to 40,000 ewt. of salt and pt c sorv ed 
meat, and a considerable amoant of salt fish; lastly, an enormooa 
supply of salt, 100,000 ewt. of rice, and 10,000 «wt of coffee, 
irrespective of all the other differrat products which are in the 
warehonsct) and shops*)." 

The beantifnl parks, in which large herds of animals were 
collected, presented a remarkable spectacle, but the cattle soon 
suiTered greatly for want of proper care. Another remarkable 
flight was presented by the public buildings, the stations, halls, 
theatres, and above all the newly erected opera-house in marble 
and ^>ld, filled from cellar to roof with sacks of flour, grain, 
potatoes and barrels of wine, the corridors and green rooms arranged 
as kitchens and offices, and the amphitheatres as hospitals. 

The second question was the fortifications. 

In wliat manner tliey were increased and strengthened under 
the dire<-tinn of CJeneral Trochn has already been mentioned. The 
last w<'eks of August and the first half of September were really 
well employ<'d in the erection of tlu^se new works, and from tliis 
time forth, they were continued diligently. 

Hut the equipnunit of all the works, also, require<l great 
a<-tivity, and an enormous material. Neither failed. 

The arsenals of Paris and Vincennes were emptied, and everj* 
pin, even the old trophies from the Invalides, were C4>nveyc*d to 

*> Thr-.r r>tiinntr>> <lirtV'r \vr\ iiiin"h from tin* fomuT I'alcnlation. The 


iniinlxT nf .sIm-c]) is inurli <;n>:itrr. tliiit of nxcii and I'i^s . iinirli sinnllrr. 
Vet it iiiav hv a.ssuiiUMl that a L'r<'at iiiiinhiT of aiiiinaU, of thr tuo la>>t 
LiiiiU, wrrr at th«' hiilrhrr.-. 

Thr Fn-ni-h otiiiiNtc of thr .-ton* of lUmr, .show** only ont* -ixlh of the 
i|uantit\ ahovc ri't'konrd . hut quote-, on tlic other hiiml , conitideralile 
• |uantiti(->< nf x\cv. 

All rah'iilation i>i diftirult . hrraii.-r private famili4>> nn<l trndr^pooplc 
naturally |iri>\i«l<'fl -tores on tlieir own aerount; stilUA. Knmiin';hau>* <'>tiinat«' 
i- \aluahh-. heeausr it i> l>as<il upon well foundeil -rienlilie in\i*i'ti;;Htii»ii<i, 
into the aetual rei{uiMite> for the maintennnce of life. 


the ramparts; from Havre all the heavy guns of tlio fleet were 
brought to Paris by the Sehie, and the equipmeut of the forts 
aud of tlie euceiute was gradually eompleted. The fortress of 
Mout Valcrien carried 79 guns (amongst which were some giant 
r^iunou such as the Vali^rie, aud the Josephine), Fort Isey G4, 
Vauvres 45, Montrouge 43, Bioetre 40, Ivry 70, Vincennes 117, 
Charenton 70, Nogent 53, Rosny 5fi, Noisy 57, Komaiuville 49, 
AubtTvlllerri (ji), de TEst 52, and de la Briche 61 guns. 

Altogetlier at the end of October, in all the fortifications, 
2000 guns were to be found. 

In order to carry out the preparations, which necessarily 
precede the defence of every fortress, exertions were made to 
clear thi* glacis in order t(» procure free play for the guns. These 
efforts led to a terrible devsistntion all round the city, without 
gaining their object, in consequence of the great uumber of thickly 
dotted vilhiges, vilhis, chateaux, parks and woods. It was in vain 
that the axe and fire raged in the charming woods of Boulogne, 
Vincennes, Hondy and Meudon ; the fire would not ignite the w(K>d 
which was full of sap, and the axe was paralyzed. It was impos- 
sible to tear down the countless villages and country seats; these 
fornierly fnvourite spots of the Parisians, and of all strangers visiting 
Paris, wen? in too great abundance. But all the inhabitants were 
forced to leave their possessions, and numberless families hiid their 
happiness and property unnecessarily destroyed. 

In the interior, the army for the defence was organized. The 
defence of tlie enceinte, and the security of public tranquillity, were 
consigned t<> the Garde Nationale, which formed the First Army. 
A Second Army was f(»rmed out of the regular troops and Gardes 
M(»biles fi#r the purpose of making sorties; and a Third Army of 
the regular tr(H>ps aud sailors, was organized for the defence of 
the ftirts*). 

*) Thia distribution, crrtainlyf did not come into fnll vfTcct until the 
hc'^iiiiiint; of November ; ^ however, an annlo^^oaif eni|>loynient of the different 
kind.N of troo|».s took place from the lH*;;inninf; , the order of battle, which 
%%xi.H only ;;iv(>n out later, here follows, in order thai it may be more easily 
ronipreh ended. 



Commander in (Mdf Genenl Trochu. 

Chief of the Staff, General SekmUM. 

Deputy Chief of the Staff, General Foy. 

Commander of the Artillery, General Goiod. 

Chief of the Engineers, General de Chaband-Latonr. 

Intendant General, General Wolff. 


Chief Commandant, In September and October, General 

Tamissierf from November, General TkomoM. 
Chief of the Staff, Colonel Hontagut. 
Commandant of the Cavalry Legion, Colonel Qolelet. 
Commandant of Artillery, Colonel SchOkher. 
Tliis army oonaisted of 266 (according to other aathorities 
276) battalionB and finally numbered ^00,000 men. 


Chief Commandant, (jcneral Ducrol. 

Cliief of the Stiiflf, General Appert. 

Deputy Chief of the Staff, Lieutenant Colonel Wariiet. 

Commandant of Artillery, General Frebault. 

C^)mmandant of Engineers, General Tripier. 

First Army Cor/fs: Cicnernl f^'htoff. Chief of the Staff, 
(lencral do Vnldan. Commandant of Artillery, (toneral d'Ubexi. 
Commandant of Engineers, iieneral du Pouet. 

iHt Divirtion: General Mnlray. \>X Hrigade: General Mar- 
tenot. 2nd Brigade: (teneral Paturel. 

2nd Division : (Jenrral ile Mainr/nn/. 1st Brigade' (Ganlo 
Mobile from the provinees): Colonel Valentin. 2nd Brigade: 
(iencral Blaise. 

.'5rd Divirtion: General lUavchnrd, Ist Briga<h' (CSanie 
Mobile fn>ni the provinces: (*olonel (.^mte. 2nd Brigade: 
General dt*. Mari(»urte. 

Second Army Corps: General RenauM, Chief of the 


Staff, General Ferri-Pisani. Gommandant of Artillery , General 
Boi88<miiet. Commandant of Engineers, Colonel Corbin. 

l8t DiviHion: General Stubiellc. Ist Brigade: Colonel Bonnet. 
2iid Brigade: General Lecomte. 

2nd Division: General Berlhaut, Ist Brigade: General 
Bocher. 2nd Brigade: Colonel Boutier. 

3rd Division: General de Maussfon. Ist Brigade: General 
('oiirty. 2nd Brigade: General Avril de Lanclos. 

Third Army Corps: General d*Ejr/*a. Chief of the Staff, 
Colonel de Belgaric. Commandant of Artillery, General Princeteau. 
< ommandant of Engineers, Ctdonel Ragon. 

1st Division: (icneral de Bellemare, 1st Brigade: Colonel 
Fournes. 2nd Brigade: Colonel Colomieu. 

2nd l)ivirtl(»n: (leneral MatlaL 1st Brigade (Garde Mobile 
from th(^ provincert): General Faron. 2nd Brigade: General Daudel. 

Cavalry Division: General de Champeron. Ist Brigade: 
(ieneml dv (ierbroig. 2nd Brigade: General Cousin. Regiment of 
ni<»uiite(l (iendarmes: (*olonel Allaveine. 

In November this army numbered 120,000 men, with 80 field 
:in<i mitrailleuse batteries. 

TillKI) AiiMY 
(under the speeial command of General Trochus, 

1st Division: General Soumain, Chief of the Staff: Lieut. 
Colonel IVehin. 1st Brigade: General Dargontolle. 2nd Brigade: 
(ieneral de Chassiere. 

2nd Division: Vice Admiral de la Ronciere. Ist Brigade: 
Colonel Lavoignet. 2nd Brigade: Colonel Haurion. 3rd Brigade: 
<-aptain of Frigate, Lamotte Tenet. 

3rd Division: (ieneral de Lmiers. Chief of the Staff: Major 
Morlaineourt. 1st Brigade: Colonel Filhol de Camas. 2nd Brigade: 
Colonel de Chamberet. 

Ith Division: General de Beaufort, Chief of the Staff: 
Major I^^coy. 1st Brig^d^^: General Dumoulin. 2nd Brigade: 
Captain of Frigate, d'Andr^. 


5th DivUon: Genend Correard. Chief of th« BtMT: Ibifir 
Vial. l8t Brigade: CMonel Ghampion. 3iid Brigade: OoIomI 

6th Dirision: General JtHugue$. Chief of the Staff: Ita^ 
d*£llloy. latn^gade: Captain ofFrigate, de Bray. 3id Brigade: 
Golouel Bro. 

7th Divlflion : Rear Admiral Pothttau. Ist Brigade : UmiL 
Colonel Le Mains. 2nd Brigade: Naval Captain Salmon. 

Cavalry: Ist Brigade: General de Bernis. 2nd Brigade: 
Lieut. Colonel BlondeL 

The strength of this army was 80,000 men. 

In the month of September this distribution was only pro- 
reeding gradually. It had probably gone through many ehangea, 
i\s the opinions upon the warlike capacity of tlie different eorpa 
were altered after the first fights in Septemb^. This is shown 

by one of (Seneral Trochu*8 orders on the 11th of September, In 
acconlaiice with which the Garde Mobile of Paris was divided in 
the foHowing manner: 

Ist Division: General de Liniers (Head-Quarters in the Elys^). 
Battalitms of the arrondissements 8, 9, 16 and 17. 

2nd Division : General de Beaufort d'llautpoal (Ilead-Quarters 
in tlie Palais Royal). Battalions of the arroudissenieuts 1, 2, 9 
suid IH. 

8rd Division: General Berthaut (Head-Quarters in the Con- 
servatoire i\v Tart et de rindustrieV BatUilicais of the arron- 
disseninits 3, 4, 1(>, 11, 12, TJ and 2n. 

1th Division: (JeniTal Correard J lead -Quarters in the Luxcm- 
b<»urg^ Battalions of the arrondissoments 5, (>, 0, 13, 11 and 15. 

This distribution does not appear in the (»rd<T of battle given 
above; some of the Generals are not mentioned at all, and others 
have different eommands. 

The strength estimates in the foregc»ing order of battle cannot 
be rcganled as very tmst- worthy. There was many a cori>8 and 
many a battalion the stn^ugth of which was unknown to its own 


commander. Only thus much cau be aBSumed, that the strength 
of the army altogether was about 500,000 men. 

The stale of feeling which exisled in Ihe largest portion 
of these masses y vis, the Garde Nationalcy may be inferred 
from a description given by Francisque Sarcey, a member of the 
Garde Nationale, who has published a narrative of the state of 
Paris during the siege, and writes as follows, with regard to the 
general feeling during the advance of the Germans, in the first 
half of September: 

''All the world expected to see the ''Prussians" fall upon 
Paris and force the gates, five or six days after Sedan. Tlieir 
progress could be traced by the notices in the papers, which 
announced, one day: "The march to-day is only as far as Bar- 
Ic-Duc", the next day: "to Vitry", the following day: "The march 
to-day \ti only to Chalons'', and then : "They are going to Epernay". 
Thus we could calculate, by how many miles France had become 
reduced in size. The railroad material moved back, from town 
to town, upon Paris, and proclaimed how much country had been 
abandoned to the enemy. The girdle with which the Prussians 
enclosed us, drew closer every hour, until Asnieres and Vincennes 
became the termini of the railroad lines. One day more and all 
the carriagcri, all the engines, the whole material were collected 
together in the Ciirriage uheds at Paris, and the gates by which 
they utjcd to leave the great city were locked and walled up. 

'^It i8 highly probable that tliose who will relate the story of 
the siege to posterity, will only represent the fixed, immutable 
purpose of the Parisians at this time, to conquer or to die; they 
will blazen forth the heroic courage of this great capital, which 
broke through its habits of luxury and refinement without flinching, 
and resolved to bury itself in ruins, rather than yield to a 
C4>wardly c:ipitulation. 

"In reality however, the feelings* which agitated the Parisian 
citizens during this waiting peri<»d, were very complicated, and it 
needs an (observer of subtile mind to analyze them. 

"At the bottom of every heart lay dormant — it was ab- 
surd, irratiomil and laughable — a secret hope that "the affair 
would be arranged", and that the Prussians would halt half way. 


Upon what were flieie ttraqge Qlmlfmi gnmnded? Vprn ewf 
thing and upon nothiog. William had declared flial be ealy sale 
war againat Napoleon. ^Now** said they, *^ai the Enpetor ia 
overthrowBi why should the King of Pnuuia eontiiiiie tke eaa- 
paign agaisit a nation which never did him any hannP^ To tUa 
was added: ^'he will be afraid of the French .repaMie, aad tta 
spread of democratic ideas in his army.** In fiict all the dmmh 
crats of Paris composed long addresses to the soldiers of flie e mmg^ 
their ""German brothers'', and posted them on all the walla af 
Paris, presumably with a view to thebr bebg eonvenlently mid ly 
the agents of Monsienr von Bismarck. Besides, the 
of Europe was counted upon. ^Russia will not allow tte 
quests of Prussia to continue, wUch endanger the aeeaiHj af 
Europe. England must perceive tliat after the conquest of Praaas^ 
William will annex Holland and aspire to the doaifadon of the 
sea." On the other baud the article in the **Time^ waa Mt 
quoted, which deliberately enumerated the reasons wlqf Soopa 
must remain neutral, and recommended an indifference, to wUeh 
Europe was only too much inclined. 

''liut what nourished thii» irrational dream of the population 
more than anytliing else, was the incurable vanity, which is the 
principal feature in our national character. To take Paris ap* 
peared to us such a niunstrons sacrilege, such an astounding 
outrage against all laws, human and divine, tliat the thought of 
such t\ thing would not enter our heads; such a crime could not 
be committed, no — it was impossible. Sooner than that, the 
earth would open and Hwnllow up the accursed ones who should 
venture to raise their hands against t)ic holy ark. 1 am c<mvinced 
that this unconquerable hope held its ground with many amongst 
us until the last day« that it blended with all their sensations and 
if it ever entirely ceased t«» exist, it >^as only at the first shot 
fri»m Fort Valerien." 

Thus Francisque Sareey. 

And one must do him Justice, tor the whole demeanour of 
the population , the diplomatic steps of the government and the 
military acti(»ns of the besieged army, have confirmed bis de- 
scription. It is, besides, worthy of remark, that upon the 


iiions of tlie (Jovcrnment for all useless moutlia to leave Paris, the 
men of the well-to-do clasaeH certainly coiidueted their families to 
the south and t^» the sea side watering j)laceH, but whether from 
niriosity, pride, wantonness or love of the beautiful city, with few 
cx<'ei)tionH , they returned to Paris themselven, ''in order to take 
part in the siege". 

The GefTnan Army drew near immedialcly after the capi- 
fuiation of Sn/ariy the XI. Army Corps only, remaining bidiind 
proviKionally, fnr the purpose of sending off the captured French 
Army to (lermany. 

The King's I lead -Quarters were removed to Varennes on the 
Ith of 8ei>teinb('r, on the r)th to Kheims, on the 14th to ChAteau- 
'rhicrry, on the ir)th to Meaux and on the 19th to the chateau of 
Fcrr'n ITS. The armies of xhv ('rown Princes of I^ussia and Saxony 
m.'irrhed by the two main roads, leading from Sed;in to Paris, 
without meeting any resistance; and the troops delighted in the 
brautifiil n>uiitry, whirh unfolded itself in greater h)veliness and 
richness as rarh day's march brought them nearer to the capital. 

(icneral /Vw<;y, who had been (m the march to Mezieres, 
with \\w \'Mh Army Corps for Mac Mahon's eventual support, 
rightly nppnhensive for his own safety, had again returned to 
Paris Mil the <>tli and 7th of September. 

Tlic III. .Vrmy marched upon the southern line. The Ilcad- 
QuMitrrs of the Crnwn Prince of Prussia were in Attigny on the 
•Ith, in \V;»rmereville on the 5th, in Hheims on the fith , and in 
Hours.nilt, nt-ar Ej)eniay, on the Otii. At this place and at CliAteau- 
Thifrry, the III. Army crossed the Mame, approached the city 
bftwcrn the MMrne and the Seine, and reached Nogent-sur-Marne 
and Cn'tril with the advancetl guanl on Xlie 15th of September. 
On this ilay tin- Head - Quarters were removed from Montmirail, 
vsheri' they had been since the 12th, to C<»ulommiers. 

The IV. Army marched by Soissons, U|H>n the northern line, 
i.ikiii;: several roads. It <Mily commenced the mardi on the 5th 
n\ S('pii«nib<'r, after having rested on the previous day. At 
th«- same time, on the 5th, an attempt was made on Montmody 


by a Btrong dMMhmeiit of the Oaide Ctorpt, whidi hamrnvp b 
spite of « bombudment for severml hovrsi did malt pndaee tki 
desired result spoil fhis roek fortreeSy and wm eomeqaeitfji Ml 

further contiiuied. 


Tbe IV. Army Corps , which originally followed (he Gnde 
Corps, advanoed against Paris by Vendresse upon Laon; the XD. 
Army Corps by Le Ch&ie and Rethel npon Gormiflf. Fnm 
Launois, the Garde Corps turned to the south upon C^aonne. Ob 
the 1 1th of September, the line Laon-Craonne-Cormiey waa raaehei. 

As with the IIL Army, the Cavalry DivisioBa were two di^t 
march in advance. On the 9th of September, thereiDrey D«ke 
William of Mecklenburg, Commander of the 6th Gavabj DhrUai^ 
was able, after a short pariey, to move into Laam^ wUeh wm 
given up by the French General, Theremm. Here oecnired the 
melancholy aoddent of the ignition of the powder magaalBe ta the 
citadel, after its surrender, probably by a non-commiMioiied 
(Garde d*artUlerie). The explosion cost the lives of 40 
Jagers, and above 200 French Gardes Mobiles, and wounded many 
others, including tlie Duke himself. 

The Head-Quarters of the IV. Army were in the chateau 
Marchais ou tlie 10th and 11th of September, from the 13th to 
the 17th the advance was continued upon Nanteuil, Acy and Lisy, 
and Paris itself was reached on the 18th and 19th. The 
iV. Army Corps passed Soissons on the lith. The fortress refused 
tlie summons to surrender and was invested. 

Whihit the iV. Army thus approached the great city frmm 
thi* north and tlicn drew its line of invorttmcnt on the north and 
e;ist, opptisite the forts of St, Denix^ Aubcrvillers^ Homainrilhy 
yoisy, liosnij, the redoubt of Fonttmat/ and Fort Sogcnt ^ the 
111. Army (rontinually extended further to tlie south and iiw?i/, 
and, marching by Hievre , Talaiwau and Vcnuiilles, enclosed the 
forU of CharetUoHy Irrt/, Ifivr'trVy Montrowje^ yanvres^ Isgg 
and the fortress of Mont f'a/rrifn. 

On thi' VMh of September the circle was closed round 

The Head-Quarters *»f the 111. Army were removed to Ver- 
sailles; those of the IV. Army to Grand-Tremblay, 


Tlie enclosing m:in(ruvre of the Ias! few days had not taken 
plac«, however, without fighting. Probably the plan of the de- 
fence was, if possible, U) hold the plateanx of Clamart and Meudon, 
the heights before the south-west front, already mentioned as im- 
portant ; or perhaps the intention was only to disturb the enemy's 
manoeuvre for the moment. 

General Ducrot*) repeatedly directed vehement attacks against 
the troops which wei'e in the act of shutting off the south-west 
front, on the 17th and 18th and particularly on the 19th of 

These attacks would have greatly endangered the 111. Army, rtufficicnt forces been developed. In this they certainly failed, 
(leneral Ducrot brought into action four Divisitms of the regular 
tn»op8 — 30,000 men at the highest estimate — , much too few for 
so grave an undertaking as here presented itself. Conse(iuently 
nothing came of his attacks but a totally useless siicrifice of men, 
:in<1 moreover it entailed the disadvantage of a defeat of those 
troops, <»u which Paris had to place the greatest reliance at the 
rommencenuuit of the defence. 

Tlif fights developed themselves as follows: 

The V. Army Corps laid a pont<K)n bridge over the ' Seine, 
above lillnwuve St. Gforyttx, on the 17th, and then accom- 
panied by the 2nd Cavalry Division, marched towards Versailles with 
the <-avalrv division in front. In order to cover the conatruction 
ol the bridge, the plateau from Limeil to Boissy St. Leger, north 
of the point for crossing the Seine, and opp<»site t4> Fort Charen- 
ton at the distance of a mile (4^/5 English miles), had been occu- 
pied by the 17th Infantry Brigade, two squadrons and two bat- 
teries. This positiim waA attacked, in tlic wikmI of tirevannrSf 
:\i 2 o'clock in the aftern(M)n, by six French battalions with two 
batteries fnun Creteil. However, on the (lerman side, the five 
companies which were pushed forward to the northern point of the 
wood, were sufficient in conjunction with the artillery and cavalry, 

*) The >ainc (tcneral who commanded at Sedan after Mac MahoHf and 
«><«cn|>o<l the rA|iitulation in tome manner not yet quite cleared up. 


• uuuunteil ^^M 

tu overthrow thy cueniy. Tlic Ii>n« .if tliu ficn 
:i i>rnriin Biid in nii'ii, !tt killeil iiml wnuiiilcil. 

In tliD iDiuinwliile tbe {laiHHgd uf tlio Soiuu bail bKBit nC' 
com|)liD)ieil, xad ou tlio r>illi>win(;' iluy tliu ninrcli wbr vunUnnni 
Uiwtirdii VenuiilloM, n» for as Kji^vrf ['Jtii Divisitin) luid I'nlaiauui 
(Hull IMviBion). WIiILaI tliJa wnji Utunj; iiUcc a »kirinUb tiu-unwl 
In thi- north iif HO-vre, betwei^n iletuclimrnto iif tUe »tU lilviMun 
iinil Krunch truops, whd nttuckod frum Picttsis I'iquot. 

[I^arly ou t}ie 19tli tlio V. Army Cut-po nxivuil ulT frum Ui^m 
anil PftlaiM»u, In imlfj U) roM-h Vinnilk-it Die itnmL- lUy. In mr 
>.'{ tho V. marched the 1. U^varian CorpH whirli hnd crnswM] bj 
tlif- bridge At Vlllt-neiiv<., one day Uter. Penieulile (.fimniiioIcatliMii 
willi Venwillt^s hml been funnt-d by n pntrul, i>n Die jir«Ti<>iiii day. 

Kven before tiic commencenienf of the march, tlie Frenrh ouido 
an attue.k rrntn PflU-IiicesIrt^. It whm rejiulMed and tbr nufrh 
iif the divLuon wim proceeded with. Tbun fwllowwd u rvnewd 
violent attaek, nbirh obliged the Division to devHope for fighting 
wit)i the front to the north. Tlic eombat was bo vehemeDt, ud 
General Due rot developed such overpowering masses of troopa, 
that the 10th Division was also obliged Ui give up its m^rch ii 
urder to move forward, with the artillery corps, to VilU-CoaUi^ 
in support of the 9th Division. Still before the sirrival of tUl 
reinforcement, the advanced gnsrd of the I. Bavarian Corpe, Di^^ 
Bri);.sde, been so judiciously marched against the left flaik 
of the French, iuid had attacked with such energy, that tiie tatatt 
against the iltli Division fi-ll inli> dis.n-der, and this Divlsioi 
now siici-eeded, tolerably i|nickly, in liefiiitiug the enemy. Slwrtly 
anur II o'clock a.m. (iencial vi.n Kiirhbaeh »':>h iigain able to 
continue the march with lii* corps tn the west; he ciudd letve 
llie section of ground wliich he i|iiilleil, .is well as the enemy who 
slill held the olher side of PIi'skI^ I'iiinel , ti> the care of Ifce 
II. B:iv:irian Ocirps, now i]i;ircliing from Lonjumeaii in the soitt, 
up'in Chatenay and to hiit sLip|iiirt. 

(ieneral von Ilartniann, relieving the V. Corps upon the tnvt 
of country betwci-n Sct'niix and Vilta-Conblay, took up the Wg>- 

Towania V2 o'clock, tJie French wen 


at Moulin de la Tour iuid along tlie ridge of the plateau to the 
westward , as far jig Plesxis Piquet and beyond. The ^Bloi>e 
which they held was furnished with cover trenches formed one 
above and another, and displayed six batteries in emplacements. 

Their position was very strong, both on account of the steep- 
ness of the slope and the strength of the fortifications. Then 
in a short time, the French side again took the offensive. 

Of the Bavarian Corps, the brigades of the 3rd Division were 
moved forward upon Pelit^Bicestre and upon Sceauj'j whilst the 
4tli Division with the 8th Brigade renaained at CroLr de Femis^ 
and the 7th Brigade was sent against Bourg. Movements of the 
enemy's tmops were observed, at 11.45 o* clock, both towards 
Plessis Piquet and towards Fontenay, which led to the supposi- 
tion that an offensive effort was intended. This appeared to be 
directed from the enemy's left flank, against the infantry advancing 
by Bourg; and General von Ilartmann, therefore, C(xmmanded the 
7th Brigade to confine itself in holding Bourg until further orders. 
At 12 oVloek the Hth Brigade was moved to a reserve position 
to the (>a8t of Chatenay, in order that it might be available to 
support both wings of the corps. 

It was, however, confined t^» an artillery action, and at 2.30 
o'clock, the French eva<'uated their position. 

The advanced guard of the 3rd Division followed immediately 
and took ]>o8HeHsion of the abandoned entrenchments, with 7 12- 
pounder field ^uns which had been left behind. 

The French troops had apparently bi^en unable U* h(»ld out 
against the fire of the German artillery. In the meanwhile the 
VI. Army Cor|)« had advanced by two p<mtoon bridges over the 
Seine at rHleneuve and by Villeneuve le Koi and Orly, towards 
the fortificationrt of Paris. The artillerv fire from the entrench- 
ment** at nilfjuif then put an end to the advance of the VI. 
Corps. French infantry also showed themselves, but were defeated 
without any considerable fighting, and advanced posts were established 
upon the line (,'lievilly- Choisy. Several offensive attacks were still 
made <in the part of the French from the entrenchments, but 
witlmut success. 

On the evening of the 19th of September, the Tliird Army 

held the line BonglTil, Sinw, Mmdoa, Bomiff ] 
Thiaig, Choisy le Boi, BonnflDil. 

This day, the Bnt of the Invertnieiit, hed b 
aaturouH for Ou Vnaeb. In a panic of terror, the beatei I 
hati fled throngh the forts, withio the gates of the eify hsdH^ i 
tlicre spread slsnn and confDrion. The popnUtioii, botriSed ani 
at the same time indigiuuit at the sight of the flying dcmornltiEl \ 
soldiers, overwhelmed them with invectivea, and eone weft i 
by the Garde Nationale, to give an answer for 
And yet these wen the only regalar troops wUeh Paifa 1 
]MMHess«d. When therefore the ery resoonded throogh tbtt 4 
"Long live the Mobiles I Down with the ZoBantl Down 
the Line!" tiiis oonid only entul tin evil eoMeqieobc of •• 
gendering disBeiuion in the army, at the eipease of Die bettv 

The endeavout of the besieged, after this, mte 
dircctal to the iiutnwtion of the nnmerons bands of fix- 
Natiunule and Oarde HoUle. In addition to whieh, the jirinciplcJ 
was observed of firing with Iwavy gunii from the forts up<<ii cv<^iy 
thing thikt was visible of the bexiegcrB, not only npon ninalt d^ 
tachments, but also on single posts. 

On the Ovrmaii side everything was at first done to reader 
tlio Invuetment really impenctmble, both as regards the paidig 
of single mi'B8cnger8 nil well as the fmstraticin of attempts for an 
attiick. Ity iihikiiig nso iif every advantage nf the gnmnd, the 
most advanced line of out-pouts was piiHhcd, with cirenmspectioe, 
as near to the forts hh it was anywhrre p<>s«ble, in order to find 
out eai-li mcaHiirn adopted by llic i-iieniy and eviTy alti-mlioii in 
his )H)itition. KiitrcnclnnenlK wt-re made luliind iw a pmtediuti 
against wirtien; tlie defcnre rapiiliililicK of tlio oiitskirlx of the 
viHaK<"M, *"iTe H(rei)gtlion<-d by eailliwurkH, abatis, rovi-rlrcncb« 
and barrieadfn ; the extcnsivi- park wall* wrre cverywlicrc provided 
with liiiiph<des, pamtagt-i) wt'n- made tliningh the walls, tuid the 
points best adajitcd for poHiliims were indicated beforeliMid hjr 
sign boards. 

Tims, in the midst of a labyrinth >if countless buildings, «f 
the ebarming and beautiful reMirts of jdentture round tlie tMjt 


a cincture was <lrawii, of strong def^nnive entrenchmeDts*), of consi- 
derable depth, whicli in a short time was so completely closed op, 
that Paris was obliged to resort Ui qnit€ unusual means of inter- 
course through the air, in order to avoid absolute isolation. 

The month of September only witnessed some unimportant 
milit:iry events. 

In the night oi' the 22iid the (jJerman tmt-posts, observing 
that the entrenehuients of f'iiifj'ut/' were evacuatiMl by the French, 
had ertt'iblished themselves in them. On the following morning, 
however, they were driven out again by the tire of Forts Bi<'etre 
and Ivry. Still Maud'huy's Division, which now broke out of the 
t'ort> in pursuit, was repulsed. 

On the same dav Kear Admiral Saisset undeiiook a rec(»n- 
naissanre iii)on the n(>rth front, against Le Bouryet. 

Un the 2 1th, tin* (ierman out-posts at Sf, Cloud and Sevres 
were bombarded by gunboats, behmging to the Seine flotilla. 

On the Wi\\y a sortie on a larger scale, again took place, 
iiiidcr the direeti(>n ol (General Vinov, from the south-west front. 
Thr rial attack was made against the VI. Corps tVom the Forts 
Moiitrouge and 15io«"tn*, and fighting took plaec round f iilejui/'j 
Chvrilhfj Thiuis aii<l Choixy le Hoi y whilst demonstrations were 
iwiTiU' a;;aiii-t the V. Corps from Fort Issy, and against the XI. 
Corps iVoiii F«nl Charenton. The French wen* repulsed with c^m- 
sidcralilc loss, and amongst others, their able (jeneral, Guilhem, 
was killed. 

On the null and 2()th id* September, the negotiations, already 
UK iitit'ued at page 270, had taken plac^ between Count Hismarck 
aiitl .lides Favre, in the Chateau Hante-Maison, and in Ferri^res, 
the royal head qiiarti'rs. The negotiations as to tlu> possibility of 
a definitive armistice had Ixvn broken off, for in faet, neither of 
thf two parties was able to accept the demands of his opponent 

*) For till* bettrr (>oIll|»r^llvn^inn of tho mapit it may he rcnmrketl that 
all tin* (iiTiiiaii NNork^, whifh arc uot Humherrd ^ art* field tfdrenrhniettt s 
aii«i hattt'iies ut t/utinl atjaiust sortit.t ^ tluTffon' of a <lcf«'n«ivt« vharact(*r, 
wbiUt like nutnbtred woriit art nieye battfrieM, tliat in bombardtny batlerieji. 


for an armiMiite of tueh a kind. The poaitfoB of alUn made 
peace J most abflolntely neeeuary; an anniBtiee wai, lowever, bt- 
poBHible if it were not the immediate preliminary to peaee. 

The negotiations were broken off becanae the repubHean g ww - 
meiit was neither jadicions enough, nor strong enough, to admit at 
ouce the prospeet of a separation of land. 


The first days of October brought some small eneounters be- 
tween German cavalry and newly formed French troops, in a 
wider radius n»und Paris. Immediately after the enclosing was 
tiiiitihed, the four Cavalry Divisions of the Investing Army had 
received the mission of watching the country in the north-weet 
and west, especially also in the south as far as the Loire; and 
at the same time of bringing in requisitions the produce of which 
would be for the benefit of the uiagazines established in Corbeil. 
8iu|rle battalionH were assigned for the suppoi-t of the Cavalry. 

(leueral von Bredow, of the 5th Cavalry Division, whose 
head-quarters were in St. N(»in, had undertaken an expedition in 
the direction of Rouen, on the .'KHh of September, with the wain 
body of hirt bri|rade and six etmipanies; he here came upon 
irregular troops, which he dispersed, and after destroying; the rail- 
road \it Ktmeu, he oeeupitHl Mantes, Meanwhile the French had 
Mjjain ;if»s«*nibh»d at Pney ; (leneml von Hri'dow, whilst making a 
fnrthtT f'XptMlitioii towards Kvreux, attacked them afresh, ilro\e 
them away mi the r)tli of October, iii;uU* riMjiiisitions in fcVrew.r 
it^»*ir, colhTted ({iiantities of ratth* and fornjje from the whole 
nt'i^hbniirhood, :)nd n»tiinH'd with them t<» Paris. 

Thi' t>th (*avMlry Division, nt the same timt% advanced :i^ainst 
Chnrtres :\\n\ during its march, drovr away a (iardr Mobile de- 
tachment from th«' n<M«clibonrhood of Hamboiiill(*t, on the 2nd 4»f 

The 10th Brigade, reinforced l>y two companies and a bat- 


tery^ under command of Colonel von Alvensleben, went forward 
from Kambouillet upon Epemon, ncattered the out po8trt of a French 
det-ichment near the wood of St. Hilaire on the 4th of October, 
occupied Kpemon in the evening , and retunied to Kanibiinillet 
with the rich reHultn of the requirtitiouH, leaving Mime nmall de- 
tichroent8 distributed in rear. 

One 4 if thene detachment<< remaining behind, a Aquadron of 
the IGth HuHriarH, had quartered it^*elf in the hamlet of y4blis, and 
here, in tlie night of the 7th of (^ctober, the firnt catastrophe 
occurred from that new deplorable kind of warfare, which resulted 
from the measures taken by the republican government and from 
the iuHtipitions of the French press. The inhabitants of Ablis 
gave information of tin* pn»sence of the Ciermans, to a band of 
'Franc -tireurs in the neighbouHuNMl ; these surrounded tlie place 
in tilt* darkness, and, with the assistance of the inhabitants, killed 
th«* greater part of the soldiers who were surprised in sleep. A 
few only were able to escape. The (lermans in consequence burnt 
down the place as a terrible example. 

The 1th Cavalry Division, under command <»f Prince Albert 
of PrussiM, had gone in the direction of Orli'ang, and on the 4th 
of (Ktoher was stat'umed at Toury. From here the approach of a 
strong body of French was ascertained, wh<i were advancing from 
Orleans, in a northerlv direction. Tbe <.*avalrv I)ivisi<m moved 
hack to Ktampes, and from there to AutlKin, and reported the 
cireinn^tanee to the <'hief Command. 

riiese wer«^ the firjtt beginnings of the enterprises on the 
Loirt*, which as vet, had certainlv shown themselves of no offen- 
sive importance for the investing army. 

For all that, the circumstance^ de^*rved the greatest attention, 

on account of the strategical importance 4»f the point from whence 

the French niovemt*nt luul proceeded, and therefore an Awiy De 

tachuient , under the chief command of < General ron //rr Tann 

was imniediatel\ forme<l from th0 Third Army, cimsiating of the 

Ist Bavarian <N>rps, the 22nd Infantry Division, and the 2nd and 

4th (\'ivalr> Divisions, with the mission of discovering the plans of 

the possibly newly raised French Lioire Army and of opposing it in 

case of necessity. 

If • 


Genend von der Tann^ d < soifh on ikt 

7tli of October, (For the ope ons i Lo t. <3itt|iter 11.) 

Before Paris iteetf, everything remained qniet at the b^ 
ginning of the montk The King ri noved his htmi^ uar UrM l» 
rertaillesj am fke Bih. Ob the 9th of October, the int 14 
sieye guns arrived in Nanteail, via WeiBi»enbafg| and were thea 
traiirtpurted with great trouble, and by a wide circuit to avoid the 
iurtrt, to VilUi*Goublay. There, the siege park was entabUBbed. 

The investing army waf satisfied with tlie absolute iiolatioB 
of tlie great fortress, and the latter now b^^ gradually to eom- 
preliend what was intended. 

The account whicli Jules Favre publicly gave of his inter- 
view with Count Bismarck, in a style which came home to Freneh 
feeling, inflamed all hearts witli fresh indignation, and made thsT 
fall of Strasburg, which had now become known, earner to bear|^ 
III Paris at tliat time was sung: 

BUnuirck ri ta continuef 

Do tous tes I'rustfientf il n\*n rchtorft j^uert*, 

RiMnurck 81 tu continues 
I)t* tons tes l*russien8 il n'en restera plus. 

Paris fii*mly eoiiiited on the artHisUinco of the provintres, in 
tlie same way that the provinces, (»n the other hand, reckoned 
upon the euilurance of Paris. F^ch party hopiMl tliut the other 
would do the work. 

As three wei*krt had (dapsed since the investment, and still 
no army of ndief was approaching^ from tlic south, (Jambetta set off 
oil thi* (itli of Ortnbrr ill :iii air-hallooii^ in order to iiispin' the 
slujrjrish deputation <►!' the p)vcriiniciit in Tours, witli the lire of 
his stMitherii French enerjry. He arrived in 'I\Mirs on the tUh, 
alter li:ivin>r descended at Houen, and at once took away the 
War Ministry from the ap*d advocate Creinieux, in order to c^m- 
duct it simultaneously with the^Minktry of the Interior; so that 
he now had all the forces to he found outside Paris at his 

On the (ierman side a diplomatic act t«H)k place. Touut 
liisinarck addressed a cirtMilar, in the iM'ginnin^ of October, to the 


repreHCiiUtived of tlie North (verman Confederation in foreign lands, 
in wliirli lie iinpre8)$ively pointed out the danf^ers, to which the po- 
pulatiou would be expoged, if the French capital held out until the 
pruvision8 were completely exliausted. Amonpit otlKT thingH, he in- 
directly allowed the conclu8ion to be drawn, that only a tihort term of 
rertistance by tlic enemy, was reckoned upon at the Gennan head- 
i|uarter8. The prorisioning was however on a surprisingly large 
svalt\ and later the Parirtians displayed extraordinary frugality. 

Binmarck's dispatch had no effect upon the measures of the 
republi4*an g(»venuuent. 

After a rest of twelve days, General Tnwhu fixed upon the 
VMh of (hlober for a new sortie^ probably in consequence of 
<ieiHnil von der TannV departure bavin;; become known to him, 
and tVom nverestimating the weakness thus caused to the in- 
\rstiii;; army. On tiie day named, three c<ilumnK, under the chief 
«lirtM'ti«tii of (ieneral Vinoy, broke forth against the hei^^hts of 
Ciamarf^ after a vigorous fire had been previously opened from 
tli(* snutiicni forts; in the centre, <»ne brigade, under the command 
of (Hiirral Su^lMelle, moved against Chatiilon j upon the right 
Hank, niic battalion only against Clamart, am! upon the left flank, 
two battalion^ against Hagneuj\ 

These troops were, numerically, quite insufficient to attain 
anv sucress. 

(ieneral von Hartmann, against whose positions the attack was 
directed, took measures according to the method always em- 
ployed against French sorties, on the German side. He allowed 
thr <iicmy t<» press so far forward beyond the line of advanced 
po^t■'^, that by >urrounding him, he could bring him under the fire 
of artilh-rv ami infantrv. 

1 lie Frciirh columns p(;netrated into liagneux and Chatillon, 
without lueetiiig (onsiderable resistance, made themselves masters 
of the stone bridge between the latter place and Clamart; then 
liowev«'r, were rec«»ived by such a cross fire, that they commeDced 
tlirir n>treat as quickly as p4»ssible. 

riie 2nd Bavarian <*orps lost 388 men in killed and wounded, 
amongst whom were 10 oflgcere; the loss «»f the French mnn 
ctuisiderably greater. On the same day, perhaps as a support U* 


this sortie, or m a demonstration, tiie fortress npon Moat ValMoi 
overwhelmed the Park and Chateau of Si. Chud^ ' when tiie 
German ont-poets were stationed, with sneh a hail of the hea ^ieet 
shot, that this beantiful and huitorieally interesting bniBUng broke 
into flames, and was completely destroyed. It was one of tboae 
aseletis destmctions of their own property which, in the eontesi 
with the republic, so frequentiy bore evidence to the great laek 
of the knowledge of war in many of the French commanders, and 
of tlie love of destruction in uneducated, badly disciplined troops. 

^ sortie agam followed on the 21si of October^ wUeh it 
is presumed was cmly ordered by General Trochu upon the con- 
tinual urging of the population: **that he would still attempt 

Three French columns, about 6500 men strong in all, with* 
48 guns, supported by a reserve of 4600 men with 46 guns, 
broke forth at 1 o'clock p.m., between the Seine and Bneil, 
to the east of Rueil, and from Mont Val^en, against the posi- 
tions of the V. Army Corps, after the attack had been previously 
announced by a vigorous Are from Mont Valf^rien and the Seine 

General Ducrot commanded the sortie. 

At Malmaison tlie French cnc(»untered the furemo8t detach- 
ments of the V. Corprt, and were vigorously received. The Ist Garde 
Landw(>lir Regiment also engaged in the tight ^the Garde Land- 
welir Division, which had taken part in tlie eonquetit of Strasburg, 
had an'ived sliortly hefore, and was stationed at 8t. Germain). 
A tire -tight was developed which lasted for three hours, with 
heavy losses to the Frcncli , and was viewed by the Kin;; himself 
fnnn the Marly-viaduct. Penally the artillery of the IV. Army 
Corps cannonaded the French columns from \\\v right bank of the 


(teneral Ducrot drew back liis troops, with the loss <»f 2 held 
guns, as >^^ll as lo<» prisonera, besides numerous killed and 

Towards the end of the month there leax tnjain some senotis 
fifjhtiny on the north front of Pan's. 

The village of Le Bouryei was in the radius occupied by 


the 2nd Infantry Division of the Garde Corps; it was held by 
(Mie company. On the 28th of October, the French (leneral 
de BcUemare carried it by a surprise. As tliis inconsiderable event 
L<* Bonrget in itself was of no importance — was the first 
lucky rttroke for tlie Parisians, they did not fail to make out that 
it was an affair of unusual importance, and took fresli courage. 
Tiie 2nd Garde Division, on the other hand, however, considered 
it a point of honour to retake the village. 

On the morning of the .30th, General von Budritzki undertook 
a surrounding attack from Dugny, Pont Iblon and Blanc-Mesnil 
V. map of the north front of Paris). Five batteries of the artil- 
lery C(»rps were at his command besides those of his Division, 
and Aome battalions of the 1st Garde Division were held dispos- 
able as a reserve. Three attacking columns were formed and 
stood ready at 7.45 o'clock; that of the right wing, two battalions 
strong of the Kaiser-Franz-Regiment , under M;ijor von Derenthall, 
in Duf^ny; that of the centre at Pont Iblon, under Colonel Count 
Kanitx, cousinting of the Queen Elizabeth's Regiment, one battalion 
of tin* QucM'nV and the pi<»neer company of the 2nd (iarde; and 
that of the left wing at Blanc-Mesnil, under Colonel von Zeuner, 
composed of two battalions of the Emperor Alexander's Regiment* 
In artillery, three horse batteries were brought into position at 
Pont Ihlon, and the f<»ur light and four heavy Garde batteries at 
Blanc-Mesnil. Some cavalry was allotted to each C4>lumn. 

In rase support should be necessary, the divisional artillery 
was placed in readiness at Amouville, and the 2nd Garde Uhlan 
Regiment at Honneuil. 

At H oN'loc'k the horse batteries opened tire upon Le Bouryei^ 
and at thr sanu* timt* Zeuner's column was set in motion in order 
to (TOSS the hriKik I^e Moleret on the road to Drancy, and, moving 
along it, to take I.e Bonrget from the south-east. 

Half an \nnir later the two other columns marched off, and 
arrived at the village at the same time as the surrounding column. 

It had been barricaded and placed in a thorough state of de- 
fence by the French, who were, besides, supported by the fire of 
the guns from the Forts d*Aubervillers and de FEst, as well as 


by their field batteries, between Ckinrneuve and Lo Bonrget, 
nU(» by the rifle fire of a detachment Hbitionod in Draney. 

The fight was hot and sanguinary. £very house was ob- 
stinately defended. It was not until 12.80 o^clock that all resistaiioe 
was dubdned, and the village again completely in German handa. 

Cut off by Zeuner'n column; the French had been unable to 
HV; and 1250 nnwoanded prisoners, including 30 ofHcers, were 
taken. («rcat was the loss in killed and wounded on both sides. 

The Pnwsian Garde mourned the loss of 14 killed and 21 
wounded oflicersy and 44 killed and 405 wounded men. 

The moral effect of this discomfiture in Paris was considerable, 
because all the illusi(»us raised np4m the great importance of Le 
lk)urp;ct now collapsed; but a still more disheartening, almost 
stunning effect, was produced by the news of the fall 0f ike 
/ortrcxi of Mets. The rumour of this great catastrophe was 
widely spread in Psiris during the last days of October, and was 
known for certain on the 31st. 

In truth this event was of the greatest importance for the 
eomhict of the war on both sides. 

On thr 27th of 0<*tob<*r the irnownrd rapifu/afion of MHz 
was roneluded with Marsiial nazainc. It <leliv4>ml into the hands 
of the victors, an army of 17o,(MM> mrn, inehiding lltK)!) ofli- 
i'vvA and .*i marshals; the strong foiiress and an ent>rniou8 war 
material, valued at So millions of francs; about 80() f<»rtress guns, 
tlic m.itciial for more than S5 batteries, and (><> niitrailleuses ; about 
:UM)^(MM» rilles, cuirasses, swords etc. in very gn^at number; about 
•jono military w.-iprpuis, with many other valuable materials, and, 
a> h;id;:es •»f liniiniir, oli ia;:lr> :ni4l rnlour>. The fail of Metz 
liM|)|M ind Ml the ri^^lit time f«»r tiiJ- (ierninn>. hi the north as well 
as iiu tin* Lnirr, clreiimstances wvrr takinjr plaie which would raise 
the appn^teii nf tin* army, hitliert«> riiiplou'd in the investment of 
Metz» to tin- mo^i rrilieal im|M»iiance: althnn^rli on the (M'rnmn 
^idf, no aecnrate rom|»rehension enuld at tlii^ moment he obtained 
of the w hojr danpr whieh lay in them, for the stren;^th of the 
newlv formed repnhliean armv was unknown. 

Hut on the French ^i4h^ the wlude importance of the capitu- 
lation of Metz was now recognized, and (iand)etta*s unmeasured 


burnt of fnry af^ainAt the ^traitor'* Bazaine, proves the depth of 
hi8 (leHpair. Withiu tour weeks, a hundred thousand German 
w:irri<»rrt would be able to reinforce the army detachment, now at 
t>rl<*anM, which, at« a weak dam, had to oppose the great French 
Loire Army in its march upon Parirt; and sufKcient masses could 
be thrown agsiinrtt the Northern Army which was now in the act 
of lorination. Several weeks however were still necess:iry, for the 
nrwly (»rpini«(^d armies to attnin such efficiency that the relief of 
Paris could be seriously undertaken by them. 

(iamhotta ri'doubled his overpowering activity to ac4»x«!lerate 
this epoch , in order to bring into effect the attnck upon the 
investing army of Paris, before the (icrman troops could draw 
near from Metz. 

Thus the end of Ort«»ber bntught into action , in the calmly 
riowing stream of tlie war, outsid<» Paris, p(»tcnt new forcers, whose 
impending collision formed a fresh crisis, full of sus]H;nse. 

A dipioiiiMtic event also t<»ok place C4mjointly with the great 
military transactions of this time. Thiers, who since the 12th of 
September had b(>en travelling to the capitals of England, liussia, 
Austria ami Italy, in order to gain these powers for France, 
returned w itii batVled hopes, and, on the .'MHli of October, presented 
hiniseir at VeiN.iilles for negotiations. He first received a safe 
ccmdnct to Paris in order to place himself in communication with 
the government there, and returned to Versailles (m the 1st of 
Nov4>mher. Oihm^ again an armistice was discussed, and once 
:igain the negotiations were broken off, ogtensibly on the question 
«if the repn>>isioning of Paris. It was just as natural that, on 
the <ietniaii si<le, the imp«»rtation of pn»visions should not be 
permitted without an equivalent, as it can be understood that, on 
tlM* French side, an armistice without this, was regarded as a 
enntinuatinii of the war. The arms of the Parisians were in fact 
their stomachs. 

Thiers's appearance in Paris on the .'iOth of October, combined 
besides ^itli the bad news from Metz, and the panic of Ix? Bourget, 
pnHiu4*(>d in Paris itself considerablo and very different effecta. 
The hounjeaisiv suddenly became deeply aware of tlieir need of 
|ieace. People were completely satiated with heroism, and at tlie 



sight of Thkn, believed in the bmt of 

l^reathed fon fredy; the batehen e^ irl h igll 
stores of moat wUcb th^ had kept eooMoIad, is 
them at a high pileei so that the wittiaciam, h 
paixj was generally drcolated. On the otiier hand the 
led by FloureoB, Felix Pyat, De iQae, Ledrn-BolUn 
colieagaesi roee iu open revolt Even from the beginrfag ^if IMI 
investment they had been mnt and threatening; 

declared alond: TliierB was an a| t of the Qrieanialiy kn 
sold France I and would make peace for the Dae d'Anula{ 
zalne, Trodm and the whole government were oonspiriag wilk 
Pmssiana, and it was jnst the time to set np the 
order to save the country. 

With this intention the men of Belleville, IMnilmonteali MoiIp ; 
martre and Glignanoourt surrounded the HMel 4® \lUe ob Hi : 
31 St of October I and threatened the members of the 
there assembled, with deatli. Thanks to the timely 
of some battalions which scattered the crowd, the govemmest 
saved, but the abyss upon which it stood had displayed itielf 

.: ■.-* 


The prospects of an armistice were lost after the interviewa 
of the Chancellor with Tliiers on the 1st and Hrd of November; 
on tlic Hth of November, the negotiatitm^ were completely broken 
off by direction of the Parirtian government , and Jules Favre 
proclaimed to the city that resistance to the utiermosiy was the 
only couriMi that France ronld take. 

Witii this prortpect Vatia wad by no means edified ; the dia* 
p<»8ition tor 4'ombat had entirely vanished , and the revolt on the 
.*U»t of October ronned afresh, strong fears in the heart of every 
proprietor. It was generally asked, of what avail was a longer 
resistance, for Paris anyliow must fall some time; and Kdmond 
About had even the courage to publish an article of cool reasoning 


and soand logic; which coDclnded with the aitsertioo, that the 
capture of Paris was simply an engineering calcaUtion for the 
Germans, and they conid quietly await the result. The wisest 
policy would be to grant them what they might desire, so that 
they would only go home again. The author expressed what 
every one thought, and the deepest dejection reigned in the great 

Provisions had already risen largely in price, so tliat a very 
large part of the population was obliged to suffer privations in 
the most esrtential requisites of life. The mortality increased 
rapidly, particularly amongst children. Added to this, the want 
of gas condemned people to darkness for a far longer time than the 
Parisians were accustomed to, and consequently many amusements 
and distractions ceased. The state of isolation from the buter 
world was still more sensibly felt. Many men had sent away 
their families, and n<»w remained without news of them; others had 
been (tbli^ed to leave their business and property outside I^aris, 
and lived in anxiety with respect to them. The Gardes Mobiles 
from the provinces suffered especially from home sickness. All 
however felt very acutely the absence of political news from the 
outer world, to which they were quite unaccustomed, and especially 
of tidings as to the efforts of the provinces to come to the help 
of the capital. 

It irt true that a certain c^mnection with the exterior was 
ostabllHhcd in a very ingenious manner, by balloons and pigeon 
posts; but these means were used especially for government dis- 
patches, and could only respond in a ver>' limited manner to the 
universal wants of the public. 

Ill order to tranquillize the people, and to prove to them that 
he was usin;^ the utmost activity in Uie defence <)f the city. 
General Trociiii ver>' frequently made the outer -forts cannonade, 
even from the beginning of the investment. To this expedient he 
added still another, that of often taking in hand the re-organixation 
of his army. Thus at the beginning of November the order of 
battle appeared, which has already been given at page 278. The 
(iarde Nationale, railed the First Army, was appointed for the 
interior service, and for the oecnpation of the enceinte, and the 


latter WM diTided info nine BMttonfy « ih 

about ten baatiom* The Second Army — : •# tka Jta^ 

re^imciita de marobe and Oardea Mobilea — %mm 4&itlauk .ftj 
opcratioiia in tlie field; and the Third Army — saileni, 
(iardes Mobilea, regiments de marehe^ donaniera, fonet 
and the moUliaed Oarde Nationale — waa to defend ttie Ban if 
the forts. tfr i*' 

But even thia new order of battle waa unable to inapira Hi 
Parisiana with fresli courage; affairs had reached anch a petai 
the capitulation would probably soon have ensued , had 
impulse come from outside. 

The sUuation ehangedy howevery at one tirok^* 

On the 9th of November, t)ic French Loire Aimj^ 
irAUrelle de Paladines approached against OrMana in 
8trciigth, that General von der Tann was obliged to relin 
Touryj after a hot light The news of this aneceaa, wllli en- 
bellishmentai arrived in Paris on the 15th, by (Hgeon post 

The people drew breath; they exulted; in imaginattwi lii^ 
ev<Mi rtaw the inventing army scattered, and loudly demanded — 
rertistancc to the uttermost. 

Nevertheless it was not until the 29th of November that a 
8(»rtie was again attempted. 


The attark was now dirt'ctrd, an mipht 1)0 <-()iijc<*tureil, towards 
th<' .south' fast, and aimed, apparently, at erttabliKhiu^r a connection 
with thr Ljtire Army, thn>u<;h th<* line nt' invi'stment. Demon- 
ritration^ at ditferont points were to orc-upy tin' (irnnanH. 

On the 2Hth nf Nn\rnibrr, Mont Arron, a plateau lying in 
t'rnnt of tli(* eastern torts ^ was occupied by Admiral Saliwet and 
(Jcncral Iln^rncs with troops of the Thirtl Army: and a battery waa 
eriM'tcd upon it and <M|nipped , the tire of w hich could command 
important passages for the invcHtin^ tn»opH, aci-oss the Marne at 
t'helles and G<»uniay. At tln^ sjime time preparations were made 


t<> Iny Hevcral bridges over tlie Marne up<m the line Nogent sur 
Manie — J4»inville — St. Maur. 

Vice Admiral Roiiciere le Nonry miiceiitraUHl a conHiderable 
ni.iHH of troops at St, Dtmh j and two divisionH were formed up 
upon tiie peninsula of NanletTe. 

In the night <»f the 28th and morning of the 29th of November, 
the foftH kept np a vigorous tire in all directions. Then followed 
a sortie, under the direction of General Vinoy, with large masses 
from Forts Irrt/ and Birdirff^ against the positions of the VI. Army 
(*orps. Tiie attack was supported by tUv tire of the fl(»tilla upon 
the Seine. The French indtH'd succi^eded in getting possession of 
the railway stati(»n ChoLsy le Hoi for si>me time, but their attacks 
:it L' Half were repulsed and tliey retired with great hiss, including 
several hundred prisoners. The <ierman loss amounted to 7 ofHcers 
and ahout 100 men. 

rpon the north front, the Vic^ Ailmiral, and upon the penin- 
sul.M of N.'tnterre, (ieneral de lU^autort, carried out demonstrations 
in the afternoon, but otherwise nothing more considerable toi^k 
place, wlii<')i appears sur|Mrising after such great preparations. 
(leufM'.-il Ducrnt hail caused a pr<»claniation io be posted at the 
corners (»f all the streets, before the commencement of the sortie, 
in NNliieli he pmmised great things, and di'claretl that he would 
n*turn vjitorious or not at all. Why he did not support General 
Vin<»v l»etter on the 29tli, i>r sally forth for an inde|)endent under- 
takiii;:. \> wuX eU'ar. Un one side it was asserted that he had been 
nnahie tn (levelope his troops b<'cause K(K*hef<»rt*s barricades luul 
harretl all the roads iK(»chefort was a meml)er of the (loverument 
and pre.-^ideut of the barricade committee i, on the othi*r side it 
was iiiMintMiiied that the bridges over the Marne, by which Duerot 
had wIsIkmI to eross the river, had been partly washed away. 

The Innjn* sortie now onhj took place on the "MUh of 
yioveviher, ntnl the objevi of it wax evidently to break through 
I be Herman lines of inrestment in the direction of Meayjt and 
Fontainebleau, in order ^ subsv^uently^ to enter fkio connection 
tritb the Loire Army. 

1 he concentration of largi*- masses of tnNips for the purpose 
of breakiii^^ forth against the line Cliampigiiy — Brie, was covered 

i.r ll«- vieUft>v 

linxiglit lip l« 

i'r>ri'>!d rriuH tha 

;ma t)>.- Srd and 

these troopi «en nubia to itaj 
umid very gmt loues tbey wen obi 
able to oany tha two gm a.mj wi 
represented pa eaptoradi, in the Freneh aooonnto 
and NX eompmiaa of the 104th R Bimant wan' 
Bopport than. Villien itaelf, however, wu rdn 
auutb lide, hy a battalion of the 104th Regimeat 
4th light batteriee, and towards 3 o'doek ttiey < 
terring tha Fmeh from attempting any fortiier iiLKkn. 

The attack of Snibielle'a Diviuon, fmther ■!•< tli<- ■■mih, at 
eountered iiunediately behind Meiitf, Mont Mathf iin<l Bann&at 
(from where the advanced troops of the Wnrteminj-;,-! r>i luul bMB 
driven away at 9 o'clock a.m.) the 2nd and 3rd WiirtiinibiTic Ftri- 
gades, supported by the 7th Pmsaian Brigade <>t' tlit< U. Amy 
Corps, which bad been bronght np to Paris after tim i-jipltulaUiia 
of Meti, and was oantonned in the 8onth-«aat, in rvHr of tba 
positions of the VL Army Corps and the Wurtemburircr^. 

The French, here, had only a small nnmericiiJ HU|Krior!l|f i 
and were repniHed at al) points. At 1 o'clock, \U- i-ri^inul jHnri- 
tiou wari re-taken. 

TliHn tUo Hule advantage tu the Fruuch, resulting from the 
whole soilie to the uouth-eaiit, wan tite poiMesniou of the points 
Brif »ii<) Champigni/ with tlie lieightii between tlieM! two plaeea; 
U1I advantage uiiy Itow, had tliey been able to ciiulinn<- their attacks, 
bul now without value, for the severe cold of the eoiuing nigbl 
affeuti'd Uie troops, who eticonipud without blankets, to sieb an 
extent that no furtlier attack could be sttem))tcd ou the 1st «f 
Ih'cembrr. The <liiy wum pOKrH^d in Meeiirin^'' the wounded and 
linryiii}: the iteaii, as will :oi in riirlilyinK tlie iioiitionK {lained. 

It inu-it nlwi be observfil, lliiit n new deKtriplioii of war 
maeliiin- uas made um- of on ilic Krvneli niile dnrinf! the light; 
two mailed l>owrie«, imiIi uilli .i heavy pnii, wen- lirought into 
liuKitioii by an en};iue, iilso niiiileil , on the .Milhlhauiti- railroad 
atiainxt tin- (iernian lines, Tlie eairiajte'* were moveable on titeir 
axle», so that tlie imiZKlis ol' the ^nns eould be biiiught tnts 
dilTereiil direetioiiH. 

t'jH>a the HOrt/i frani, Viet- Admiral Ituiieii-re le Noiiry luid 


made :i demonHtration <in the 30th of November, and occupied 
Epinai. Tliis c i re uni stance which was compriHcd in a dinpatch from 
(jeneral Trociiu , with exaggenitcd and indintinct accounts uf the 
fighting in tlie south -eant, and sent off by ballotm^ gave occasion 
for proclaniatioiiri and military measures on the Ixiire, most 
characteristic of Gambetta's sanguine tempeniment and Ids want 
of military judgment. 

The balhK)n with Trochu's dispatch went off on the evening 
of the .'loth of N(»vember and was driven out of it^ course, S4» 
that it came <lown at Belle Isle en Mer. From there the dispatcli 
was telc;;raphed to Tcmrs. The circumstance that the dispatch 
lia«l not come direct by balloon , causcnl Gambetta to believe 
at i\vM that it had come from Paris entirely by road, C4mse(|Uently 
after the (ierm:ui line of investment had been broken through. 
I'hen the name of Hpinai , gave him the idea that the Kpinay 
wirK'h lies to the south -east of Longjume^iu wjis meant, and he 
coneliided that Konciere le Noury must b<* in command of the 
:Ml\aneed ;rnard of a sortie army, which, after a great victory, 
was on the {Mtiut of <'stablishing eommunications with the Loire 

III <'oiise({iieiice of this, he issued proclamations on the 1st of 
DeceuilMT, savin;: the moment for France's tardy triumph was at 
hand, onlv m -^reat effort bv the I^ire aiinv was still necessarv. 
General Troeliu was at Brie with a victorious anny of 150,(XN) 
men, I'n kilometres from I'aris (Brie is 3 kilometres from Fort 
Nogent , and Admiral Konciere was already at Kpinay, bey<md Ijong- 
jumeau*). At the sjime time he pive orders to the (tenerals to 
ailvanrc fMrthwith towards Paris. 

But nil the 2nd of December, the successes of the 30th of 
NoveiiilKT had been lost :igain. 

*) 'Vhr Willi- run tlniM : ( N'tt<> inciur jouriUM' du .'tO a (loiiiui lieu u uiic 
piiliit*' \ i;;(Mtr<iiNt' ill- rumiral dr lu Uoiirii'rt'-lc-NourN : toujour;* tlutiii U 
diriMtioii tlf ril!i\ vi (InNilly, il nVnt avanrr sur Lon^umoAii «*t ft 6iilf*t' le> 
po-itiiin- ^'KiiiniiN au lirlu de Lon^unii'au, poMitiuni^ rftraiicbcM'H «le*i PraHKiens. 



\- <^^"' ■ rT ■•ui"'- Oumnlaiairau 


of thep-onnd in rear, by which the reserven murtt appn»ach. 8o4>n after, 
tlie French infantry again took the (iffenHive in overpowering masMes, 
and aft<T a desperate rttrn^gle witli t)ie battalions, who obstinately 
defend(Ml house after houxe in the villager, they again entabliolied 
the fight in their favour, although fresh troops from the II. Army 
Corps had joined in the action at Champigny. In Brie above 
4CM) Saxons, who would not give way, were taken prisoners, arid 
Champigny was again for the most part occupied by the French. 
The att^iek was C4>ntinued beyond bi^th points, against yiUiert 
which was held by the Wurtembergers ; fr«>m MoUy the Sax(m 
4th lienvy battery was driven away by the cannon fire, and the 
battle field of the 30th of November was again filled by about 
l(M>,0()i) French. NevertheleKs (lerman valour and Kuperior tactics 
gaineil the final victory. 

<Jeneral von Fransecky united by degrees about 5<),iMM) men 
up<Mi the rritical points, f(»r the purpose of a ^urrounding attack 
against the enemy, crowded together on the peninsula, which was 
rendered possible by the formation of the ground. 

The :;rd Infantry Division, and the Artillery Corps of the 
li. ('nips reiiiioreed the centre, the left wing had already been 
ri'lnfonril hy the 7th Infantry Brigade , and tlie Hth Infantry 
Brigadt" with a Brigade of the VI. Corps toruied the reser\'es at 

Thn.<% towards -1 (/cloek p.m., after a sanguinary fight of 
many hniirs the enemy was forced to retreat. At this time Cham- 
pigny was a;rain, for the greater part, in (ierman hands; at Villiers 
and Co'uilly tiie stipcriority of the <iermans was decisive, and Brie 
\\itii tiie >iiir<»unding heights were alone in French power. 

The French, convinced of the hopelessness of further attacks, 
eeased tiring, and alst> on the (leruian side no fresh assault was 
attempted, .-i^ darkness had commenced. 

(■eneral IVoehu decided upon a complete retreat on the 
folin>\ing day; in order to cover it he caused a fresh attack to be 
made at Bri<* :ind Champigny on the moniing of the 3rd of December, 
and meanwhile conducted the army back to the right bank of the 
Mitrne. His Io!%h, in the combats from the 30th of November to the 


ard of December I amounted , according to French mOmatmp 
more than 6000 men inclnding 414 officers. •*..*] 

The Germans had lost in the fonr days about 5000 mw. Of } 
thc^)e the Wnrtembergers suffered the greatest loss, 2019 
01 <»fHcer8; the Saxons 1096 men and 55 officers; and the 
(^»rp8 1517 men and Sd officers. This loss is exAraofdhMiilf 
liigh. It was caused especially by the fire from the forti mH 
entrenchments. It is a wonderful feat that victory was gaiaed fa 
Hpite of it, and notwitlistanding the enormous numerical saperiofii^ 
of the French at times; the Wnrtembergers carried off the faail 

A heavy blow was inflicted on the defence of Pttia by Iha 
failure of this vigttrous aud obstinate sortie, which had beeo baaed 
on tlie imaginary advantiges of the French Ijoire Army. Tk» 
prospect of an indepetidetU rupture of the mvesiing Bm frmm 
within had to ranish completely. 

It was the moment of a general great crisis for Pmru^ fmr 
on the same days, at the end of November and beghmmg mf 
December, in the north and also in the south the hopes of a 
r^/ief were frustrated. 

Till* (icrman Army from Metz, divided into two powerful 
ndumns^ liad drawn near when the danger was at its highest. 
On the 2 7th of NnvcmlxT (ieneral vcm Mantenffel had beaten the 
French Northern Army, and on th<' 'JHtli Prince Fn*deriek Charles 
had led tlie first victnrions n»ntliet a^^ainst the Frencli Loire Army, 
at licanne la lioiande. On the 2nd of Deeember, began tlie victorious 
eondiats id* the (ierman I^oire Armv to thi* nortli of Orleans, 
^^liirli led to tlit> occupation <»f this important city on the night 
«d' the Ith. 

Sinli successes cjMild not hut excite the ho|)e, that the (iov«»ni- 
meiit in Pari**, perceivinjr the useles«4m'ss of resi^'tance, would 
smriiider the city. (Miieral von Moltke intormeil (ieneral TnH'hu 
hy letter on the Tith 4d' Decend^er, of the det'eats of the I^dri* 
Army, and tin* occupation <d' (hh'ans, at the same time inviting 
him to send out an ot'ticer in 4»rder to ascertain the tnith. 

(ieneral 'rriNJiirs >ituation, ho\ve\er. hore hut a small n*iiem- 
hlanee to that of a n^al commandant of a fortress; he gave au 


answer, <»f which the ParinianH Haiti: "il eiit de l'e«prit tine fols 
ni h;i vip." With a c:in8tic repetition of itrt exprertKions !ie in- 
formed (ieneral von Moltke of the receipt of hia letter, and declined 
an enquiry into the 8t*itc of the case. 

Still each dav made it more difiicult for the citv of Pari« 
to m:iint.ain its liauprhty mien, and cold and hunj^^er hegan to presa 
severely on the population. Outside, however, the preparationa 
for the hombardment were now seriously undertaken. The Frendi 
nevertheless, in spite of their sad eJperien<'es on the 2nd of 
December, attempted another {rreat sortie before the commencement 
oi the iMMubardment, thou«:h certainly with little enerj^y, as well as 
without .iny judicious stratej^ic-il combination. For (Ieneral Trocliu 
rniild hardly rcj-koii up<»n a co-operation with the Northern Army 
uiuhr (Jeneral Faidherlx'. 


On the 'Jnth of Oeccniber, preparations for a sortie, which 
would ap|i:irently Ix* directed aptinst the positions of the (tanie 
Torps, werr perceivetl by the (terman posts of observation. In 
the ni^rht ot' the 2()th all the forts again opened a vigunnis fire, 
and ill tli(> tore-n<Nin of the 21st, Admiral Konciere, leading on 
the marini's nnd scune other detai'hments, attacked Stainjt^ iJutfny 
and Lr lionrtji*t from 8t. Denitf and Fort Auliervillers. Ilis troops 
fought remarkably well, took Stains and Le liourget, but Ix^fore 
:; o'riurk p.m., were completely repulsed by the Prussian (iarde 
<'nrps. rpnn this (ieneral Dncrot advanced, o<'<'upied Dranry 
and />/• (wmslaij with strong masses, and opened fire with his 
artillny a; Pout Ihlon and Le Blanc- MexniL lie retired 
again however in the evening without attempting a s<*rionrt att-ack. 

Monovtr, at midday, a Division had been led forwanl against 
Si'vran, (liclles and Ville Evrart, but soon fell under the fire of 
the (iirman batteries at Soisy'le'Grand^ beaidet) being attacked 


by the 34th (Siuiin> Infuntry Divieino And retnraed ia 
nighi or the 32nd sft*r a protrHtted fight round Ville Evnut. 

Upon other points, Efiiiiai near 8t. Denii And the 
of Nanlerre, demon strati ona were made by the French. 

The day hud been witliout any favounihle reHuU fM- fhe 
French, but hud led t" coneiderAblc loeaeK with the capture it 
Above 1000 unwonnded priaonerB; *in the German aide the IHI 
wttH far amitlbr; in spite of the iinremitting lire nf the furta, B 
amounted to about 500 killed and wonndeil, of whieh M offieen 
and 400 mea fell in the Garde CorpK. 


It had become evident at the sorties in the end of November 
and dnrini; th<? fight on the 2nd of Derember, that Mant Arrom, 
which the Frenrli had oernpied willi Klron^ i^trenehments uid 
7fi gun*, WM very troublesome to the investing troops npna tiMt ■ 
east front. In coiiseiiuenre of tliis, by directions (rom VerMillm, 
the f'mwn I'rince of Saxony at a conference, lield at Lf VmI 
(ialanl on the 18tb of December, ordered the artillery attaHc 
upon ihis advanced point of the beaieged,-- Me firti offnuirr 
adtianrf on the Gntnan tide — , and that n demonatrntixn slwald 
he maile iit the aame time to divert the attention of the Parisian* 
from the prinripal point« of the projected nrtillery attack, to 
the hcightu "f Metidon and Clamart, and the park of 81. Olond. 

By itie '.'Tth of December the niegc batleries were ciimplet«d 
by the pjoneera ol the Qarde, IV'. and SU. Corps, under the 
trnidaiiee of Major Klemm, in a line snrrounding Mont Aerou, 
extending from the park of Rainey, and to the aouth of it, »» (ar 
■a the M>ulh-enii(eni slope of the liei^lits of Pressoir (v. map flf 
the east front of Pari*), and were equipped with 76 heavy gana, 
rifled 24-poDnder*, rifled I'i-pounden and mortars. 


At 7 o*clock in the morning of this day the fire was 

The effect of the fire, quite unexpected by the French, was 
n>iisid(*rable ; it wan returned indeed , but the commandant of 
Mont Avron, Colonel Stoffel, wafi convinced even on the first day 
that n InHting rer^istance against the (ierman batteries, placed all 
round , was importnible. lie had intended to abandon it. But 
in the defence of Paris militarv reas4)nH were seldom of account. 
P:iri8 wan pleased to think that Mont Avron was (me of the most 
important points of the fortifications, and the military authorities, 
satisHed tliat the Germans did not dispute their triumph in having 
occupifMi this place, had confirmed the population in their opinion. 

They were now unable, in opposition to the people, to give 
lip Mont A\Ton without anything further, and applied forces to 
maintain it, whieli the object would not have been worth even had 
tliese forw^s been rightly employed. But the proper measures 
were :\Un wantinj^. 

(tenernl d'Hugues, Commandant of the forts on the east 
front, mllerted above 20,(M)0 men on the night of the 27th of 
HeeenihiT upon the imperilled plateau and in rear of it, in order 
to be ahh' t<» resist the possible infantry attack of the enemy. 

TIm' (Jernian patrols, however, brought information of the 
<KTUpation on the morning of the 28th, and therefore the bombard- 
ment rniitinued. This resulted, in the withdrawal of the 
el4»sely packed French tn»ops In rapid flight, under heavy losses, 
and a general panic was spread in Paris, so that General Tn>chn 
further or<1en*d the plateau to be evacuated. 

in tJM' night of the 28th, after it had been impossible any 
longer to reply t4» the < ierman fire during the day, all the guns 
were brought away with tlie exception of two dism«»nnted 24- 
pounders ; and (»n the morning of the 29th, when the 8axons took 
po<«sehsion of the plateau, they found n<»thing but corpses and 
ruins. The liomhardment of the Forts on the east front coold 
n4»w he commenced, and it was carried on with such g(K>d results 
on the ^Ust (»f December and 1st of Jannarv, that the French 
s|M»e<]ily (evacuated their advanced poaitions on this front, and 
even on the latter day were no longer able to reply to the re- 


cognized saperioiity of the Oernuui fire, 

with repmiring the damageB esosed to the fo . -w 

Yet the besiegen did not approach the east maty te ft 
mon8tration oaly was to be suide here. 

Before Paris, the year 1870 came to an end aniil 
preparations fiir the bombardmenty which commenoed cm- the 
of January 1871. 

After the defeats of the Loire and Northern AmueSi the 
had entered its final phase. 

In trophies of victory, Germany counted 4 Marshals^ llylM 
ofKicers ; in non-commissioned officers and men, 333,886 uiwiNBdal 
prisoners, and 4640 guns, 115 eagles and colonrs. Badi af 
the fortresses of Mayence, Coblentz, Stettin, Erfurt, Magdebiqi^ 
(ilogau, Neisse, Wescl, Cologne and Kolbeig lodged in greai 
camps 12,000, 15,000 up to 24,000 men, and many other anall 
fortresses and open towns enclosed otlier less numerous dlvMoas 
of the conquered French armies. 

JANUARY 1871. 

The b<»mbar(inirnt of PariK bo^an on the Tith of January 
1871. Lt wart opened fr(»m tlio Iiei|>:ht8 (»f Meiuion, (liamart and 
('hatlHoii :ind from thi* park of St. ('h»iuiy afi^inst the forta of 
Ihk}', Vanvrt's and Montmup;. 

For some montlis public <»pinion in (tcrmany had demanded 
and urp'd its commenremcnt. Hut tlic pn>p:irations urceHgary for 
thirt <;n*:it uiidi'rtakin^ nMiuintl a Inn^ tiuie, and iK'rtideH, the 
<i<'nnan Army I>inM*ti«»n would not ho^in the bombanlment until 
the p<Tiod had arrived when the sufforinp* of the lM»r4iege<l eity 
had beeu hm increa»»ed by hunger that the moral impre-ssion of 
the falling sliot would perhaps brinji: the decisive* reKult. 

The ehief difKrulty lay in the transport of the heavy guna 
and oi t\w enormouh stores of ammunition and implements, from 


the railway terminus ^ the station of Lagny, to Villa -Coublay, 
where the Hiege park waH formed. The distance, it is true, was 
only ab<»ut <> miles ^27'. 5 English milcH^, but just upon this tract 
of ground tlie communications had been destroyed by the Parisians, 
ill several places, previous t4> the investment; in particular the great 
Ma rue bridge at I^gny itself, which had to be replaced by a 
pontoon bridge above the f(»rmer one. After all the destroyed 
conmiunications had been restored, the war material, the transport 
(»r which from its nature, required the greatest caution, was brought 
to the place of its destination, upon country roads, by beasts of 

The construction of the batteries also was rendered ver}' 
difficult in c^mse<iii(*nce of the chalky nature <»f the ground, the 
rhtahlishment of IJattery No. 1 being parti<*ularly described as most 
I.ihoiious. Several batteries had to be very ingeniously erected 
behind cover, for they lay C4)mplctely in the range of the fire 
from the forts. 

In the night of the .Srd of January, the batteries opposite 
the south-west fronty which were to open the fire, were finally 
«'(iuip|)e(l. They were the foHo^^iug (v. map II. of Parisi: 

No. 1. r<»sition: :it St, VAoud. Aim: the .Serine with its 
islands, and the w(»rks upon the peninsula Houh»gne. F>{uipment : 
♦> rifled \1 pounders. 

No. *J. IN)sition: upon the terrace of Meudon, Aim: Bou- 
logne, Hillaneourt, and the upper S(»ine. Kquipment: 8 rifled 

No. \\. l*ositi<»n : upon the terrace of Meudon. Aim: Knfi- 
ladin;: the nonth front and dismounting the west front «>f Fort 
d'Issy. K(|uipment: (\ long rifled 24-ponnders. 

No. i. Position: upon the terrac<* of Meud<ui. Aim: the 
same as No. W, Equipment as No. W. 

N'n. .'). Position: to the south of Ctamart. Aim: enfilading 
th<* west front, dismounting the south front of Fort d*lssy. Equip- 
ment : t> long rifled 21 -pounders. 

No. r>. Position: at Porte Chatillon, Aim: enfilailing the 
west front and dismounting the south front of F(»rt de Vanvres. 
E<|uipnu'nt : H long rifled 24-pouiider8. 


No effect of a decided kind wag prodnced apon the excellently 
built, HtroDg forts. It is true that some of the buildings in the 
inter iorrt were destroyed, also many an embrasui*e and many a gun 
wan dit^mounted ; the superiority of the (ierman artillery came ont 
brilliantly, for even on the second day Fort Issy was no longer 
able to reply, and gradually the serving trcNips in the other 
forts were also unable t4» continue holding ont lastingly ; to 
destroy the f<»rtitieiitions so quickly was, however, not possible. 
The French staved in the forts, covered themselves as well as 
they could, n^paired the damages that arose and spared their fire 
in cane the enemy should make a nearer approach. At the same 
time they began in a very skilful manner to alternate their fire. 
They liad erected two batteries to the west of Fort Issy and also 
laid out some emplacements between Issy and Vanvres; as soon 
as they ccMild no longer reply to the enemy's fire in the forts 
themselves, they began to fire from the batteries mentioned, and 
if the (ierman artillerymen fired u|K)n the latter, the French began 
to fire again from the forts. Yet the b<»mbardment on the German 
riide had, at all events, gained the advantage of being able to 
bombani the rity itself from some of the batteries, from the 8th 
<if January, without its being possible for the French fire to 
prevent it. 

Hy the 1 1th of January the lH»siegers had constructed five 
new batteries Noh. \h to 22, and ceased firing from No. 4 on 
the 8tli of January, No. 6 on the 9th and Nos. 10 and 11 on 
the 11th. 

No. ix, ft long rifl«»d 24-pounder8> lay to the west of 
Bagnt*tu\ Aim: dismounting Fort de Montrouge. The finf com- 
meneed on the Htli of January*. 

No. 19, I 1 hing rifled and 4 short rifled 24-poanders^ lay 
to the OHM of Fleury, and on the lUh of January, began dis- 
mounting and breaching the S4>uth-west bastion and -the south-west 
curtain of Fort Ihsv, and dismounting the eneeinte of the city. 

No. 2o, 6 long rifled 24-pounders) to ftic west of Ciamariy 
to the south of Notre Dame de Clamart, commeneed on the KHh 
of January dismounting the sonth front and the leA face of the 
north-west bastion of Fort Vanvres. 

No. 21, (6 abort rifled 24-poun(1crs) by to Uic worn of CAa- 
tillon , nnil on the 14tli nr Jmiiiary begna dismountiii^ and if 
mulisliin^ tlie anuth front of Fort Vanvres. 

No, 2a i,fi long riflod 24-poQmiGrB)'lay lo tho west of No. IH, 
nnt) on Mii^ 14tli be^ii tr> tnke over the &iiiiii of No. 11. 

Alllioiigli, bnwever, the inttirior of tlie yity was only firwl 
Hpon (Vum the 8th of Jxaniiry, utili even in the earlier days siD^le 
xliolA bnit tlnwu far beyond the furtM. Thi-y foil in the arronditi- 
sementx nf Vaugirard, I'liMy, and even at far greater dintanceft, aaa 
the Pwitlieou, Lnxemhoiirg and tlie I16tel den Invalideit to beyond 
thv Boutevard St (lermain. 

The population of PariH raeeived these fintt rifled eAimoa 
shot, SR well aB later ttiuse thrown mueh more frequently and 
designedly, with a kind nf curiomty and Boom, and aW with 
indignation at the ''barbnriani)" ; but the bombardment decidedly 
made no deep impreioiiiin. The guvernmenl wan even obliged 
to pnblish a proclamation , drawing attention to the danger of 
running tiignther in places where a lihell had fallen, because Uie 
people loMt Htghl of all danger in order to analeh a splinter. 
A tolerable number of persunH were no doubt killed and wounded, 
and a r)uantity of people moved sway from the endangered to tlie 
Hafe partfl of llie city, but thiA number whb not grcnt emmgh to 
rantie any coufuRion , or the pHrlrnl want of dwelling accun- 

The matnrial damiige nait Nmall. The city was Ino largr 
and the buildingK wrTe too Holid. 

b may be concluded how inRignificant the number I'f injured 
bnildingH wan in I'oinparieon with the whole diiibn , for after the 
devaMtaliiijiH of ihc Frrni-b bombardment during the civil war, and 
alter the uontlagrationn of the Comuimie, the total number of hiiniHu 
rfwfroyrrf brnideii public buildingn, smh an the Tuilertes, i\!A*\ 
de Mile eh-., only amounted altogether to 20t), thus only a tUrd 
pan of th« Dumbtir of hounea which Haiuutmami , tlie l*refe«l of 
the 8riue, ha<l the chargo of pulling down an^inally for besati- 
fying pnrpoHcs, under tlie Imperial guverntnent. 

By (lermrin thol pmbably vrry few , perhapM only iMtlNtod 
buildingK, were destroyed inside the cmcinte; il wan not until Um 


22ncl of Jaunary that fires were perceived in the city, and fire 
in tilt* Hpecial agent of destruction in a bombardment; the immediate 
<'fH<':iey (»f tlie rthot can only be material with very sliglitly built 
IxMiscrt. If tlierefore the bombardment had been continued until 
tlie cjipitulation of Pari^, there is still no reason to conclude that 
this would have b4*en the result of the bombardment. 

Paris fHl by starvation^ and in the (jerman Head-Quarters, 
tlic chif^f authority ha^l no doubt from the commencement as to 
the right means of obtaining the end, although publir opinion was 
taken into ai-coimt. 

Thv Parisians attempted K<»me further small attacks in January, 
and one sortie in large masses. They first attacked the (icrman 
outposts on the morning of the KHh of January near Ciamari, 
:iih1 were driven back ; then in the night of the 12th an attack, 
in the ntrength of perhaps a brigade, followed upon the south- 
N\(!st IVniit against the dangen»us battenes upon the heights of 
Mrtiffon and Ciamari, The sortie was very soon repulsed. 

Then, late in the evening of the 13th, some detiiehments <mee 
again brnki' fnrth against the much contested village of Le ttouryely 
upon the iKM'th fnmt. This sortie was also beaten back with little 



(hi the llHh of January, however, above 1(K>,000 men were 
deM'InpfMJ, for a last desperate struggle npon the south-west front, 
with the iiitt>ntion of attacking Versailles. 

I'liited round Mont Valerien in three great masses under the 
chief coiinnaiul of (General Troi'hu himself, at 8 o'chnrk a.m. the 
centre CMlimin pressed forwartl against Garrhes , under General 
Heih'niarr ; the column of the left wing, under Oeneral Vinoy, 
against Monlreioul\ and after a very disadvantageous delay of 
three hours, the column of the right wing, under General Ducrot, 
bv lit/zfnrni. 

The late arrival of the last column, caused partly by a de- 

»h and 

31fl ^^^^1 

Teetive execiittoo of the depositions, &nd partly by the fire of Ibe 
Otrmaii cannon from the right bank of the r<eine , at once cansed 
a vacillation JD the whole sortie. The troopit :d the centre and 
on the left wing oniy advanced nlowly, tor Ihey wwted f"r Iho 
support of the right wing, and when they nn-t with tho Umgb 
reeistance of the Iflth Infantry Division at Garehet , a long con- 
tinued stationary fight was developi?d even here. 

On the Germaji side the troops standing nearest, the 9th and 
•21»l Infantry Dirisions, acting as reserves to Hie KKh, the t 
laudwfhr Division and the I. Bavarian Corps, were moved I 
towards Versailles. 

Still the French did not succeed in coming np so far that U 
was necessary to employ these two last bodies of ti-oops. Tbry 
were unable U> overcome the resist.inci- of the Oermana in (larchea, 
and satisfied themselves with occupying the heights lying in front, 
from which the Ucrmaii advanced posts were driven away. They 
took possession of the entivnchment of Montretont, which was only 
weakly occupied by the Germans. Towards 2 o'clock p.m., how- 
ever, two battalions of the King'" Grenadier Regiment and oni- 
battalion of the 59th Kegimcnt made a sncressfnl advance , ami, 
at dark, completely threw hack the French near Garches. The 
entrenchment of Sfontretoal was re-liiken at 11 o'clock p.m. by 
batUlions of the 47th, &Hth and iSi'nd Regiments. The loaa t>f 
the Germans amounted lo Glti men and ;(9 uiflc^rs. The Iims of 
the French was extraordinarily great; it amonnled to about 7000 
men. General Trochu maintained rhal the majority <>f the wotindrd 
had suffered from the awkwardness of the Gardes Nattonaux, whw 
had continually Gred upon their own trmips. This is indeed poK- 
siblc. Tlic (iarde Nationale, who had nnccasingly dcmandM). 
during the whole siege, that the Governor should employ the other 
tr(H>ps in sorties, wax this day led out for the fiwt time, and may 
probably not have possessed the itmgfl'aid neceasary to distingnkli 
between friend and foe. 

Thus ended the last sortie which the Parisians Nllempt«d, 
iheii' laat desperate attempt, still more deplorable than all tloU 
had preci-di-d it. 

The continual failiiif of the offensive undertakings was 


naturally founded, in general, on the great soperiority in the 
quality of the German troops, and in their excellent defenaive 
poHJtionrt iK'cupied by a numerooB field artillery. Yet two special 
i'lrciiiuHtaucert which impeded the success of the sorties appear 
proiniiH>iitly. Ln.the first place, enormous labour and time were 
required to bring together the badly disciplined French troops, 
proNidt'd with few serviceable ufficerH. It was even necessary to 
assemble the troops for a sortie the day before, in order to have 
them on the spot at tlie right time. This however, naturally, 
fatigued the soldiers before the fight, and in November, December 
and Januarv thev wt^re benumbed and dispirited bv the severe 

Then sec<»iidly, the unavoidably noisy and visible preparations 
f«»r the concentration of thew troop.s, made the (terman posts of 
ohrtervation aware of the enemy's undertaking so early, that in 
most canes, the army of investment was able to make arrangements 
Tor the reception of the enemy quite undisturbed. 

Frequently, even, dispatches from Versailles gave information 
in (HM'uiany, that a sortie wtmld take place on the following day. 
Thu> niuleiiakiiigs, where a surprise was the main condition of 
success. c«»nUl not possibly have a fortunate result. 

On the 21st of January, after the bombardment upon the 
south-west front and the east front had been continued for sixteen 
davs, a b«»iiil)ardment of the fortiiioati(mK on the north front 
V. map of the north front of Paris'! was also begun, combined 
with the honihardmeut of the town of Si. Denis. Here the Ger- 
man shot had far greater success than in Paris itself, and con- 
tlajrratioiis couUl be observed in St. Denis even on the second dav. 

Still tin* Ixmihardment here, as on the east front, ha*l more 
the character <»f a demonstration. 

I pon the south-west front, t<»(>, where the serious attack was 
ma<ie , it succeeded before the 11th of January in setting fire 
t(» the barracks of Forts Issy^ l^anvres and Monlrouge^ and 
destroying the greater part of them. 

On tiie 1 Ith of January these forts were almost entindy 
sih-nc^Ml, but took up the fire again later. On the 12th of January 
the batteries of the city enceinte (v. map of the Miutli-west front 

of I'ltriK^ al Point Ja Jour, bcf;an to fire very vlf^roiuily Ufit 
battury N'k 1 nt, St. Climd. Tlie Gi-niiun battvrieri, in a i 
time, always ittiiined the- KHpori'irity whcu , oii tlie Freiicli 
ne« ljxttvr(<(K were bronf^ht inU> aclfim, »r thn (nrU 
fire; iivviTtlifirs? tlic bimihnrdnicut wnulit jinibiilily l<nve hMl 
Ik coiilitiui'il niiuK' tiuH' luitj^'dr for tho pro[taratinn tu itppeor 1 
ficieot for a formal attaoli or mi uiuKiiil. 

However tlie Interior oonclitioii nf I'hHs, iiml tVniw'c's nititarf 
situation avwyvhwe, made ne.h int-aBiir^'H no loncor m'^vaauiy. 

On the S8nf o/* Jmuan/ nMjiilinh'om far an armulK 
commenced, wkiek had to far /irospered on the 'iGth, that from 
1 2 o'clock at night the cannon /ire on fioth nidex vat 'loftf 

Tlie population of Paris liaJ anived ui h Htate of privatiM 
fnim tbe siege now lasting I'J'A (I»>m, wliicli, williuut a Aval 
Huiipiy of provisions and fiiel^ must I<?nd within th« sliort ^M 
of eight to fourteen days, to tlif death of many tliouoantb frna^— 
exhaustion. Bread and horse flcnh, n-liicli fur wiM-ki* had onlj' kwta 

'•Tnuicnt, well.' fiml rc<*kuii»d wt 

.'iikI hI UkI ut :tii {;rauiiui;s, oud 

III) II II inviting ni>in|>iiHi[4i>ii. 

iiself afresh uu tiic night of tW 

iiiiiry, iti .1 I'l'Vohtli'inury 

given nut in rations by the ^i 
:^U<> grHiiimeM fitr each person , 
added t<i this the breitd whs i.f 

Tlie "Comnjuiie" bcKtirreii 
2l8t aud ou the 22nd of Jui 
under Flourens's direction. 

Every hope of a sueeeHsl'iil Hortii- liiul >Iiiiii|>(ii'ureU alWr (ha 
defeiit iif the 19tli iif Jauuarj', and wticti Ok repuntud ovt-rthniKv 
of the I'liriLier Loire Army at Le Maiis, of the Nurthem Atiuy 
■SI. (Jui-miti and of the Kaiiteni Army ut Ittlfurt beeanie known, 
nil hojii' ..I' Mief from without vuui^ihed. 

Thus the C.ivcninieiit ul hisl -ieeid.-d iip«ii iii'snlintionH wbidi 
had for their nbjeel the eapitiilation nf Vnr'iK, hut an armistii-e nt thff 
Hiiuii- timi' whieh wan to hi- reKanled ;i« -i preliminary tii peaee. 

Alter the failure >•{ the xurtie on the I'.ltli, General Tmcha, 
undi'r till' prcHiire of giiural ilJKtriii't, had resigned the OU«f 
t'oinmand, but still remained Pretidenl of the Covernrocnt; thM 
he kept faithful I" lils ansertiou, tlisl the Oovenior of I 'ana tnM 
never eapitulate. JuleH Favre enndueted the negutiatmna witk 

ha I 



Count BiHinarck, and on the 28th uf January concluded the 

Tills formed part «»f the Conrenlion of f'^ersaiilet*) and 
determined the occupation of all the forts of Paris by the Ger- 
man Armifj the disarmament of the French Line Army, Garde 
Mobile and Marine troops^ who alio became prisoners of war, 
and the iiumiMliate re-provJHitming: of PariK. The Garde Nationale, 
h<»wever, were t(» keep their anurt and undertake the maintenance 
tif order in the city ; the German Army wa8 not to occupy Paritf 
during the annistice. 

These last resolutions must have been repented of later by 
the (lerman government, but still more by the French g(»vernmenty 
whi<'h, untaught by four-and-a-half months experience, opposed to 
the utmortt the l>etter judgment and urgent desire of Tount Bismarck. 

When the Ganle Nationale, which was to keep order in Paris, 
seized the power with armed hands and brought on the civil war, 
Jules Favre exclaimed in despair: ^The German government wanted 
these men to be dinanned, and 1 t»pposed it. 1 call upon God and 
men to witness my repentance!" 

Differing in all its phenomena from the phases through which 
(•rdiiiary si(*ges pass, and surpassing the measure of foimer warlike 
occurrences, the siege of Paris found a worthy conclusion in most 
unusual conditions of capitulation. 

*) Set* th« tonor of the conTention at the close of the book. 


importiint tine, witicli drew a nharply defined limit to the 
tiifUH ijf the tiermiuis frum Paria. Upuu tlio road Trum Pari* I 
ToiirM, either hy Chntcauduii nr by Orlt^iis, expi^ilitiuiu 
acarctly have nuw becD attempted <^^ the putt of thit Qm 
because weak detach menta dared not veaturi? s» deep into 
(Hiuntry vccupieil by the enemy, und Htruutc detacliuieut* cohI 
unly be fornwlied by the JnTeHting iirtny uiidur tirgKnl nccBati^ 
When therefore (leaeral de U MoUerouge ventured forward beyoi 
(.)rl<-»iiH, probably at the iiMligation of the delegHtioii in 1'om 
lie drew attention to himself i|i)ite unneceMxrily, nntl »ccHsiuBi 
the occupation of the town of Orleans tm the part of tl 

The great Importauce of thix town wm fully apprecinted I 
llii' Uemians, bnt, iu spite of it, the ta«lc of a lasting ocou|»atk| 
niuld not devolve uu ['rince Albert'H Cavalry Division, 
chfirgc wtw fur General von der Tanri, with a whole Anuy Dq 

The ritnatiOB at the town, in a strategical point ' 
\» H<( if made for n fortread, wliirli ahuiild eeeure the aoutb i 
France and prevent the siege of Paris. 

OrltisDii commaDds tlie principal passage over the Luire, m 
uuiti-s the ruilroiuls from Nantes, Bordeaux and ToulonHe, aa wi 
as the central line which connects Lyons witli Fariit by Bour| 
An ufRcient army placed Ijere, which could constantly be n 
forced from the suiilh , might render a siege of Parii . 
impossible, by continually tbreateniD^ the besiegers. 

The town possesses rich re.source* within itself, aii4 
about 70,(>C>>J InlinbitiinU, a moot well to do population. 

If France had been able to i-eckon upon a war such ] 
Orl^ns would surely have been made a fortress. 



(leneral von der Tann approached the town on the 11th of 
October with the I. Bavarian Corps, the 22nd Infantry Divinion, 
and the 4th and 2nd Cavalry l)ivigion>«, after having defeated the 
advanced troopn of the French at Arienf^y on the previous* day. 
The 22nd Division, covered by the 4th Cavalry Division on the 
ri^ht tiank, marched by Huetre and Bonlny upon Ormes, the Ist 
Bavarian C^orps advanced in the centre, and npon the left flank 
the 2nd ('avalry Division drew near by the edge" of the g^eat 


(General de la Motterouge lield possession of the country to the 
north of Orleans, where favourably situated hills, covered with vines, 
formed natural capabilities for defence, whi<'h he had strengthened by 
entrenchments. The first fight t4M»k place between Bouiay and 
Ormes ; after it had lasted for some hours, and reinforcements had 
been C4>ncentrated npon this point, on both sides, de la Motterouge 
ordered the retreat. The French retired upon the town and from 
thf'H' to the lett bank, but still held the outskirts of the suburbs 
for a short time, so that some batteries were bnuight inU» posititm 
at Ingrc^ and bombarded the t4)wn. Very soon after this the 
town authnrities appeared to announce a peaceable submission. 
The French Army drew back upcm Bourges and fierzon. 

Orif*ans was occupied by the Germans on the evening of 
the 11 /A of October J and became, with the snrronnding country, 
a rich and tranquil c4mtonment for a time. From here (General von 
der Tann smt out the 22nd Division and Prince Albert's Cavalry 
Divinion towards the north-west, t<» suppress the movements of 
the p«M»plp there. On the 19th of Oct4iber a hot fight took place 
in Chateauduny between these troops and about 400() French, in 
which this barricaded pUce was almost entirely destroyed. The 
march was then continued upon Chartres, where a strong position 
was taken up. 


(ieneral de Is Hottorau^ wax imniedUtely deprived of 
conunnnil Ity GiunbetU iwlio bxd turivMl in Tnunt » f«w Aa$t 
beforci, ulthongb he had dona his doty UioMu^hty. He wn 
piseeij iu tlie command i)t the Iiolro Arniy by (ienerHl it^uraSt 
de Paladinns, who whm ruminheil by dcfcrettH witli coDsiderdAl 
reiDforccmcDta, the 16th Oorp» and parts of thu 17th C'urp*, 
receivi-d the mission of re-takhift Orl<!uiiM at auy prlc«. 

At the eud uf Octubor Gcitvnil d'Aur«llc hud conceotrmM^ 
about 10,000 men at I'ieraon, with a tolerably numeroiis ai 
lery; Ihciw wcro to be reinforced by Ui),(K)0 men from Toi 
and the wliulv woald then bo tbruwii botweun Genural von dcr TmhiX, 
detacliraenta , atandinK >^ milos luearly 37 Kngliuh miles) divtart 
from iinii anotlier, in order to K|i;Ut tluMn idngly if fioMiiblf, or K 
BOrrouud and v»|iture tlie portion stationed nt Orl<^ns. , 

The aaia body of the Frcncli Army waa to be dJroct«d Tn^ 
Vierziiii tipioj Bf^aiigt'iiey , to i'jii'oin|i»HH (>r1t-:iiiK from the wert; 
anotlier division, in tlio I'entn-, was to mnke a dfrnioDKtration only, 
againat Url&tns, fVoni the south to kocp tlie (iermans in tbe t«w«; 
the right wiiig, principally rmnpoHt'd of cavalry, Has Ui cdmr tkt 
l^ire at St. B<^nuft, nbcvc Orltiaiis, to enclose the Iuwd Avm, 
the caat. 

Tht^ whvlu Fri^ndi plan waa, Itownvor, wret^ked by (Sambetta'l 
injudicious iiit«rferenr«. l)y his eomniand, tlie troops, oonevntratgd 
at Viertou on the 2nd of Kovember, were not to reach Deaii^^aiii^ 
by maridiMi;;, hut ti> trav>-l by riiil tliroHKb Tifiirn. In npile of 
d'Anrelle'ii nbjcetions tbiit took place, and by this means, not <aAj 
was there a loss of three days iu time, but also the (lemua 
cavalry remarked the trains i-ontinually fn1h>wing one another, anl 
General von der Tann reeeivud timely information*). 

Un tbe 7t)] of November the niovenients of the French Im> 

•) [|| (liU «,»vrtir)n ilic author rtlics u[, 

n the ..counu in "MiHUiri.(*« 

dHnken un<< li.'tra>'1iliii>i:<'n" hy Ihp author 

of 'Krii't-w urn M«tt" (a Pr»». 

TchM merit the deepnt itudy. 


v:\mv cl(*ar to the (General, and althtMigli he wart unable to bring 
up the 22nd Divirtiou quickly enough ^ yet he baftied the enemy 
by cvaicuating Orh'*anri (»n the 8th of November and diking up a 
poHiti(»n at CouhnierSj which made a forcible neparatitm of hirt 
divihjonrt ImpogAible. 

The French, wlio had failed in encompjuMsing Urlf^aiirt, owing 
to the Hh)W execution of their movemeuta, advanced ti» the wertt 
of it. 

Consequently, on the Otli of November, an encounter took place 
at Couhniers, 

(teneral d'Aurelle very judicioiudy made hi8 numerous artillery 
operate chiefly against the enemy, whilst he did m»t employ \m 
infantry in oflVuHivc attnckn. Thurt Iuh young troops gained con- 
fidence, when, thev finallv saw the eneniv retreat at dusk. 

(icnerai von der Tann had no intention of here making an 
obstiiiiite n'sistance against the foe, perhaps four times su|>eri(»r in 
iiiimbtTs ; he retired upon St. I'eravy, Artenay and Toury, At 
tin* last place, which he reached on the evening of the l()th of 
November, the (teneral halted, and brought up the 22nd Division 
in the ni^lit. 

, (teneral d'Aurelle did not follow him, for e^irreetly estimating 
the ^Inall ndvantage gained and the cpiality of his troops, it did 
not appear to liim advisable, even now, to being the French array 
very Tiear t** the great (ternian army nnind i*ans. He contented 
hiniselt' with the occupation of Orleans, and t<N)k up a strong 
waitiii^^ p(»sition in order to (»ppose the (terman forces which had 
been newly reinf((»n*ed , on the 1 1th of November, by the arrival 
of the 17tli Division. 


(tamlx'tta, on the other hand, pushed on wiUi precipitate 
haste, the reinforcement of the l^iire Army, wlirwe Oommander in 
('hief, whose bravery, and whoae victory he thought he ooald not 
suftieientlv extol. 

Th« FVouch active foroed at tlwt time appeur to liave bee> 
M follown: 

Id the middlf^ nf October Prance had been divided into four 
general govern men Is , with four chief connnandit: let ttie North, 
with the head-tjuartera at Lille, 2iid the West, with the bead 
qiiArt«re at [^e Mans, 3rd tlie Centre, with the heAd-(iuart«TB ml 
BniirKee, iind 4tb the Ea»t, with the head -quarters at Be-8»nc>a. 
Within these general govemmenls the previfnia dittrihntion in lerri- 
torial military divisions was rontinued , and the forces alnwdj 
called «p under the Empire, time-served soldiere, Usrdes llobilei 
etc., were organized and drilled under the guidance of the oliittfi 
of theoe military distrieta. 

Moreover (iambetta had recently , on the 2nd of Nnvembtf, 
in desperation at tlic fall of Metz, set on foot a decree of the 
delegation at Tonre, according to whirh all men from 2I> to 4^ 
years of age, still free, were to he enrolled in the arniy. This 
decree wag more fully definiid and enlarged in Ihe next few days; 
the men already previonaly enrolled were to form a first levy, 
those called in by tin; decree of the 2nd of November a secmnd 
levy, and thia second was li) be again subdivided into thrM 
categories according to age, whirb would not be snmmone^] all tt 
once, but line after another. It commenced with the timt Ban, an 
from ai til 30 years of age, then the second Ban, mm fntm 31 
to H6. and lastly the third Ban, men from 36 to 40. [n order la 
transfoi-ni the great masaes of men, which the snocessivc ]evi*« of 
the three bans moat bring together, into bodies of troops, Out- 
betta, on the 2.^tb of November, decreed the formation of elevMi 
cam|)B of inxtruction and defence, at St. Omer, Cherbourg, L> 
Hnehelh-, Bordeaux, Toulouse, Hontpellier, MarHeille", Lyona, 
('lermon! Fcrrand , Nevers and LVmlie. By degrees the recmiU 
railed in aeenrding lo the above-named categories and tin- tiiii»- 
KCrved soldiers would be collected in these camps, and there drilled, 
and at the same time fonned into armies. In view of the grcsat 
ronltitDde of men composing all these levies, the number uf whi^ 
might be calcniated at a million and a half, Ihe campM woald 
have to be very large, each prepared for fiO,(WX» f. 2.')n,0«)fl rmml 

The general* who commanded under the republic, were tnt 


the most part, old officers, who had already retired ftom 
active service , bnt now entered again on active service (de la 
Motteronge and d^Aarelle de Paladines); partly marine officers, and 
partly also Jnni(»r Generals who had been recalled from Algiers. 
To the laAt belonged General Faidherbe, Commander of the Northern 
Army in December and January. 

Gambetta's plan, considered by itself, appears judicious and 
grand. Hut — it required at least two years time and some 
thousand A of Huperior officers, to carry it out In face of the 
situation of affairs as they were in reality, it was the pursuit of a 

Not that Gambetta could have found an organization more 
conformable to the purpose, but — resistance generally was a 
xtn against the prosperity of the country. 

The situation of affairs imperiously demanded peace for France; 
there wen^ no means of carrying on the war without ii\juring the 
country in a high degree. After the army had been destroyed, 
further resistance was impossible, or ought not to have been made, 
in opposition t4> the active and powerful enemy; and no great 
Rtatc8man , no great , organizer and general would have attempted 
it. No ^eniuK contd now help France. Gambetta made the 

The occupation of Orleans and the fight at Coulmiers having 
inspired him with fresh courage, he was now anxious, above all 
things y for an immediate advance against the investing army of 
Paris, in order to effect the relief before Prince Frederick Charles 
could approach from Metz. 

Hut in order, for the moment, to reinforce General d'Aurelle 
sufficiently to enable him to attempt the relief of Paris, the decree 
of the 2nd of November was still of no use; those troops only 
cc»nld be reckoned on which had already been organized for weeks 
and months. It is true their training was still very defective, 
hut the great number of old soldiers gave tolerable steadiness to 
the rest. All were well armed, the artillery was nnmeroot, and 
even in cavalry, some serviceable corps had been newly formed 
besides the imperial regiments still existing. 

Gambetta, under the pressure of aeeeailtyy eonaeqveatly inter 


ru)iti»l hU farther iDNtraotion, 0(illeuti>d tlin drtn^hmentM tvom 
ttic towns Md uwnpa cif thu »outh nnd wut, &im1 nt thv Mid 
NavcoibcT, bruDght togetbcr tm iirmy roiiDd OrlL-aiiEi wliii-li uunil 
i&u,mttt wraitwUnto, nnd m'lgltt be cjipiihlu uf tmiitiim M'lar lUiKio^ 
Ht (lie Uerman lI«ad-Uuiirti-ni. 

Everything miw depeiiddd npim ["rlaee Fredurict {^linrii-a's 
|)furiti); III Uie righl liinc; utlii^rvriM: Ihr wlvimru or Ntinh n nuioflnfM 
Hriuy, combiood will) a aortie en maige irom I'arie, miglit 
(Kvibiua oitiiMtiqiM^neeit for the iiiventment iif llm eity. 

Thn wacoatJoti of tlit) town uf Orl^aDH Ittwi, alnwdy, bees 4 
disagreAsble event for tlie Cerniaji War Direction, lew ftXMD 
inipm-tHnw <>r tlw tliiny ilMlf, ttmii mi nccuniil »f the ituiml 
pruwimn whJcJi it oxcKiitcd u])uii tLe Frcnrli pM>p1o. 

Ni>t only M'Mt I'arin mud wUli Joy und prepared f'>T » wtrtlft 
witli rrwli rountge, btil tlic tiding* of vicniry fluw lUruueh tiM 
wliok of Prance, aod suod Io8| all Mmilnrity tn ircnrral d'AnrvlMl 
rooderatfi rapurt. Everywlit^rn h eluiuge in Qic fortamw of WM 
wM liailed, ovrn VeranillM, vrliicli wit* iiMiipind by tlie 
beAd->|uiirtcrH and in the roidat of the poneriiii tiurninn annn 
raUed \ivx liead. 


Imrmxliatpty Kfltr tlir niui(iuncrni<-nt of th« rrtn-itt iif Gei 
von der Tiuin, s reinforcement of the triiiip<4 to the aoath (if I 
WM ordered from Venwilliw, whilnt, »I Ihu ume time, Pi 
Frederick CharleB received nrdera t<> opprmicl) by r-rn^ mu 
in nrder to b« able to rttrike in between Paria anil the L 
At that time, tbe Prince hak, with hi* corpN, in tlif- uei|;hbaiirti(M4 
of Troywt, nnd (a tbe north of tbe Anbe and Si-iiif . 

On the vnS\ <>{ November the tiraiid Oukr <>( JHncklimbtaf*, 
Schwerm led tJie t7th lHvi«ioii, wliieh had bn-ii Htalioned In th» 
line i<f iiiveMtmi-nl, I'ppiMile Firrt L'baronton and the rillage af 
Urtitell, since Uio toUt of On«bt>r, U> the as>i>Uno> of Ueiwnl 


von der Tamils Army Detachment, towards An^erviUe^ and os 
the 11th of November awamed the chief command of the bodies 
of troopg, now anited together: — the I. Bavarian Corps, 22nd 
Division, 17th Division, and 2nd and 4th Cavalry Divisions. 

As to the intentions of the enemy nothing conld, at first, be 
kn(»wu for certain, for the French, as yet too weak for a decisive 
advance, fortified their position romid Orleans and made very 
Hkilful demonstrations in order t(» decoy the German Army Detach- 
ment from the road to Paris and towards the west. General 
d'Aiirelle made detachments of the corps, stationed at Le Mans, 
march upon Cliartres and Dreux for this purpose. 

The demonstration, at first, completely sncceeded in its object. 
Tpoii tlie accordant reports that French detachments were ap- 
proaching Paris from N<»rmandy and Brittany, the Grand Duke, 
l)cli(;vinf^ perhaps that this might be the army of K^ratry (who 
had left i'aris on the f)th of Oct<»ber in the same way as Gambetta, 
and who wan known to be organizing an army in Brittany), com- 
pletely changed his front from the south to the west; made the 
ITtli Division, upt»n the right wing, march, on the 15th of No- 
veinbfT, from Angerville to Dreux j by Auneau, Rambouillet and 
Maintenon^ and directed the 22nd Division, which was f(»Uowed 
by the Havarian Corps, upon Chateanneuf en Thimerais. (The 
17th Division was commanded by the Adjutant General, Lieutenant 
(ieneral von Tresckow j from the 16Ui of November, in place of 
Lieutenant General von Hchimmelmann, invalided."^ 

On the 17th of No^icmber, the 17th Division came upon the 
enemy near Dreua*, defeated him after a fight of about three 
hours, and took the town. On the 18th the 22nd Division took 
Chatfauneuf] on the 19th it was engaged with French detachments 
beyond this place, and on the 21st oeenpied La Loupe after in- 
c^cmsiderable fighting. 

Now, however, the Grand Duke learnt that the enemy had 
not retired towards the west, but to the sonth-west upon Le 
Mans. Ho endeavoored to keep feeling with the qniekly retiring 
detachments, once again changed his front and, after a wheel to 
the left, pressed forward against Le Mans. On the 21st different 
small fights took place to the sonth of La Loupe, on the 22nd 

Nogenl-lf-Botroa wan or^Dpied, and on the 'iUti nnd 34tli of 
Novpmhpr, th« tirand l)«k»' cwmtiiiiied his marnh aa far sm Ln FrrU 
ftemard. Iler«, linwever, he received r'lmnuiiida from tli« Kin);'* 
Hi^ad-QumtHni tii proi-«pd im fDrtli«ir in tlje dircetJon »r Ijk Mn* 
unci 111 mari'b towaniK thf phhI; Bmm aflir lie aUo rwjrivwi dlrw 
tions ty«m Prince Krederick Chiirlps — wbo in Iho mpaiinliilf had 
fome up by Tniytin, Senii and Fnntaineblean, aud wan approjidiiaf 
(he theatre ol' war round Orlf^ans l<i taki- Ih*- (liinf ciiinmand »rf 
all the Uermaii forces in the aouth - U\ marrh upmi OH<^v 
and endeaviiiir to unite with thi> Prinr#'a army. From I>n Ferfc 
BeiTiard, tiiv Urand Diiktr, tht^rrfon^ , ixmtiourd hia xig-saf* mareb 
townrdfi Oliateandun; but In this march he met with atill witrtbor 
pMHHJiin; int«rriiptt(in , f>>r in Baxnc.hen the report suddenly reacM 
thr 'Irand I>nkp that a Frcorh C^orpa wan stationed at. Bran, thM 
in rear of the Army Detachment. The march wa» dir«wted npns 
Bron, a Rulhidiin took plaee «itli an ianlatfHl dftarhmpnt nt tiw 
i-nemy, of whkh thfrp were iwvcral wandering ahont at thai tjne, 
and it was then cmtttnued , in order to lead to the jiine4i<rn wid) 
the Piinec on the 1st iif Oeeemttfi' at Orghex mid Toury , thr 
■tartine P"int for the operalioni* a^inat (he w«-i<t. 

WhiUt the Omnd Dake waa executing his marches in tkt 
west, General d'Aurelle had drawn together almoat all Um id*- 
forcementa, which at that time conid be placed «t hia diapOMl, 
in the south; namely the 17th C«rps (General DDrieni), the IMh 
(General Barrah and the 2nth (General Crouzat), an that with tte 
tftth Corps vGeneral Pallicrex) and the 16th (.General Chsnir), m 
well as a Cavab7 Corps ((ieneral Michel) which had be«a stKttaMt 
at Orleans since the middle of November, he united noder Ut 
command an army of abont 200,000 combatant*. 

There were in addition itill two corps in reaerte, tb« 9IA 


under Keratry, in rear of the left wing, and the 18th under 
Bimrbaki at Nevera^ in rear of the right >»iog. (General Boarbaki, 
coinmandaDt of the 18th Corps had ei»caped the capitulation of 
Metz in an accidental and wonderful manner.) • 

Prince Frederick Charles — a Field Marshal, like the Crown 
Prince of Prudsla, since the capitulation of Metz — brought up 
three Army Corps, the HI., IX. and X. as well as the 1st Cavalry 
Division, whilst another part of the former investing army of Metz, 
the 1. :ind Vlll. Army Corps and the 3rd Cavalry Division, under 
the command of General von Manteuffel had turned against the 
French Northern Army and of the remainder, the II. and VII. 
Army Corps, the former moved off to Paris and the latter remained 
behind provisionally for the occupation of Metz, and the siege of 
Thiiinville. Both, at last, formed General von Manteuffers army, 
which drove Bourbaki*s troops over the Swiss frontier. 

General tTAurelle had his large army upon a line of 
cousiderahle length, on the right bank of the Loire, in part 
ijuite concealed from the reconnaissances of the Germans, by 
the extensive foreUs of Orleans and Marchenoiry and distributed 
in a manner, that even now allowed the subsequent division 
of the army into tiro parts to be foreseen, 

And indeed it appears that such a division was intended 
for the advance upon Paris, 

Cieneral d'Aurelle might probably have wished to avoid a great 
decisive battle witli Prince Frederick Charles, and therefore had 
the plan of marching upon Paris by two roads, far distant from 
one another y in order to deceive the enemy and to reach Paria 
with at least one half of the army. 

At the time of the first collision with Prince Frederick Charkii, 
the French corps stood partly concentrated on the right wing be- 
hind the forest of Origins, and partly on the left wing to the 
west of Origins. Certainly, the exact position of this left wing la 
not known, but it appears to have stood aomewhere between 
Chateaudun and Venddme. At all events the centre, la front of 
the town of Orleans itaelf, was only weak, and the right wiag, 
whose position and atrength were known from the figfata on the 
24th of November, waa not ao strong and ao far diataot from the 

eentn- witliout intt^Dtion. D'Aarelle appean on the cimtfary,- Wj 
have liud the desl(;ii of turning tltc IMnctr'H Kroiy, wliicli taunt 
rrom t)iu niirtli-eut by Fontainublt'jiu mid ioigny , upon hlnm^ 
in onlLT to occnpy 4t aai detain it in tim ToriMtt of Orlt^uM, whiM 
the Iftl wing waa moved Tiirwurd liy Cluit<^nndim nnA Cliartnw. 

I'rinco Frederick ('btirlds niTi»t )ii>vc siupcclud Hnmc sacb pla& 
He developed iiin furcee eautiouflly, gimrded tiiuself well HfftiiaA 
c'%*S'"g ^'" niHny truopM in oppoxiiig the French rij^ht wing, vr 
of following it into the forest, and likcwigc unfolded a very ct- 
tended front, which vomiuanded the wliitle (Miiintry between OrUsM 
and I'HnH, thvni Beioinf^ In KoUiide aa fur ** i.'hiiteaiidiin. Tim 
it came to pBM, that the fight* which led to Ihc name of tte 
''battif! of OrliWift", were fongfat upon a front of abunt tl milol 
(27*/s EngltNh miloM), in extent, a diKproportionalel.v I»n|; llni; ii 
coinpariHoD with the atrengUi of bolli nnnien. 


Thf firat itctiou l>etween the two Ijoire Annies, took ^ 
between a part uf ttie French right wing, the ^oth Cm 
the rrinr« Field Manhal'tt left flank column, the X. Armjr | 
to the iMjrtli of tiie great forest of cirli'ans, aa the (!er 
devel<iped it*elf, fronting mmth, to aflvance iigninnt (IrMnnH^-l 
X. Army ('nrps, which croiBed the river I^)ing on the 3lBt at 
Monlarijix in the direction of Pilhiriers had the task of BDitiBg 
around Keaiine la Kolnnde on the 24th of November, and, in m^ 
junction with the llesiiian (Jnva)ry lirigado, of carrying out ree«i> 
nHissances against llic enemy, wtjiwe presence at Giim on the Loin 
and t^) the north of this town, was known. 

In order to reach Beanne, where tlie remainder of the Ooi|H^ 
under (icnerat Voigts-Khetz, liad already arrived, Valentini's Brlprft) 
with the Artillery corpe advanced from Montargis, and Lehmai^ 
Brigade, by Lsdon , towards the west, when the French bvtkt 



fortli out of the forest of Orleans, in three heavy colnmiiB 30^500 
men in strcn^h, likewine in the direction of Beaune, with the 
ol)j(Tt of croHsing the mnrch of tlie two brigades, cimsisting of 
about 12,000 men. The brigades developed towards the left flank; 
th(' artiUery corps was brought on towards Beanne, and a vigorons 
ntTiMirtive w:i8 opposed to the enemy*s attack. Jjehmann^s Brigade 
t<M»k Ladorij Valentini's Maizwres, and the two united then threw 
i\w enemy back upon Uellcgarde, After the fight was ended the 
march was continued upon B<*anne, and the intended junction was 
«:arri(*d out. 

The losrt (»f the Germans amounted to 13 officers, and 220 
nil Ml ; the French loss was more c^msidenible , besides one officer 
and I TO men as prisoners. 

From tin* papers <»f a fallen French «>ffieer it was discovered 
that tin* thn*e divirtions of the 20th Army Corps, General Cronzafs, 
were to n*a('h the points Ik'anne la Kolande, Jnranville and I>a 
iiUii|H* on thin day; a proof tliat they commenced by a partial 
offensive with the right wing. 

This was, moreover, e^>ntinued with vigour. The 20th Corps, 
aft«r Ihr ti;rhts on th<^ 24th of November was reinforced by the 
l>tli Cnrps , so that, according to French Hcc(»unts, the strength 
of the ri;,'ht wing was 70,(HM» men. 


The Prince Field Marshal did not aUow himself to be led 
a>trav hy these operations. The (lerroan left wing received the 
I har^re of n'butting the Fn»nch attacks, and the further development 
ot' the aniiy C4)ntinued notwith-^tanding. 

The X. Army Corps retained, provisionally, its position near 
lU'tiiitu' la lioiant/f, in order t<» serve as a |Hnnt of support for 
the n|M'rations of the other corps, which gradually formed front 
to the south, and endeavtmrcHl , with the right flank to effect a 
junction with the Grand Duke's Army Detachment 


On th« 28th of Morembttr, at 9 u'clovk a. m. , the rigbt 
of tbe Kr«nch nude a fresh advuice againat tbo S. Corpa, buC' 
indeed, aa t]i« aocouiita of tlie Oennaii triiU|M arkiiowleil^ , witk 
great rapidity and vuhpmuiier, a« well m with decided (ilntinaej. 
Several troopa of tiie Line, old soldien, furmcd lli« |>riDcJ)>al 
eleuieut of Hit French attacking coluninti, and a iiiiUK^nxia artiU(!i7 
uanDunatlvd the Gt^rmiin positions. TI)C X. Army IJ»rpa wUnd 
upon the line from Bcaune to Longuar, and liad forUlied lU 
positions. Beaune ri>rmed the centre of the engageuieut and wm 
strongly barricndcd. The Frvncti attacked th<.* pinrr im tluai 
sides slmnltaDeoasty and also in the rear ; it was defended \tf 
Wedell's Brigade. Thf Bght, aUiug the whole lint?, waa ftill of 
desperation, nod l««tc(l UDtil Ihv vomuirnixtaeDt of tlarkiiHs. At 
4 o'clock in the afternoon, the Sth litfantry Dividiuu ifhrin Uir 
HL Army Corps) joinnl in thr light against the left win^ of Uit 
French, with four battalions from Boynea, and the lot CAVtit$ 
Division came np as a support. The French Carpi did bH 
commence their retreat ititii the forest of Orleans until towardi 
6 o'clock. A piirsait on the part of the Uermaus, after so hai4 
a fight, could certainly not be thought of, and moreover lUl 
would not have been judicious in the present military aituittion. 

The troops of the X. Army C-urps bad lield out with mt- 
mirablo courage against greatly nuperioi' iu numbers; their 
and knowledge of war, under the excclleni generalship of 
von yoigU-Rhelz overcame the t^rions assault, In the am^- 
glorioUB manner. The Corps had lust abont 101 H) men; the \tmt 
uf the Kreni'h amounted to considerably more, ItiHI killed, &0O0 
wounded and 161X1 prisoners. U whk the firsl e:i.'implc uf thai 
enormous pr<.>digulity in humau life, by which slone the FVmdl 
repoblic could pay the cost of continuing the war 
proved and tactically superior army of Qemuuiy. 



After the failure of the 28th of November, General d*Aurelle 
brought hin C<»rp8 chmer together round Orleans and to the north 
of it, rttill h<»wever retaining a very extended position. Upi»n the 
right wing he placed the 18th Corps , opposite Beaune, on the 
northern b<»iindary of the great forest of Orleans , and the 2()th 
('<»rp8 up(»n the r<»ad from Orl<^ns to Pithiviers, also in the forest 
of Orleans. In rejir of these Corps stood the 15th, nearer to 
Orif'nns. Perhaps ho now meant to entice the enemy npon his 
centre, in order then to advance by Fontainebleau, with the three 
eorprt of the riglit wing. 

In the meantime the Prince Field Marshal completed his 
diHp<»sition towards the south, established his junction with the 
(irand Duke on the high road from Orleans to Paris, which now 
formed the right wing of the united (German I^ire Army, and at 
Xhv K.'une time leaving his left wing, the X. and III. Army 
(*orps, HO far t4» the eastward, that he commanded the road by 
Pitfiiviers, and the c<»untry to the west of Loing. 

The (iernian Army might amount t<i 120,000 men, and the 
FrcMieli, ;i> far as they could now be bnmght into battle, to 200,000. 

On the iHt f)f December, Gambetta Cf>ncluded from Tr(K*hn*s 
re))4»rt8 upon the s<»rti(^ fn>m Paris, that a sortie army was 
already on this side <»f Longjumeau, and he therefon? now issued 
the most urgent commands for the advance on all sides, m»r did 
he allow proeiamations to be wanting for the inspiration of the 
tnMtps (v. page 306). 

On the 2nd (»f December both armies stood facing one another, 
ready t^> light, and in fact were so placed that the French centre, 
the KHh and 17th C<»rps, was opptmite the German right wing, 
whilst the French left wing, the 19th and 21st Corps, was furtlier 
to the west and south, behind the forest of Marchenoir. The 
Corps on the (ierman side had the advantage of being able t4» 
unite :uid mutually support one antither, in the open country of 
Or^'eres, Artenay, as far as Pitliivien and to the eaat of it, witli 
greater faeility than the French Corps, to whom the forest of 

Orl^nnH JuubtlcriM nffnti d<>fi!iiHivi< iiilvniit]ige«, but hUi> int«i-f«n4> 
very mach with general HUp^rvisioii aiid [Dobilit]'. 

Tli(^ Jlrat culliBtoii occurrt-d lu-ar lUe Pai-iii iuid Orl^uis nnd^ 
wlii^ii iHitU tbu Urrnuui rtgiit win|: and tlio KrCDch cvntre nuulc an- 
otft-naive advance. 

On tlie ov^^iiiijg (if tlir iRt of DecfiiDber, n RnvnrU* Ttcuf 
iicitriiig dtttacluntiit Mot xiit fn-m tiio (Iraod DuIci-'h nrmy-divUoa 
li&d citiup upon tb« advunceii j^nard of the IGtli tVuiK-h Car|i^ 
between Orgires aud Patay, niid whm tliru\«'n bai^k. The wbab 
of the (irand Duke's nrmy-divij^i^m immcdiati^ly movrd forward, it 
H u'cWk t>u tbi> fulliiHing miiriung; tb« BavHimns <in the rlftt 
-wing, fmm Org^rat, Daiiketl by the 4tli Cuviilry I>h-i«iiini ^ 
17th DlvUitm in the O-'iitre, by Bu&ifhofi; and the ^3tii! DlTisia% 
■ipiiii tlic Ifft wing, in iviiimvtion with die IX. Anuy ('orpn and «up- 
pxrtcd by the Jnd Uavalry Dimion, lUung the high r<>wl. 

These divialoDH had hardly passtid Orgh-ea ami Haaochet wltM 
tliey were vlgvroualy attacked by tbo Iieade uf tlie advaneiti|^ I<t4t> 
«nd 17th Frsni-h CorpH. Th« BnrariaTiM were, at tirHt, fbnari 
back, but tiic 17(1. Divi»i.iii »(»,ii re estiiblwhed rlie e..mbi«t; tJ* 
Frrni-h weir defeated after a rontexl i>f two hiinrx , Lotgng wm 
■tunned by the centre nud riglit niog, Pouprtf by the leA wing^ 
aud the purauit was carried on until cloHe in fmnt of j-trtaia^ 
fleneral d'Anrelle led up tliti ITth (VirpH an » reinfiirnenieBt, bvt 
wu unable to succeed in bringing tlie advantage t<> hie aide, i 
on tbfl evening of the 2nd of Oeceuilxtr, waH obliged tu U'^av* mm, 
puinta liuigoy and I'onpry in puMewiiin uf the right wing af tfW 
tierman lioire Amy. 

T)jf 17lb lliM-i->ii :<\..m- h:u\ Lsk.Tj 7 yuiiH, uiid muJ« UOO 
priaoneni, iDi-ludiiig one general and twenty officers. 

The Prinee Field Uarahnl now made diapoaitiiina for « la^ 
rounding atlack againnt Url^anD, by all the Corp«, upon C4>nTefgia|[ 
liuea. The radiating roads leading tn this town, formed the Ums 
of operations. 

Un the 3rd of December, the Grand Duke again eoutteaii 
hifl muvement on the right of the high road; next tu him, in tti 
centre of the whole oi-der of battle, upon this road and to tti 
left uf it, was Ueneral von Mauatein, whilst upon hia left iai^ 


tlie 2n(l Cavalry Division -held the connection with General 
von Aivensleben's III. Army Corps. This (.'orps marched from 
Pithivicrs upon (liiUeurs and, finally, the X. Army Corps, npon 
the extreme left wing, by Boyne. 

Gi*neral d'Aurelle did not again tjike the offensive on the 
'\ rd (if Dci'cmber, neither was the resistance on this day generally 
of a tennciotisly obstinate character. 

The (irand Dnke of Mecklenburg and General von Manstein 
threw the enemy back upon CheriUy, (ieneral von Alvensleben 
penetrated beyond ChHleurs^ and (ieneral von Voigts-Hhetz attained 
an e(|ual level with the centre, in the forest of Orleans. 

(ieneral d'Aurelle, in spite of his strength, drew back his 
centre, whilst leaving his wings stationary, and exposed them, even 
oil tluH day, t(» the danger (»f a separation. 

Probably the cvrnts of the 3rd <»f December still corresponded 
with d'Aurelle^H original idea, of being able to advance t^iwards 
ParJK with at least one stnmg wing, and indeed he mutt now 
ftarf CONN ted upon (he left wing^ which remained stiii intact, 
and fven unobserved^ bfhind the forest of Marchenoir. 

F'roin thiH day, however, the FVencli plan fell into confusion, 
chiefly, it would appear, through GamlM'tt.Vs interference. No 
rtystciiiatic action on the part <»f the French can any longer be 
recopiJMcd. However, it must certainly not be inferred that the 
march upon Paris would have succ^eeded had it not been for the 
differences between (iambetUi and d*Aurelle. The dispositions of 
the Prince, models (»f circumspection and decision during the whole 
I^fire campaign, would scarcely have allowed a French army t4» 
advance unobserved. 

(iamlM'tta issued the command that Orleans should be defended, 
and this naturally was at cross purposes with General d^Aurelle's 
disp4»sitions ; the retreat was C4»ntinued mi further, a fight occurred 
oil the Ith. but the separati<»n was, nevertheless, accomplished. 

All the (iemian (Jorps pressinl forward this day against 
Orleans, in the same direeticm as on the previons day. 

< ieneral von Manstein, with the IKth Division in the first 
line, and the 2,^ith dlessiant Division in the second line, came 
upon tin- main position of the French to the south of Cheviiiy, 

in tbi.- line rcrautb^H — Oicly, leading RcmsH tho high road. 
combnt cnanod, Uating Tor many hoars, with hot Aehtint; in pUeo^ 
which (iitilttd In tiw retreat »f Uic Fniiiclk ii[h>u Orl<'-iin 

/tnd now, lehilal t/ie German corps cenltniiett their wiartt 
upon OrUant wilJi a front beeofimiff ronlmuaUi/ mor^ a/roM^ 
wi, till- martii'/ioa.i dirisifm of Ihf f'rmrh //rmi/ into fwo ffr^wt' 
mattvx look plan; parting rom/iany up and ilown Ike Cvvt, 
Ike one towartU the xaulh-tee*l, the other toiritrtU the «0ivtA> 
ea$U This iuovchdiiiiI Imh tincn bocu inptiiim-d tiy Iiinlifiil 
for thfi rierman corpa, in the centro, had Advanced m far that 
Frencli wingH vaxv. no longer abli; I^i rnach Orli^a and tlie eei 

Thus whtlHt d'Aurcllc'H coojcutnred plan wax purtially MfillH, 
he whh at tlie aune time hindered from i adept? oil outly nxoniUlf; 
his cominHnd, and tlie two Hirong wingN, which should 
gone forward, nttired. 

The I8th (^orj)i passed the Loire at Sully, the SOtk M 
Jargeau In order to retreat upon Itourgei, luid the ITith Oorpa hili, 
croflstMl at Orli^ans; th^ remaining corjiii hatl cr-tnmnioed 
retreat upon Meung, partly also Ui tinir fonni-r poaitlon bmt 

Mcaii while tho German Army immediately followod ||n 
retreating nori'"; '^* ''^* ^^my Corps waa in pa*»nsiom af llm 
suburb of St. Jean htf the erenimj of the ith of Oercmkrr, 
after a cigorout fi>/ht. and. in common with ihr Grand IHtt^ 
Corpji, orcupied the loum of Ortean* early on the mantimf t^ 
the ^(A of Derember. * 

III till' three dnys fighting, the Iomm in the Frmrh Amy hal 
been cxCraoiilinnrily Ifti:^, i fiiclly in priBOiii-rB, uf wliuoi ikl>u>c lit,\MM 
fell into the bands of the Germans, together with 77 gnns wai 
4 gun-boats, surpvixed upon the I^iire. Itnt the German Iom alw 
was not inconsiderable, it amounted to about 5(KK) men >■ UIM 
and wounded. 




The Prince Field Marshal established his head - quarters in 
Orleans on the 5th of December, and from here sent out detach- 
ments in ail directions which were to keep feeling with the enemy. 

The division of the French Army, which Gambett^i instantly 
.'innounced to the world as a strategical plan, was confirmed by 
the German reconnaissances, and the track of the French right 
wing was followed for several days, with repeated small engage- 
ments at Gien, yierson and other p(»ints in the south-west and 

C(»ntrary to (tambett^i's hopes, however, the Prince made no 
further pursuit (»f liimrbaki's Army i^the three C'orps of the right 
wiiij^M after the loth i»f December, but now, correctly estimating 
\\w. iuiportanee of the French left wing, the 111. Army Corps was 
recalled from its march upi»n (iiefky and the whole German I^iire 
Army was direet<^ against the forces which showed themselves in 
opp(>8iti(»u to the Grand Duke*s troops and the IX. Army Corps at 
Alt* liny, Hea agency and Blots* 

The h'ft wing of the anuy which had been beaten near 
Orleans, the UUh, 17th, llHh and 21st Corps, had, under the 
eonnuand of (ieneral C-hanzy — d'Aurelle had fallen out with 
Gamb4*tui and been dismissed -- cimcentrated on the right bank 
of tJH^ I^»ire in the line lieangency — Marchen(»ir, and first offered 
resistanee to the pursuing German Corps on the 7th of December 
to the n<»rth of Meung. 

An offhuire movement m the direction of Paris, with 
surroundintf the German right wing, was not attempted by this 
strong army, although the present moment offered a better 
prospfct uf success than ever. 

Beaten by the 17th Division, the French rear goard drew 
back upon Beaugency, and on the following day General Chaniy 
luoved against the Grand Duke with his whole force. A hot 
eniragemeiit t<M»k place at Beaugency, in which the French wore 
oner again thrown back with considerable losses (1500 prisoners 
and 6 guns . 

On the 9th of December, amidst repeated fights, the Grand 


Duke oceapied the forest of Marchenoir and the diiirirti #f 
Roil valet y CSemay and others to the sooth of 
were still defended by the enemy. 

Upon the report of the combat near Meang, the Priae^^i 
Marshal made the X. Army Corps follow the UL and fte 

The 10th of December was to have been a day of 
German Army, but on this day General Chaniy 
oifensive afresh; the combat^ principally condieted by aitOlHJll * 
ended In Uie reireai of the Fremch^ who nmb wmU mm fm^ttm 
towards the south, but by Fenddme upon Le Mtms. •■•*-* 

The delegation of Tours had left thai town after ikm AflMb 
of OrlianSf and fled to Bordeamv. -^^ 

The German side was at fanlt, for some dajrs, as to the Bm 
of retreat taken by the French; it was believed that ttey 
fallen back npon Blois and Tonrs, and the march wai 
continued in this direction. The head-qnarters were in 
on the 19thy and in Sn^vres on the 13th. 

On the latter day, however, General Voigts-Rhetx made As 
discovery, after occupying Blois, that General Chanzy had drawa 
off towards Fenddme, 

In consequence of this the march was directed to the tpeaf, 
upon Fenddme, from the 13th of December, the X. Army Ostps 
upon the left wing and the Graud Duke upon the right, in tte 
first line; following them, the HI. Army Corps was to turn tff 
from Hcaugenry t(»wards the west, and the IX. Army Corps was 
to croKrt from the left to the right bank of the Loire at Blois. 

On X\w ITith of December a sharp tight took place in the liae 
Vendomo — Monk? on the Loir^ against C'hanzy's Army. 

But (wambcffa now appears to hare concHred the new platk 
of drawing the German ylrmy contiriuaih/ further westward and 
of occupying it, whilst in the meantime, Bourbaki was to march 
unimpeded towards the east, and break away, past GenermI 
eon Herder's smali ^-Irmy, into Germany, or eompteiefy im 
interrupt the German communications ,v. diaptnr XU). 

A lasting resistance was conhe(|uently not offered at Veiid6me| 
hut the retreat fn»m this favourable p<»8ition was decided on, aad 


commenced on the 16th of December. On the same day Venddnie 
wart occupied with some fighting on the part of the Germans, and 
8i\ gunrt and a mitrailleuBe were taken by the victorious X. Army 

The retreat of the French from Vendome, combined with the 
news (»f Bourbakis position at Bourgcs and Gien^ caused Prince 
FrtMlerick Cliarles to suspect that lie was to be entic4^ to the 
westwarily in order, [wssibly, to send Bourbaki to Paris. He there- 
fore returned to Orleauis on the IDtli, directed tlie Grand Duke 
of Mei'klonburg and General von Voigts-Hhetz to pursue General 
Clianzy as far only as £puisay and St. Calais, and then took up 
a position o/ observation with his trhoie army, both against 
Chanzy and Bourbaki. 

At the same time the latter commenced rmbarkinti his 
army upon the railroad for Besanfon, 

The Grand Duke and (leneral von Voigts - Khetz occupied the 
line riiartrert-riiateaudun -Vendome- Tours with their own C^rps 
and the Ist^ 2nd and 4th Cavalry Divisions, the former on the 
right and the latter on the left ; General von Manstein and General 
von Aivensieben extended their Corps and the 6th Cavalry Division 
ti awards the south-east and made reconnaissanees upon Vierson, 
Hourgeri, and upon the right bank of the Loire, as far as Gien 
and Briare. 

These measures f(»r observation were continued for a long 
time; yet it appears that B(»urbaki*s movements here were not at 
first deteeted, for the Prince remained at Or](^ans until the be- 
ginning of January, and the Southern Army was only get in 
movement Tor General Werder's assistance, at the commencement 
of that month. 

General Chanzy t^Mi, was in uncertainty on his side as to 
what the Prin<*<^ was going to do; his army was not yet fit again 
(o undertake any great operation; it had been terribly weakened, 
not only by the enemy, but also by the severe weather. 

The French troops were in the most deplorable condition, 
deserting in crowds, large detachments of them without arms, and 
all most insufHciently clad and fed. On the road Arom Orleans to 
Blois alone, more than 6000 French wounded, who had been left 

tii'liinil ittitirvl)' wit])<)ut ilooUn-H, wtm fnunil Htid BU(;nd«d to hf 
tlic ()i:rinHiu. Ilut tlic (lennHn trooiM Itnd alau aaCeni fVwai Un* 
niuxsisln^ figlitln^ and winter bivuoarkSn); ; ttiiiir fo'it-fi^xuir wiu fw 
t)ic miiitt i»rt in B wrvtclivd i-iiiiditkin, luul it is s grgat trionpk' 
fur tlirir axoellent moral (juuiitiofl, and tliu maHtoHy gflni 
nnd admluiatrittion, tlmt they, ucvcrtticUiRK , rr)inBin«il wnpletadt 
rtuiily for the figlit. 

From the 16th pf Deccmboi' 1870 to tiie Htli uf JmiiuiJ 
ir^Tl, utitking but reviiiiiuiMiuaiccii Di»'iirrrd, in WPufonnKy whb I 
»itiinti<>n of aflkira. 

Un the SlBt of Uooembei', t)if liltii Ulviiii'm fnim the X. i 
Oorpii, whiito Iiend ■ <|iurtent were at DIuIr, aiipi^Hm] bttforu Taa 
viu L'hatenU'Ui-nnutt, nflDT having dcl'oated mimi.' or the i iiwj'i 
ttctachiUKnta on t)ii? 19th. Tho tiiwu, nner tutino rifled i-ju 
iuul Ix'i'n thrown into it, rcfiuvittFtI n I'ruMiui ^ri'itwin, bnt it 
not occDpie^l; tht:: UivisioD tnovi^d Into Mntonroentu in 

A dftnchment from tbo 20th IHvisIoD at VendAme, atx c 
}i:Liiii'B. one BqUBtlron nnd two ^'nns , uuder liit^iitciiKitt Cnlifoid 
vim ItoltiMiKti^rn , went down the l^ir on the 27tli of DMomber, 
»Dd oami; npon h superior forre of tlitr enemy bctwi'i'ii hlanimrv 
»ml Lu Cliartre, which cocnp lately niirroiiiidtid tlie d< 
Aftor Muudry Kkirmi«hci<. Ttiu dctjtelimcut fouglit \\a way tbraqnl^ 
And ri^tiimed with a Ioh of abont 10<) men and 1(1 officcrfl, vA 
with 'i'M^ men of the enemy a* priM>iii,'n). 

Oil thu 'AUi of Uccombur, tlic 'JOtli Division, at Vandtett 
wai4 atlarked by superior forcen, bnl n'pnlncd the altaek, and iStr 
1st Cavalry Urigudc, under General von LUderitz, succeeded !■ 
taking 4 guns. 


In the beginning of 1K71 it was evident thitt Bonrbaki 
make a push towards the east (v. Chapter XII.), and Ihinoe 
Charles, in accordance with the Chief Head - Qnartera 


special dispoBitions were made against Bonrbaki^ now decided, 
on hjg Hide, to attack General Cbansy, who waa stationed at 
Le Mans. 

On the 2nd ot January, the Prince commanded the XIII. Army 
Corps (17th and 22nd Infantry Divisions) to concentrate at Chartres, 
the IX. at Orit^ans, the III. at Beangency and the X. at Venddme. 

On the 6th of January the following points were to be reached : 
BroUy up(»n the light wing, by the XIII. Army Corps and 

the ith (Cavalry Division, and Nogcni le Rotrou by a flanking 

ilctachment on the right. 

Morve, further down on the Loir, by the IX. Army Corps 
IHth Infantry Division and Artillery Corps) and the 2nd Cavalry 

f'eN(/omey in the centre, by the III. Army Corps, whose 
advanced guard was in occupy the line of Azai; Manloire, upon 
the left wing, by the X. Army Corps and the Ist and 6th Cavalry 

Di visions. 

Tiiese dispositions indicate a surrounding attack against Le Mans, 
an<l formed the introduction to a series of fights, which lasted 
seven days, before coming t(» a crisis at IjC Mans itself. 

The peculiar tormation of the ground, to the east of the 
ancient Norman town of Le Mans, explains why the overthrow of 
the westeni army was marked by a succeasion of fights instead 
of by one great decisive stroke. 

The two rivers Huisne and Lair^ running into the Sarthe 
which Hows by Le Mans towards Angers, form with their numenins 
small tributaries, a number of tactically important positions, lying 
regularly (»nc behind another, in the hilly and undulating country 
round liC Mans. The ground is, moreover, intersected by numerous 
(|uick-set fenciis upon low earth banks, which enclose the fields; 
numerous isolated farms, with several villages, thickets and many 
solidly built chateaui lie scattered about, forming special points 
of appui for the defenders. Added to this, a cold of 8 to 10 
degrees ^ Reaumur) with snow and gales increased the diffioultiea, 
on both sides it is true, ^^ marching and fighting. 

On the 6th of Jasoary tlie fighting began. 



The French had, on the 5th of Jimiwry, i 
piiHilion iii>piH»ito Uki '.'Dth Infnntry Hivitdim, and ooeapied tfc| 
forpst nf Vendftrac; fiiim here, <iu Din Glh of Juiunrjr, il>«y i 
HtfackH n[Hin thti iiut])(HiU of tlie Divlaion, wtiicb 
HtBtiuiiiiry, whilst tiw Utter wiu moving to tlit^ smith - wt>st o]i« 
Hontoire. i^ooii howovrr, towardii middity, tlie hrxdu of tkf 
lU. Cor[w ftirived iil yntddme, took U|i thn oomliul aiitl cmilitiiHl 
it, ngajnst tlio tonacioiis, iiiid rcinfurccd, rrsisbuicv iif Uio enn 
until IiIb retrt'Mt behind tlio Asai line. 

The X. CorpH r»in)ied Montoire witli «liglit reitltiUuicau 

The regiinentH nf the 38th ItrJgadc, on the other (uuid, 
pitrtH iif the 1M Cuvftlry Division aiid the 6tli Citvalry liivkw^ 
who wpro appointed to cover the mnreh of the X. ('orpa apuD I 
exircmc left flaiik , in a position at St. Amand , were; Nttaekd 
fVnrn C'hnt«aii - Renault, from th<- south - went, and forced hAek npa 
Ambloy. — The enuiny thns altempti'd tn pnralyzo the attack, 
Borronnding the left flank of the Germaiu. 

Tlie IX. Corps had reached Morfe; the XIII. C«rp», 
had met with an obstinatr resistimec, and had only juat 
the vieinity at' Brou . and not yet Nogeiil le Rutron. It hji 
becjime evident in tlie coui-xe of tlie day, tiiat Divioioru nf Ite 
16th and 17th Oorps had fought a/ainat t)ie Ul., part* nf tta 
31. Corps ae^inst the XIII., and a Division of the 16th Gm$^ 
had fought at St. Amand. 

TliP Frincc Field Marshal deelded to continne thff ann 
attaclc upon le Maim, and only tti devote a Secondary OOBl 
to the enemy at 8t. Amiind. 

Ky hi* diipoisitioos for the 7th iif January, the XUl. Owy» 
wa* to advance upon Montmirail, the IX. upon Epiiinay, tbn X. 
upon La Charlrr, *\»Ut rebutting the threatening npon tta I 
the Ul. Corps upou Sai-ifpii/ and EftuUaif , and he 
towards CrUainai, in tim eentre. 

A thick fog lay upon the ^rt<und and shut oat the eOhtt if 
tlic artillery. •" that the fighting had to he .■■rried on by I 
infantry aione. There wore onga{;emeiiU al Kpuiaay, 
and Nogcut le ItoCmu. In tlip evening all tlie divisions ha4 I 
np the previoDaly iadiealcd prwilions with the eieepllun of tkt J 


X. Corps which hud been retarded by a victorious fight at St. Amand 
.iiid only got as far as Montoire with its main body. Tlie Prince 
rstabli.shod his head-quarters in Vendome, and ordered a general 
contiiiuation of the offensive for the 8th of January. 

On this day the leading troops of the 111. Corps reached 
Fkorpain without a contest; the IX. Corps, in its rear, reached 
St. Calais, to which place the licad-quarters were also removed; 
the X. Corps, uHcr a slight resistance, reached la Chartre, and 
the Xlll. La F^ile Bernard, and pushed out an advanced guard 

The orders for the 9th of January directed the XIII. Corps 
to the hill of Montfort, the III. upon Artenay, the IX. upon Bou- 
loire, and the X. upon Parigne-Evcque. Detached divisions were 
also commanded to undertake the destniction of the railway connec- 
tiou'^ from I^ ManH to Alenyon and Tours. 

(teneral von Hartmann, with a mixed detachment was charged 
to throw the enemy V troops further back, which bad threatened 
the left flank of the X. Corps, on the 6th. 

The previously indicated points, Artenay^ Le Breil, La Belle 
inutile, L'llonime, Montreuil, St. Georges and Sceaux, were almost 
reached on all Hides, amid hot fighting. 

The Prince Field Marshal established his head^quarters in 
IVuiloire and ordered the surrounding advance upon Le Mans 
UspI/\ for the Wth of January. The IX. Corps was to form 
the reserve of the centre. 

The rnads, rtince the 9th of January, had been covered with 
slippery iee, so that the march was rendered unusually difficult, 
especially for horses. 

But notwithstanding this hindrance and the obstinate resistance 
offfTcd by the enemy, chiefly against the III. and XIII. Corps, 
the following; points wore reached in the evening. 

The HI. Corps stood in Change, between this plaee and 
Paritjne, to the west of St Hubert and in CkampaffiU. The 
X. Army Corps at Grand Lue*. Of the XIII. Corps, the 22Dd 
Divisinii had only reached the line CouleonCkdtfmU'Connerri 
railway sUtion; the 17tii Division bad not been able to fwoe the 



passage mrer flie Hmtgne agsiint i ] M Ito-lM 

Corps, and stood at Pant de C t. 1 BL i qs 
Baulaire. **^ 

^ : 


On the evening of the 10th of January, the Freaoh Ajf^ 
was formed up with a carved front in a Ibe three milea (18^/g K^f- 
lish miles) in extent, to the east and north-east of Le Ifaas^ if 
excellent positions for further fighting. Tlie 16th Corps wai 
the left wing, on the right bank of the Huisne, the 17tli 
and parts of the 21st Corps, in the centre, on the left buJk iff 
the Huisne, and one Division of the 19th Corps, upon tlie rijijtt 
wing, on the road to La Chartre. The Qardes MoUIbs 
mobilised Gardes Nationaux, who had only arrived shortly 
were in reserve. 

The whole Army might still number 100,000 men. 

The Prince Field Marslial again oi*dered the attack for the 
11th of January, in tlie old, often proved Prutisian msinner; tkaft 
of Rurnmnding the enemy with both wings and then attaekusg 
vigorously from the centre and tlie wings. 

The XIII. Army Corps was t<» accomplish the passage ofcr 
the Huisne on this day, and to move forward against Le Maaa 
from the north-cast; the remaining Corps were to keep their pre- 
sent directions. 

On tliis day the success was gained of wresting some very 
important positionrt fn>m the enemy; still the decisive combat re- 
quired yet a seventh day. 

In the evening of the 11th of January, the 111. Corps had 
gained possession <»f Arches Chatvau and yoyvrs Chdteam^ wmik 
the IHtli Division, after a fight of many hours, had taken the 
Plateau ttAnrour. The Xlli. Corps had crossed the river «l 
Connerre with the 17th Division, and in the evening after a hud 


fight, UiIr Division occupied the country to the cast of Lombrany 
and tlio 22iid Division, La Chapeiie. 

Tiio X. Army Corps had reached Les Mories j4ures and 
Mulsantw lat<^ in the evening, and taken the lieight of yerd- 
ijaianlj an important point of suppi»rt for the enemy. 

The 14tii Cavalry Brigade with two battalions was, in the 
cvoiiing, between Chateau de la Paillerie and Parigni^t Er^i/ue, 

The IVince Field Marslial e8tabiishe<l his lieadH|narters in 
tiio Chateau dArtenay, and gave the following orders for the 
12th of January: 

"The III.* and X. Corps will continue the offensive; the IX. 
Ciirps will f establish its artillery Corps upon the plateau d'Anvour 
and, with a brigade of the IHth Division, support the Xlll. Corps 
whilst it d<'b<»uches by the bridge over the Huisne." 

With the commencement of dawn, however. General Chanzy 
first took X\w offensive. Shortly after, whilst still dark, the ad- 
vanced posts of the III. Corps were engaged; at noon, those of 
the IX. C<»rps in the neighbourh<H>d of Fatines\ and, at the same 
time, the 17th Division, to the south-east of St. Comrtlley was 

(H'ii(>ral Clianzy risked a final desperate battle, and it is a 
matter of a>^tonishmcnt that he was still able to move his Army 
to su(*h a ti<clit as took place this day, after six days of almost 
nnintrrrupt<*d defeats. 

On the German side, the 35th Brigade joined in the combat 
at St. C(»rneille by a flanking movement; the French were defeated, 
and the Brigade reached Parance in the evening. 

Tiie 17th Division t<»ok St. Corneille and the passage over 
tiie Parance stream at Thouvaii-Chdteau. 

The 22nd Division m4»ved forward from La Chapeiie^ by 
.S7. (%'*ierir and Torce and reached the Bonnetable and I^ Mans 
n»ad. In a further advance the Division came upon strong forces 
of the enemy near Chantelaupf and after an <»bstinate combat, 
pL'iced itself, ttiwards evening, in possession of La Croit. 

The 4 th Cavalry Division reached Balian and Soulign^. 
General von Ifanstein bad ocenpied the plateau d*Anvour witli 

luit] the Somme, a porilnn of the J.trd Refttraent or the TAne ni 
II jimiill [itrcv of Cavulry, ndvjiiict^l fnun An'H» t» nnkc n re- 
cunnaisBancv towards pAris, and came into cullUiDa with twit Off 
man aquadronK Iii tliu iit'ighbuurho<id nf Br/^leiiit, Ut the Mntli U 
Aiuii^'tia. Tliuy at unce turned iiguin in rapid n-trout apon AtnieM 
and Arrae. * 

These newly oripuiized troops, however, did uot gain impW' 
tnnce as an amy, which could <^ndangcr tliu iiivestiuoat of Pum, 
nntil much Uter, at thegaote time that the French Loire Ara.i 
also attained a threatening Htrengtii in the «outh, under Unoefal 

General Farre had, originally, been charged witli tlif uqm 
izatiun of the active forcoit in tliu north; then, on the 'J'Jud af 
October, Bourbaki took over the Cliief Ooinmiiiiil, nflcr Ills depar- 
tnrc from Heti; bnt In November, before there had b^^ uij 
fighting in ^e north, he wa« called away to take up a comuod 
on the Loire. 

Even at the ^d of October the organization in tlic norik 
appeared of aufRcicnt importance to the German Army DircctiM 
for General von Mant^nffel to be sent there, after the cjipitalxtJM 
of Metz, with the I. and VTIl. Army CorpH (the L wvut rcdtietri 
by having sent away det&ehmentti'i and the .'Ird Cavalry UivialM. 

TiiiB Army Detachnienl, however, waa only able to move af 
fmm HetE on tlie 7th of November, for the 1. Army (wlUelt cok 
siated <>f the VU. Corps and Sendeii's Di\'iHiun he«idcs tiki- ^m- 
tiitns of troops named) had been given tlie charge of carryiD;^ otf 
the evacna^on and removal of the captured army, in delat:ktnc«% 
from Metz. This ardnous woi'k, occupying much time, wan fin«Hy 
so aiTangcd that the Lmidaehr troops, liitlierlo belonf^Bii; It 
Kummer's UiviHion, uliould midertnkc the tr)ini<[H>rt to GomuuV 
and then remain at home on guard) it WMt then only that Ibe L 
Army was distributed for tlie clivers tasks of uocupyili|; 
Thionville, Lougwy, Moiitmi.'dy, UesiiNres, partially alau for the ■ 
and obftcrvalion of Venluii Cv. Chapter IX.) and to udvaw 
llie north-west of France. 

I'art of the VU. Corpa remained In Hots, Senden'ii 
bcaiegcd Thionvilk' and the furtrcNM-s on the Belgian 


Zglinitzki'rt Hri^ide from the l8t Corpn, reinforcecl by a squadron 
and a battery, moved forward by the railroad to SoIamidh for the 
Kiegt' of La F^re, whilst Bentheim't) Division was *eiit away for the 
investment of Mezieres. 

On the 7th of November General von Mauteuffel commenced 
hin inarch with the remainder, by two main n»ad8y towards the 
w«'8t. Tlie I. Corps, upon the riglit wing, followed the line of Briey- 
l>amvillerM-H<'thel-Laon-Noyon, and the VIll. Corps, U|M)n the left 
wing, that of Verdun- VarenneH-KheimH-SoiBwms-Compiegne. 

On the 21rtt Ham wan occupied. 

On tlie 23rd of November the advance upon /t miens ^ by 
Monttli<lier and Koye, wjih made, preceded by the Cavalry Di- 
vision. On the f<»11owing day fighting took place with the advanced 
;^uanl , under Colonel von Luderitz at Quesnel and Mezieres ; 
on th<* iNIth, tht' presence of stmng fi»rceH of the enemy at 
Thftmt's on the line of the Luce was ascert'tined, and dinpiisitioiis 
w»*n* inadi' for a battle on the 27th. 

Of the 1. Corps, only <me infantry brigade, the Artillery 
<'<»r|)'i and a cavalry regiment wer<» on the spot; the Ist Oivinion, 
nn\N n-rMvi'd hct'ori' Mr-zirrcs by Sendfu's Divisit^n, was still upon the 
ni.urli, tin* Vlll. Corps, on the other hand, was complft<». Ilow- 
«\er, tli«' Ki-^riniVnls Kronprinz and No. 41, belonging to the Ist 
hivision , as well as the cavalry and artillery, still arrived in 
time, on tli<; following day. 


(itMicral Faidherbe reckonii the ftirces*), at that time on the 
rriMK'li ^id(• in Amiens, as coiwisting of only three brigades, 
Levohih^'s. Ufrrojas and Ofssots, with the garriiMm of Amienn, 
altugetloT 'J.'iyiH^o nien including 4 st|uaidroii8 and 7 batteries under 

*i III )ii^ )>ultlii-ation 'Tftiupa^^tie de TAriude du Nord**, dedicated to 

(ttiiiilMtt.t : It iMitiliratioii with excellent closing remarkv, but written with 

too iltTi.liills |>olitical ubjcctji. 


■ 364 

the command of General Farre, Gardee Mobiles, Harinea uid R- 
gaUr infantry, nud very tiomeruna uffieers escaiietl fruiii the ea|M- 
tulationa of Sednn and Metz. If these efitimatoH lire correct^ — sad 
Pnidherbe'e detailed accuiint make;) it probuble— the Preach army 
was about equal in numbers t<> the German, thongli mach weaker 
in cavalry and artillery. The enti-enchmenti, in whieh the Frpneb 
fought, certainly cumpenBated for this disadvantage. 

The Herman Army, im tlie raoniing of the 27th uf Noi'embtr, 
advanced for the offenaive directly upon Amieiu; the VUL Corpt 
upon the left wing, and the detachments of ttie 1. Ckirps npun tlir 
right wing. 

The French Army held an entrenched position , in a very 
extended line, in fmnt of Amiens, 

The VIII. Corps attacked in a northerly direction towai-ds tlie 
town, threw back the enemy, who ofTi'red a brave resistance, from 
one poaition to another, in a fight lasting for many huura, during 
which several bayonet tittacks were carried out, and a battaliw 
of marines was ridden down by the 9th Hussars; and in tb« 
evening ita leading troops were half a mile {2*/^ EugUsh milwi 
from Amiens. 

Tlif I. Corps, when advancing against the heights of (ienlttilm 
and yillers-Br^lonneux, hud to endure a still harder Hgbl; it «m 
attacked by a French det-ichment whidi had taken up a puaitin 
for the defence of Corbie and the railroad to Arras atid Lille. 
The 1. Corps was only able to g^n ground slowly and ntnid 
severe losseH, yet being vigorously niipported on the right wing by 
the Cavalry Division, this corps also succeeded at last in defeiatlng 
the enemy and takiu^ tlie entrenchment at VillerH-Brcloiinenx. 

With this the French army certainly waa not driven uat of 
its last position before Amiens; yet its loss waa so conaid«T»bl«, 
and the steadiness of the troops «o shaken , that a rapid rMrv«l 
111 tlie north was commenced in the evening. 

I^ho loss of the Oerroans was pretty considerable ; it unoonlaJ 
to 1300 men and 79 ufGcers. Ncvcrthilcss 9 guns and 2 culunn 
were taken, and KO<i uuwonndcd prisoners made; the Vn* uf tiic 
French is estimated, by Faidherbc, at :t66 killed and 1117 wooj 
betides a greal number wishing luid scattered. 



No purnuit wan made after the enemy in retreat to the north; 
and tlierefore the reriult8 of the battle were only momentiry. An 
energetic pursuit would probably have put an end to the whole 
wiir ill the north, whiUt a^ it was, the French army again 
recovered and was reinforced in the northern fortrertAes, ho that it 
waii able to repeat many times \U attempts to press forward across 
the Soinmc towards Paris ^ and to engage in several fresh battles. 
WhetJier a purnnit was impi»ssible^ cann<»t as yet be decided, for 
bufiii-iently exact information is wanting as to the positions on both 
sides and the condition of the tro(»ps after the combat. On the 
French side only, is there a detailed ai*count of the battle by 
(ieneral Faidherbc, according to which the German army was pre- 
sented by \U hmses, and the fatigues of the contest, from profiting 
liy Itrt victory, whilst the French had, for the greater part, retired 
in ^ood order. Ia'ss contidence can be placed in this account 
than nn the atrength estimate's from the same source, because a 
deseription cau easily be coloured; nevertheless the conrse of eventn 
;;iv<h it some likelihood. As the (Jennan army, with its superior 
and iiunirrons ravalry, had so greatly the advantage, in r(*gard to 
a pnr.'^iiit, n\ei an enemy alm^ist entirely deficient in cavalry, it 
in diltii ult t<» explain why lietter ust* was not made of the victory. 
It \r- tni«- that in general, a pursuit by cavalry, after the fahhiou 
ot fonner war.-^, is no h)nger possible, and this arises from the 
new arms of the infantrv. F<»nnerlv the cavalrv remained so close 
np«»n the heel> ot' the retiring enemy, that it could take advantage 
of eaeli moment of disorder to fall upon it; m)\i, however, even 
a small drtaeliment of infantry with the rapid-firing, hnig- ranged 
breech Inadei^ , keeps the cavalry at such a distince, that all 
f«*elin>^ l)»:\\een the rear guard of the retiring body and the pur- 
Miing ca\alry '\t% easil\ lost. A pin suit, therefore, is only possible 
how with all three arms, and principally indeed with infantry still 
thoroughly fit ft^r marching (»r at least more tit for marching than 
tlie eiiemv. 

The whole war of 1870 71 presents no single instance of 
a piodmtive pursuit by cavalry, as was the case formerly, and 
in general, iMily oflers examples of pursuits of little energy and 
Nalut-. ihi^, naturally, is maiiily owing to the principal battles 

P 366 

at HeU and Seitiin hAting ended with the retrent of the txdi 
foe into h fortretta hdU a capituUtitiD , which without donbt , 
of more value than any puraait; but in other euea, After tb« 
battle of Woerth for instance, nu pursuit was made, because ihr 
vietore had not any fresb infnnti^ near enough to the «nt.-my, mai 
because the ciivalry wks unable lu pursue. Here, at Aminft, 
however, the pnmud was more lavoiiriible for cavalry tliAU at 

On the 2Hlh, Amienx wnx ovcupind by the Germatuj bit 
the citidel held out until tlie following morning, and wsa otij 
taken ufter a short fight. At this place, 11 officers and 400 mn, 
30 gam and coneiderable war tnateriiil fell into the hands of the 

From the beginning of the campaign in the north, the clixnKlet 
of Die population exhibited quite a different aspect to that qmI 
with by the Hermans in the south and in the Vosgee, Herv therr 
was uotliing of fanaticism tti be observed ; the people, welt-to-4t 
and of a quiet temperament, looked with great dislike upon Ag 
continuance of the war, feared an exeess of the Fnwc-tinv 
motion, and above all every revolutionary movement, and frfMianntlf 
sought protection from the German military authorities agiiinst iha 
armed proletari.itd of their own country. The towns, for the nwrt 
part, were not wirry to eee a (lerman garrison; the troop« wen 
met in -J, friendly manner, and the billetting and reqaisitiuns rf 
the Uermauit were tolerated, as the lighter of the unavoidable tmk 
of the war, because every thing wus dune in ■irdcr. 


Un the i^tk and Ituth of November, detachmenU (ollow«l 
the enemy in the direction of Arms and Lille, and at the smm 
time the raareli upon Kouen , where other French forces wem to 
be found, wns bIsu arranged, A detachment was left belund l» gDwi 
agalubt the enemy who had retreated towards the nortJi, tb* 


railroadrt leading from the north, were alno destniyed, for greater 
Hociirit y , and General von Manteuffel then move<! off au tlie Idt 
«»f Deri'mber, towards the Houtli-west, ag.iiniit R(Mien. 

The VUI. Army Corj)i* formed the right wing and went by 
I'oix, Forges and Buchy, and the 1, Army Corps, which had now 
a^ain bmnglit up the greatest part of its troops from M<^zieres 
and La Fere, marehed upon the left wing and took the direction 
of Breteuil - (lournay. 

TIh* rearmost triwips of the enemy retired rapidly, were 
pursinfd, and on the 4th of December General von (toben came 
upon a French corps of obrtervatiou between Forges iind Buchy. 

Thf VIII. Corps attacked immediately; the enemy only offered 
a slight rcNistance, and was 8i>on driven away from several p<>si- 
tions, with severe h»ss, besides 4()0 prisoners. General von Gdben 
stili rravhed Houen on the same day. 

The I. Corps likewise advanced, driving before it the enemy's 
detaelnnents, whieh made but an indifferent stand. 

On the ♦Uh of December, R<men was occupied by a strong 
garrison; General von Manteuffel moved in, in the afternoon, and 
then immediately arranged the march of a detachment upon 
!>ieppe. This sea p(»rt town was occupied on the 9th of December. 

The result was considerable. The French f<»rces were here 
cr»niph*te|y ilriven away, and retired towards Havre; the im- 
portant town of Rouen, with above U)0,00(» inhabitAuts, and 
!>ieppe, of eonsequence as a harbour, were in German power. 

The troops, wearied by forced marchea and repeated engage- 
ments, could now be allowed a little rest. 


On the .'^rd of December General Faidhftrhe had tftken com- 
mand of the united French forces , in Lille, and in a few weeks 
had brou^^lit them up to the strength of three Divisions, Lecointe's, 
Paulze dTvoy*s and Moiihc*Sy whose force, as represented by 


Fudherbe, wm 30,000 men iinrl fiO gun». With thin urnty h» 
ftgain moved off townrds thp noiitlj. 

He dirwW tlie lut Division, liei-oint^'s , upon St. Qomtii. 
It rerapturfid Ham on tlje lOtli of Dwembor, and there mide 
210 prisoners. He then appeared with Wb whole force, beflnt* 
La Ffre, on the 12th. An this little fortress roiild not be taktt 
without a aietr^, OenernI Paidherbe turned towards Amiens. IV 
Bperial task of tiie Preiicli iiorOjcm army wnit tlie relicT of Pbtu; 
therefore this march appears rnmHrlcable. It was to be expMM 
that Faidlierbe wi>uld ^n soutli from Lit P6re; still he migfat ham 
feared a flank attack by MantenfTel and tlien^ore wonld ooatoot 
himself witli disturbing the enemy's operations upon Havrn. 

On the 20th of December he was on the ffa/iiie. a tribnUi^ 
<lf the .Somtne, with his army, and the sortie by the PnriniHI 
against Le Boiirget, on the 21st ol' Oeeembcr, which hu bMi 
described at page ^{to, took place in connection with hla offemnln 

fieneral von ManteufTel, however, had received timoly intrtli- 
gence of these movements, and '(uickly approached the thre«t«Md 
Amiens with his disposable force, wliicii, after the departnrv af 
the necessary garrisonn for Konen, Dieppe and other places, «til 
consiiitrd of the VID. Array Corps, one brigade of the 1, Arav 
Corps and tlie 3rd cavalry Division, altogether pertiaps Ivxa thai 
20,000 men. 

Even on the 20th a fight took place in the fronU tit 
French stood in cantonments in the valley of the Hallne ntr«aa, 
upon the right bank of the Somme, towards the south, rovend 
by this river and the i-anal, as well as by extensive roarshes, ^d 
had occupied Corbi> besides the villages in (he llallne vmlhjy: 
In this position iwnsiderable reinforcements were drawn togetlwi^ 
which had been organized in Lille, and consequently formed a new 
corps, so thai the French Northrm Array now numbered the 23iid 
and 23rd Corps, altogether about 40,000 men with 78 gn». 
The 22nd Corps, under Oeneml I^eoinle, two Division.-, and nil 
batteries, look the line along the Hallne, from Diwuri to Bf^tt- 
court: the 23rd Corps, under (itnrral PauUe d'lvoy, held Coi-Ut 
and its environs with iU 1st Division and five halterieN, and bad 


stationed it8 2nd Division, in a second line, in the villages to tlie 
south- west of Albert 

On tlie 20th, a German reconnoitring detachment came straight 
upon the French centre at Querrieux, and a small but hot fight 


On the 23rd of December, (Jeneral Manteuffei advanced for 
the rrgular attack. 

The ofTejmive of tiie (iemian army whk directed from Amienn 
aj^Hiiist tlie front of the French, who, in the last few davH, had 
stren^lM'iied the heightn upon the left bank of the Hallue by 
Kome ciitrenchmenti*, and intended to offer an energetic resistance. 
Their position was, in fact, very well chosen, for their left \*ing, 
which the (ierman side might have wished to surround, lay greatly 
protcrtrd, and the right wing curving to the rear with the con- 
fnrmMti<»ii of the chain of heights, rendered an emMimpaasing 
difficult luTc also. 

riif (icrni.'in t oops attacked, as always, with great courage, 
lhr«*u hark the French advanced troops fn)m the Im'alities and 
l>o-itioii> vshich they (»ccupi(Hl upon the right bank of the Hallue, 
and then wiiit forward Ut st^irm the heights upon the left bank. 
The ronihat revolved chiefly alnnit Daours ui>on the German right 
wing, and about Ponhyoyelles in the C4^ntre; up<m the German 
h'ft uinj:: ••n attack was undertaken against Frerhencourt , These 
iiM'Mlitifs w»»re successfully wrested from tlie French; yet at 
FrcrhtMiconrt , where the attack appears to have been made with 
weaker forces, no particular further success was gained; the French 
maintained themselves on this wing. 

According to Faidherbe's account, t^twards 4 o'clock in the 
.aftemorin , (leneral von Manteuffei had again lost so many of the 
advanta^^er> which he had originally gained, that on the French 
side an offfusix* movement could be thought of, and, indeed, the 
Germans, although at this time aiiU in pottesalon of the left bank, 

liHil hifn Iwrd preaacd In the centre, and it ww Ui« intention, m"! 
llii' Miilr of the PriMicb, t« tlin-aU'ii (In- fiermau htft Rank bj , 
wliooliDK Dp tfie right tring. The iMvrntioii »f tbi«, hnwitwr, iiatf 
p'siilLed in trlflitij^ anoeoBB, as aiKlit »<kiu put nil cud in lh« • 
liniirt, the only rcnuH gniiicd bring tin; rf^cnjitiiri' "( I'lAil-Noyvlbl 
mid Daonrs. During tlio niglit, it is true, tlio UcrnmiiH look poi 
Hi'MiiDii of both placoH a&eah, and made some hundred pri 
in tlii^m. 

r»idtierbe'B aco«unt, writtrn attugotber with a renigi 
objini, in hero, appareutly, at a I<mm u> impruvi' npiiD the i 
of the French Army. 

A GeiTiuaD di'tailtd »cc<inDt of thi! haltip dove nut Piirtj ll 
imicb in vertaiti, that botli Hrmieit bivtmaikMl upoi^ tbo BM<I 
hutllr, xud that thr. Krcnrh army, which mily rrtirMi in (lie sRo^ 
noon (if the FollowiDi^ day, wsa not pufsopil. Thpsc 
Hiinirient tO fnnn a jitd^nnent upon thtt ronihat; ttic battle an tlH 
I lull m: wna certainly, nut a anc-MVH to any great rxlont ; it « 
very similar to thi> battle nt Amiens mi Ilie 37tli uf Navenfai 

tliH <■! ly w»^ bealen, biK he v.w iii<t ili-pri\cd uf lln- puwrr ^ 

withdriiwing upon bin baMiH i>f (ippriitiun" , in onlrr to reUtl^, 
again in a abort time with fresh forccn. Tlint the Prencli wcMi 
mnfjnert-d ia, Iiowever, not tn be doubted, and U< beat an t 
doubly Mupcriur in numliera anil in enenllent poRilimiii was 
a distingQisbed feat fur the Oennan army and ita general. 

(ieneral Faidherbe estimate^ bis liimi at 111 Itilled, 
Komi<l«d, Mimo hundred priaoncn and l«fK> ilixperand. The ttei 
Ims amounted to 3>4 offleera and >^H men in killed and wool 
u well iiK l>.'t miHRiiig. 

The Krenrb norllit-ni army relrcHtril upon Arriu- and Da«Kjf 
(>n the li'ilh General von Hantouffel ciuiuienecd tlit^ roanb 
pursuit; he reacbed Albert nu Uie «anie day, but l'n>m lici«, m 
followed will] niiiglr detnchnieDtH , and nnly an far as BafMin 
lie kept the main body of his force at Amiens, and Mjol ( 
corps of observHtion IVom there, in all dirnctimia. 

(renrral Faldberb<> mnved into cantonments between ArrM a 
Dnnay, with hia front towards the south. 

On the 37th tbe iQve»tnicnt of Pi^Mnne whs unilertakra I 



Amiens^ where (ieneral Count von der Groben cominHnded. This 
toitn'Krt pn>ved itnelf of Hpeciai import-uice at the battle of 
St. i^uentiii, which took place later; but even iM'fore, it was of 
( sMMitial ciuisequt'uce for the pa^Kagc over the Somme, and it is 
;in iiidiration of the npontaneous intelligence (»f the Prussian sub- 
altmi officer, ns well an of the important jxwition which even the 
lower ofliccrs were obliged to, or cxiuld assume, at times, in this 
Ion;; protractcil and widely extended war, that the c^mquest of 
INronne wan carried out on the plan and proposal of First 
LitMitenant Schmidt, of the 11th hiege artillery division, who was 
artilierv commander in the citadel of Amiens. 


Tlir conquest (»f IVroinie (v. page 25f>) had Huch n quick 
result , because Lieutenant Schmidt , upon his own res|>onsibility, 
liad fitted out the ref|uiHite siege park with gn'at rapidity, — a park 
wli'uli ('onsiKtiMJ entirelv of French material. 


(oMiiTal von Senden was first charged with the si^ge , then 
(hmkt.'iI von Harnekow, with ten battalions, eight squadrons and 
T) I firld ;;nns, whilst fJenerals von Kummer and Count von der 
OnJbrn wi'H' pushed forwards toward Arras for their protection, 
with. :iltH;;rtlM'r twelve battalions, sixteen squadrons and 30 guns. 
Thrre were Iws'uh's five battalions, twelve squadrons and 30 guns 
Ifft at the di'iposal of General von G^ben, who had the dirwtion 
of th«' whole operation. 

Besides this greater undertaking, the next few days brought 
-ome snialh-r encounters. 

(Ml the 2Hth, a flying eolumn of three cximpanies and three 
>quadp>ns, under Lieutenant Colonel Pestel , came upon an ad- 
vancing eolninn of three battalions of Gardes Mobiles near Longpre, 

w hieh w ere beaten, and lost 10 officers and 230 men as prisonere. 
On the 3oth of December, Colonel Wittich with another flying 
eolumn took /> officers and 170 men prisoners at Souches between 
Arras and Bethune. 

On the 31st of December, five battaliona from Kouen, where 
(ieneral von Bentheim was in command, made an attack against 
the enemy^s forces which had shown themselves on the left bank 
of the Seine. These were partly scattered and parttj thrown 

liiu'Jt into Uir tlmng cjikIIp, Hobtrt Ir thahle. wlUch wm i 
hy tl>e QermiuiB. 

A<'titns nf (frt-ater iiDpnrlaocc did not Uke place TiDtil JanH 


la the beginning ul' Jtuiimry 1X71, it wan found 
the Gtvmaii ude to tnkp Liito Minsidcration thiit neuMi-nl 
liitd marelied i>R rri>rii tlic Iaiiik witli mi tiriny of Hbuut 
men, with 800 guns, lowardu tiic paat, apparently with the lal 
or fHlliuf; on the (iurroiui forctrii at Uijmi, at reiii-viiig Belfni 
abuvi' HJI •>( makiug tlif invcntnienl of I'liriH impiixMiblt, by 
in reur of the msin anoy of tho Oonnana. 

To itrevont this, (ipueral von Warder, w 
D^'in, WW prlurapally ei>unt(^d npon; kIiH Gtiiervl eon Mmrntt 
Wiu alto called xway from hta command in the north, and 
the difficult and lioiiniirabic cliargp "if MllHikiiiK Hi 
army nf ttiA Fn-ncb, HiTCording to nii'c.nini>1aaci.'i' , with mi Ktmj 
whieli was being newly formed, at Oliitillon our Seine, out nf As 
,tl. aud Vll, Army (kirps. 

(lenerul von fiSbim. munmnnding Ihn VIII. Corp*, r ata h irf 
the chief eommnnd in the north, in place of Oenenil von HantcaMk 
whilst (Ifoeral von Benthcim took over the eiimmaiid of thp I. Coiyt. 

On Ikti lit of Januan/. tii-ni^ral Faiilherhn, again, tmk 
ihi- offi-mfrr, with thf mlrntt'on of rrlirring Pn'onne. St 
marched npon Bapaitme bj foui' iiarallcl road«. On tti« Sod rf 
Jsnnnry, the 2nd DIvMon of the 'J'Jnd Amiy PorpK, at Achiet>lh 
Grand to the north -wi'Ht ofBapaumr, and the IhI DtTirioK to fa 
north of it, at Sapignies, eame npnn Struhberf^'s Brigade, of Qt 
1 !Sth Infantry Dtvialon, to \t bii>h plaee it had htt^n pnahed forwij- 
tnd from midday nnlil evening made vigomn« nltaekH Bgatnst |^ 
hut were alwayit repnlaeid. 

Ai-eonlini,' ^> Gent^ral von tiShra'* own ftoeount, the tn£uiV 
of the VIIL Army t'orp* hail, at thnl time, been *o weakeood If 
illnMii and hardahipa, that the battaliona, od an average, moftl 


into tlie fight only 500 men in strength, some even afl low aB 350 
and 400 strong. The five battalions of the 3rd reserve Division 
now >tanr1ing before P^nmne, which had arrived immediately before^ 
wen- alone in g^reater strength. Strubberg's Brigade, therefore, did 
it>^ work in a superior manner. 

In the evening General von Kummer had, in consequence of 
this fijrlit, concentrated 4i is whole Division — estimated by General 
von Gobcn , at the highest , at 5500 men with 4(K) horses and 
24 puns at R'tjiaiimc, and before the following moniing, all the 
troopH that could be disposed of were directed there by the c^rps 
commandcrHi, so that on the 3rd of December a detachment of 
3 battalions, 8 s(|uadrons and 24 guns, under lYinee Albert of 
Pnir^sia, and another <if five battalions with 24 guns, were ready 
at the immediate disposition of General von Gdben, for the snpport 
of the I5th Division. To the latter Division 12 guns were 
a^signc(l in addition. 

Karly in the moniiuL' General Faidherbe proceeded to the 
Mttack. lie succeeded in taking the villages to the north of 
Hapaunus which were only weakly occupied; his repeated attacks, 
liow(>v«T, against the main position at Bapaume were completely 
n*puU<(l , and his attempts at surrounding were also wrecked by 
the advance of the detachments brought up t^> assist General 

The Freneh army found itself compelled to commence its 
retreat np<»n Arras early on the 4tli of Jannit^', whilst General von 
(i<iben, on account ,4if scarcity of ammunition, had even given the 
<»rder to evacuate the Bapaume position. 

The loHs of the French amounted to 53 officers and 2056 men, 
besides H)0 missing; the loss of the Germans to 47 officers and 
99^ men. 

The German cavalr>' puraued for some milea, scattering single 
battalions which were covering the retreat; bat then the German 
tro<»ps also retired, for in their weak numbers, they could not 
have the object of moving forward against the fortresses of the north. 

rr . ,„ ~^ 
Oener&l von Bmtkeim, at the same time, coodnoted Mi ^SH 
petition KfniiiBt the Fi-nndi General Roye, npoii the left baakv" 
the Seine. He fell npon this ciirptt nn the 4tli nr .lanniuy, seattani 
it, and took 3 eoloura, 2 guos and about f><K) priBoners. 


Id January the German 1. Army was distributed nver m «^^H 
wide extent of conntry, at Rouen, to the aualh of thin town, n^' 
aa far as the Reii, also at AmienH and Peronne. The diittribatioa 
of the Frt-ncli Corps necegaitated this extended railiua of ob- 
»ervKtiou »nd oe,oapation. Upon tliia General Fiu'dherbe, formed 
the plan of altering his station towards the east, nnd tlins of bniag 
able to execute a diversion in rear of the enemy. 

He, desi^edly, cansed the news to be sprend th»t it wat 
hid intention to advance upon Amiens, nnd, in the mesnwhUe, b* 
mareheil upon 8t. Quentin, in the middle <)f the month, with 40,000 
men And 70 gnntt, but weak in cavalry. 

General ran G9ben, however, did not allow himself to h* 
deceived by the lelegriims from BrnMele, announcing F)udb«riW« 
presence at Arras. His reeonnaisssneei' kept feeling with Wio Frenck 
Array, and in eonsequenee uf the report; brought to tnm by the 
eavalry, he moved off"; on the Iftth of .lanuary, with all the trno(M 
he could bring together, the whole of the N^I. Corps, pan «f 
the 1. Corps and the ^rd Cavalry Division, from Amiena toward* 
St. Quentin, making use of the nitlroiid. On this day he reacbod 
Neele. P^ronuc, having fallen on the loth of January, waa it 
German hands, and secured the left Hank. 

General Faidlierbe had caused the town of St. Qtumtim. 
situated on both bankrt i>f the Sommo, an important point of support 
imd a eonsidersble railway atatiou, to be occupied by his advanred 
guard on the 15th, and, alter the weak German garriaon hal 
withdrawn, he moved m with hi4 main body on the 17tb, and 
then ttiok up a position upon the heighla to the south at tbc 
town. Aa early as the 18th, n colliHioD look place with the Gennaa 


adv.Miicrt] i^uard, under Qeneml von Memerty, in which the FVench 
were defeated. On the VJlh of January a decisive battle was 
/omjhty ill which y besideM the tr<»opi» mentioned, Count Lippe*8 
Sax(»n Cavalry DiviHiou with the 12th Jager battalion and two 
h<»i^(' batteries, from La Fere, were able to take part, im» that 
the (lerniaii Htrength, altogether, wan 39 battalions, 53 aquadronn 
and ir)2 ^^uih. General von Goben, on the morning of tlie 19th, 
directtHl the 15th l)ivi«ion, in the eentre,'upon Savy; Count 
(iWUjenV Cavalry Divimon with part of the 1. CorpM, upon the left 
will*:, tor a surrounding, upon Marteville; the 16th Infantry Division, 
upon the ri^ht wing, by Serancourt upon St. Quentin ; and finally, 
the enuibiiied detachment fnmi La Fere to make a rturrouiiding 
niovenieiit apiinst thin town upon the extreme right flank. 

A renerve eoiigiHting of four battalioiiB and regiment of eavalry 
followtMl ^ with tilt* commanding Generart) St^iff, upon the road 
hourliy - St. C^nenthi. 

riir Uith I>i\ision was tirht engaged. The enemy mIikmI fai'ing 
It, in a strong po>iti«in, between the villagert of Grugis and AVi/- 
rlllr St. yfmand, which was obstinately defended. The last 
\ill;«;jr :i\n\ (laiichif were ticcupied by the l:*t Divirtion of the 
JJiid FrtMcli rnr|>s. and the former and Castres by the 2iidl)i>iKion. 

>«M.ii :ittcr the combat hail arisen here, the ITith Division 
also eoiiinimrrd tin* attiek U|h>ii a portitm of the French 23rd Corps, 
at Jar//, hi the ecntre of the French position, the rising gnmnd 
\^ith the windmill Tout'f'ent^ (ieneral FaidherbeV |Nunt of view, 
was also occupied by the 23rd (-orps. The separation of the two 
Corp^ U\ the canal de (Vozal, so that they were unable to render 
each otiicr mutual support except by a circuit through the town, 
proNcd di-»ad\antageous for the French. The village of Castres 
v\a.H >oi»n evacuated by the 22nd C«»rps; at Gruyis and *Vfiiri//r 
the tightin^' \sa> hotter. .\t last, however, when the DUh Division, 
vslth the aH>istanc«* ot' paii of the res<Tves, had taken both 
\ill;i^c> at'tcr ;t co|lte^t of many hours, and amid great loHses, 
\vhiUt upon huth tianks the >urrounding had come into effect, the 
whuh' Frt'urh liitf wax forved buck from its oriyinai position^ 
aiitl ( on-traiiMMJ to occupy a second line, lying furtln^r b:ick. The 
undiilaiiii;: griMind here favoured the French in a high degree. 


AVliilat the OeriDan columnH were following. FaidhurtH!, at 3 o'l 
)j. u., uttemplod an DlTriiJiive uiiivmit!iil. lit' initdc the 'JSnd Cucya 
ailvHiK't' Willi H Btroiig I'oruv v( nrtilli^ry. TIk- nlUck, Ixiwevoili 
wun witliout aucoeaa, for [he S^Ii-U Cov\m was uualttR lu mailer 
|iiMpi.'r iiiippurt, na<i iit 4 u'doclt, tU»t wholo Fn^neh Army waa M 
full retreat, wliich, under the cfBciu^iouH fire of tho (IcmiaB batterti 
' iuii] Ilii- uameruiia porHiiiiig cavali'y, degenerated at 7 ii'itliieli. 
Hk cvt^uing intu a nipid lliglit iipiii Cuinbrai huiI Oniac. Bf 
9IJ0U priagners and C gauB fell into the )iAud« uf the viet'>rs, n 
ill St. Qncntin, which wad oecnpiud in the evening, aflur 
d<ifi?nded for a Nh»rt ttini-, 3IMM) wuiiiided fnund. 

The Uorman Iom amounted to 94 ot&aen and 3369 m 

The vir,l4iry hhh dearly bought, but it waa di-mivr, in a hlgfc 
dpgrni'. Thn Frrnrh .\ortkt^m ,4rmy, irhirk. for lifu momtimf 
had areompluhcd great things under iU inJr/atiyatilr 
f)ieri/rlic leader, n'fl* nearly dettroyrd. and nerd ho iooyrr 
/re of i-onMideralion in the further course of the war. 

Thua the Moiul army, wbicli liad bean vrgauised fii 
relief of I'aris, ua8 uliio i:i>uipl<'ti.'ly ciiii|Ueri?<], iiiid itt overthru* 
had a iroiididt^rablu hIiuiv in the CH|iitiilHtioii of the capital, aid 
iu the i-oncliidiuii vf the arm i nil c^^. 

Uoneral von Uifben, in purnuit of the army which eunliQuallf 
became more bntknii up, moved In front uf the foUrew f»f Cambn^ 
and CHiiHed it to be bombarded; the aniiiiitiu«, hnvrevcr, wUeh hit 
bcuD cunulnded in the meaiitime, put an end to the niilUary uiuIm^ 
takiiiKS in the nortli, and brought hack ihu (Ivrmun Northeni Ami^ 
i>«er the line uf detDareatiuu. < 


H ext 


V the 


From ttie htgli land of Aiivergne, inferior rtixins of hilU 
extend towHrds the Dortli, uniting witlj the I'oxgrt hy llip SirkH- 
inrge, and dividing the Khono country from that of tliv Sein« a>J 
Meuse. They form two main aectioiiB, the PUteau of Langrs it 

lorth, and the wino renowned series of Itilla uf the Ctflt; tfOr, 
the aouth, and terminate the extended rini-tnre of moootaiv 
snrroonding, on all sides, the tabto-laud of Qorgundy thru^Eh 
wbiuti How tlio riven Saone, Oignon, Donbti, to the Khune sttcoi, 
whicli receives them. The occupation of thia muuntAinoos oettii 
of conntry, so very favourable for petty warfxre, was «aMafiri 
for tlie xecnrity of the lines from Straabiirg to Paris as w«n a 
tlie Metz-Troyes-OrleauB line, Prince Frederick Charlea's road to 
the Loire. 

Then agnin, that remarkable and historically renowned iaim- 
tntion which divides the eouthoni slope of the Vosgea ftvin the 
Jura raimntnins, rising perpend irti I nrly on the other siilr, leak 
down from the (ubie-land of Uurgundy, through FnuichvCuBU, 
aud formK a wonderfully, clearly defined, road from Frani-c to 
Southern (fermauy. Tins "Burganiliun gale", which Prance k«p* 
locked wilh two powerful bolts, Uelfort in the lirst line nnd Bfr 
Minion in the'ROCond, gained importan>-e, in a higii dt-gr«c, Ami 
(ieuerHl Bourbaki's march in January 1»T1. 


Un the 30th uf September, the King, then in 
iwned order* for the formation of the XIV. Army l.'oi 
the commiuid of Ueneral iion H'eri/t^; who had just taken i 
barg. This Army CorpEi was to consist uf the Baden 
ud another Division, wbieli whs formed of a ■■umliiiKM] InTil 
Brigade of the Lino under Major (Jenoral Knig, later ' 
Oullx i,:t<>th and ^llth Infaulry Heginienlii\ and the lat combi 
Uuidwi'hr Urigiule under C.lonel von Bndilcnbnwk (Landwehr lU- 
ginienttf Nuh. 14, il and .'>!) as well as Iwo rcxervr Cai«kj 
Reginienl«. It wan l« fone the Vusgiii and scatter 


Fn*iu-li tnM)prt, forming to the south of them, in the Cote (VOr. 
The order arrived in Straijburg on the 4th of October. 

I*reviou8ly, on the iBt «»f October, General von Werder, 
having received informati(»n tliat the numen»U8 bodies of volun- 
teei-s, between St. Die, Baccarat and lUmbeiTillers, supported by 
(iardcH Mobiles, were assuming a military iormatitm, \\iu\ sent out 
a Hying (-(dunin of Baden troops, composed of six battalions, two- 
aiiil-a quarter squadrons and two batteries, under Major General 
rofi Dviji'ufeldj t«»wards tlie Vosges witli a similar chai*ge. The 
Dying column marched, in three divisions, upon Sidiirmeck and 
tlin»ugli tin- Viller valley, everywhere found the n»ads entrenched 
:\\\k\ barricaded, but only once, tm the 4th of <)rt«ilKM', encountered 
the eiKiiiy, at <*hampenay, and then concentrated, on the r>tli of 
<N'toher, at Haon fEtape^ a small town on the Meurthe, which 
\^J^< m'cupied by Francs-tireurs, 

These were seattered nftiT a short fin'-fight, and suffered very 
gi'eat losses. 

Oil tlii> day General ran Dftjfnfeld reeeived orders from 
Stra^liiirg, to eimsitler his column as the advanced guard of the, 
now iieul\ loninMl, XIV. Corp**, whieli was set in movement upon 
Kmiui TKtape, Ktixal and St. I)i«*. The la^t place was t<» be «mtu 
piiil, anil re<'oiiii:iiHsances were to be made !<» the west and south. 
AeeMnlin^jlN. on the Oth of Oetober, he stjirted upon the niareli 
f«u- Si. Ui«', with the greater part t»f his trmips; he was however 
so vigorously attacki'd on the right tlank, at Eiiral, from Bruyen*s 
and Uainhervillers, that he was unable Ut reach the t4»wn, but had 
to roiitnit liiiii-ielf with the repulse »if the enemy, al>out 12,<MM> 
iiitii ill strength, eonsisting of line regiments de marche and (ianles 
Mobile-. riic tight lasU'd seven hours, and led t<» a loss on the 
Baden ^ide of 22 offici-rs and .*JH2 men; on the French sid«*, of 
ll<Mi nun, as well as of 5h2 unwounded men and i\ oflieers, as 
pri^oiurs^ • 

On the 7th of October, Genenil von Degenfeld remainetl 
stati«Miary to the south of Ktival, in onler to cover the colnmilB 
of the XiV. Corps, now deb<»iiching from the mounUiin pass<»H, 
into the \ alley of the Meurthi* ; St. Oie, alrt4», w«8 oiTupied by 
the leading troops of the eclaireurs. 




On the tttli uf October, alrong columns of the Baden DivUun 
deboucbed at Ktivnl and St. Di^, and eBtabliahud the jiitiction. 

For tbe nwment, General voii Werder had only the Baden 
field Divisiuu xnd ii combined Pniniiiitn Urigade dU|it>Bflble for hk 
Dnduitakiiigi) tuwai'ds tlie west and aonth, sh tlie remainder weiv 
required to gnrrisun Straabnrg and thL' rest of Alsace. Thttt 
troopa, were at Raou I'Etape un tlie 9th of October, after aecm- 
plisliiug the passage of the Voages, and on the two fotlowiog lUyi 
commenced the march apon Bpinal, in four columna. On tkt 
evening of the Oth, a reconniiiss;in<'e had already led to a (igbt at 
Rttmbervillers ; on the lOth, there was a sinall conflict at j4tnnU, 
and on the 11th, :it BrouvelHers. Un the i2th, the camj 
attempted to take up a position at Bpiual, but was driTen tmtf 
by artillery fire. 

Oh the 12//t of October, Gimeral rjon Werder remortJ 
his /lead-guartfrs to Epinal, and made recuQDaistuinwt) towardt 
the west and south. It turned out that the enemy had mareb»4 
off upon Vesunl. 

In consequence of lliis, from the 15th to the lt<th of October, 
the Corps moved towards Vesoul, by Xertigny and SI. I^up, fond 
the uommuuicatiuus everywhere interrupted, the railroads und til- 
dncld destroyed and blown up, but met with no encount'-r as Uw 
enemy had gone further back upon Belfort and Beaanfon. \tt 
the latter fortress, the head-quarters of fieneral Cnmbriflt, tbr 
Chief Commander of the French forces in the east, it was lesual 
that Garibaldi liiut also arrived but had again departed to orgmtiM 
a volunteer army in IJijon. 

General von (Veri/er eslahlithed hit head - qaartirr* m 
yeiout on the iiHh and •l\st of October, and on the SM 
oommenued hie umvement against Besanyim, enm-ctly nntieipal^, 
that he would find s<ime of the enemy's forc«« in the nctghbMV- 
hood of this strong fortress, * ' 

The advance agahist the Oignon river was bo arranged tfeat 
the 1st Baden Brigade, Prince William's, forming the right vng, 
marclied from Frasne-le-Chatean upon i'in, by Autorellr; the Snd 
Baden Brigude, Major General von Degenfeld's, in the centre, tnm 
Pretigny upon Hluit and (.'ussey, hy Oiaelayj and tlie 3rd BmIm 


Brigade, Major General von Keller, upon the left wing, on Voray, 
by Rioz. The Pnissian Brigade followed, in the centre, a8 a re- 
nerve, nnder (teneral Krug. Finally, Major General von Laroche 
had b('(Mi given tlie mittdion (»n thiti day, of reaching the country 
of Dole and Auxonne, and of derttroying the railroads there ; he had 
ei^ht Hqiiadrons, a horne battery and two conipsuiiea of infantry* 
in waggourt, under hia command. In order Ut iu.H*ure the connec- 
tion, Vertoul remained occupied by two battalions and Home cavalry; 
the country was also inventigated from INirt-sur-Saone to the west 
and south. 


The pa88ag«' of the Ktrongly 8>^ollen river had now to be 
t.ikcii in hand, the cruKsing of which it wan anticipaited would be 
ditrniled, even on this rtide. 

In fact at 11 o'chn-k a.m., reports already came in to Ge- 
nnal von W^nler, in <^i^elay, that the left wing had come upon 
tiM' eiMiny tn the south 4»f RioZj aud wan driving liim before it; 
that tiie eentre had iound Etuz and Cnssey strongly occupied, 
and tliat the advanced guard <»f the right wing, only, had found 
th«' pansajre tree at Pin. 

The onler was now given for the centre, Degenfehrs Brigade, 
to carry on a detaining figlit .igain^t the pimitions lying in fnmt, 
until Prinre William, inf(»rined of the situatitui 4if affairs, had 
crossed the river, and could take the enemy, in rear, at (*ussey, 
on the tet't bank. tSeneral Keller was to advance steadilv. 

tieneral von Degenfeld, conse4|uently, attacke<l Elus-^ but drove 
the eneni) out of it quicker than was calculattnl up<m, so that he 
was ablt' to prm-eed Xk* the attack of VuMsey b<*fort* the right 
wing came up. 

The \illage, lying on the other bank, and rising in the form 
of tt-rracf***, t»tfered considerable advantages for the defence; never- 
theless the 2nd Brigade succeeded in taking the piwitiou quite 
alone. llit- artillery bombarded the village from two poiutts, and 

14 • 




the infnntry then rushed tu the astault, over a stone bridge \ 
was there. Twi) c/ieft de bataidon of tlie enemy, eleven i 
anil 200 men were taken priHonerB, and great luseea io Idtti 
and Wounded wei-e iu6icted on the French. 

The pursuit however, led to a fnrther continuation of ths 
figlit. The cavalry met witli resistance in the direction of ^u^oif 
Detmu; and upon tlie heights at ChiUiUon-le-Duc, Btnmg miuwet 
of the euemy showed tliemselves, wlio aUo brought artilli;rj' into 
actiou. The resistaneu, liowever, conld not last long, fur ttpM 
the left wing, General v>m Keller's advanced guard was alraarfy 
in Voray, and upon the right wing, the heads of I'rinee Willtwa't 
Brigade tind reached Aaxoa-Dessuii. Agaiust the last place, tvo 
battalioiiH and three batteries were pushed forward from CusMy, 
two battalions muved against ChSti lion -le- Due, by (ieneuillo, aad 
one battalion for their support t'>ward8 Geneuille. Thus the enesy 
was soon defeated with considerable losses, and Auxou-Desntu «h 
occupied as darkness was setting in. 

The losses of the Germans amounted to D officers tad 
96 men. 


To attack Ihe fortreas of Besan^on was not in General roa 
Werder's power, nor did it lie in his mission. The enemjr'a 
forves were, here, beaten and scattered ; it consequently appt-uvd 
eipedieot to turn to the spot where it was pi-esuined, that Uui- 
baldi formed a nucleus for the Francs-tireurs. 

Tlie march was, therefoi-e, first directed upon Gratf, impor 
toat as a railroud-jnnction i fnim (here it would lead ui>on L>iJM. 
On the 21tli of Uetober, the Army (^orps was united in the fntaer 
town, and for some days, Hying ouluuins were sent out fruo 
here, nil round, to scatter bands of the enemy. Bmall tighta took 
place on the 27th of Uetober, between the Cenuau tnH)p(i and 
tbe Fraues- tire urn and armrd pniHant^, at thn-e ililTerent plKM) 


Sf. Seine tEgiiJie, Renove and in tlie immediate neighbourh<»od 
of Gray. 

Oil the 2Htli, General von Werder, formed up Iiik trm>prt 
aliMijr tlu' Virgeanne, a tribut'iry stream of tlie Sai'me ; pushed for- 
ward Prince William*8 Brigade towardn Mirebeau, and intended to 
movr towanb Dijon on the 20th. 

This plan waa^ liowever, crossed by a c<»mmand from the 
Kinj^^'s Head - Quarters directing the XIV. Army Corps to hold 
(tfuiy for th<' purpose of commanding the plateau of LanyreSj 
in order that IVince Frederick Cliarlcs sliould not Ik? troubled 
by an enemy (»n liis left tiank, during liis march from Metz, by 
TroyeK, to the Loire. 

(icncral von Wenler returned, with the greater part of his 
fnrct* t4i (Iray, but made the 2nd am! \\t\\ Brigades, under com- 
mand of Lieutenant (Jeneral von Meyer, continue tlie advance upon 
Dijon , ill order U) occupy this important town, whirh, accord- 
ing to tilt' reports of the advanced guard , was denuded of 

'V\\v whole country, in a wide cin*uit, was most insi'cure; 
the )M>piilatioii was stirred up by tlie government, by the chiefs 
of the v(»liiiileer bands and by the priests, which latter tried to 
kiiidlc a nligioiift warfare; the mountainous c4Mintry favouriKl the 
:iH-(iiiMy and es<'ape of the lawless bands; thus the (lerman 
iMMJic^ of trtHjps were forci'd into marching to and fro continually, 
and to alnioht daily conflicts; here also, more than elsewhere, 
exeeiitions bv martial law and other means of terror wen* em- 
ph»yed a^'aiii>t that part of the population who, eontrary to all the 
laws of wai, appeare<l t^Mlay as armed men and the next day as 
citizens or p<^asants, but always with inimical designs. 

(Miieral von W<»rder found himself compclbMi to man*h back 
again from (iray to Ves<ml, for new enemies had appeared in bis 
n*ar; meanwhile a contest had taken place at Dijon, in an un- 
expectetl manner. 

r ■" ^ 


Prince William's Brigade, whiclt loft Mirobcaa on Ilie 3(Hh of 
October, met witli resist4Uicc un (lie march to Pijun, siiil altlionpb 
irconnidersble at first, it became every hour more vehomf^nt, and 
calminated in an obfltinatu defence of tlie itabiirb of SI. ApollinMirr. 
At the approach o( tlie Oraiaos, lino battnlione de marcltp and 
Ciardes Mobiles had , by tlie desire of some of the inliabitaiiU of 
Dijon, been brought together at the lust moment, out of the cattre 
neigbbonrbood for the defence of the town, which, althougb u 
open one, was still well calculated for resistance. The commandaal 
of these triHips , Colonel Pauconay, occupied the wall - eneloMd 
vineyard hills of the suburbs, as well as the nneieut rampart with 
its wet ditches, and only bridge like approaches to the town. 

The fight wua very hut. Keller's Brigade not having yel 
come lip, and Prince William's Brigade not having completely tvt- 
eentrated , General von Beyer opeiu-d a preliminary fire of 
artillery with 3fi guns, so that several conflagrations had bn>kea 
out in the town in the evening. The lire was now stopped, wbile 
both brigades stood ready, the !iud upon the right wing nnr 
St. Apollinaire, and the It rd upon the left wing, to be able to nimmnvtc 
the assault on the following morning, or again to Like up the 
cannonade. But, even before break of day, a ileputalion from ike 
town appeared, who offered (he capitulation of the eity, mat 
declared tliat Dijon was evacuated by the French fnmps. 

The loss of the Badon troops amounted lo 32 killed and 313 
wounded; that of the French to ISO killed and about 'Aim uuuniM. 
Dyan «■«* occupied on the 3Ul of October ' 
The siege operations in Alsaee stand In connection with the 
uperatiouH in the open field. As has been nb-eady related tChapterDC), 
the 4th Kesorve Division, couoisting of the 'J.5th Infantry lUrgimMrt 
of the Line, and the combined east Pnissian Landwehr RegimcBlt 
Noa. 1, 2 and 3, and two reserve Cavalry Kegiraont^, moved info 
Alsaee in Oc^>b<'r, nnd<-r command of Major Clrneral ron Sc/imrln^, 
had brought SchlflUtaifl to capitulate on the 24th, and had I 
moved before ."S'eu - Brei^Of^ ■ This last fortress fell 

lu M^ 


of N(»vember. In October another detachment <if PrusKian Land- 
welir had been formed , Iikewi»*o in the Grand Duchy of Baden, 
('ouHiHtin^ of one battalion from each nf the Landw(*hr Kegimenti^ 
lotli and 84th, and two battalions from each of tlie Landwehr 
Regiments, 7th, 17th and 5lHt, aa w<>ll aa two A^uadnrng, under 
the command of General ron Debschiitz. These moved into 
AlHHOf in the end of Oct4»b(T, and there t<K>k up the duties of 
(iene'ral von TrenckowV lut Pomeranian Landwehr Division. The 
latter wait now able to proce.ed towanls the south, and on the 
\\\\\ of Novtmiher, commenced alno the attack of the fortress of 
Bplfurt by a preliminary investment. Aft4»r the fall of Neu- 
HnMsach, von Selimeling's Divisiim undert<K>k, on thf'ir part, the 
M't'urity of tlio LtappiMi roads in the d<'partm<'nts of the Vosges 
:uhI Haute - Saone , and thereby enabled General von Werder t4» 
roiH'enlrate his troops of the Line for further enterprises of an 
offensive nature, without having again to fear a disturbance in 
his rear. 

Prinee Frederick Charles's advance towards Orli^ans had been 
senireil from interruption with complete success, by the XIV. Army 
Corps, from the plateau of Langres. 



\'/, a fortified place with a citadel, situated on the 
Saoni- , ^^as, like Ik'sanyon, a rendez-vous for the ever newly 
rjj^in^ hantls of Francs -tireurs and foreign adventurers, who 
followed (laribaldi's flag. General von Werder therefore wished, 
by an operation upon Auxtmne, to attempt U^ bring the enemy to 
stand and fight, in the same way as he had succeeded at HeMO^n. 
It did not, lio>i(*ver, come to this. No enemy showed himself in 
the open field , and , being deficient in siege guns. General von 
Werder rouM not attempt the attack of the small, strongly oeca. 
pied fortress ; it might also be expected, that in the neighhourhood 

■ S70 

of Wjon, if not here , ;i blow could be struck with dcdatn* 

Garibaldi wns, ac«oriling to the littcnt news, at Dijon. Thii 
well - kuown , bold and fantastic Itnliau had come to France wiiL 
dusigDD, wliiuh probably have completely destroyed hU political 
fame for ever, ju8t as hit military renown haa been completeh 
annihilated by the very inconnidcrable part which he plnyci! is 
the cam|)aign; and had attracted among hiu adherents, pcrsonn 
whoso protence prove thut the old frce-buoter had entiroly lost 
both his knowledge of mankind, lu well as the mastery over the 
elements led by him*). It was also a disgraceful undertaking cm 
his part) tn take the field against the Honii of a country with wMc& 
his own land was living in peace. 

For all that, however, the acknowledgment is due U> his, 
»(i well as to his sons and to some of his friends, that in Uw 
field itself, in hattle, and in their treatment of German .prisnncn 
and wimnded men, tliey behaved chivalrously and knew bow In 
reitpect the enemy and the honour of their own names, better 
than did many of the French (generals aud onicora. It aUi> wtH 
nut be forgotten that RiccioUi Gurihalili gave back the culoar 
of the -inA battalion of the (tth Pomeranian Infantry Ri-giimnrt 
Ku. 61, which had fallen into his hands on the 23rd of January, 
by an nnlncky accident — tlm only colour of the whole Oemua 
army which was lost — , in just recognition of his brave uiieMf, 
as it had not been taken in combat. 

Garihalili's force has been n^ckoned, in the estimnten appejuilc 
in the "Kifornia" at Flurencu, upon secure grounds, as fuUowa: 

■) Colotifl Rliilow, in his inlcretliriK work '-OrT Krirj; urn ilip Rhdk- 
i;tFnie tSIO— 71", wyt: "At the end of tlic vntr IMTO tbn ii'nup* gf (ka 
llaliui laiilliprTi trmj wcrn rcckonnt , bj ihr pof-ofjife auihoriiin, « 
70,000 men, inrludinic ahoul 9000 K<^nonilt and rnl>in«U. l'pi>n the bMfc 
Held*, liawerar, nu more than t&.OOO men were v*i>r neea, viea In iha liMM 
ef th« g^oatMt dangiT, and amuni; Ihom , pvrha|Hi , banllj moir ihaa 
IS Kcneral* and vulonHa". Here, an in alinoal Fitry truperx, thin ckrellMll 
nllitarj aulhoi hu ht-vn itty well iornnuol. The dclailcd citimaica, 
(•ublishcd in the ..Kirurnia", confinn hia calt-ulation. 



l8t Brigade ^Bosrtak - Hauke) . . 4001 men^ 
2iid lirigade (I)elpecli) .... 2088 ^ 
3rd Brigade (Meiiotti Giiribaldi^ . 556r) ^ 
Uh Brigade (Kieciotti Garibuldi) . 1157 ^ 

Artillery 571 ^ 

Cavalry 520 ^ 

Isolated Vdliiiiteer Corps .... 1585 „ 

Various braiichei) 1985 ^ 

Total"! 7, lf>7 men; 
Tlie t<»wn of IHjoii had, without doubt, been occupiiKl by 
(iaribaldi's handH, sliortly aiW the I^den troops had left it in 
order t(» inareli againnt Auxonne, in conjunction with the remaining 
|MHlions of tlie XIV. Corps. 

WIm'h, however, (ii'neral von Wenler again turned against 
Pij(»n, ill the iniddlt> of NovembiT, the (taribaldians retired t<»wards 
tJK' Miutli-west, without a contest. 

<M*ii('ral von Wrrder established his head -quarters in IMJon, 
x'lit out Hying roliunn^ fnun here on all sides, but at the same 
tiiiH* Hindi' Krlhrs Brigadr continue the nian*h by IS'uiis U|Hm 
.futnn. A small tight o4'curred on this march, at Ai/f/jr, on the 

.JOtll nt' NovtinlMT. 

KcllcrV Ihigadr desrrilH*d a viide circuit in marching fn>m 
Nuith to Aiitiiii lint of December), fmm there again to Beaune, 
anil tlii-iiri' towards tlit* north. 

iMNtjrt's, a tortitied plare with a strong garrison, was watched 
by till* Prux'^ian Infantry Brigade, m»w under the command of 
Major (iiiicral von dcr tloltz. On the l^tli of DecembiT, an 
cnpigcmciit took place at Lonyrau , between this brig:ide and a 
force of the enemy of about OtKK) men, in which the French 
were beaten. 

Another encountiT t4M»k place at ChdHllon^tur'St^int*. There, 
Tuna's LamUehr battalion and two squadnms of the 5th reserve 
Hussar Keginient , were attacked, on the 19th of November by 
bands of volunteers, and were obliged to retire upon Chateau-Vilaln, 
with the loss of 120 men and 70 horses. 

A ciunbat als<» oc^Mirred at Dijon itself, for Garibaldi's troops 
suddenly emerged to the north-west of the town. At oight-fall 


c<ii llje !26lb of Nnvoniber, tlie nut-pciHta af a reconDnJtriii|c detack- 
[iii-nt wcri? atfaioked ^m l'n«i|ii(;)i , aihI, h(U-t rtveMag •appnrl, 
rtpiilMil Uie enemy. TKo roUowiug lUy Goncral von Werdtr 
IjiuiaeU ftdvantwd witii three brifcadt^s, ud throa^b K'>intt ntund 
by I'lomliiiTi^, re«cb(^(l tliu n<jir guard of t1i<; enemy ut l'iwi|aM, 
already In full rotroat. A fight took place which boob otmvwted 
the, rotrout nf Garlfaaldi'H UriKpci iut<) a Higbt. The latter auffani 
a li>Be lit frum 30<J tu 4(H) men; tliu lr<M uf the GtinMiH aatranlfll 
to abont 50 lucn, both daya IncliiBive, 

The next KerJoiiH eiu^iiunter willi the muviMble imnray, wba 
was DO diffiuult tu CHt«h, did nut take place until after tlio rotddli 
of December, wheii already a Urge accuninUtion of troopa in Uw 
eaut tteemed to wish to nnnouuc<^t Buurbaki'ii powerful ailvaiMe 

BeaideB Garibaldi, a roaaa of about 15,0(M) men, Gardw 
Mobiles and Prancacliri^iiirn — CAlk'4 Llie jirmi-p du HhdBf — hid 
collected mon io the tioutli, under the French olSc«r, Vritmrr, 
formerly a captain on the Htaff, who liad given hia word of honoa 
at Mctz, oil thf :Uisl I'f OitoIxT, not to fi(;l>r a(;ainKl Ormajty 
again ms long aa the war lasted, but now, having broken hia wttti 
«f honour, he ofBciated aa a General. 

Tin-: nairr op kdits 

TliC rt^porta whiuli aime into Dijon in the mJdtllc ni' Deoonibcf', 
'Confirmt^d tho advance of the above mentioned army from Beaia* 
towards tho north. Thin movemi'iit vinA, probubty, in ciitiiK-eltH 
with Hourhaki'n iiil^ndett approucii, and had the objcet "f (-ovcrinf 
thp transport of the eHBtorn army, commencing soon after by Ite 
railroads from Bourgoa, Nevtirw and Lyonn upcm Beaanvon, aittl thai 
of HiKuriiig the flank and rear for further opernllun*, by a poaitlM 
at Dijon, in coiOunction witli Garibaldi. In eonHeciuoncit- of thit, 
<iencral von We.rder fonnd liimttelf obligi^d to <M'ni1 off Hie Bad*! 
Diviaiun, now under (be rommand of General ron Glibwr, tuxranb 


the. south, in order to tbrow back the eneniy from his position at 

General von GlUmer moved off on the 18th of December, 
leading the main body himself, consisting of eiglit battalions, six 
M|uadrnnH and five batterien, by Longwie and Kpernay, agiiinst the 
ciiemy'rt ri^ht wing; whilnt, on iiis right, two small detachments 
preiwed forward against Villars-Fcmtaine, by Trey and Temant, 
and from Courcelles againrtt Concxpur, by ChamboMif. 

Kitir skirmihheK b<*gan with the leading trorips, even at Fenay^ 
hut the march went on without delay, merely detaching numerous 
parties, and cloHely sean'liing the hilly, intersected country. 

It waK at Boncourt that an obstinate combat with the ad- 
vanced guard fir^t t<M)k place, which ended at 12.45 o'clock p.m. 
with tlie capture of this h»C4i]ity and the piece of wood lying to 
the north - west (»f it. 

The advanced guard then took up a position in the line I^a 
Hcrchrre - Agencourt, and discovered from here that the enemy had 
\rry considerable forces for disposal at Nuits, and that columns were 
on the march from Voug<'ot and Heaune. 

(renier, having beeome aware of the danger to which his 
right wiu^ was cxpo.-^ed, here drew^ together his main force. The 
French .irtillery was very advantageously placed u|;Mm the heights 
to the west of Nuits, from where they could c<mimand the free 
and op<'n fiehl of attack of the Germans. 

(hi the (icrman side, no a(*tion of the columns on the right 
could vet he observed. 


Towards 1 o'clock, the Baden tro(»ps were formed for the 
attack, their ai*tiUery tried to shake the columns which were visible 
opposite, and at the same time fired from the bridge, across the 
Meuziu brook, up<m the stnmgly (»ccupied railway cutting as far 
as to the Fontaine de Vosne. The cavalry was sent forward upon 
the extreme left fiank. 

After the disposition for battle had been i*onipletod, the 
infantry att.ick against the railway cutting was carried out; General 
von (ilumer, as well as General von Wcrder himself, joined in 
this hazardous undertaking. The troops could only advance amid 


severe kiMB in the entirely open eryantry, and under the kmSH^f 
rapid fire of the enemy; — the Division commsnder am well li 
Prince ^Uiam were wounded, wnA Colonel von Beni| «ko 
ceeded to the ^oonmiandy was kitted with his aide-de-( 
nevertheless at. 8*30 o'elock, the eastern side of the railway 
was stormed^ with extraordinary ebnrage. Tlie artillery had 
gained gronnd| by degrees , in a jself-sacrificing manner, aa la 
doing they drew upon themselves the caimon fire of the 
Likewise y after taking the railway cutting , connection 
found with the nearest flanking detaohment on the right; baft m\ 
the left wing, the cavalry who had to cross the Men^ 
was obliged to retire again, under the hot infiuitiy fire of • lla 
enemy, to the heights of Agencourt. Cromer's troops wen ama^ 
throughout, with Spencer and Chassepot rifles. 

The town of Nuits itself had now still to be taken. 

Supported by the artillery, of which Porbeck^s and Holt/ls 
batteries, amongst others, distinguished themselves by making a 
brilliant advance, the infantry went forward, from the railw^ 
cutting; against Nuits, gained tlie outskirts, stormed one street 
atter another under an obstinate rcsiBtance, and at 4.30 o^clock, 
when it was getting dark, had repulsed the enemy from all his 
positions and driven liim, in full flight, before it. 

T!ie losses of the enemy were considerable, ab(»ve 20<X) mea 
in killed and woundi^l, and If) officers and 70<) men as prisonen. 

On the (jerman side the loss amounted to 934 men, including 
51 officers^ 

A report from the column on the extreme riglit flank only 
arrived in the ni^lit. It had come upon the enemy in a very 
strong, favourable position at f'iiinrSj had been unable to defeat 
him, and had returned by Cliamboruf to Peripiy. 

As it was not the intention to punsue. the totally dispersed 
^nemy any further to^anls the south, the Had<»n Division re- 
turned to Dijon on the tollowing afternoon, the 10th of December. 





















Both forU are of ci>ntild«rHtilH Klrengtli. 

There are itlsu two forts lying in the vmt, det Barr^s mil 
Bellmme. The first, originating fruui t1t<i y»ar XBiM vntt bKBI 
iu viuw uf the mcditiited war iigiiinst PviiaHia, taki-e the r<imi iti ^ 
crown-wurlt aDd is provided with several covered plare>; it euvoV 
the Paubinirg dea Aiioi''treti ami thn Fnubuurg d^ Fninuc; tlie laUai 
fvrt, tu the «onth uf tlie Faubourg dc France?, is very im<|^;nM) 
and iH not of tlic same iujtortaiiui hm tin- »Ilier forta. 

Ill the south and <!a«t tiiurc arc still the Foi'ts Haulet-Pfrekt^- 
mill baMea-Perchnt , 2S00 pacea hoax the encebte, wlilcb lian 
already been alludttd Ui in llm rtrlalion of IIik retreat of llie FrCaok. 
corpH , after tlic battle of Wocrth (.page* B3). At that tirav tl» 
troopa >if Win 7th Corps were occnpied in caniplcting tlir carA' 
w.irku of Ihcso foria and :iUo 'if Fort Av la FKrinr. Bolii Prrr-bw. 
lire built in the form of lunetlt<s iind croMii a ridge of bills 400* 
feet high. They were quite new , niid tlie present ciimuiand«irif: 
Colonel Dmferl, liad neglected notldiig in order to p)itc'« thm Ifc 
M nimlition Mpable of defence. 

Itelfort thus forms a great niountainoim entrenchment, wUA 
iit fortiiied, throughout, in the strungeiit manner, and is snfBdcaQf 
large to receive an army of 30,000 men. Added to this, tbe Mi^ 
rounding villages, the woodd, and llie liills are all very ei^ af 
defence in ctmnection with the fortrerts. 

A regular attack, approaching the enceinte by meuM if 
trenches, is nearly impoasJble, the only expedieat is to cooiUm 
the regular attack and the bombardment, with the object of UyiRg 
a breach frijui a ilislani-e. That Ion ix aswciated with iotnitc 
(rouble. The comphtf mrrstmPHl, however, miiHt be preceded 
by the nin(|uest of the gninnd in front. 

In onler to atlain thin, Trrnckow'x Division hud to uccumpliih 
exlruordinarv Ihingi*. Helforl watt defended by an euerg«tie, flSr 
pabic officer with abiive ia,i)0() men. 

At fir^t the strong casth' of Monlbf/iartI (MHax[>t:\gnTii\ euM 
into i|nestii-n, nituatei^ in the proximity of the fortresi, owtf 
3 vabotit II Knglish mileit) miles ilt'-lant, a junction for i 
roads, at the v-mfluence of the AlUine, the Savourense ai 


Lisaiiu'; as well as of the Rhine-Rhone canal, and a point for the 
biv>iegeni to obtain at all risks. 

Un the 9th of November the Germans succeeded in occnpyiiig 
tile e:i8tle, and now, iu fourteen days fighting, General von Tresckow 
g:iin(Hl m much ground round Belfort that the investment was effec- 
tually completed. After the occupation of Montb^liard, the German 
outp4»HtM were^ at first, at Bonrogne, half way between Delle and 
Belfort, then by degrees, first Sermamagny, in the north, was occn- 
pied, and from here Valdoie; CYavanche, Offeniont and Vetringe 
Nserc tak(>u, and on the 23rd of November, after all the positions 
previ4nisly raptured had been fortified and secured , the line of 
iiivi'stuient round Belfort was closed, running nearly by the vil- 
Ui^vti of Bavilliers , Cht^vremont , Perouse and Oavanche. The 
I lead -Quartern were n»m<»ved, this day, from La Chapelle to Fon- 
taine. <*<>ntinual Hoi-ties and constantly recurring fights round the 
imiMirtant villjige of HnviUhrs^ had retarded, thus long, the ac- 
eoiiiplislinicrit (»f the investment. 

The most im}H>rtant of these fights were: <m the 16th of 
N(»\(Mnbrr, a K<»rti<^ by three battalions and six guns, from the 
fortpf^s aj^ainst Hessoncoart; then on the 23rd of November, another 
similar sortit*, which ended in the (iermans taking possession of 
important positions, near the fortress. In the first C4imbat, the 
Fr»Micli sutlVrcd the loss of 2(K) killed and wounded , and 58 

Ill the beginning of December, the C4>nritmction of batteries 
and excavation of trenches was c^>mmenced, the completion of 
whirli the lM*sieged endeavouivd to prevent by a vigorous fire from 
about 7o «:nns. 

Tresckow's Division was reinforced by Prussian and Wurtem- 
berg sie^e artillery for carrying out the proper siegi» and bom- 
banlnient. In spite of the enemy's fire and the rocky ground, 
the (iermaii piimeers succeeded in finishing a series 4if trenches 
and embankments, in the night of the 2nd of Decemlier, in front 
of tlir \illage of Kssert, which may be called the firsi paralhL 
III the irregular line mentioned, the batteries No. 1 to No. G were 
erecte«l and e((uip|>ed <v. the map), so that on the moniing of the 
Wrd of Uerfmher^ fir^ was opened from 28 jfimi, against the 

Forts do Battm *nd BaUcttic, ax wfll na npifnit Hi^ cttaOpI 

Tho defenden ropli<Ml with tncrgy , nod obligtti the 
ititH:iiliiiit8 to withdraw Kiime of tlio low favourably puHttd ^n""^ 
Mi'iit of the guu«, however, held out, iinil bmiiglit into tuvrixisl 
tlic nui>erioTlt;r of the I'TUHeiaii artillery matFrial, iti its ai»Misli>iiiad 
brillinnt manner, ta that, hy [hn 9lh of Di>n«nibi>r, under ihi- cuii- 
«l»Titly DiAintaiucd efficacy of the rillod guns, p:irt of tit" towi 
liac] been bamt down, and the works of tint fdrts wore cimsidera 
iiijiii-cd. However Die fortit, napecially Itolli'viie, ak» pttned | 
<-cs«cs agunttt the viUagui of liasert and, partifiiUrly , BMvillii 
u|i to which the parallel had, by dej^reea, been opeiied, i 
rimiixlii'd with batteriofl Nua. 10 to 12. 

Un tlic 1 Ith, the gHrri«on attempted a ttortlo n^inat Ih4> I 
ti'i'ies, which was, however, rcpulaed. The boiubardniont was i 
hIwi iiiidortakdn frcitn the aonth-twit, exit mid imrth, aud tben, | 
Jiiiiiiiiry, althiiugli Rourlmki'K appmacb was already iu pnMgf 
prelimlnariM wore nude fur tho regular attack agaiiut Iht i 
Baiifi-Pfreftes and Uaiili-s-Perelii's , fr^ui Pan/outm, naild I 
pnH:4Hle]itod ditricultu't. To thin t^iid, tlii' villikgc of UaiijoHtiu I 
Unit to be taken , with hard lighting , in the night of ths 7tli 1 
January; thus after a bombardnionl of nearly five weeka, 
diKtautly aituatt^ butterim. At tho aaentitt nf lhi« villap; —J 
tvMtimony to the obstinacy of the defence and tho attach - 
iinwomided prieonera with 1^ ofScera foil into Uermao hawi 
without r«ckuittDg the h«avy lowwa in killoil and wounded. 

When, however, all theso advaDtn^^ hod been gviaed, : 
the r>'<;ular attack eonlil couiim-rii-e, ii leiii|i(>riiry >-t'FiHalii 
imilerlakingd nf tho boxiegers whx Uron^^ht on bff the attack *f 
l/ie Frvnvh Eastern Army u/ioa tin- posilioiix of the XIV, AfWtM 
Vorfs. (Icjieral von Treackow was ohliged to show fruut wilk 
purt uf liiri DiviHiun touiu'dtt the wont, and to place a portion •( 
his lieuvy gnuH at Ceneral von Werdt-r'a diajHtsal, against tlie a«w 
offt-nsivc of liie enemy. 

Sriiloni, perliapit, has a siege been cond)incil witli such gnat 
difliciilties, and acldoin ho ghiriously carried out. 




After the engagement at Nuits, (Jeneral von Werder bad 
ngain established his Head-Quarters in Dijon, and hoped, from liis 
central position in the Cote d'Or, to carry on, saccossfully , the 
suppression of the people's warfare and the dispersion of Garibaldi^s 
and Cremer's bands. It then became evident from various signs 
(What had long ago been conjectured)^ that Bourbaki's army, which 
had been for a long time in the neighbourhood of Bonrges and 
Nevers like a threatening and constantly increasing thunder cloud, 
was turning towards him. Bourbah\ as already mentioned (Chapter 
Xi.) united three Corps under his command, the 15th, 18th, and 
2(>th ; the 24th Corps, newly formed in Lyons, was moreover, 
uow plaeed under him, making a total of about 140,0(X) men with 
above *MH) guns. In the Inst half of December and the first 
fl(ii/s of January this army was completely concentrated at 
Hi\san{'onj by waking use of the railroads which, on the one side, 
lead from Nevers to Besan^m by Chalous-surSat'iue , as well as 
from Lyons direct, and on the (»ther side, likewise thither by 
Clialons. This mode of traffic was obviously injurious to the 
su('C(>K8 of the undertaking *\ since it was impossible io conciuil 
from the (lexmans, the transit across the last tract of country, 
whiUt an unexpected appearance at Besangon was indispensable, 
and besides, this mode of traffic injured in every respect the fitness 
for battle of these y(»ung troops. 

Bourbaki*s departure had als(» become known in the King's 
I lead -Qua iters at Versailles, and a command was issued, from here, 
to General \on Werder to retard the onslaught of the French, 
whilst rapid measures were taken, at the same time, to send help 
from the north to the XIV. Army Ck)rps. 

(leneral von Werder was in a most hazardous position. 

His fon*es were just sufficient t4) hold in check the enemy 

*) The author hcref once mores drawn atWntioo to the work **Militii- 
ri-x )i(' (M«lankeii unci Betrachtun^en'*, by the author of the **Kriegcii um 
M<'t/'\ ill \\\\\v\\ Hourbaki** march, in relation to the Ufte of rtiilroadtf, \» 
MT\ lhoroui;|i|\ ireuttil. 


now »lr«m<ly iipiin tliv AMtie of war, bat a new enemy bad }otaH 
. the ilrst, who atone vim in number" Ihrt-ffold iitperior to th^ n 
bintti lltTnian Army Corps. This nt-w powerful snny, alait, i 
under tiic Ruminatid of ii real eoldicr, the l'i>rm<T coroina&d^r 
the Imperial Guard, who wiw ctrtaiuly « lender f\)>«riei»wcl 
war^ altliout^h he coiitd not be Mllfd a groat gencrNL 

Thi! siiKgc of Bolfurt cuuld not bo ruisvd, U-Ht a iivw, ad 
eneniy ahoiild arise iu roar of the (ierman poaitign*. 'flio | 
betwt^cii tho Votigca and the Jura, ;ibi)ve all, could uot bo uet tn^ 
else iiuthing could hav« prvventMl the untnitov of the Pn^ndi 
Baden, To o])poee the French forcoa, which, including Gftfibaltftf 
and rromor's troopa uiul the gai-riaoua of BoLfort and 
mual Ititvo amiiuntutl to moru tlmn 1)^II,(MK) men, only one 
of alwut I>0,<XK) men — reclconing nil togethor, otiso Uic 
trooiJB of Belfort — could be prodnced. 

Should thuae troupa be OTcrttirown, the ntpHttions xod 
thiratin^ troopa of the republic would pour into Baden i 
check. Aasiatanee from tJie north-west, the Gei-oian ''Smitbm 
Army" iindL-r MaiitcufftI, eould not posi^ibly airivu in time to reiUf^ 
Boui'baki'H advance. 

The position of the XIV. Army Corps might luive be«a 
desperate one, if — this Corps had not heim a German 
every man a ra/iiibtf, fiiilhfu/ soliUt-r , anil ihrr commani/er 

As soon aa General voii Wenicr had gained tlie spot 
on fur stopping Bourbaki's army, lie gave np the extended Udb 
held pofl^ession of, .iiid cuni'etitniti'd all the ilicpn^iihlr' In>opa roi 
Vei^oul i these consisted of the three Baden brigades, which ware it 
Dijon, von der Goltz's combined Brigade, at Liingres, and tba 
4th reserve Division which was very widely extended ^m GlKf 
to Lure; h Corps, put together from the most diverse iificli— 
(if the troops, whiise firm cohesion and unanimous action form a 
brilliant testimony to the excellent leadership and military eapaU- 
lity of each single part. 

In the latter days of December the Corps was united at A^eaM^ 
with the rear guiird at (irai/. Here General von Werdw W 


came couviuced that Bourbaki's offensive would be directed agaiiuit 
Ik'lfurty and took meabures accordingly. 

Uourbaki approached very slowly. His main body, the 15thy 
18th and 20th Corps, commenced its movement in the direction 
of Belfort from Besanyon, his right wing, the 24th Corps, moving 
along the Jura to the same destination. In order to cover his left 
Hank, Garibaldi and Cremer were to operate from Dijon, and 
tliene two commanders were probably destined to advance indepen- 
d<;ntly against the German lines of conunonication , after the 
lioped-for overtlirow of the XIV. Army Corps. 

As soon as the Germans had left Dijon on the 28th of De- 
cember, Garibaldi*8 and Cremer*s troops moved in. On the 2nd 
of January 1871, Bourbaki himself arrived in Dijon, and on the 
rtame day, 200 men, forming tlio outermost leading troops of the 
French 24th Corps, who had already stolen near to the investing 
curps of Belfort, by the extreme frontier of France and Switzer- 
land, were driven on to Swiss territory, by General von Tresckow, 
at Croi'a- to the south of Delle. 

On the 5th and 6th of January different outpost fights took 
place to the south of Vesoul, with the heads of Bourbaki's left 

Tlieue removed all doubt as to Bourbaki's object. The French 
army was tjoing direct for Belfort 

General von tVerder decided to retire upon this fortreu^ 
and J without giving up the siege of Belfort^ to occupy the 
favourable positions along the Lisaine, fronting towards the 


west. He at once made his dispositions for marching to the reaTi 
but tirbt detached von der Goltz's Brigade and the 4th reserve 
Division against the left flank of the French Army, in order to 
cause it some further delay. 

The bold undertaking of these troops led to the hot fights 
at Marat and yUlersejcel on the 9th of January. 

Villersexel, with its strong castle, and also Mantt, had already 
been strongly (occupied by the troops covering the flank of the 
French, when the Qennan advanced guard approached. The Ger- 
mans attacked resolutely, stormed (the 25th Infantry Regiment) 

tlie f^tle of Vnierwitel , drove ont the enemy from both pIsiW 
iitiil iiiiiJe xunrly f)(H> pH«iJticrH in Villi'miKAl alune. 

TLi-Hc figliU, Intitiiig f(jr MxtiH^n lu>iini, iwmpUfUiljr nilllllr<4' 
tlicir ahjixi. Uonrbaki eent strong columiia, from all eidos, to tW' 
lUMiHtmiuti <if. tlie tiealHii tr(i(ii)it cuverlng the flittik , whose imail 
had biit^n Uk«n by nuiiHitlt, fnim noon on thf Olli of Jnniiitry, b^ 
Ihf iiormaiiH, whilst those alrcndj' ro-comniouFod tticir furtlHt 
inai-ih, ill ordor tii iiiiit« witli the lualii body nf tiip XIV. Amf 
r(ir|is, whirl] W4U1 KtcAility rrtiriiiK "iiiin Relf"rl. 

T/ih manivrty retreat, in immediittt ffvlinjj wilh thr over- 
fioirrring PHmiy, hull tht^ fwonrahh ithuUs of enablmg Gm^rtS 
ton H-'erdn- to rfaeh thr dtfvmivr poxttiotu on the t.uai 
iif luirltf a» the Wtli af Jnnuanj, anti uf atUtwing him tiami 
hcliiiv the \blh of Jiitmarif, to fortify liix jiosiliont and lafwif^ 
thrill in pnrt with Ihf Hrlf'urt nii-i/p giifix. 


Tilt- smHll GcnDHii army made preparntione for the fint aat 
Inet defensive bnttle, which war fonglit, on the German side, dvia( 
tlie whole war — setting aside the sortie battles before liotB mmI 
Paris, (jcneral viiii Wcider had tu occupy a line, the great Or 
tent of which was out of all pniportlun to the numerical stnoftt 
of his corps, — the whole range of heights and positiona, taieatti^ 
from Frahicr in the north tii HeUe in the Koiilh-eaM; a distaaee 
of 3 (iunnnii miles ^nearly 14 English miles) on the left baak of 
the Lisnine wliicli finws into the Doubs and tljiii bick as far aa 
the Swiss frontier. The unt-posls «ere stationed upon the rigM 
hank, piisliMl some miles to the I'nint, in order t<i watch the a|^ 
proai'h of the enemy, whoae mighty masses lolhd slowly <a^ 
having lieen detained for several days by the fight at VillttMxiL 

Schmcling's Division held the eontre and the left wing; M 
chief points of support were llfricourt, Bussui-el, BethoiMuurt arf 
Montbeliai'd, and Wt. advanced positions, the viltagis uf Ste. Marllk 


Aibre and T:ivey. On its right stodd von der GoItz*8 Brigade, 
wiioK(^ chief point of Buppurt wa8 Ei'henans, and whotic advanced 
tr<M)ps held Byans and Champey. The Baden Division waa upon 
the right wing as far m Frahier; a large part o( it, liowever, 
together with detachments from von der Goltz^s Brigade, formed 
the main reserve, between H(^ricourt and Brevilliers. Upon the 
4'\trome left flank, in Montlx^liard , there wa^ still a portion of 
l)obscliUtz*8 detachment, wliose main body was further to the rear, 
at Dolle. This detachment had been brought up froib Alsace to 
tlie inveHting corps of Belfort, at the end of December. 

All the villages and c<Mintry surrounding them were carefully 
placed in a state of defence before the arrival ol the French. The 
roads and the outskirts of the villages were barricailed, and the 
walls of the houses and those of the fields and gardens pi*ovided 
with loop-holes and embrasures; small parts of the wood were 
hewn down where they hindered the range of fire, and parts, in 
favourable situations, were surrounded with abatis; gun emplace- 
uicntH were prepared in all open places, redoubts constructed and 
ctpiippt'd with field artillery and siege guna, — especially upon 
tiie great hill, I^s Baragues, in the neighbourhood of llerioourt, 
which commanded the main mad through lli^ricourt and tlie villages 
of Byans and Tavey , — and at Bossurel. Lastly , the bridges 
across the Lisnine were so prepared that they cimld easily be 
rem(»ved or blown up after the anticipated retreat of the advanced 

(ienerai von Werder*s Head-Qnarters were in Brevilliers. 

A remarkable contest then arose between the small, widely 
extended (jcrman troops, but which were pliant, active and firm 
as iron, and the great, clumsy masses of the French, nnaccnstomed 
to war. 

On the 13th of January, the first collision took place. 
Bourbaki's advanced trmips attacked the villages of Ste, Marie j 
Aihre and Champey, occupied by the Germans, and took them 
after an obstinate retreating tight of the troops who retired, con- 
formably to the dispositions, on to the left bank. Vigorons attacks 
mUo took place against MoutbtUiard, Bethonconrt and Bassarel, 

Jm; BiTtin ^ 

wliinli ended witb the caphu-c (if Mantbi^liard by tli>- Fr^Mirh. 
'Dk' ciutic only, ii-jniiiiied in tlit< liiiiida of tlin (>unuHU«. 

Ttio cliiof nttuck , liiiwcvur, tiret commt^Dced cm tin? 16lb nf 
Jiuiiinry, agiilnBt tlic, how rccn^iiiiiiod, puHitJoD if tlic Germans, atin 
UiiLirbaki liai! dfiiriiiitrati;!! \\\i niritx, Alrciidjr aeriinuil)' aliAkeu and 
(liKorguiiNcd, aud uxliauatfid by KCMivity of jifwd ni>iiriiihni«at. 

Un thi§ day, the nttat^k w»h, Tat- tlic moxt part, dlracbid 
agahi«t the Oemiiiii Irft wing Hnd lenlir. CdIoucI ZinnnrnnaiHi, 
with the cKKt I'ru««ian Laiidwchr Urigadc, bad Huccevded on tiw 
previous day, tii again fiirctn^ MontbMiaril ftum the Frrnrli, 
which bad be«n taken by thum un (be nth, sind tbiM day wa* At- 
t'«iid(;d witb great obstinacy. Tbo Krcmch right wing was, t>ow««»r, 
strongly w-ioforcfld , so tbut a Bncwiiwful reaistance here 
til be ex])ected. Oeiiiirnl vf>n WerdBf tbcreforc nenl 
viiti (illlmcr witb the Isl Itndca Urigado, rroiu the maio 
to tbL> iicigbts oa tlie imrtb-weBt of Montbi^ltard, In order ttf' 
from here, Colonel Zlramcniitiiii's retre»t frvm tliis place. 
CiiKtlc only remained in poe(W«MioTi of the Uemmni!, with the 
ptwitiim to the nortli-wt^Bt of this place ; in Montbeliard itoelf Uw 
Freneli ostablislied tlieniielveit. tii the <-«-Mlre, Rcxirbalii'it n\ 
attacks remained atwolatcly witbuut auecesx. Hen^, the conteat ok^, 
the Uerman aide was, cBpedatly, an artiilory combat, 
battttrien, fmm their exoulltintly prepared pOBiUnnB, 
heavy guns, Hunt a dcstnictive lire upon ttie enemy' 
Infantry columiiB, aa booq as thoy appeared upon the heig^ite 
the right bank uf tlie LiBaiou. The attack upua Uint9m% 
Bel/iancourl and Busxnrfl wn« tlii' iiioat deHpcruti-. In tlic latltf 
place tlie French infantry alBo auci-eeded in establiBhing Ibiiimltw, 
but Btiii tiicy did not come over tlic Lisainc. 

Even the night did not' completely put an end to the Blllggk. 
L'nder cover of the darkness the enemy pushed forward Us il- 
hintry nearer to the tierman poBitiuiu, fur a renewed attack •• 
the following morning and in doing this repeated fights Ink 

On the 16th of January a change was made in the AvMk 
attack, for Donrbaki now made the attempt to aornnnid Iht 


Gorman right wing, whilst the a88aalt8 against H^ricourt, in the 
c'ciitro, and against the German left wing, relaxed in vigour. 
Tliiri day more employment fell upon the infantry on both sidea, 
although the artillery still played an important part, chiefly on 
the German side. 

General von Werder held the same positions as on tlie pre- 
vious day; the right wing, until now little threatened, was t^der- 
ahly weak, the main body of the Baden tn>ops was in reserve 
behind Hdriconrt, and one brigade still in position behind Mont* 

(teneral Bourbaki, whose loft wing had now been joined by 
Cremer's troops — Garibaldi, only, remaining at Dijon — attacked 
upon all points with the infantry drawn closer np, after having 
prepared tiic attack with numerous guns and also mitrailleuses 
batteries. Upon his right wing, whence; the main attack only came 
on at l\ o'clock, lie was very energetically driven back, with very 
severe jogses. In the centre, where (teneral von Schmeling com- 
mandod an the German side, the exceedingly hot artillery fire of 
the French w:ui chiefly subdued by the superior fire of the 
artilhTV; in position upon the hill of Les BaragueSj and four 
infantry attacks were repulsed. Upon the left wing, on the other 
liand, Hourbaki, this day, gained some successes. 

By H o'clock in the morning, the French opened a very 
lively fire from their guns against Chimebier and its environs, 
which (iobel'H and Krutzsch's batteries had to c>ope with alone. 
The artillery fire on the French side was cx>ntinually reinforced, 
during the day, by fresh batteries, and at last it was observed, 
on the (terman side, that strong masses of infantry were drawing 
near by the woodlands which border the slope of the valley Irom 
Ktobon to Frahier. This manoeuvre apparently mimed at sur- 
n»unding the flank. At the same time masses of infantry ad- 
vanctnl to the north of Chagey directly against the flank position 
of the Germans. 

Only the most insignificant force, three battalions and throe 
batteries alt4)gether, could be opposed to these attacks, wbieh 
were leil by General Cremer with a force of abottt 15,rKX) men. 
A gnidual retreat of the German right wing was here inevitable, 

in .tpili' «r tliB grcmtt^l bravery luid iikJIl. Tlie villii|!:r at CV- 
nebiiT was vvatnuitcJ, luiit tliu punition iit tlie Ftrmc Bvugrti 
waa tlitn ii|^n Uken up, in order to bar tlic road to iivUurt 
troni tli« t:it«iny. The ubiitinnt« dufeiicn bad, however, (blfllM 
its nbjoct for tliU day; f'fHliicr iiml Cli(;iti'l»i(ir wwo, indwd, b»- 
ciipied by the Froncli, vtill tho attitric wiu coutinaed no ftuthcr. 
Uarkiii-iiH &\m mwh bcgaii tii Ml in. 

Ijtiiicrxl von Wnrdur, inrurmcd of tUu dui^oous HUa»tiuD of 
the riglit wing, sent Kullcr's Itrig&du tbore from the Iteserva^ 
duriijg the iilght, with the charge »f rotakiii^ Chiiiiobier no the 
toDowing day. In tho centre, aliw, thi'^ niglil waa t» bring no 
rest to the wetu-icd troopit, fvr Uuurbaki hero fttt«mpt«d as attadt 
by aurprUe. But thin aIho fiilkd, like thi> I'ormiir one, thniv^ 
the watclifiilnesA nf the Gemiitn out-pitat«, itod tliiu the moming til 
the iTth of JsuHHry lirolti.-, without a gap having bwp UmeA n 
the {lositioDa of tlie Uermaiia. 

On tlila morning tlie positiuna of the rifrlit wing, went cMdIif 
coiH'iTned , — the villa^ uf Ch^i^binr and the wiiodUinlit in it* 

Two columns nuder Generals Keller and Deg«iifeld, ilto- 
getber eight battalions, four squadnms and foor batteriM ii 
strength, started from H^ricoort and £clievanne, aa early it 
3.30 o'clock in the morning, against Chenebier and the B«it im 
EvanU aitnnted in front uf it towards the north, and ^"^l^r^^ 
the enemy with great iropetnosity. The intended sarpriM dl 
not, indeed, fnlly succeed, for a French ont-post beat the itan^ 
still it was posttible to take a part of the villag« bflfon ttlj' 
Friiuch coiild offer a very con§iderable resistance. Then, It ii 
Irue, they nhuwed in such cousiderahlc numerical iiuperiorjfy, thal| 
itonu alter the break of day, Gi^neral Keller found himnelf «o^ 
pelted to ciimmcnoc a retreat, wjtii a great number of FtoMh 
prisouers anil captnred baggHge. On his right General na O*- 
;;<'nfe1d liad be<^ii involved in a very hot and tedious combkt kmuI 
the Itoin drs EcanU, wliicli ended towards noon in the d«tet tf 
the Prencli, and General vun Degenfeld was able to rnov* !■• 
ward from Clienebier an far km the northern edge. After Q«Mnl 
Keller, in i-onjntiction with von der Gottz's Brigade at CfcMfM 


1ia<l occupied and stoutly defended the Bois Fery^ opptmite Cbc- 
iit*bi(>r, the fight lasted until tlie afternoon, when the exhaustion 
of both Bides caused the chief action to fall to the artillery. 

Upon the other points of the widely extended battle • field, 
renewed att^ks had been constantly made by the French in the 
sjime manner as on the previous days, and as before, they failed 
tliroQgli the firmness of the German lines. 

in despair, Bourbaki commenced the retreat on the 18th of 
January, endeavouring to cover it by his artillery. This retreat 
was to lead to a terrible catastrophe. 

He had lost from 3000 to 4000 killed and wounded in front 
of the Lisaine positions, whilst the XIV. Corps had only suflfered 
the loss of about 1500 men; the msirch towards the south-west 
w:i8 carried 4>ut, amid yet far greater losses. 

N(»t only did (General von Werder begin the pursuit on the 
VM\\ of Janujiry, but General von Manteuffel now appeared with 
the (ierman Soutiiem Army, in a very threatening manner upon 
the line i\i retreat of the French Array, which was so terribly 
weakened by cold, privation and defeat. 



Ill order to render assistance to General von Werder, the 
German Army Direction had arranged a concentration of the XL 
and VII. .\ruiy Corps at ChAtiUon-sur' Seine. The first C<»rp8 
came from Paris, the latter fnim Metz and the Luxemburg frontier. 
On the, 1 2th of January the two Corps, in the strength of 56 
battalions^ 20 squadnms and IGH guns, stood formed for battle 
upon the line N4»yers — Nuits - Kavi^re^ - ChAtillon — Montigny ; 
General von Manipuffel assumed the chief command on the same 
day, and, (»ii the 13tii of January, began a rapid advance in the 
direction of f 'esoui, in order, if possible, Ui establish a oomieo* 
tion with the XIV. Army Corps before Bonrbaki^s attack could 
take place. 


The march was umsiiaUy difBeutt on aeoomt of the Mf/fmf 
ivoj deep snow, cold and monntainoiiB oonntiy; yet on the IMk 
and 16th of Jaonaryy the leading troops debonchod tnm the ehain 
of monntidns of the Cote d*Or, at Selongey^ Pranthiqr aal Las* 
geau, and on the 19th of January, the main body^ the any 
was anited at Fontome Franpaise (II. Corps) and Dtm^rierrw 
(VII. Corps), whilst the advanced g^oards had already erosaedlha 
Saonc at Gray and farther np. Upon the outermost right 
and to cover the right flank, Kettler^s Brigade, of five 
two squadrons and two batteries, drew near the town of tf j/^ 
wliere Garibaldi himself, with wonderful oomposttre, held 
nbout 30,000 men, which France had never needed mre 
JuRt now. From this time until tlie end of Mantenffel's 
(icniTai Kettler kept the whole of Garibaldi's force in 
rpon the left wing. General von Mantenffel had pushed 
a det'icliment of the VII. Corps by Lua:euU and St. Lmmf^ in 
order to seek connection with General von Werder. 

Tiie whole great campaign, so ricli in surprising strokes, in 
talented military combinations, and exciting situations, scareely 
presftnts a moment of greater military interest than that shown in 
tlic mutual 8ituation of the armies at the moment when Bourfaaki 
made liin last desperate attack against the Lisaine position. 

All army, still consisting of 12()/H)() men in the east, press- 
in;; (»n furiously against the small chain barrier of Werder's 
Corps, in the vicinity of the (ierman fnmtier; a second (fcnnaa 
army penetrating, by foif^d marches, the mountains of the Gdle 
d'Or, in the most hazardous directi<m, for the French army, imagin- 
iii;^ that H(»urbaki was stnuigly <'(ivered in tlie rear at I>|jon. 
Add(Ml to this the formation of the ground; no way of escape for 
Hourb.'iki except by victory; behind him the table-land of Burgundy, 
stretching in a great bend between mountains, his single road of 
retreat, and Manteuffers army already on the northern edge of 
thin plateau. — A remarkable example, indicating the difference be- 
twe<*n warriors and armed multitudes, between generals and leaden 
of adventure. 

(Seneral von Manteuffel had learnt, even at Fontaine-Fran^aise- 
Dampierre, that General von Werder had conquered; thai the 


n<'1fort Siege Ck)rp8 had taken up tlie attack upon Belfort afrertli, 
and that Bourbaki was retiring. He immediately decided tliat an 
advance in the former direction towards the south-east, was no 
longer necessary , but that the retreat of the French Army must 
now be cut off. 

Conformably to this, the Southern Army executed a wiieel 
to the riglit on the 19th of January, and marched against the 
Doubs, the VII. Corps upon Besan^on, the II. Corps, by Pesmes, 
upon Dole, in order, in the first place, to interrupt the railroad 
communications here and at Villerri-Farlay, towards the south. 

Thus General von Manteuffel hoped, at any rate, to Bnd the 
French Eastern Army between the Sa6ne and the Jura, and to 
fone it to fight with its rear against Switzerland or Alssice. It 
was a very bold undertaking, for the French possessed a double 
superiority in numbers; a condition of strength which was cer- 
tainly favourable at the time of the contest against the republic 

(iaribaldi on the other hand attempted nothing, and probably 
he remarked n(»tliing at all ; still he might easily have been able t4) 
cross and hinder the marches of the German southern army, by 
marching upon Auxonne and Besan^on, so far as the distance was 
concerned. At that time he issued the well known pr(»claroation 
to Ills troops wliicii begins: "Once more, young combatants for 
freedom^ you have seen the heels of King William*s formidable 

.Several days still passed away, before it was exactly known 
on the (German side, where Bourbaki was directing his retreat; 
the heads of the c<ilumn8 of all three Army Corps, amid repeated 
small encounters, retained close feeling with the main body of the 
French Army, which they, finally, found c^mcentrated in the 
neighbourhood of Besan^on, whilst, simultaneously, all the ways of 
exit from the table-land of Burgundy, with the exception of that 
leading into Switzerland, were barred. 

On the 2l8t the II. Corps occupied Dole, destroyed the rail- 
road and captured 230 loaded waggons. The VII. Corps, on the 
same day, marched close past Beaan^on and wheeling to the south 
of the fortress, occupied Dampierre and there captured 30 loaded 
waggons. Tlie passages across the Doubs were found undeatroyed; 


at (^lingey, to the 8oath-«oiith-west of BeMD{OD| the nilwaj 
municatioii y from BeMDQoiiy by Lons le Santaiiflr tir LyoaSy WM 
interrupted ; on the 28rd the 14th Divbion had a t^i at Bmmt^ 
marie J and confirmed the presence of the 30th Fkvaeh Coip% 
later, also, of the 15th and 18th French GorpB, and M lft« Sftll 
o/' January ike road from Betanpon to Lyons , Bwmrtukfs 
single line of retreat^ was completohf borred. 

On UiiB day the VII. Corps was at St *Vit and Qnlnff, 
and behind it, the II. GorpSi upon the line Sallna — EKMo. 

At the same time the XIV. Gk>rps drew near, towaidi tki 
noi-th-west, against the French army standing at Besaiiyin, 1^ 
immediate pnrsiiit had, in the first instance, been made by 
lings Division only; on the 25th of January it oeeapied 
let) Dames, on the Doubs, to tlie north-east of Bedaa^on. 
von Debschats moved forward from Blamopt, nearer to the Svte 
frontier, in order, together with General von Schmeling^ to opcnii 
.(gainst tlie road from Besan^n to Pontarlier. General von WerdcTi 
IMisliing to the right, with three brigades of his eoipa^ had at 
the same moment reached the neighbourhmKl of Rios, dne north 
of lie8an^<iu, and relieved the detachments of .the 14th Division, 
which had, nntil now, held poHMession of tlie passages across the 
Oignon at V\>niy, Etuz and Pin. 

Thus Bourbaki at Besaftfon was surrounded by a circle^ 
irhit'h was ervnfirhere closod p;vrept towards Switzerland , in 
the direction of Pontarlier, 

The unfortunate (ieneral, owing t(» Francois unparalleled 
defeats in the bMttles at Metz, at which he had been present, 
and at the .si^ht of the terrible misery of iiis army, now surrounded 
on all sides, ha<l fallen into a e<inditi(»n of the deepest dejection, 
lit' saw the di.<^^raee of a capitulation or of a retreat upon Swiss 
territory Ix'fore his eyes, and he would not survive this inglorious 
nu\ of tlio last French annv. 

On the 24th (»f January, he ^ve up the chief command to 
(ieneral (linchant at I^'san^on, and sent a bullet into his head — 
which, it is true, was not destined to put an end to his life. 

General Clinchant commenced the retreat of all the Corps, 
concentrated in the neighbourhoiKl of the fortress, on the morning 


of tlic 25th, upon Pontarlier; the Cavalry Division and about 
8000 Infantry, only, of the army had got away, by Lonn le 
Saulnier, towards Lyons, before the German Southern Army had 
cut off thin road. On the 28tli of January this retreat was 
effected, and the French Army stood in the neighbourhood of Pon- 
tarlier on the Swiss frontier, fronting towards the north • west ; the 
18th Corps on the right; tlie 15tii Corps, at 8ombac4>urt and 
Cliaffois, in the centre; the 20th Corps, upon the left wing, as 
far as Fra^ne, and lastly, the 24th Corps, whicli had arrived in 
the greatest confusion, as a reserve in rear of the centre. 

General von Manteuifel, who had now assumed the chief 
c<»mman(] of all three German Corps, made a snrr<»unding approach, 
with the 11. Army Corps by Nozeroy, the VII. Army Corps by 
Villenouve, and Generals von Schmeling and Uebschfltz, from the 
north, along the Swiss frontier. 

Garibaldi, too, who was still at Dij<»n, had not been forgotten; 
after the fight on the 23rd, which had cost the 2nd battalion of 
the Olst Regiment its colour, in the night. General Ilann 
von Weyhern was 8<*nt to tlie assistance of General von Keller, 
with DegeufeldV Haden Brigade, Knesebeck*s Brigade and Willisseu^H 
Rnden Cavalry Brigade; he advanced, on the 27th of January, 
with his united forces, from Pesmes upon Dijon. 

Whilst the situation of the French forces in the ea»*t was so 
desp(*rate a i>ne, the (Chancellor of the C^onfederation and Jules 
Favre were n<'gotiatlng an armistice in Versailles, and in so doing 
a xpevial vonvention was made with reference to the east, which 
is an evi(ien<'e of the illusions of the French Government, and 
whicli wa> of gi*eat importance to the French Eastern Army. The 
Chaneellor demanded, amongst other things, the surrender of the 
fortress of Ik'li'urt As this might prejudice the question of the 
annexation of the whole of Alsace with the fortress — and Jules 
Favre w.-ih by no mcjuis disposed to give up Belfort, although, 
as a matter of counie, the principle of a cession of territory, 
already formed the basis of the armistice negotiations, Jules Fatrr 
proposed that in the east, the armistire should not eome into 
e/ffcl. He must therefore have believed, up to the 28th of January, 
that Buiirbaki would be able to relieve Belfort, or otiierwise gain siic- 


cesses which woald make it advantageoot finr Franee to aany w 
war npon this stage. Goant Bismarek had no raaioa far 
this desire, and ii wut therefore esiabtisked m ike 
that the wriHiary oferaiums in the deperimemU of ike CMt fOr^ 
Jura- and Doube^ and also the eiege of Belfori ekowld At ooih 
ii'nued. Jules Favre at once tel^^phed the conelarion of Hm 
convention to OambetUy bat neglected to impart the qiedal detenrf* 
nations mentioned ; and Gambetta, naturally, ^mply anomeed tki 
conclusion of the armistice to all the Generals of the repdMb; 
Count Bismarck, on the contrary, caused information to be seit %e 
the German generals, of the article of exceptk>n as welL 

Thus misunderstandings were unavoidable. 

On the 29th of January Manteuffsl made a ooncenlrie attMk 
upon the advanced posts of the French Army. 

The VII. Corps, retaining possession of Levier, pushed for w aii 
to the left, where it held the road from 8t Gorgon to nmteriier 
as woll as that from Levier to Pbntarlier; the II. Corps approached 
from the south, by Frasne, whilst a detachment ftom it kali 
possession of the mountain road at Les Planches; Genersl 
voD Schmeling and General von Debschtttz proceeded witli their 
march against Pontarlier, along the frontier, and von der Golti*s 
Brigade {XiV, Army Corps) moved upon Villeneuve from Arbois, 
by Pont d'llery, and so formed the reserve of the centre. 
General Clinchant, not being in a position to undertake anythingi 
with his troops in their most wretched condition, remained stationary 
whei*e he wjis. 

In the afternoon a combat ensued. The adv:uiced guard sf 
th(^ 14th Division came upon the enemy at Sombacourt and Ckaf^ 
fot's J stormed the vilhigen, which were still tnlenibly obstinately 
defended, carried <»ft' 17 guns and 5(MM) prisoners, including two 
generals, and threw the .idversary back upon Pontarlier. 

The following day, the 11. (orps attacked FrasfiP^ captured 
above 3000 prisoners, oceiipied the phu'C, and drove the Fn»ieh 
troops still turtlier back. 

On this day, the :>oth of January, General (lincliant, upon 
the stn'ugth of the aimistice, n<»w began to (»pen negotiations. 
Genenil von Mantruffcl, as nuiy be imagined, couid not agree tu 


tliem, aiid made a farther advance; on the 3l8t, after a sharp 
fight at VaujL^ he occupied tlie cross roads at Ste. Marie, in the 
mountains to the south of Fontarlicr, and at mid -day, on the 
Ist of February, stood ready for the attack with the heads of his 
columns in front of Pontarlier, 

On the same morning, however, General Cliuchant had con- 
cluded a convention with the Swiss Commander in Chief, General 
llerzog, in accordance with which, the French army was to cross 
over into Switzerland and there be disarmed. 

The retreat began even on the day of its conclusion, the 
1st of February, and only a rear -guard still covered the retreat 
upon French territory. Du TrosseFs Brigade came Ui an engagement 
with it in the afternoon, took Pontarlier^ made 4000 prisoners 
and captured an enormous number of waggons with stores , arms 
and provisions. 

(icneral von Manteuffel established his head - quarters in Pon- 
tarlier the same afternoon, whilst the French army moved into 
Switzerland by various mountain roads, the main body at Les 

Such a catastrophe was never before known. Switzerland 
received 85,000 men with ^6 guns and about 10,000 horses, 
and provided for the masses of men, who had suffered so miserably 
from cold and hunger, with that hospitable generosity, for which 
this high - minded republic has always been distinguished. About 
15,000 men had been taken prisoners in the retreating fights of 
the la^t few days; only about 20,000 men altogether, had escaped 
towards the south, including Cremer's divisiim. 

(iaribaldi had also appealed to the armistice, when General 
Ilann von Weyhern drew near, but then, as it was not recognised by 
the enemy, he escaped so quickly to the south, by the railway, 
that he could no longer be reached. 


lmmediati*ly after the victorious termination of the combats 
on the Lisaine, the regular siege of the fortress of Belfort was 

Hgntn tHken up witti renews) tt%l, And w*h nlwi 
tliu ixtuuliulflti of tbe Hrmiflticif, in i^mifoniiity with Article I. tif tl»> 
)^»1 veil ti (III. Prinn thiH tbe Inference mny bo drawn m wnll 
u rniin the it^»ire of tliv Chunct-Ilor of llic 0'>tif<cdorntit>ii, in 
opposition to JliIkh Fitvre, al VmssilloB (v. p»<;o H!f7). tlial tbe 
Oennnn f^ernmtoil held the drflnitive (UMiuiaKioii of the r»rtntM 
witli tlmt uf Alutw to be vory ewuiitiitl. 

Tho niej^ wns KMocintod with tbc grcalMt dirGcaltiM, fur tiw 
Hfiu'lips hwl, jwrtly, to be bhrt^Ml oiil of the rock, and (he wnm 
mill UM wt^ll M tbe tliuw wlilch Hol ill iHtcr, itifinilAly in«rcRH<(l 
the (lifflcultiM of tbis nr>rk. ltt<tw<vn tbe villMprR iif /ia»Ji'ntm 
mid Pertnue — tlic latter v»» taken b> ^toriu in the nii^bt »f the 
2(itli of JaiiiiHiy — tilt? itiirnllplN wen^ npi-nt^d af^aiiiit Porta 
Bttnars - Perehex and Hnutrii - Perchex \ thr batturii-n wiTtt, by 
lUgrt'ca, broiii;!!! Up to the works, and on the 8th of I'ebnuTy 
tli<- i^nptnre of botli theiie fortx wua mieceiwfiilly earrivd out. 

lint a rury gremt wi>rk yM n^iuainei). It wn« avstMttry %o 
ford- the fortress llacif to snrrender from thp heights of tbe two 
tortr. iu«l fr<Jiii tbe iJiirallrlit mijtieeliiiK tlii'Uj. TIk' i'iCud<'l, bowrvxr, 
a« well iiH Piiil liH JriKliec c'tnl^ very well rommnnd (lie tiHghta 
of tbe I'orcboM. A cannon fig)it unxMud, lantiiig f»r ci^ht day*, la 
which tbe (k-nnaHk came off oonqnonirs, as they liad doite In every 
uclion xiiKie tbe be^niiiiig of the war. 

Ui] tbt> 16tb (>f I-'ebrimr)' tlie strung fort rfw» ciipituUtcd, witli 
I3,ni)0 nieii. in eiiiisideratioii of tlie ^''■^'■■'■'"'b Itrate defence, tba 
(lerni.'iii Knipirnir grHiited it u free tlt^pnrlnre. 



The convetUion of f ^ersailles, which was ratified on the 28tli 
of January 1871, put an end to the military operations of the 
campaign 1870 — 71. The tenor of the convention is as follows: 


The following convention has been concluded between Count von Bin* 
marck, ('hancellor of the German confederation, in the name of Ui« Majesty, 
the German Kniperor« King of Pruttsia, and Monsieur Jules Favre, Minister 
of Foreign AtVuir^ of the government of the National Defence, as authorised 
plenipotentiaries : 

Article 1. 

A general armistice upon the whole line of the military operations, in the 
act of being carried out by the German and French armies, begins on 
this day for TariN , and in three days for the departments. The duration 
of the armiAtice will be twenty-one days, commencing from this day, so 
that, excepting in the case of a renewal, the armistice will have expired, 
every wliere, at noon on the 19th of February. 

The armies engaged in war will retain their respective positions, and 
tlK'se will he separated by a line of demarcation. This line will commence 
from Tont rKviM^ue on the boundary of the Calvados department, will lead 
to Lignieres in the north-cast of the Mayenne department, passing between 
Hriou/.e and Frommentel ; touching the Mayenne department at Ligniere*>, 
it will follow the boundary which divides this department from those of the 
Orne and tlie Sarthc, as far as the north of Morannes and will then be 
carrieil on to the point where the departments C6te d'Or, Ni^rre and Yonne 
meet together, on the east of Qoar^ les Tombes, — so that the depart- 
ments Sarthe, Indre et Loire, Loire et Cher, Loiret and Yonne remain in 
|io-i!ie!%>ion of the (tcrmans. From this point, the direction of the line is 



reserved for an iigreement, which will take plftce wh«i the co n tmet i t for- 
ties have been informed m to the preeent position of opemtioM in tte d»- 
partment« C6te d'Or, Donbe and Jnra. 

The department! Nord and Pas de Calais, the fortimM Oivel nad 
Langres with a radios of 10 kilometres (abont 6V4 English ■illea)t and dM 
peninsula of Harre as far as the line Etretat — St. Bomaittt will not be 
occupied on the German side. Both parties carrying on the war, aad tlMir 
outi)08t8 on both sides, are to keep at a distance of, at least, 10 UlonMtras 
from the line of demarcation. 

Each of the two armies resenres to itself, the right of naintalBinc Hi 
authority in the territory it occupies, and of employing sneh mcaat aa dM 
commanders jndge necessary for this end. 

The armistice applies equally to the na?al powers of both emiatri«t 
and here the meridian of Dunkirk will form as the line of ilSMiiTHlnn 
The French fleet will keep to the west of it, and the German mcn-of^rar 
now in the western waters, will withdraw to the east of it as aoon aa Ihaj 
have been appriaed thereof. The captures that may be made allw dM 
conclusion of the armistice and before its notification will be raatowd, aa 
well as the prisoners made in the intenral named. 

The operations upon the territory of the departments Donbe, Jnm aad 
Cute d'Or as well as the siege of Belfoi^ will be continued, Indepeadwrty 
of the armiitice , until such time as the still reserved settlement of Ike de- 
marcation line , in the departments named , shall have been supplementarily 
agreed upon. 

Article 2. 

The object of the armistice concluded in this manner, is to allow the 
government of the National Defence to call together a freely elected assembly 
who will have to decide the question as to whether the war is to be con- 
tinued, or upon what conditions peace shall be concluded. 

The assembly will meet in the town of Bordeaux. 

The commanders (}f the (ierman Annies will render every assistance to 
the elections uiid meeting of the deputies. 

Article 3. 

All the outer forts round Paris , with their war material will be de- 
livered up to the German Army, by the French military authorities. The 
commonalties and the houses outside and between the forts, may be occupied 
by the German troop;* up to a line fixed by the military i*ommiasioners. 
The ground between this line and the enceinte of the city of Paris naay 
not be set foot upon by armed men of either side. 


The form and mode of Hurrender of the forts, and the line mentioned 
will form the subject of an additional protocol to the present convention. 

Article 4. 

During the period of the armistice the German anny will not enter 
the city of Paris. 

Article 5. 

The enceinte will be disarmed , and the carriages of the guns will be 
brought into the forts, appointed by a German commission. 

Article 6. 

The garrison (Army of the Line, Gardes Mobiles and Marine troops) 
of the fortH and city will be prisoners of war, with the exception of a 
division of 12,000 men , which the military authorities retain in Paris for 
duty in the interior. 

The troops who arc prisoners of war, lay down their arms, and these 
are collected and delivered up at appointed places, according to the custo- 
mary arrangements by commissioners. The troops remain in the city, the 
enceinte of which they are not allowed to pass daring the armistice. The 
French authorities must use vigilance, that each individual of the army and 
(iarde Mobile remains consigned to the interior of the city. 

The officers of the troops , who are prisoners of war, will be specified 
in a list, which will be delivered to the German authorities. 

At the expiration of the armistice , all the military , belonging to the 
army consigned to Paris, mast present themselves as prisoners of war to 
the (jennan army, in case peace is not previously concluded. 

The officers, who are prisoners of war, retain their arms. 

Article 7. 

The (jarde Nationale retains its arms, and is entrusted with the protection 
of Paris and the maintenance of order. This equally applies to the Qen- 
darnierie and troops employed in a similar manner to them in the mnnicipal 
»er\ice, as the Republican Guard, Donaniers and Pompiers; this category 
amounts, altogether to only 3500 men. All the corps of the Franc-tireurs 
will be diitbandiMl by command of the French government. 


Abticlb 8. 

ImmedUtdy after the ratification of the present conditUmtv and yreviow 
to the occniMUioii of the forts, the Commander in Chief of the Armaa 
armies will facilitate the task of the commissioners, who will he ant by the 
French goTemment both into the departments and to foreifa coaatrieai 
to make arrangements for the re-proTisioning of Paris, and lo Mmg «p the 
HtoreH destined for the city. 

Abticle 9. 

After the surrender of the forts , and the disarmament of the encelBH 
and of the garrison, in accordance with Articles 6 and 6, the re-proflsioBiaf 
of Paris will proceed unimpeded, by the railways and water eommnniealkms. 

Stores destined for this re-provisioning, are not to be taken ont of the 
districts occupied by the German troops, and the French gOTemmcat Mods 
itself to procure them outside the line of demarcation which nirrowida the 
German armies, unless the commander of the latter grants permlsaion. 

Article 10. 

Kvery-one who wishes to leave Paris, must be provided with a regularly 
drawn-up permit) by the military authorities, which is subjected to the 
vise of the German out-posts. These permits and vises will be forwarded 
as of rightf to tlie candidates of the Provincial Deputation and the deputies 
uf the National Assemblv. 

The persons provided with the permissions mentioned are only allowed 
to pass out between G o'clock a. ni. and 6 o'clock p. m. 

Article 11. 

Thr citv of Vans pavs a rontriliution of 200 million franrs. The 
puMiu'iit must hi' iiuidf before tlu' tiftrt'nth dav of the uniii.stire. The mode 
of paynient \vill be fixed by a mixed French and (lernian eommissiun. 

Article 12. 

During the armistice, nothing of public value may be removed, which 
might serve a:< a pledge to cover the contributions. 


Article 13. 

During the armistice, the importation of arms, ammnnitton and material 
for their fabrication, is forbidden. 

Article 14. 

The exchange of all prisoners of vrar made, on the side of the French, 
hi nee the commencement of the war, will be proceeded with without delay. 
For this object the French authorities will, as soon as possible, deliver 
.Npeeial lists of the German prisoners of war to the German military authori- 
ties at Amiens, Le Mans, Orldans and Vcsoul. The German prisoners of 
war will be set at liberty as near the frontier as possible. The German 
authorities will, on the other hand, give up to the French authorities, in 
the same manner and as soon as possible, an equal number of French 
prisoners of war, of corresponding rank. 

The exchange refers also to prisoners in civil positions, such as the 
captains of German merchant vessels and French civilians interned in 

Article 15. 

A postal service for unclosed letters between Paris and the departments, 
will he regulated through the head-quarters in Versailles. 

* in rutiHeation of the present convention , it is provided with the signa- 
tures and i»ealh of the undersigned. 

Versailles, the 28th of January* 1871. 

Birauurek. FaTrt. 

The tenor of the protocol appended to the convention, men- 
tioned in article 3 of the convention, is as foUowg: 

Addition to the convention of the 2Sth of January 1871. 

Article I. 

Boundary line before Paris. — On the French side the boandary line 
will he formed by the cincture wall of the city. On the German side (y. 
map I. of Paris) : 

1 1 f 'pan the south front , the line runs from the Heine to the northern 
point of the island of St. Germain, along the conduit of Isty, then between 
the cincture wall and Forts Issy , Vanvrcs, Montroage, Bio^tre and Ivry, 
keeping at a distance of about 600 metres from the fronts of the forta, np 
to the spot where the road from Paris separates towards Port4k-r Anglais 
and Alfort. 


2) Upon tke mut frmUt from the Um mentioned point, the line 
the junction of the Mnrne and Seine, then pasiei nkmf the weelt 
northern bonndariee of the Tillage of Charenton, to as to irndk the gale 
of Fontcnay jut above the Place de rObelisqne. From tUf It raaa la m 
northerly direction^ to 600 metres weat of Fort Rosny, and to dM «nith of 
Forts Noiay and Romainville, to the spot where the Pantin road itrlkea the 
Ourcq canal. 

The garrison of the ch&tean of Vincennes consists of OM company 
of 200 men, and will not be relieved during the armistiee. 

3) Up<m ike north front ^ it continues to a point 500 metree aoath- 
west of Fort Anbenrillers , then running by the sonthem border of the 
village of Anbenrillers and along the St. Denis canal, crosses the latter 
500 metres to the sonth of its bend, and remains, eqni-distant to the aoatt 
of the canal bridge running in a straight line, as far as the Seine. 

4) Upon the weit fronts it continues, from the spot where the indlentil' 
line reaches the Seine, upon the left bank up the river as far as the eondnlt 
of Issy. 

Small deviations from this boundary line are permitted to the Gtrman 
troops, in so far as they should be necessary in the position of the on t p o st s, 
for the security of the army. 

Article 2. 

Padsaj^e through the boundary line. — Persons who have been granted 
permi^sion to pasti the German out-posts, may do so only by the following 
roadri : the roads to Calais, Lille, Metx, Strasburg (gate of Fontenay), Basle, 
Antibcs, Toulou^e, and road 189 and lastly by the bridges over the Seine, 
including the one at Sevres, the reconstruction of which is permitted. 

Articlk 3. 

Surrender of the forts and earth- works. — This surrender will take 
place on tho 29th of Januury. conmirnciiii; Ht tO oVltx'k u. m. and in the 
following; iiuiniier: 

The French trriopN will withdraw from the forts and neutral ground ; 
in eaeh fort will remain, merely, the Commandnnt, the Superintendent of 
l-.nj;ineers and Artillery, and the jjate-keepiT. 

A> >oon as a fort ha> heen evacuated, a French >tatf officer will come 
to the (i<>rman out-po>t>, in order to give any explanations that may be 
dc>ire4l ahout the fort, mm well a!> to >how the way leading to it. Afler 
taking pu^^e^.si<>n of each single fort, and after the ne<'essary explanations 
have been given, the fortre» cummantiant, the superintendents of Kngineers 
and Artillery, with the gate-keeper will repair to Paris to the garrison of 
the fort.x. 

Article 4. 

Surrender of arnui and war material. — The rifles, field gant, coloars 
and all the war material will be given up to the German authoritioi» within 
fourteen days, reckoning from the ratification of the present agreement, 
and will be brought together in Sovran, through the instrumentality of the 
French authorities. An inventory of the arms and war material, will be 
handed over, by the French authorities to the German authorities, before 
the 4th of February. 

The carriages of the cannon upon the ramparts must likewise be re- 
moved before the above named time. 

On the 15th of February, moreover, the Convention on the 
surrender of Belfort and the continuation of the line of demar- 
cation, succeeded the Convention of the 28th of January in the 
following terms: 

Article 1. 

The fortress of Belfort will be given up to the commandant of the 
besieging army, with the war material which belongs to the place. 

The garribon of Belfort will leave the place with the honours of war, 
and retain their arms, their means of transport, and the war material be- 
longing to the troops, as well as the military archives. The commandants 
of Belfort and of the besieging army, will place them>elyes in communi- 
cation rei»pecting the execution of the above t»tipulationc , as well as con- 
cerning detailn which have not been foreseen, and in regard to the direction 
and road> by which the garrison of Belfort will join the French army on 
the other side of the line of demarcation. 

Article. 2. 

The German prisoners in Belfort will be released. 

Article 3. 

The line of demarcation, fixed as far as the point where the three 
departments of Yonne, Nievre and Cote d'Or come in contact, will be 
continued along the southern boundary of the department of the CAte d*Or 
to the points where the railroad , which runs from Nevert by Anton and 
Cha^ny to Chalons-sur-SaAoe, crosses the frontier of the department named. 
This railroad remains outside the German occupation, so that the line of 


demarcation, which if drawn at the distance of one kilometre from the 
mil road, reachet the aoathern boundary of the C6te d'Or department to te 
<'Ast of Chagny and follows the boundary which divides the Satee tl Loire 
d(>i)artmpnt from the departments of the Cute d'Or and Jnra. After folioiHnf 
the road from Lonhras to Loos le Sanlnier it will leave the department 
houndary upon the hdght of the village of Malleret, from w h en ce It will 
run on 80 as to intersect the railroad from Lons le Sanlnier to Bonrg at 
a (iiiiUnce of eleven kilometres to the sonth of Lons le Sanlnier, whilst 
from there it la directed by the bridges of the Ain npon the Clairranx road, 
whence it will follow the northern boandary of the arrondissement of St. 
Claude as far as the Swiss frontier. 

Article 4. 

A radius of ten kilometres will be kept, for the nse of the garriaoBy 
rouiifl the fortress of Besan^on. The fortifled place, Anxonne, will he snr- 
roundeil by three kilometres of neutral territory, in which there will be free' 
circulation npon the railroad, leading from Dijon to Gray and Dftla, fbr 
the military trains and those of the administration. The commandaati of 
the *troop8 on both sides, will regulate the re-provisioning of the two 
fortresses and the forts which arc in possession of the French troops, ia tfM 
departinents of the Doubs and Jura, as well as the boundaries of the radii 
of tlu'AC forts, each of which will have three kilometres. The circulation by 
the railroad and country roads, which pUbs throuj^h these radii, will be free. 

Article 5. 

The three depurtments, Jura, Douhs and Cote d'Or, will now be included 
ill thi* Hnnihtice, ratified on the :2Hth of January, and the whole of the 
stipulutious made in the convention of the 28th of January with respect to the 
duration of the nrniistic(> as well n> to the other conditions, will apply to 


Versailles^ tin* lotli of Fehrunrv tS71. 

Joloi Favre. ▼. Bismarek. 

Tin* coiKiitions of X\w mnvonticm were earried nut without 

Th«» (iorman Army Direction in conHequence attaincKl such 
MU aUKpiciouH military situation, tliat a continuation of the war, on 
the part of France, could indeed n«» hmger be attempted. 

it irt true tliat there were still French armies in existence. 


At the coiicluftion of tlie convt^ntion General Clianzy ought to have 
had 120,000 men, General Faidherhe 60,000 and Genera! Loysel 
at Havre 80,000 men, whilst there should have heen 250,000 men 
in the different camps of instructitui. These forces, however, 
existed only on paper. Of troops fit for battle , F>ance probably 
possessed only about 50,(MK), and these were demoralized. On 
the German side, on the otiier hand, thei*e were 800,000 (ierman 
soldiers extending from the French - Swiss frontier as far as the 
southern corner of Touraine , and up to the Atlantic ocean , in 
possession of nearly all the fortresses and important positions of 
northern and midland France, and also, by the occupation of the 
forts of Paris, commanding, in fact, the capital itself. 

Tlie whole number of French prisoners provided for in Ger- 
man dejjots and places of internment, now amounted to ll,Hfi(» 
ofticers and 371,881 men, added to which all the soldiers of the 
army of Paris were prisoners of war, with the exception o( the 
(iarde N:Ui«malc in the city itself, so that the number of the 
prisoners of war almost reached the strength of the German armies. 
The resumption of hostilities must have appeared impossible even 
to the most extravagant members of the French Government. 

The nav.-il warfare had been devoid of any important encounter, 
bein^ eontined solely to the injury of commerce, and remained 
quite without any consequence, wiiicli, at tlie conclusion of peace, 
could liave \\eighe<l in favour of France. 

Seldom perhaps has a state been so completely overthrown, 
and it> n\ilitary power so crushed to its last members, as France 
was now cMst down and shattered , by the mistaken and criminal 
continuation (d* this war, which ^as begun so thoroughly un|>oliti- 
callv and most wantonlv. 

Thus then, the armistice became the introduction to peace. 

The National Assemblv which met in Bordeaux on the 12th of 
February pronounced for peace, and on the 2<Uh of February 1871, 
after the armistice had been twice prolonged, the preliminarieM 
o/ prarr wero concluded at Versailles^ which was followed by the 
definitive vonchmon of peace ^ at Frankfort ^ on the lOth of 
Ma If 1S71. 

Catonder of the C«nipaipn, 

SaiBMtfy \T in clironologicAl 

i«I; law. 

It. The JiMwa Cm gndit br the tra stKrmmoni fni ifao ««r U Mwr- 
tionod ^afe IB). Th* boopa hi c »nigi u( Chklona. an^l diructt- 
mCDti dtaimra raady for mr an i ruled kgajnit the Germati frontiiT 
(P. U). Tha KiBf «l PmmI« < r> ibi- luobiluatiun ot lii* urar 
(P. l»). 

IC. MobUlMliM or Am BKTMiu aa4 Bad<;ii armiro. Tbn r>»r 
» n a c i rtWi bf MMJMMtt for doMXixiration (I*- ID). 

17. MoUUntiM «r *• Wwrtmbcfs Am^. 

It. France declare* war agunil Pniada U'. ■&) 
lt-30. SkinnUhe* on the frontier (P. 49). 

t. The King takes the chief command in Hajence (P. M). Tht Kmftmt 
Napoleon aitaeki Saarbrlieken (P. bO). 

4. AbwuIi of (he poiition of Weiuenhnrg occnpied hj Doujr^ DMriM 
by the III. German arm; (P. 6:\). 

t. Battle of Woerth in which the French right wing ander eoaaHal «t 
Marsbkl Mac Mahoa ii beaten b; the Crown Prince of PtmhIb — 
Bailie of Saarbriicken (height of Speichem) wherv tbe Fraaik lift 
wing, Froaiard'i Corpi ii beaten bj the leading Iroopa of Iba I. ■iHfi 
and detachment* of tbe 111. Army Corpi. The French Arm; eOMMMMi 
it* retreat (P. M-84). 

7, Pari! ii declared in a suie of liege Decree for the GaH* HohU* 
and Garde Natioiiale (P. 85). 

7-14. Advance of the German I. and U- armie* to Meu, and of the ID. Aimj 
to Nancj- (P. 85). 

8. Baden oavalr; arriie before Straibnrg (P. 87). 
0. LiiUelHlein occupied (P. 86). 

10. Lii-htenberg occupied (P. 86). 

12. Marshal Baiainc receive the chief command of the Ann; of U«ti (P. tfc). 

U. The King in Hemv, Prince Frederick Charles in Pont^-MooiMn (P. M>. 

14. Bombardment of Pfaliborg br the VI. Corp* (P. 341). Itlllll «t 
Courcclles in which the retiring French Armj is held fast bj At L 
Army on the right bank of (he Moselle (P. eS-98^. TTiiiUMlaw 
againU TonI (P. 90). General von Werder, ComMMdwl Mbtt 
.Strashurg (P- 89). Napoleon leaves Meu (F. M). 

15. Mantal capiiulaie> (!'. 90). 



IG. Battle of Vionvillc. The III. Army Corps, fp'adoallj reinforced stops 
Baxainc's departure to Verdun (F. 99-117). 

18. Battle of Gravelotte. The I. and II. Armies, under the command of 
tho King, force Bazaine to retire upon Metz (F. 118-142). Kehl is set 
on fire by cannon from Strasburg (F. 229). 

19. The 111. Army begins the passage across the Meuse (F. 143). 

21. Mac Mahon*s Army leaves Chftlons for Rheims (P. 148). 

22. The IV. Army (newly formed) commences the advance against Cha- 
lons (P. 144). 

23. Unsuccessful attack upon Verdun by the IV. Army (P. 144). Mac 
Mahon moves off from Rheims (P. 150). 

24. Mac Mahon in Rethel (P. 150). The bombardment of Strasburg be- 
Kins (P. 280). 

26. The 111. Army takes Vitry le Franyais (P. 151). In the night, the 
German Armies receive orders to wheel to the right (P. 151). 

27. Mac Mahon in Chene-populeux (P. 150). Fight of Busancy (P. 151). 

28. Mac Mahon in Stonne (P. 152). 

29. Fight at Nouart (P. 154). In the night, the first parallel before Stras- 
burg is opened (P. 232). 

30. Kngagement at Beaumont (P. 155). 

31. The surrounding advance by the (iermans against Sedan (P. 158). 
Bazaine's sortie against Prince Frederick Charles's Army , Battle of 
Noissevillc which last« till midday on the 1st of September (P. 204-218). 


1. Battle of Sedan. The French armv is thrown back into the fortress, 
and inelohcd all round by the III. and IV. armies (P. 165-173). 

2. Capitulation of Sedan (P. 175). 

5. The royal head-quarters in Rheims (P. 283). 
9. Laon oceiipied. The citadel is blown up (P. 284). 
12. The (;rand Uuke of Me<klenburg invests Toul (P. 250). 

14. The royal head-quarter* in Chateau-Thierry (P. 283). 

15. The royal head-<)uarters in Meaux (P. 28.H). 

19. Ki;;ht at I'etit-Bieestre. The V. and II. Bavarian corps repulse General 

Vinoy's sortie (P. 286). 

Completion of the investment of Paris (P. 284). Commencement of 

negotiations between the Chancellor and J. Favre. Royal head-quarters 

in Ferrieres (P. 270 and 289). 
23. Capituhition of Toul (P. 251). 

(V>nil)at at Villejuif to the south of Paris, sortie against the VI. Corps 

(IV -iHiO. 
28. (apitulation of Strasburg (P. 236). 
30. (ienernl Vinoy's sortie against the VI. Corps (P. 289). 

2. Hazuine's sortie against Kummer*H Division (P. 222). 

4. Colonrl \«Mi Alvensleben beats the French troops at the wood of St. 
Ililaire and oerupies Kpemon (P. 291). Prince Albert of Prassia re- 
connoitres from Toury towards Orleans and notes the French Loire 
Army (P, 291). 

5. (if neral von Degenfeld's fight at Raon TKupe (P. 369). Fight of the 5th 
('a\alry Brigade at Pacy to the west of Paris (P. 290). 

7. (leneral von derTann marches off* from Paris towards the south (P. 292). 

Ha/aine's sortie against Kuromer's Division (P. 2^2). 
9. (ian»h« tia> arrival in Tours (P. 292). 


9. InTestment of Neu-Breiiach (P. S40). 
tl. General ▼on der Tann occnpies Orl^tna (P. SS5). 
Mm Commencement of the bombardment of Soiiwons (P. 161). 

Ueneral von Werder in Kpinal (P. 870). 
UU General Vinov*i» sortie a^^ainst Clamart, Chatillon, «ad Bagnewt 

(P. 198). 

St. Cloud in iict on lire by the cannonade of the French (P. 114). 
15. Capitulation of SoiMons (P. 262). 
19. ne;;inning of the bombardment of SchletUtadt (P. 189). 

Cumbat round Chatcaudun (P. 825). 
20« General von Werder in Ve«oal (P. 870). 
'.'I. Sortie againtt the V. Army Corpa (P. 194). 
"it. Fight on the Oignon, at £tux and Cuwey. General von Werder beali 

the French sonth-eafltern army (P. 871). 
*i4. Capitulation of the fortreM of Schlettttadt (P. 189). 

General von Werder at Gray (P. 871). 

27. Cflpitnlation of Metx (P. 296). 

28. The French take the village of Le Bonrget to the north of, Parle 
(P. 296). 

M), The 2nd Garde-Infantry Division re-uke Le Bourget (P. 196). 

Thiers negotiates in Versailles (P. 297). 
:U« General von Werder occnpies Dijon (P. 874). 


2* Beginning of the bombardment of Neu-BreiMch and Fort ICortier 
(P. 140). 

8. Tho investment of Bolfort bcRnn (P. 381). 

(>• 'Vho arnn>ti('o ii(*;:otirtiioiis are broken otV (P. 208). 
7. Fort Mortier caiiitulato (P. 241). 

(iriicral von Maiiti-nflVl niarclu's from Met/. (P. H52). 
S. Capinilatidu of Vt?nliin (P. 254). 

(ii'iuTal \un dor Tann rvai"nati.'?i <>rlean^ (P. 327). 

9. I'ir^ht at ('onlniier> hotwcm (icneral von der Tann and General 
.rAuivIh- ill' PaIa»^mo^ (P. A'll). 

10, Niii-nrrisnrli ca|iitn1atc3 (P. 211). 

11, Thr (iran«l Dukr ol Mockli'iihurj^-Scliworin tnke^ tlic command again«t 
.i'Aunllr .IV MM). 

X^u Tin* (irantl I)uk<* innn'lu'. to the west (P. H31). 

17. Fiu'lit of thr ITih Divisiou at Drenx (i*. XM). 

|H, Fi::lit ot" thr -J'inil l)i\i-ion at Chateaunoul* (P. .S.'Ui. 

21. 'Ill'- '2'2w\ l)i\i-io!i o.-.u|.ir- I.n Loupr ^1*. .H.'ll ). 
( \«)n M.niti'iitlrl in'i'iiiiii-. Ilaiu (1*. .'ir>.*l). 

22. lln' tirautl Duk.' No;^'rnt lo Kotmu (1* 332). 
I'lii- iMiiuh.irilnMUt lit" Tlii'inx ilh' hr;;uii (P. 2I<»). 

23. < innplilinii nt till' iin ratlin nt nt" lU-Ifort \^\*. 3s3'. 

24. M;itit«Milil'> ail\:«Mii«| -unul tii;hts at (^iieMiel and Me/.ieres (P. 858). 
Thioiixillr capitiihiti-^ 1'. *Jir»). 

lUr (iiand Dukr ii:i«!i.^ Lji Firtr Bernnrd v^P. 332). 

Fi;;lit* of ihf \. .\ini} ('oi|)'» :i::aiii>t th*- ri^lit uin;^ of the French 

L'»ir<' .Vrni\ at Ladon, Mai/.i«n'>, and Hoi* eoinmun ^P. 334). 

24». < :i|ntuhiiiori di [.a Vcrf \V. 2.'>,'> . 

27. Hatth- nt Aini«ns. ( \on .Maiitrnflid lieatsliciieral Farrc (P. 858). 

2«1. Ihf l'ari«ian> (Mrnii\ Mont A\ioii [V. 3«M);. 

l-'.n:;ii'^t>iiirnt at Itcauiii' La Utdandr; the X. Army ('or|>!i re|iulso the 
.itta.k of th.- Fi'-M.|i l-^th and 2«>th Corps ^P. 33i')>. 


General von Manteuifel occupieM Amiens (P. 356). 
29* Sortie bv the PariMians against the positions of the VI. Armv Corps 

(P. 301). 
30. (freat sortie by the Parisians against the sonth-east front (P. 301 f.). 

Brie and Chanipigny remain in possession of the French. 


1. The Parisians strengthen themselves at Brie and Champigny (P. 304). 
(ieneral von Manteuifel commences the march upon Kouen (P. 350). 

2, The Saxons and Wurtembergers , supported by the II. and VI. Army 
Corps fight round Brie and Champigny (P. 306). 

Beginning of the combat at Orleans between Prince Frederick Charhs 
and (ieneral d*Aurelle. Fight at Orgeres, Patav, Poupry, L<»igny 
(P. 337). 

3, The Parisians retire upon the right bank of the Marne (P. 307). 
Combats at Chevilly and Chilleurs near Orleans (P. 339). 

Thi- bombardment if Belfort begun (P. 383). 

4. Combats at Cercottes and Gidv. Ketreat of the French in two >>e> 
panile bodies (P. 340). 

**• Prince Frederick Charles occupies Orleans (P. 340). 
G. (Ieneral von ManteufTel occupies Uouen (P. 357). 

8. Kngagement at Beaugencv. The Grand Duke beats General Chan/.v 
(P. 341). 

9, The Grand Duke occupies Bouvalet and Cernay (P. 342). 
Occupation of Dieppe by one of ManteufTel's detachments (P. 357). 

10. General Chanzy is fon*ed to retreat upon Vendome (P. 342). 

12. Pfalzburg capitulates (P. 244). 

The bombardment of Montmedy begun (P. 247). 

13. Prince Frederick Charles's march against Vendome (P. 342). 
Montmedy capitulates (i*. 247). 

15. Kngagement on the Loir between Prince Frederick Charles and Ge- 
neral Chancy (P. 342). 

16. Prince Frederick Charles occupies Vendome (P. 343). 

18. Figlii at Nuits. The Baden Division beats the French under Cremer 
(P. 37M). 

19. Prince Frederick Charles taikes up a position of observation at Orleans 
(P. 313). 

21. Sortie b\ the Parisians against the (iarde-C-orj)* and the Saxons (P. 309). 
23. liattle on the Ilallue. (ieneral von Manteu^el beats (ieneral Faidherbr 
(P. :tr)9). 

27. ('oniinencement of the artillery attack upon Paris. Bombardment of 
Mom Avron (P. 310). 

(.'onibats at Montoire and La Chartre in the neighbourhood of Ven- 
d.Muc (P. 341) 

28. Coiiiliut at Longpre (Northern Army) (P. 301). 

29. <)<-cupHiion of Mont Avron by the Saxons (P. 311). 

30. C<Mnhat at Souch«-jt (Northern Army) (P. 361). 

31. Combat of the 20th Division at vJndome (P. .344). 

The castle Kobert le Diable in Normandy in storminl (P. 362). 

January 1M71. 

2. Mezicres capitulates (P. 248). 

The bombardment of Peronne begun (P. 256). 
2-3. i'ombats at Bapaame. Faidherbe** attacks repulsed by General %on 
Guben (P. 362). 


Jannary. ' 

4. General Ton Bentheim tcattert the French troopa npon tfic lall baak 
of the Seine near Bonen (P. 864). 

5. The tonthem attack upon Paris begun. Bomhardment of (he soothcn 
forte (P. 818). 

Rocroy taken by a coap de main (P. S4Q). 
The adrance upon Le Mans begun (P. 844). 
G-13. Combate against General Chansy, which end with his complete defeat, 
and the occupation of Le Mans (P. 845). 

8. The bombardment of the city of Paris begun (P. 816). 

9. Engagement at Villersexel. General Ton Werder stops BonrbaU'b 
march by a flank attack (P. 887). 

Capitulation of P^onne (P. 866). 
10. Sortie by the Parisians agidnst Clamart (P. 817). 

18. Sortie by the Parisians against Meudon and Clamart as well aa against 
Le Bourget (P. 317). 

14. The camp of Conlie near Le Mans is found forsaken (P. 850). 
16-17. Battle of Belfort. Bourbaki's repeated attacks npon Qminl voa 

Warder's position on the Lisaine are beaten back (P. 888). 
1G« The bombardment of Longwy begun (P. 848). 

19. Great sortie by the Parisians against Versailles (P. 817). 
General von Hartmann occupies Tours (P. 861). 

Battle of St. Quentin. General too Gdben beate General FaMherte 

(P. 364). 
31. The bombardment of St. Denis begun (P. 819). 
28* Commencement of the armistice-negotiations (P. 880). 
36. Longwy capitulates (P. 848). 
36-87. At 12 o'clock at ni};ht riring at Paris ceases (P. .S80). 

38. Coneluttion of the convention of Versailles, which includes the capl* 
tulation of Parid (P. 321). 

39. Fi)^lits at Sombacourt and ChafTois. Manteufl'el beat8 the advanced troops 
of the French eastern army (P. 398). 

30. Fight at Frasne. The French eastern army is forced still nearer to 
the Swiss frontier (P. 398). 

31. General von Munteuflcl occupies Ste. Marie. Fight at Vanx (P. 899). 


1« Fi^Iit at Pontarlicr with the eastern arniv retreating into Switaerland 
(P. 399). 
16. Fall of Belfort (P. 400). 



AbliMf surprine of 291. 

Achiet, ti^'bt at 862. 

AHmtI, Crown l*rincc, v. Saxony. 

Albert, Prince of Pmtwia, v. Loire 

Army 20 1. 
AIvfnMh'ben I, General von, v. Sedan 

and Parin. 
Alvensiebcn 11, General von, v. Vion- 

villo, Gravelotte, Invehtmcnt of 

Mc'U, Loire Armv. 
AnianvilliTd, v. Gravelottc 138. 
Aniient), battle of 36H. 
Anouia, tii;ht at 370. 
ArniiKtice, conclusion of 320. Tenorof 

it, V. convention of Vernaille* 401- 
Artcnay, !i>;ht at 33H. 
Aubi;'nv, v. NoiN»eviile 2'>9. 
AtircUc (Ic l'aladinei», General d\ v. 

Loire Army. Iliii advance a^^ainst 

Orleans :i2r>. IMan for a march 

upon Parin 333. 
Auxonnc, march opon 375. 
Avron, Mont 310. 


Ka);ncux, Hortie fi^ht at 293. 

Hapaume, combata at 362. 

Har icDac. head-quaiten of the King, 

23rd of Au)^a«t 146. 
Bavillicrs, v. Helfort 383. 
Kazaine , Marshal, takes the com- 

maud 92, conduct after Vionville 

118, during Noisaeville 220, comp. 

McU 197. 
Uaxeillcii, combat round, r. Sedan 167. 
Hazochca, ti^'ht at 338. 
Beauc<»uri, v. Ilallne 368. 
Hcautc*'n(->, en^^afcement at 341. 
Beaumont, engagement at 166. 

BeaunelaRolande, engagement at 336. 
Belfort, fortress 83, Inrentment of 

381, BatUe of 388, Fall of 400. 
Bcllegarde, Fight at 386. 
Bellevue, interview at 176. 
Bentheim, General von, v. Courcelled 

and northern army. 
Besan^on, v. southern army 368, 370, 

386, 396. 
Bessoncourt, sortie at 383. 
B^thoncourt, tight at 390. 
Beyer, (leneral von, ▼. Strasburg 

87, Southern army 374. 
Bicvre, sortie tight at 286. 
Bismarck, interview with Napoleon 

174, negotiations with Favre 270, 

289 and 320. 
Bitsch, fortress 86. 
Blois 341. 

Bois commun, tight at 334. 
Bois de la Cusse, v. Gravelotte 131. 
BoisdesGeniveaux, v. Gravelotte 132. 
Bombardment of Paris 271, 312, of 

Strasburg 228. 
Boncourt, v. Nuits 379. 
Bonneuil, sortie fight at 804. 
Borny, v. Courcelles 92 (the French 

call the battle of Courcelles, the 

battle of Borny.) 
Bose, General Ton, v. Woerth. 
BonUy, Aght at 326. 
Bourbaki, t. Vionville, northern ar- 
my 362, south-eastern army 386. 
Bourg, sortie Aght at 287. 
Bourges, pursuit after 343. 
Bourget, Le 296. 
Bouvalet, Aght at 842. 
Brandenburg, count, ▼. Vionville 109. 
Breisach, Neu- 240. 
Breteuil, encounter at 862. 
Brevannes, sortie Aght at 802. 
Briare, pursuit to 848. 


. VIOB- 

Tille, Ldre Aimj. 
BuMncj, ombT fli^ ■! IM, 161. 
BnuQiel, Bgkt M SM. 
Baienval, Mftla agalaH 117. 


Cunbrielt, QflBarkI, v. Mntb-eMttn 

urn; S70. 
Canps, for ths iiubvctiaa of tb« 

French andw 8S8. 
Caorobart, lUnhal, t. ^odtIII*, 

Noii«e*llU »8. 
Ckrignan 168. 

Cutrei, T. St. Qawlin 886. 
Cercoitea, flght at MO. 
Ceraay, fight at 841. 
ChsiToi*, f^ht u 8H. 
Ch&loni, army of 61, 146. 
Ohampenoia, t. Grsnlotte 186. 
ChampigDir 804, 800. 
ChAntreone, r. OmmIoim 181. 
Chartre* SW, 816. 
Chaieandnn, dtiBmetfn of 886. 
Chatt-anneDf, taklag of 881. 
Chateau -Thierr; , head-qnanen of 

the Kintf SS3. . 
ChatillDa, nortic Hgbt at 89S. 
Cbatilloi)-i>ur-S«iDe ST7, 893. 
Cheherv IGl. 
Cheoebier, fight at 391. 
Chfne-popnlcDX 160. 
Chevillv, gorUe %■■' ■> S89 (Parii.) 
Ch»illv, Hght at SS9. (Orlcani.) 
Chillcun. liglit at 389. 
Choiiv-le-ltoi. sortietighl at 8H9, 301. 
CUmart, turtie Hght at 893, 317. 


t 3fl2. 


•)•>. (Tb.' 

buttle of (', 

tbv cni^icciiii-iil at Culoiiiln-i' 

N'lisM'vilk 2IIH.) 
('(lulic, ramji of .Ifid. 
Curbiu. v.Aimi-n<>mllbillii.>:i.-.H 
Tourci-Urii, battlE nf '.i^ f. 
t'lmlniii-f*. nii.'ai;inu-iit ..f H27. 
CniiK-r. V M>uih-<'n~tti»iinii\ 3 
Croix n.'«r Urlle .1(t7. 

mtlun of war U 
L mtAl. Grnvral <ai> SSf. 
I i«ht,fMi, V n.ion.UU 844- 
Inappc, i.«r:u|.ftii«ft uf SftT. 
D^, a'-ciipaiion of »7I. 
DirfdOB, «r the Vnatb Lolic Amrl 

840. ■ 

DoneMiy, y. Sii.lati |M. 
Dm 17, Abel. OMianl, t. Waaa 

'' 1- 
Doi t7, t'fllix, Qmctnl H3, 147- 
DonM 89u. 
D lej, -i.rii- fichi St 309. 

Dnux, iii:i.i ai aai. 

S«da* and fart*. 


I sffli 

• Wo«nb W. 
Epcnon »ci.-iipir»t 391. 
Kpiui-ki-St. Ornta 3| 
•n«r ii'>|i«<.Diiit ii 3 
Epinal t>i:rii].lnl H'O. 
Erival, fi-l.i «i My. 
Kini, Hgbt at 371. 

«idi Bb- 

f tfa« Kiag 


F^dhcrbe, General, t. 

Faillv, Gtneni it, 

Woerth 8!. 
Katre. General 362. 
Favre, Julee, 

march 870, 8)19, 3S0. 
I'*nay. iij-ht at 379. 

■iH;i, 38K. 
Klanvillc, V. NoiMcWIle 811, 811. 
KUrii-iiv, KKbt at, r. Vioiirilk 108. 
Kliiin';. v. .Spiian Ititi. 
Furbui-h, rrtrpBt upiin 76. 
Krahiir. liuhi at 391- 
Fcancs-linur* I'.IO. 
Fruiiaccky , (ieiKfal *on , ani*al M 

(iraveloite 130, liuht KMind Brtt 

and L'haiupiicny 307. 
FraxDc. H^-lit at 39)}. 
Frvi'livni'ourt, t. Hallae 869. 
FrniDab, r. Sedan IH. 



Frederick Charles, Prince of PrnMia, 
V. Vionville, Gravelotte, Noiwe- 
villc, MeU, Loire Army 

Frosthweilcr, v. Woerth 69. 

KrcKssftrd, (icneral, attack upon Saar- 
hriicken *2n<l of Augnnt 60, engage- 
ment at Suarbriicken 6th of Augnst 
71, retreat 77, v. Vionville, Noiwe- 


(iamlietta 1«4, 327, v. Loire array. 

Trocliu'h opinion of him 269. 
(fiirrhc8, sortie against 317. 
(;Hrac Mobile 85, 189. 
(iarde Nationale 85, 190. 
Ciaribaldi, v. South-eastern army 376, 

Gftiuhy, V. St. Quentin 365. 
(jcisber;; at Wcissenburg 56. 
(HiilcllrH, H;;hl at 354. 
(HT.HWfiU'r, >kirmish at 49. 
(ii<l>, ti-ht at 340. 
(iien, purnuil to 341. 
(fivoniic, V. Sedan 166. 
(fliimcr, (i<neral von, v. South-eastern 

army 37H. 
(iobrn, (iiiieral von, v. Saarhriicken, 

Uoucii, HapHUHie, St. Quentin. 
(Jiirsdorf, v. Wocrth 67. 
(iravclottc, bHttle of 118-142. 
(iray, .Marrh upon 372. 
(iunbtctt, V. Woerth 64. 


llAbonvillr, v. (Jravelolte 133. 
llA^cnau, r<'<<)nnais*an<*e of 50. 
Halluc, buttle on the 359. 
Ham, <Mru|^ti<m of 353; re-uken 

l)y iIh" French 358. 
Hartmaiin, Baron von, General, v. 

\V«M>>cnbur;: , Woerth , Sedan, 

Paris. • 

Hartmann , Lieutenant general , v. 

Mnz, Loire Army. 
Hcricourt, ti;:ht at 390, 
Herny, ca>tlc , royal head-quarter^ 


lily, V Sedan, battle of 169. 
Interview of the King of Prussia with 

Napoleon 176, Napoleon's with 

Misniarck 174, Bismarck's with 

Favrc 270, 289. 320. 


.larn), v. (iravclolte , battle of. 

Javy, V. St. Quentin 365. 
J ussy, v. Gravelotte 189. 


Kaninchenberg 77. 

Kehl, bombardment of the town 229. 

Kirchbach, General von, v. Woerth, 

Sedan, Paris. 
King William of Prussia joins the 

army 52. interview with Napoleon 

176. Also V. MeU, Sedan, 

Kraau-Koschlau , General von, v. 

Vionville 113, Loire Army. 
Kummer, General von, v. Noisscvillc, 

Metr (Rummer's Division) 222. 


La Chartre, tight at 344. 
La Croix, tight at 349. 
Ladmirault, General, v. Vionville, 

Ladon, tight at 335. 
La Fere, fortress 254. 
La Fcrte Bernard 332, v. Le Mans. 
Lagny, station of 313. 
La Loupe, captnre of 331. 
Lamotterouge, v. Mottcrouge. 
Langrcs, fortitie«l place 377. 
Laon, explosion of the citadel of 284. 
Leboeuf, Marshal 92, v. Vionville, 

LeBourget, sortie HghU at 289, 294. 
Legions 190. 

Le Groiilay, sortie tight at 309. 
Lehmann, detachment of Colonel 107. 
Le Mann, advance upon 344, Crisis 
at :U8 351. 

Lch Krrucs, tight at 381. 

L'Hay, sortie fight at 301. 

Lichtenberg, fortified place 86. 

Li^aine, battle on the, v. Belfort 

Loigny, fight at 338. 

Loir, fights on the 342, 344 

Loire armies, operations of the 32S 

Longeau, combat at 377. 

Longpre, v. Hallue 361. 

Longwy, fortress 248. 

Lorraine, table land of HO. 

Liiuelstcin, fortified place 86. 

Ljnkcr, detachment of Colonel, v. 
Vionville 107. 


MurMnhon, Marshal, t. WeiMenbnrg, 
Woerth, Sedan. 

Mairv UM). 

Mni/itTOH, fi^ht at 836. 

Mahiixourt, ▼. Gravdottc 1H2, 137. 

MHliimison, sortie Hght at 204. 

^Ian^tc•il^ General von, ▼. Vionville, 
Gravclottc, Mets, Loire Army. 

Maute8, rcconnaittsancc to 290. 

MantouftVl , Baron von. General, v. 
Noihsovillc, Northern army, South- 
«*rii unuy. 

Marut, ti^ht at 387. 

Marine Infantry 18U. 

Marbnl, fortress 90. 

Mars-la-Tour, v. Vionville. 

Mranx, head-quarters of the King 283. 

MorkltMihur^-Schwerin, Grand Duke 
of H.'iO, V. Toul, SoiHSons, Loire Ar- 
my. William, Uuke of, v. Vion- 
vilks Laon, Paris. 

.Mercy Ic llnut, v. Noisseville 217. 

M( -^ly, sortie fi);ht at 304. 

Mctz, army of 81, fortress 141, Battles 
of, V. C'oan*elleM, Vionrille, Grave- 
lotto , Iint'NtnuMit of 190—224, 
C*a{titul<itioii of 2tHi. 

McihIoii, hri;;hts of 2HI , hortio fi;;ht 

MtMiii;:, li;;ht at 341. 

Mouse army, «»r IV. army, Formation 
of 11. 'i, Sodan, Tar is. 

Mo/.ii'ro.s ir,*2, 248. 

Moz-irrr.-. , ti;:ht at (^Northorii army) 


.Mohili/.atioii of the army of tho North 

(mtiiihii ( 'oitfoiloration ir>. 
Moltkf. (it'iicral, von, intorvii'w with 

Na{M>1(Min 174. 
Montaiih.-ni. Cousin, v. Palikao. 
M«»nt .\\r«ni 30(K 

MontJuIianl, tiu'lit at, v. Hilfnrt :i'.M> 
Montni4*i|\, r..itr»'H> -Jli'., -JXH. I.'rj. 
.M«»uinn'"»I_\ , -Mftif h;;ht at 'M)\. 
Monti>ii«', ti::ht at .'111. 
Mnntov. \. Noi-^.sovjllf "ill. 
Moiitrt-t'iiit , «<i»ttii' a;;ain>t 317. I-.»i- 

tr«'iif-)irii( lit of *jr>l . 
M'Mil Vali'iitn . hattio of, v. .■»oiiir 

on I'.MIi .laiiiiai) 317 
Mn^i'lli' liiH', .^tralf^iinl iiii|>oriani-o 

of thr ?•.♦, 01, ll'l 
Motl«'r(iii;:«>, tM'nrrnl t\v la, advnnor 

from < >r!<-an.^ 3J3. 

Moulin de la Tcmr M7. 
Monxon 167. 


Nancy 00. 

Napoleon III. emperor, nrigiia the 

command to Bazaine 99. Hb owv 

reasons for the failure of bb plftiia 

17, V. Metz, Sedan. 
Ncu-Breisach and Fort Mortier 340. 
Nenville St. Amand, t. St. Qnentiii 

Nied, river 90. 
No};ont-le-Kotroa SSS. 
Noisseville, battle of 204. 
Noisy-le-Grand , sortie fight at 809, 

Northern army, operations of the S51. 
Nonart, fight at 164. 
Nuits, light at 378. 


Oignon, tight on the 371. 

Onlor of battle, of the French amy 
22; of the German •rmj W^i 
of the French 19th Corpa 140; 

of the army of Paris 978. 
nr;;ani/.ation.s, (iamhetta's 327. 
(»r;;iros, H;rht at .338. 
Orloan^, Ntrato;;ioal importance 394. 

<>r<'iipAtion by Gonoral v. d. Tana 

3*J5. Kvai'iiation of 326. Rattle 

of 337. 
Ormo.<i, ti^ht at 325. 


Tary, ll^ht at 29<». 

Talikao, count, plan for the relief 

of Motii 117. lli» relations with 

Troihu 2r>H. 
l*an;;o, H;;ht at, v. ConrooUes battle 

of [r.\. 
raii^no ri'#vi.Mpi»', v, Kr Man!« 347,349. 
r.iii-., iiii|Mirtini«'c of flio city IKIi, 

•jr>7 . -J'V.*. Kiirtiriiations of 2.%9. 

.\iin> of lM»3, •27H. Kr)nipnimt 

<»f 27»». rro\i>ionin;: of 274. 

si.Ljo of 'j:*?- 321. lnve>tnii'ni 

..f -JHl. 
Tatax. tiu'ht at 338. 
roH.'.' ton. 
rorrhr*, Ilantos and Rasnos, Outerforu 

of Brlfort 4'K>. 
I'oronno, fortros.n , roni|urMl of 9AA. 

Importanoo for the Northern 



rrtit-HiccMrv. »ortic fight at 287. 
ri'fit-Mau;iiv, rt;:hl at 381. 
rtnl/hiir;;, fnrtro.i Sl». Iiivotiiiciit ol' 

*J(*J. ('•iiii{iirM (if 211. 
ri«''.His.l*ii|iut, Mirtii' li;:!it at 2^7 . 
r(iiit-a-Miiii»iiii , iiii|MirtHiitr nl' tlri" 

pnint fur tli(.' Mo»rllc-liiii> and for- 

iriHs .if Mil/. "lO, KHL 
l''iiitarlitr, tiu'lit ut 3t*ll. 
i'l'iii N«>vll'-^« ^- llalliK' :f:tii. 
rniiill_\ . pa^M;;** ui-rii» tin- MriiM- 

at l."»*^. 
riiiiiu'.. tijlit at :*:"»^. 
rii^iiiii-i H of Will, Fm-ih li. llii ir iiiiiii- 

hii .11 tlif I ii<i of ls7n M'*, ai ili«' 

•Mill ill till uai lo'.l. 

<^»ui-.'inl. flight .It :i."i;i. 


ICaii)li<>i ulli 1^. Iij^lil at .iTd. 

Ka«.f» ri,ta|.« , fijhi at MWi. 

!«• jiiiii-rii < "h- Mart ht |.*».*k. 

Iliilii . NajKiIiMri'' a'ljiiiaiil-^ 


liiiit \i-, fi;:lM at M.i 

!{• |iiili|ii an L:i>\r|iinii III ut thi (ih 

III" Si |i|iiiiIm I l'^7<* It' • fiara« • 

tiri-li- I"* -J. 
Ik<'l)ii-1 . Ma<- NlalMMi'^ III a<l •|iial ti I - 

L'ltli .'I Ad-N-t l.'lH. 

Ill . ■•Ill r)|i . li.inli <it , V tiia\rliittt 


liliiiMi-. M.r NlahfMi- ht :ii|-'(M.irt« i « 

■J!»^ 111 Aii_'ii,t |K7«» I r.i. Iliatl- 

ijiiart'i- lit till Kni;^' tif rrii^siH 

.■.t»- ^. !•( -J.-ii 
lihi iiiJ-al'i ii'. • avail V tin i-tinn, * . .Shhi- 

l'» li It'll. Vm'Ih illi . 
!il|i iii'it nil. Nkiriiii^li at ;iM. 
K"l"if !• Ihatijt , -.ttirinin^ til thf 

'a-l!« .iii-J. 
Kf-i.... I iiM<|iii -t 'if 111' |tii irt «H *J 1^1 
\\'" n , \ • iiaw i<i|ti . I'altit III 

!;<•_•. I.i*. I.iT. 
Koin-ii . man h ••! <ii-iitiiil \iin Man- 

tt iitli I ii|iiiii :i.'tii. 
l\i'Mj' iii"ni. ti::hi ill :\f^\ . 
K"/t I iriijji ... \. ( iravt-ifittt' IHO. 


SaaiJifip k« !i . iitini k in»"ii. hy Kr»»:«- 
'MiiIh t»ii|i* on ihr "Jnil (if Aii;;ii8i 

fiO. Kn^^a^rmpnt at 71. The 

Miinllcr fi;:htA in Jiih A9, 
Saxon V, ('rtmii Prinrt' AUicrt (if. v. 

(■nivcltittc, Sciliiii, I*arih. 
Sa\(»iifi «XII. Anuy L'(ir|»>*, \. iiravt*- 

Iiitic Si-tliin, l'uri>. 
Sa|ii;;nii->. i'i*nihatat, v. Haiiauiiif3R2. 
Sr«-aux, Miftii' ri;;lil at 2Hl*i. 
Srli)(tt>tu(it, rt>iii|iii-«t of tlic l(irirr.'*.'« 

^«l •' ■ 

Si-linK-liii;:, ri'MT\(' tli\i'.iiin. v. Vill«*r- 

HiM 1 :is7 ami Hclftiri :t.SS. 
iS'lircikliii;!*'!! ."h>. 
Sr)iMarl/kti|i|irii, (iviicral vmi, v. Violl- 

\illf Il>'». 
SfliW(jki-n. >kiriiii.'>hi'> at .'it). 
Siilaii . Iiattl<* tif lii.'i. Cajiitulation 

of, ti'iior 17.'!. 
Siillr. riviT. ini|iorl:inii> of iM», 2111. 
Si'r\i:;ii_v, tii'lit ruiintl . %■. Nui>M'\ilUr 

211. " 
StM'«>tiii>, fijiii{iir.<.t 'if the fortrc» 2.M . 
Siiinl>M'i'iirt. ti;rlit at :i'.tH. 
Stint'liiv, \. ILilhu- :»iil. 
Sonthrrn .irm\ . (n-rman. v. Man- 

It iitf( I'}* ai rival 'A*X\. 
Soiiili-i ;i.«tiTn ii\iH\ . ii|M-ralit»n.^ of 

.iti7 1«M» 
>|i«ith(rii . .oiorniin:; of the ^l••il;ht^ 

M .\il. \ill:t::i'of. v. (tiavilottf \:\:\. 
>l t'alai-. \. !««■ MaiM. attvaiicc 

IIIM'II i{(7. 

St ( 'i'ii rii' . tii:lii at. V. !«(' Muii:«, 

liattlf i.f :t|'.» 
St <'l>iiii|, ili'»(rni-(ion of the (tiatcaii 

• tf 2!tl. 
St. t'tirifiilli-. ti.;lit at. v. Lv Man>, 

battli- of :i|<i. 
St |)i-iii«. lionihMitlinciil of lU'.t 
St. Ililain-. li^'lit al 2'.* I 
SI. Ilnnihi-it, \. <iia\r|ott«' I'M* 
S|i- Mnrifaii\ ('lifn<-<*. foniliHt round, 

\ draw lotti'. liatllf nf I'M. 
Si. M> nilit>iild . mart li td the III. 

ariiiv I'V l.'il. 

St. rriiat la Mofita::iif, «-oiiihat riHind, 
V. (ira^dtilK. hattic of l.'l.'i |:<H 

St. Qncniin. halllc of *\*i\ 

St Siinc rK;:!!-.!', li^lil at :t7:i 

Staino, softii* HkIiI al :V»t) 

Sii-inni(*t/ , itcniTnl vitn. v. Saar 
liriifkcn, <'oiiri-#dl«'*. <travrl"tlr. 

Stnlfrl. ('oloncl, (-niniiiandant of Mont 
Avmn 311. 

SMnnf, hvail-([a>rtcrr of Mac Mihon 

Struhurit, atrnlciiical iin[i<irU>ice of 
the furtretw 79. t'ortiHi-ationa iif 
m. Ultge of S85. Opinions 
on homhftrdnienl of ^19. C>iiilu- 
Ulion of 3H6. 

NtUlpnagrl, QcDcral von, r. VioDviUc, 

SwiMcrland, cntt; uf the French into 


Tinn, Genpral ron Her, acnt W Or- 

\4itu !i91. Uccupation uf (Jrlenn* 

bj 325. 
Thtneu 363. 

Tbikia, aortic tl^'ht sL S89. 
Thiers, nogotiatinni with 3!)T. 
ThioDTilk , Fonijucat of the fortrcH 

of 3U. 
Tout, imiiotlBaue of, and <^on<|Uc*l 
, of SGO. 
Tunn, Ihc t^vcminvnt delegation 

ItkTi Ike loirn 348. Thu lOlh Diti- 

sino r«*chea Toiim !)44. Goneml 

von llartmann nceuiiius Tuura 351. 
Toarj ^91, SSi. 
Trrackow't I.andwohr Uiviaon, invcal- 

mcDi of Bclfon »8I. 
Tra(<hu, General, lu Comnandvr in 

Chief and gorernor of P>ri> SRA. 
TQinpIing, (Seneral von, v. Sedan. 


Uhrlch, Ocncrat, conmianilBni of 

Strubnrg, 87, v. Siege of Ktras- 

Vancoutcun . bead - iiuailcr* of the 

Crown I'rincc :lUt— :!ard of An- 

KDal IttTO Ut- 
Tkox, V. OKvcloite tSO, 13B. 
VMi(,'H|{bt ai (touth-eaatern arm]') 


VeadAme, ntaivh of Prince Kreilrtick 
Charlo a|><ni 943. KnuaK'^iui't at, 
(. I>oir, Combala un ihe 34a. 

Vvrdnn , io rrforuwe Oi BaMuiir b 
arm; 07, IIA. Aiuvk of th<' IV. 
arnj npon 144. UoDiguwl ofSfiS. 

VlTBtTlil*, V. UravclalU; IV9. 

Vcnsillea, head-quartcTB of the Kint 
during the «iei;c of Paris iSi, 
• Coiirenlioa of 4U1. 

VeM>n1, head-rjuarter* of General eon 
Warder, SOth and 8l«i of October 
IfiTO, 37'). Coneentration of the 
XIV. Arm/ Curpa near 3S«. 

Vienon, General d'Aurrile'a poiition 
al 3Se. Parauit of the Frenrh 
Loire Anny Io 341. 

Villa-Coublsy, sieg;e park of Pnrii at 

V. Nni 



Villejiiif, Borlie liKht* al 387, 209. 
Villenenve-Kt.-Gcor];ci , paiva^;! of 

the V. Armj Corps acnwi ibe Seine 

at !8&. 
Villers-Brctunneux, flghtat, t. Amiena 

Viller»excl, Hyht ai 3H7. 
Villicri, aonie Hghta ai 3<>3. 301. 
'Vinoy, General, v. Pari> S83, 311. 
Vionvillc, battle of (Man la Tonr) 

99- 117. 
Vitr; le Franfais, oecnpied by Ibe 

HI. Array 151. 
Vulklingen, Hkirmiuh al bO. 
Vusgea, siraU'girnI iinportanreof (be 

57, T9, 3Sll. ConflicU in the 3«ft. 
Voigla-lUleU, General von, v. VW- 

•illc, Loire anuy 331. 
Voneif, cODijucat of the village by 

diimouated huuan 154. 


Wedeirs briK»li'. v. Vioovill* IW. 
Wehrden, akirmish at 49. 
WciMenhurg, lit;hi at 64 — 67, 
Werder, General >od , v. Stfaabart 

and South-eastern army. 
WimpfTcn, General. >. Hedaa, bMlla 

of 1«8, 174. 
Wotrth, baUlu of 58 7t. 
WnrtcmberK. PHnee Aatnintun of, t 

Gravelutw I3i, Seilan, PaHn 
Wnrtemberi;er« , v. Woerlh. Sedan, 

Pari*. Copibata round Hiie. Chaai- 

pigny and Vllliera .tU2-:iUA.